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ABSTRACT 
"Plato's theory of desire in the Symposium and the Republic" 
Maria Angelica Fierro 
One of the main purposes of the Symposium is to describe the best and truest 
expression of Eros/epcog (the god/Saijucou and at the same time the affective 
disposition): (f)iXocro<picx. Eros is an intermediary Scxijucov between our mortal 
condition and what is divine and immortal. As such he makes us spontaneously 
feel attracted to beauty and through our procreating in it helps us to attain in this 
life 'a sort of immmortality by leaving behind our productions and, together with 
it, a certain ownership of the good, which is universally desired. Most people only 
attain a second grade of vicarious immortality, either through biological 
procreation or, in the best case, through cultural procreation. However, those 
who are able to follow a philosophical way of life might be able to contemplate 
Beauty itself and by procreating in it produce authentic virtue, in this way 
attaining ownership of the good as far as is possible for a human being in this life. 
But at the same time, it is hinted that a more permanent, god-like, existence might 
be available for the philosopher after death. In the light of the Republic some 
issues which remain unclear in the Symposium find an articulate explanation: a) 
The tripartite theory of the soul explains why, although everybody desires the 
good, different individuals focus their love and desire in different ways (even in a 
destructive way as is the case of the tyrant or ofAlcibiades in the Symposium), b) 
The programme of earlier and higher education makes clear what the levels of the 
erotic ascent consist in. c) The nature of the Good helps us to understand the 
status of Beauty itself, d) The myth of Er describes what a 'god-like', post-
mortem existence for the philosopher would be like, while also simultaneously, 
allowing for a different sort of 'immortality', along the lines suggested by the 
Symposium. 
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G E N E R A L INTRODUCTION 
1. Subject. Limits: The purpose of this thesis is to develop an interpretation of 
Plato's theory of desire in the Symposium in the light of the Republic. I also show 
the parallelism between the Symposium and the Lysis regarding certain basic 
apects of Plato's theory of desire. The corpus of the thesis is limited to these 
works of Plato, although I am aware that other dialogues could have taken into 
consideration. In the 'Epilogue' I briefly suggest the projections of this 
interpretation in other dialogues such as the Phaedo and, especially, in the myth of 
the winged soul in the Phaedrus. 
2. Hermeneutic position: My interpretation presuposes a synchronic 
understanding of the dialogues insofar as I consider that some works give us clues 
to enlarge the understanding of others and vice versa. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that the same things are described in all of them exactly in the same form: 
different dialogues redescribe similar topics in a diverse way as the context and 
main focus vary from one to another. Moreover, the employment of a synchronic 
reading does not imply that I do not accept that Plato, like any other creative 
thinker, might have evolved and changed in his ideas. However, the establishment 
of a definitive chronology of his works seems to be unlikely. In addition to this, 
despite some modifications in his approaches, he seems to have consistently held 
some fundamental views about what reality, knowledge, human beings, the 
universe are in their essence. 
3. Secondary bibliography and main contributions of the thesis: Some 
scholars have already suggested ideas about Plato's theory of desire along the lines 
of the interpretation that I follow here. I acknowledge their contributions in the 
footnotes and hope that I have been able to add some new arguments to their 
suggestions. In general I will not develop discussions with authors from whom I 
16 
diverge. The reasons for my discrepancies with them will hopefully be clear from 
my argument. 
The main contributions I have made in the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
-An articulated understanding of the tripartite theory of the soul in the Republic is 
traced, especially in two respects: a) All cognitive functions are attributed to the 
XoyicJTiKOV so that the contradiction of adjudicating intellectual capacities to the 
lower, irrational parts of the soul1 is avoided, b) I try to show that the earlier 
education of the guardians consists in training the proper desire/s of each part of 
the soul. The training of the £Jli0'U|J.r|Ti,K6v is an important part of this 
process.lbls 
-1 have tried to prove that in the Symposium a god-like immortality after death for 
the philosopher is suggested along the lines of the description of that kind of 
immortality given in Book 10 of the Republic. At the same time this god-like 
existence can be understood in both dialogues, by reading each of them in the light 
of the other, as something achievable in this life, albeit in a lesser degree and less 
stable form. 
4. Greek text and translations: The Greek text is cited according to Burnet's 
edition. I follow Griffith's translation of the Republic (unless otherwise indicated), 
Rowe's translations of the Symposium and Lamb's translation of the Lysis. In the 
chapter on the Republic most of the time I give the Greek text and the English 
translation because I felt that it was necessary to render more inmediately visible 
the meaning of passages which are often long and complex. By contrast, in the 
chapter on the Symposium in general I have preferred simply to give the Greek 
1 See, for example, Penner (1971) and Moline (1978). 
l b i s Differently from Gill (1985), who considers that nothing is said about the education of the 
appetitive part in the Republic. 
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text (unless a passage is closely discussed as in the case of Symp. 212a2-7) as the 
citations are usually very short and to introduce the translation would only 
interrupt the flow of the argument. 
5. Importance and projections of Plato's theory of desire: Plato gave a 
description of desire such that for first time epax;, normally felt simply as an 
unavoidable but tyrannical force which governs those who fall in love, became a 
kind of force which configurates our whole life and perhaps a possible divine 
expression of what we are. The productiveness of this idea in Western culture has 
been perennial and enormous. Aristotle's conception of the Prime Mover2 is 
rooted in this conception of Platonic Love. Plato's idea of love is also one of the 
central concepts of the Platonic philosophy developed by the Neoplatonists. The 
consideration of Eros as one of the names of Gods in the Treatise on the Divine 
names by Pseudo-Dionysius is a result of these Neoplatonic remakings. Moreover, 
the Christian conception of love -CLyanry is, in a way, a reaction to this same 
Platonic conception of passion and love.3 Some contemporary theories, like 
Freud's, Marcuse's, Lacan's or Foucault's4 have also found inspiration from this 
idea of Platonic Eros. The influence of this conception of desire and love in 
literature has also been immeasurable from the mystic poetry of San Juan de la 
Cruz to Virginia Woolf (see Night and day). The cinema has also recreated the 
crucial human theme which Plato conceptualized through his theory of Eros as, for 
example, in The Wings of Desire by Wim Wenders, Visconti's Death in Venice, 
based on Thomas Mann's novel, or the whole output of Pedro Almodovar. This 
thesis is a modest attempt to interrogate once again the creator of this conception 
of the human being as constituted by his leading desire about the nature of Eros 
and his effects on our lives. 
2 See especially Metaphysics, Book A. 
3 See Nygren (1932-1939), vol. I, chapter 5 (esp. pp. 129-139). 
4 Foucault (1985); Marcuse (1956); Lacan (1999); Detel (1998); Le Brun (2002). For the 
relationship between Plato' theory of love and Freud's theory of love see Santas (1988). 
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abvr\ aoi, c5 <t>iXe " Epoo<;, 
ei? tmexepav 8vva|xiv on KaXXiaxn Ka\ dtpicxri 
SeSoiai xe Kod feK-tfeteiatat jcaA.vvcp6ia... 
PI., Phaedr. 257a3-4 
C H A P T E R I 
The theory of desire in Socrates's speech in the Symposium. 
The best praise of the truest epcoq or (j>iX,oao<j>ioc 
Abstract of argument of chapter 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present Plato's theory of desire in the 
Symposium, while identifying some assertions whose real significance -I claim-
needs to be filled out in the light of the Republic. 
My understanding presupposes that Plato's conception of kpcoq is essentially 
developed through the character of Socrates, firstly in the dialogue between 
Socrates and Agathon (199c3-200c9) and then in the speech that he attributes to 
Diotima (201dl-212a7). Socrates' contribution is a critical-philosophical answer 
to what has been stated in the five previous speeches since Socrates, in contrast 
with the other speakers, commits himself to uttering only the truth about Eros. 
Given that the 'mise en scene' is festive in atmosphere, he expounds only Eros' 
positive aspects, the potentially destructive aspects of Love being put aside and 
only dramatically suggested through the testimony given by the character of 
Alcibiades. 
According to the interpretation that I propose, the dialogue between Socrates and 
Agathon presents a description of the structure of Eros that is applicable to desire 
in general but is, however, focused on the description of erotic desire and 
especially, as it becomes clear later, of the intense desire for knowing the truth or 
(plXo<JO(j)ioc. In this first section there is a characterization of Eros 
-simultaneously Eros the god and erotic desire- as deficient of what he desires so 
that, being neither good nor beautiful, he desires the good and the beautiful. 
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Through this conversation Agathon, after being refuted, is left -along with the 
reader- bereft of false beliefs and so in an appropriate erotic state to start to 
(j)iXocro(f>£iv. Nevertheless, the eXeyxoQ is not only aporetic: at the same time it 
also provides positive assertions regarding what Eros is like, which overlap in 
many cases with statements about the object and subject of desire made in the 
Lysis. 
The assertions made in Socrates' dialogue with Agathon give a basis to the 
description developed in Diotima's/Socrates' speech concerning what Eros is like 
and what his works are. But in this new section the argument is progressively 
shifted so that Eros/ipcog is considered not just as erotic desire but as the intense 
desire that leads each one's life and fundamentally in the light of his/its highest 
possibility: to be a lover of the truth or wisdom. This is achieved through diverse 
devices in the construction of the argument. Thus: 
a) Through Socrates's use of Diotima's mask the speech about Eros is fictionally 
attributed to a woman wise in Tex epcoriKCX and other things, who has contact 
with the divine realm, in a way similar to the way that Eros -StxifiCQV and 
(piXocrocpog- has. 
b) Eros, being neither good nor bad nor beautiful nor ugly, is characterized as 
fieza^v through a comparison with dpOrj So^a and, especially, through his 
inclusion in the genus of the Saipoveg, so that he turns out to be piera^v not 
just as an 'intermediate' (i.e. something in between two states and/or combining 
opposing features of these two states) but also, and above all, an 'intermediary' 
that thanks to this hybrid nature links the human sphere and the gods' domain. 
c) In the myth of Eros' birth the previous developments -i.e. a) and b)- are brought 
together in order to portray Eros as (piXdcrofpog: his deficient condition in 
relation to what is good and beautiful makes him desire to look for truth and 
wisdom, which only belong fully to the gods. In this way, he becomes a medium 
between what is mortal and human and what is immortal and divine. 
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In Diotima's section on the works of Eros some rectifications and further 
developments of the assertions made at a), b) and c) occur: Eros/spcog becomes 
now the intense desire for the eternal possession of the good (in which happiness 
consists) that dominates our whole life and has as its specific erotic form the 
search for immortality through procreation in beauty in order to get as near as 
possible to ownership of the good. Attainable immortality is by procreation 
(Kara TO crcojua or Kara TJ]V y/vxrjv), given that love (in spite of his/its 
longing for being like the gods) is always limited and unstable, due to its deficient 
condition, and so the only way of enduring in our present existence and surviving 
after death is, in principle, by replacement or substitution. Why human beings, 
though all of them desire the good, look for immortality in different ways and 
consider different things as the good and focus of their epcog is left in the 
Symposium without explanation. 
In the erotic ascent the lover/philosopher's steps toward increasing beauty and 
perfection are only sketched. If the philosopher or lover of the truth arrives at a 
"sudden" vision of Beauty itself -the most visible aspect of the Good-, he comes, 
through wisdom, as far as possible for a human being, to the eternal possession of 
the good, the production of true virtue and, possibly, a god-like immortality after 
death, suggested at 212a5-7 but not described. This access to an eternal reality is, 
at least in our present existence, never permanent so that Eros/ipcoQ even under 
such extraordinary circumstances, is not annihilated by losing his/its deficient 
condition, although there is a certain preservation of the wisdom acquired as well 
as of its effects. 
Finally, in Alcibiades' speech a description of Eros-(j>iXdcro(j)og is offered 
through the portrait of Socrates as well as an illustration of what the production 
of true virtue by one who has contemplated Beauty itself (i.e. Socrates) would be 
like. In addition to this, Alcibiades' recounting of the episodes of his love-story 
with Socrates shows us that for a philosopher an erotic interpersonal relationship 
means, far from treating the beloved as an object, precisely to lead him to the 
21 
position of a subject of desire and, above all, to that of a lover of the truth, if 
possible. At the same time Alcibiades provides an example of a talented 
personality unable to direct his 'currents' of desire in the right way -i.e. 
incapable of restraining his appetites and love for honour so that they are not 
ruled by the practice of philosophy or reason's love for the truth. This proves that 
the beneficial effects of Eros described in Diotima 's speech -especially in relation 
to the philosopher but also regarding ordinary people who direct their kpcoq 
toward biological or cultural procreation- are the best but not the only possible 
ways in which desire can guide and channel a human life. 
The main questions which remain open and can be answered in the light of the 
Republic are: a) why, although all human beings desire the good, the erotic 
currents can be organized in each human being in different ways such that they 
are directed to diverse goals and even away from the real good; b) what the steps 
of the erotic ascent would more specifically refer to; c) what god-like immortality 
attainable by the philosopher after death would actually consist in. 
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1. Socrates' speech in the Symposium: a true and best report about Eros 5 
The Symposium is basically constructed as a report of some Ttepi TCDV epootiKCDV 
X,6yoi (see 172b2) pronounced on the occasion of Agathon's victory with his first 
tragedy (173a5-7). These speeches about Eros are narrated to a group of friends 
and, at the same time, to us, the readers, by Apollodorus, who has received the 
report from Aristodemus, one of those present at that famous party and a fanatic in 
relation to anything concerning Socrates (173bl-6). Their content can be briefly 
summarized as follows: Phaedrus makes a speech on the possibilities of moral 
improvement through an erotic relationship. Pausanias describes "terrestrial" 
heterosexual love in contrast to the "heavenly" homosexual love that brings virtue 
and intellectual progress. Eryximachus gives a medical and cosmic interpretation 
of Eros based on the attraction of opposite things. Aristophanes interprets passion 
as a search for a lost unity through sexual intercourse. Agathon praises the 
beautiful and young god Eros6 who presides over love affairs and poetry. After an 
eA,£YX°Q of Agathon, Socrates reports Diotima's speech on x a epcoxiKd, which 
culminates in a sketch of the erotic ascent to Beauty itself, i f this were to be 
possible for anybody. Finally, Alcibiades gives an encomium in which he 
confesses his frustrated passion for Socrates and offers an unforgettable portrait of 
Eros-the philosopher, through the description of his friend. 
Whatever value or meaning the five speeches previous to Socrates' may have in 
relation to the overall structure of the dialogue, it is reasonable to suppose that 
they are all liable to the criticism made by Socrates at the end of Agathon's 
speech, i.e. they imply a belief that the thing to do when making an eyKCDjiiov is: 
5 I follow Rowe's Symposium translation from now on. The lines of the passages are given 
according to Burnet's edition of the Greek text. 
6 In the Symposium and particularly in Socrates ' speech fepcoq refers to both: Eros the god and 
epco<; as erotic desire (see below 2.2.1. Eros as the god and erotic desire, pp. 29 ff.). Except 
when necessary to distinguish one or the other I will use just 'Eros'. 
23 
. . . T O foe, \ieyiGxa dvccxiGevoa TOO TcpdyM-axi K O C I &><; KdA.A,icxa, edv xe 
f j oftxccx; e^ovxa edv xe j i f ] - e i 5e xye-uSfj, ot>5ev dp' f|v Ttpdyiiot. 
(198d8-e2) 
In other words, Socrates' disagreement with what has been said in relation to Eros 
up to that point expresses Plato's general philosophical criticism of uncritical, 
often false opinions. Philosophy as represented by Socrates/Diotima means to 
show how things really are in contrast with sophists and other 'wise' men of the 
time who are not interested in searching for the truth but only give semblances of 
it . 7 
The acclaimed poet Agathon, who has just -so Socrates hyperbolically reflects-
been celebrated by thirty thousand Athenians (175e2-6) and, at that very moment, 
by a selected intellectual group of friends (198al-3; see also 174a6-7 and 194b6-
8) is, being an imitator of Gorgias (198cl-3), the most conspicuous example of 
this uncritical attitude of sophistry.8 In contrast, Socrates, being a philosopher or 
7 Nevertheless, this does not imply that a plain rejection of all the content of the speeches previous 
to Socrates'/Diotima's is here meant: as shown later (see. p. 66), the previous speeches, though not 
reporting the truth but being just "images of it", are part of the "Lesser Mysteries" as they are a 
first attempt to procreate in beauty in order to possess for ever the good universally desired. 
8On this point see Robin (1951), pp. xxx; Ixiv. Similarly Wippern (1965), p. 124. 
8 b , s Socrates's expertise in erotic matters would not be any different from his usual claim of not 
knowing anything except his own state of ignorance, as, according to Symp. 204a, Eros is above all 
((uXoc>o<t)ia, i.e. awareness of one's ignorance and so something between ignorance and 
knowledge. On this point see Waterfield (1994), p. 85 who also refers toLys. 218b. 
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lover of wisdom, is committed to only saying the truth about Eros (198dl, 199bl). 
His enthusiastic agreement to Eryximachus' proposal of giving speeches in praise 
of Eros has been motivated by his "not to knowing about anything except things 
erotic" (177d7-8; see also 193e4-5, 198dl-2; see also Lys. 204b8-c2)8bis. Thus, we 
can suppose that Socrates' capacity to give a true report about Eros is based in this 
expertise in xa epcoxiKd. 
Socrates' commitment to reporting the truth about Eros has been often been 
pointed out. However, it has been less noticed that he does not intend to say all 
kinds of true things about Eros but only to refer to Love's most beautiful aspects: 
eyob [lev yap \m' a^ekxepiaq9 cp|iT|v 8e1v xaX<r|0fj A.eyeiv nepi 
EK&OTOV xov eYKco[iia^o|j.evo'u, Kori xowo [Lev vn&p%eiv, kE, avxcov 5e 
Toincov xd KCXXXICTTCX EKXeyoiievovg cog evnpeTtecnaTa xiOkvav 
(198d3-8) 
It would be wrong to suppose that Plato's omission of Eros' negative aspects here 
means that he only recognizes his uplifting expressions and underestimates or 
ignores the fact that sometimes Love can also be so ruinous that, for example, it 
may mislead even the just man and lead him into injustice and self-destruction 
(Sophocles, Antigone 781-801). Insofar as a ruinous Eros is illustrated through the 
portrait of the lover of Socrates' first speech in the Phaedrus, the different kinds 
of unjust men of Republic 8 and 9, especially the sketch of the tyrant dominated 
by a devastating kpcoq and also here in the Symposium through the character of 
Alcibiades, it is clear that Plato was well aware of love's potentially destructive 
9 \m 6tpeXtepia<; is ironical: Socrates knows very well from the beginning that none of the 
speakers were interested in telling the truth as he is. 
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effects.10 The way in which this omission in Socrates' speech in the Symposium 
has to be understood seems to be the following: in the context of a celebration 
where a praise or 'eyK(£>[Liov is the proposal, Socrates considers it appropriate to 
say the truth about Eros but, at the same time, only what is best and most beautiful 
about it. So on this occasion Socrates concentrates on revealing the fact that our 
lives are dominated by passion or Eros and that this opens up to us the chance of 
being ruled by the best and most authentic form of passion: the love for the truth 
or (J>iA,oao(|)ia, i f we could be "appropriately led in T O , epcoxiKCt"; or, i f this is 
not possible, at least as a second best, to have the leading passion of our life as 
well orientated as possible (to biological procreation11 or, better, to cultural 
creativity). 
2. The dialogue between Socrates and Agathon (199c3-201c9): and 
desire for the truth; the structure of desire. 
Socrates's discourse about Eros is preceded by a refutation by Socrates of 
Agathon (199c3-201c9). Here I try to show that this eA,eyx°G h a s two aims: a) 
The interlocutor (and with him the reader) is left by it in a lacking state of mind 
similar to the lacking aspect of Eros (which is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of (|)iA,ocTO(|)£tv). b) Alongside the destruction of Agathon's views about 
In the Symposium the character of Alcibiades seems to be the one that carries the weight of 
representing a passionate individual whose fepcoi; has unfortunately been misdirected and will lead 
him to his self-destruction. 
1 1 An individual who focuses his/her epcoQ on biological procreation does not, of course, attain real 
virtue or even "images" of it. Nevertheless, when biologically procreating, his/her sexual appetites 
are at least orientated in a positive, productive way (from Plato's point of view), in contrast to the 
situation in which sex is merely recreational. In other words, sexual appetites orientated to 
biological procreation would be a first, humble sign of our desire for immortality and of 
procreation in beauty, and being in this sense good. 
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Eros, in this section of the Symposium, a positive exposition of the structure of 
Eros is also provided. 
2.1. Refutation: emptiness through release from false beliefs and the 
generation of desire for knowledge 
The dialogue between Socrates and Agathon at 199c3-201c9 fits into the structure 
of eA.£Y%°?12 of the so called aporetic dialogues, so that Agathon's thesis "Eros is 
beautiful" (195a7; 197cl-2) turns out to be refuted at the end of it. 
It has been pointed out that the bizarre and complex narrative structure of the 
Symposium as a whole corresponds with Plato's conception of desire, insofar as it 
involves an erotic effect on the reader, provoking both emptiness and longing 
-constitutive characteristics of Eros- with regard to the real meaning of the text.13 
A similar consideration can be applied to this eXeyxoc, of Agathon by Socrates. 
As wil l be clearly shown in the myth of Eros' birth, 1 4 emptiness -supplied by 
I l e v i a - and the skill of filling it -provided by ndpoc,- are the two essential 
aspects of Eros-(|)iA,6ao(t>o<;. When Agathon is refuted by Socrates, he is 'emptied' 
of his beliefs about Eros and so, having acquired at least one of the essential 
characteristics of Eros -his lacking condition-, is in a better position to 
(|)iXoao(j)eiv. 
This effect of Socratic refutation -the release from the holding of false beliefs- is 
described in other works, such as the Apology,15 which shows that such liberation 
is a condition of the awareness of one's self-ignorance that is a sort of wisdom 
1 2 See the description of the zXeyxoq in Vlastos (1983), 39. 
1 3 Halperin (1992). 
1 4 203bl-204b9. 
]SApol. 21c5-dl. 
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attainable for human beings. Similarly, at Theaet. 150b9-c3, getting-rid of mere 
appearances and wrong judgements is considered a necessary step along with the 
'delivery' of true opinions through midwifery. But in the Symposium there is 
something else: Plato seems here to bring to light the possible (but not necessary) 
erotic effect of the recognition of this emptiness (which is a condition for 
undertaking a philosophical way of life). In other words, he tries to teach Agathon 
what Eros is, both providing him with the basis of a conceptual understanding (see 
below 2.2.) and trying to generate in him with the eA.ey%OQ a state resembling one 
of the aspects of the new born Eros of the myth (it seems that the second of these -
the Ilopo^-like aspect- cannot be provided by anybody but depends upon each 
individual).1 7 Although Socrates tries to lead Agathon to this erotic/philosophical 
disposition, Agathon's claim of ignorance ( K I V 8 V V £ \ ) C 0 , 63 EcbicpaxEQ, o\)5ev 
eiSevai GOV T O T E eucov., 201bll-12) is just apparent. In fact at the end of the 
zkzyypc, he refuses to recognise his emptiness (eycb, <))dvai, GO Zooicpaxei;, 
aoi oi)K dv 8wcd|ar|v dvxiAeyeiv, akX ofrxcoc; e%exco cb<; av A,eyei<;, 
201c6-7) and does not show any desire to ())iX,oao(|)eiv.18 This fact makes us think 
that Socrates has failed in his attempt to awake in Agathon the desire for wisdom. 
However, it is probable that Plato hoped not to fail in leading his readers through 
this dramatic situation to the appropriate state for the emergence of an 
1 6 On the meaning of Socratic wisdom in the Apology see Stokes (1997), pp. 7-21; Irwin (1995), 
pp. 28-29; Woodruff (1992); Nozick (1995); Nuddler (1995); Gomez Lobo (1995). 
1 7 The erotic and active attitude of Ilevia emfiovAevoixra 5ia T/nv CtTtopiav raxiSiov 
noitjcraaBai E K XOV Tlbpov (203b7-8), which is reminiscent of Eros' description as 
EitifiovXbq at 203d4 and as a creative force in 206b7-8, contrasts with the passive description of 
riopoq as sleeping and drunk. This seems to suggest that desire and its resources originate out of 
emptiness. But how/why does the impulse of satisfying this emptiness emerge from it? Plato seems 
to state this as a matter of fact and only explains it in mythical terms. 
1 8 In fact Agathon seems to be a good illustration of the state of d|xa0ia (204a3-7). Although he 
does recognise that he was wrong in what he said about Eros (201bll-12), he understands nothing 
except that Socrates has refuted him and won the argument (201c6-7) and so he completely misses 
Socrates' point, that is, about true need to look for the truth about Eros. 
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erotic/philosophical attitude. In fact the substitution of Socrates for Agathon after 
the latter's refutation seems to be designed with this very protreptic intention: 
Socrates, who has described himself as an "expert" about toe epcotiKCt, presents 
himself in the past in an 'erotic' situation similar to Agathon's and refuted by 
Diotima his teacher in Eros.19 In this way Socrates' own example wil l provide 
what Agathon failed to provide, that is, the recognition of his emptiness -i.e. his 
ignorance about what Eros is- and the desire to look for the truth with his teacher's 
help.20 
2.2. 'Euporetic' eXeyxoc,: positive assertions on the structure of Eros/epcoq. 
The short kXeyxoc, by Socrates of Agathon does not have just the aim of refuting 
the young poet by leaving him in contradiction with some of his previous 
assertions and so, i f it were possible (which is not the case), ready to (|)iA.oao<|>eiv 
thanks to the recognition of his own ignorance. Similarly to what happens in the 
(so called) Socratic dialogues, there is a combination of the negative function of 
the eX,£YX°Q with an exposition of positive -though maybe not definitive-
conclusions,21 in this case concerning the structure of desire in general and of Eros 
in particular. 
''This may be one of the purposes of the fictionality of Diotima. On this point see below n. 51. 
2 0 Rowe (1998), p. 168. 
2 1 In the Euthyphro, for example, although there is no final answer about what the pious is, we do 
find some positive considerations, as for example that the pious is an eTSoq that makes all pious 
actions pious (5c9-d7; 6d9-e6) and that it is a notion independent of theology (9e-10e8). Also in 
the Laches we get at the end at least a provisional definition of ocvSpeva (on this point see also 
Guthrie (1975), p. 132): it is an erciCTTrpr| of the hopeful and fearful which is different from other 
particular xexvai and from irrational reactions towards attack and defence and is part of the 
ETUcnfiUT) of what is good and bad concerning bad, present and future things. Gomez Lobo 
(1989) goes further in relation to the Crito, the Apology and the Gorgias: he thinks that an 
axiomatic system of ethical principles is being developed. In Theaet. 150b6-c3 and Soph. 230b4-
d4 -two of the (so called) later dialogues- the 'eXeyyoc, is also valued as a precondition of the 
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Besides the destruction of wrong beliefs about Eros produced by the kXeyxoc,, a 
positive doctrine about Eros is simultaneously expounded. In fact in this section of 
the Symposium Plato gives a schematic and structural description of Eros, which 
settles the grounds for the succeeding exposition of the theory of Eros in 
Socrates/Diotima's speech. This account of desire's structure can be briefly 
expressed in the following terms: 
1. Eros is always Eros for something, i.e. it has an intentional or relational 
structure (199dl-199e8).22 
2. If Eros loves (epa) something it follows that it desires (e7ii9"U|j.ei) something 
(200al-4). 
3. Eros always desires what it desires only in case it lacks it (200a5-b3). 
4. Eros does not desire what it currently has but desires to have it and keep it in 
the future, i.e. it has an essentially prospective structure (200b4-200e6). 
5. Eros is for the beautiful (201a2-201b3) and the good (201cl-3). 
6. Eros is neither beautiful (201b4-201bl2) nor good (201c4-5). 
What 'Eros' refers to in these statements and what these statements mean is 
treated in the following sections. 
2.2.1. epcoQ as Eros the god and as erotic desire 
The statements agreed by Socrates and Agathon formally refer to Eros the god. 
This is the subject proposed at the beginning23 and all the speakers except 
development of a learning process. In a 'middle' dialogue like Republic, at 538c6-539d7 there is a 
criticism of the eXeyxo? though focused not on the method itself but on the use of it by the 
questioner with someone who is too young or by the young who superficially imitate the 
questioner. For all these reasons I think that Plato always valued the eXey^oc, (differently Reeve 
(1992), who thinks that in his maturity Plato criticizes the destructive effects of Socrates' 
eXeyxo?). 
2 2 See ch. 20 of Friedlander (1969), p. 24. 
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Alcibiades (including Socrates) respect this at least from a formal point of view. 
In the specific case of the passage 199c-201c Agathon has just been speaking 
about Eros the god and Socrates, taking profit from some of Agathon's previous 
assumptions25 and agreeing some new ones with him, leads Agathon towards a 
truer analysis of Eros the god. 
However, the assumptions agreed here in relation to Eros the god refer also to the 
structure of Eros as erotic desire. 
First of all, a typical Socratic question in the form "What is x?", in relation to 
Eros, is posed at the beginning of the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon: 
...Tcpcoxov [LEV Seoi ocbxov em8eii;ai buoioq xiq eaxiv b" Epcoi;, ftcxepov 
8e xd epya ainou (199c4-5)23b i s 
Similarly at the starting point of her exposition Diotima says that the thing to do 
is: 
2 3 177a5-e6. 
2 3 b l sHere at 199c4-5 Socrates, who is mainly referring to Agathon's proprosal at 195a, poses his 
question in an inaccurate way. According to the Meno, a proper formulation of the typical Socratic 
question would require previous knowledge of what X is (xi fecti) before determining what X is 
like (brcbicx; xiq fecm). He makes a more accurate formulation of the question when he starts his 
own speech under the mask of Diotima saying at 201d8-e2 that it is necessary to both explain xiq 
fccmv d " Epooq iced Jtdloq xiq. 
2 41 say "at least from a formal point of view" since it seems that most of them begin by speaking 
about the god but then mainly speak about the relation epaatfiq- epc6|ievo<; (Phaedrus-
Pausanias-Aristophanes), or the epd)(aevo? (Agathon). 
2 5 Socrates agrees with some points made by Agathon in his speech: at 199c3-5 and 201d8-e2 he 
approves Agathon's methodological proposal at 195al-5; at 201a2-5 he picks up Agathon's 
assertion at 197b7-c3 that the object of Eros is the beautiful (cf. Bury (1932), p. lix; Rowe (1998), 
p. 171). 
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...8ieX,6elv obxov rcpcoxov, xiq ecxiv d * Epocx; K a i 710161; XIQ, ETteixa xd 
epya aincvu.(201d8-e2) 
This question could be understood, nevertheless, as only concerning Eros the god. 
The fact that it can also be construed as being about the essence of epcoq is clearly 
established through linguistic and metalinguistic remarks made by Socrates in 
199c-e. 
a) In this passage Socrates says that Agathon is being asked about Eros "as i f I 
were asking about that very thing 'father'" (199d4) or "about a brother or a sister" 
"that very thing that it is" (ocbxo XODG' OTtep eaxiv 199e3-4). The use of this 
latter expression means, as in other passages of Plato,26 that the question is about 
Eros/epcoQ in general. 
b) In addition to this, it is also said that this question about Eros must not be 
answered by reference to "a love for a mother" or "a love for a father" (199d2-4) -
i.e., as I take it, with examples; in other words the object of Eros must be 
considered from a general point view. 
c) Finally, the use of the indefinite pronoun in the question whether "Eros is love 
of anything or nothing (Jtoxepov eaxi XOIOWOQ oioc; xivog b " EpooQ epcoq, 
t) obSevog,)" (199dl-2) indicates again that epocx; has to be taken in a general 
sense.27 
2 6 See T O oaiov a lno (Euth. 5d2), aired T O KCXA ,6V (Hi. Ma. 289d2). OJiep eaxtv underlines, 
alongside ocirco, that the question is about essence (for a similar interpretation of this passage of 
the Symposium see Bury (1932), p. 90; Robin (1951) and Vicaire (1989), pp. 47-48 in his edition 
of the Symposium seem to indicate something similar by using capital letters in the expressions "to 
be Father/Mother of ) . For expressions similar to onep eaTiv see O T I eaxi T O K O C X O V (Hi. Ma. 
287d6), avxo b eaxiv E K O C C J T O V (Rep. 7.532a7), b eazi 8ea7tOTT|<; (Farm. 133d8). 
2 7 With respect to the importance of these points for clarifying the subject of the passage, see Robin 
(1951), pp. lxxiii-lxxvi. 
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Hence, in the dialogue of Socrates and Agathon and afterwards in Diotima's 
speech there are two levels of reference that work simultaneously: Eros the god 
and epcoq as erotic desire in general. Plato's interest is not to differentiate these 
levels but to lead the fictional characters and the reader from the uncritical 
eYKCD|j.i.a of the previous speakers about Eros towards the exposition of a theory 
of epax; 
2.2.2. Eros intentional/relational structure 
epcoQ like all desires is always "epoot; of something": 
- b " EpcoQ epco^  eativ oi)5ev6<; f] xivo<;; 
-raxvu \ikv ovv eaxiv. (199e6-7) 
This means that it has an intentional structure and is, then, always addressed to 
something.29 In other words, it is a relative term and, as such, cannot be 
understood independently of the relationship to its object.30 Thus, this description 
of erotic desire as a relationship between a subject and an object prepares the 
distinction between subject of desire (b epoav) and object of desire (b epco|J.£VO<;) 
clearly made later in Diotima's speech.31 
2 8 So I disagree with Reeve (1992), pp. 111-114 that Socrates is here arguing fallaciously and 
making an improper replacement of Agathon's anthropomorphic conception of love as a beautiful 
young god -as is is usually portrayed by Greek artists- by a sophisticated argument about Eros to 
demonstrate that he is neither beautiful nor good. Socrates picks up some of Agathon's assertions 
(see above n. 25) and introduces some new ones in order not to make an invalid argument but to 
lead Agathon (and us, the readers) from an uncritical conception of Eros to a coherent and 
systematic description of it. 
2 9 See ch. 20 of Friedlander (1969) pp. 23-24 and Wippern (1965), p. 125. 
3 0 Mignucci (1988). 
3 1204cl-6. 
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2.2.3. Erotic desire as a species of desire in general 
Another conclusion that can be got from the dialogue between Socrates and 
Agathon is that " i f Eros loves (epa) something it also desires (ejtiGuiiei) it". 
Thus, at 200a2-4: 
- ...Tcoxepov b" Epcoq E K E ' I V O V OV ecrxiv epcoQ, eTciG-ojiei ocuxo-u f) ov; 
- navv ye... 
And then at 200a5-7: 
-juoxepov e^cov ocbxo ov emOvpiei xe K C C I epa, eixot emOvjuei xe m i 
epa v\ OVK e^cov; 
- OVK e^tov, &><; xo eiKOQ... 
Differently from kniQv[Lioi, epcG£ normally refers to a more intense form of 
desire ("Double £7Ui9v|i'ia is epcoQ", Prodicus B7 DK) and also to a more 
specific form: sexual passion.32 However, these passages show that in this section 
Socrates uses in this section EniQx>\ieiv, epdv (see passage 200a5-7 above) and 
also (touX-eciGai (see, for example, eyco vyiaivcov f3ovXo/iai K a i 
v y i a i v e i v , K a i 7rAouxcov JSovAojuai K a i nXovxeiv, K a i emOvfico ai)xcov 
xotixoov d e^co, 200c6-8) interchangeably. This is not because the three words 
mean the same (which they obviously do not) but because he is interested in the 
notion underlying all three -desire- and wants to apply some features of the genus 
desire (its relational structure, its deficient condition) to one of the species: erotic 
desire, which has as its standard expression sexual desire but is for Plato, above 
3 2 'This word ... usually means 'love' in the sense which that word bears in our expressions 'be in 
love (with)' ...and 'fall in love with...': that is; intense desire for a particular individual as sexual 
partner' Dover (1980), 1. 
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all, an intense passion that dominates one's life. Thus, some assertions in this 
section are about Eros or erotic desire but, at the same time, valid for desire in 
general and its other forms.3 3 It also paves the way for Diotima's assertion at 
205dl-8 where, although the reference keeps being epco£ -erotic desire- and not 
desire in general, £pco<; does not mean sexual desire but the passion that leads 
each one's life, especially the overall desire for the truth or (t>iXoao(})ia. 
2.2.4. Eros' lacking condition 
Eros does not have the object of desire to which it is addressed (that is why it 
desires it) and so always has a lacking condition: 
-Ttoxepov excov a m o ov kmQv\i£i xe K C C I epa, e i x a e7ii9v|iei xe K C X I 
epa, t| oi)K excov; 
- oi)K excov COQ xo e'iKOi; ye, (|)dvai. 
-aKOTcei df\...avxi xov eiKoxo? e i OCVOCYKTI OVXOX;, X O ETZIQV\JLOVV 
em8v|a.eiv ov evdekq eaxiv, r\ (ir) e7ci0i)|j.eiv, eav [ir\ ev8ee<; f j ; 
(200 a5-bl) 
This aspect of Eros, which wil l be reflected later in the IlEvia-like features of 
Eros in the myth, implies that there is no desire, no passion, i f there is not a 
deficient condition. In other words, desire is not possible in completeness, in 
which nothing is lacking. 
3 3 Bury (1932), pp. xxxvi-xxxvii, Wippern (1965), p. 125 and Dover (1980), pp. 2,134, 135,145 
think that in this passage there is an equation epcoi;- eTriSuuia. Differently Hyland (1968), passim 
thinks that this passage partially reflects a hierarchy of desires that Plato intends to settle: irrational 
desire (e7Ci8u(iia), more rational desires (fepcoc, and Po\)Xea9ai), the most rational desire 
(fyiXia). Cummins (1981), passim criticizes Hyland's arguments. On this point see also Halperin 
(1985). 
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2.2.5. Prospective structure of desire 
In 200b-d it is established that what we call desire for things that we possess in the 
present -such as strength, health, wealth, etc.- means, in fact, the desire for 
keeping these things in the future: 
aK07tei cuv, oxav xovxo Xkyyc,, 6xi eitiGunco xoov Tcapovxcov, ei aXXo 
xi X-eyeig r\ x65e, oxi Po\>)io|jm x a vt>v rcapovxa KOCI eic; xov erceixa 
X,p6vov Tiapeivai (200d3-6) 
This allows a consideration of Eros' lacking condition from a temporal point of 
view. While in the present there may be34 actual possession of certain things 
-either they are desired or not (eixe f3cri)A.ei eixe [ir\, 200d2-3)- the continued 
possession of these things in the future is still missing and so desired: 
- C / O K O W xouxo y'kaxiv eKeivcu epav, b OIJJUCO exo\.\iov a-bxcp eaxiv 
ovde e^ei, xo ei<; xov ejteixa %povov t a i n a e ivai ai>xcp acp^6|ieva 
K a i 7cap6vxa; (200d8-10) 
This prospective structure35 of Eros means that, even i f fulfilled in the present, it 
keeps being deficient and without total guarantee of satisfaction in the future. This 
gives an important foundation for one of the points developed later in Diotima's 
speech.36 Eros' permanent and necessary process of replacement, in order to get a 
vicarious immortality and so a partial satisfaction of the desire for an eternal 
possession of the good, and the elusiveness of his object are coherent with the 
reflection made at 200 b-d in relation to the limitation that the inscription in time 
I say "may be" because, if the present is an imaginary point between the past and future, as 
Parm. 152b4-e3 suggests, is a real possession of the object of desire possible, even in the present? 
3 5 Wippern (1965), p. 125 also refers to an eiq- xov- e7teixa- xpovov perspective of Eros. 
3 6 See below pp. 44 ff.. 
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imposes upon Eros' possession of his object of desire, which, even when 
possessed in the present, might still be absent, lacking and desired in the future: 
K a i oftxoq depot KOCI aXXoc, ndq b e7u6u|i.cov xo-o | ir | exoin-cru e7ci8v|iel 
K a i xov \ir\ raxpovxex;, K a i b |iT) K a i b \ir\ ecx iv abxos KOU O D 
EVSETIQ eax i , x o i a m ' d x x a eaxiv dov r| ejiiG-ujiia xe K a i epcoi; eaxiv; 
(200e2-5) 
2.2.6. The object of Eros: the beautiful and the good 
By picking up at 201a4-5 what Agathon has previously stated in his speech at 
197b4-5:37 
...xoi<; 8eoiq KocxeaKeixxaSri x d Tcpdyjiaxa 81' epcoxa KaXoov diaxpcov 
yap oi)K eiri epcoQ. 
Socrates makes Agathon concludes now that: 
...d " Epco<; K&Xkovc, dv evr) epox;, cCia%ovq 8e ol>... (201a9-10). 
Then, from the principle that what is good is also beautiful (201c4-5), the 
conclusion that the good is also the object of Eros is drawn. 
In this part of the argument beauty and goodness are just 'formal' objects of desire 
without specific reference.38 There is interest -at least at this point- neither in 
3 7 60ev 5r| Kai KaxeaK£ixxa9r| xcov Beciov xd Tcpdyuaxa " Epcoxoq kyyevo^ievov, 8f\kov 
oxi KCXXXOV)? - octa^ei yap OVK em epcoq - itpo xox> 5e, &cmep ev apxfi 
einov, noXXd Kai Seivd 9ebi<; eyiyvexo, d>q Xeyexai, Sid xr\v xr\q avdyKt|<; 
PaaiXeiav 
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making differences between the two concepts (actually it wi l l never be clear what 
the relationship between the good and the beautiful is) nor in establishing a new 
reference by saying, for example, what things are K(xA,d or d y a 0 d . Thus, the 
only thing asserted up to this point is that the object that Eros does not have and 
lacks is the beautiful and the good, with exclusion of the bad and the ugly. 
However, a question can start to be raised here: does this mean that all desire or, 
more specifically, all epco<; is for the beautiful and the good? Or that in all of us 
there is a kind o/epax; which naturally desires the good and the beautiful? 
2.2.7. Eros is neither good nor beautiful 
His object of desire being the beautiful and the good, Eros, according to what was 
established before, lacks what is beautiful and, in consequence, what is good: 
e i dpa o' "Epcoq xcov KCCXCDV ev8ef)^ eax i , xd 5e dyaGd KaX,d, Kdv 
xcov dyaGclov ev8ef]q eir|. (201c4-5) 
and so is himself neither good nor beautiful.3 9 This assertion receives a further 
development in Diotima's speech through the characterization of Eros as a 
3 8 For this reason "beauty'V'goodness" can equally refer to beauty/goodness in general and/or its 
particular instances (differently, Nussbaum thinks that there is the implicit premise that what is 
loved is a beautiful individual and not beauty in general (Nussbaum (1986), pp. 178-179). On this 
point see also n. 39 below. 
3 9 Nussbaum (1986) says, pp. 178-179 that Eros' object of desire must be particular instances and 
not beauty in general since an individual can desire the beauty of another individual or thing, being 
beautiful himself and so not lacking beauty in general (similarly Dover (1980), p. 136 and Soble 
(1985), 43-44). I disagree with Nussbaum because here only desire as such is being considered and 
so the lover or subject of desire is taken qua lover (but not the whole person with his or her 
properties) and as such is not beautiful. It is true that Eros and the individuals who erotically desire 
can be considered beautiful and be desired. However, in that case for Plato Eros would not be 
being considered insofar as it is erotic desire but insofar as it is object of desire. In other words, the 
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(iexa^'6. However, for the moment the only thing that can be concluded is that 
beauty and goodness cannot be attributes of Eros. 
2.3. Subject and object of desire in the Lysis. Similarities with the Symposium 
Many of the points agreed in the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon and later 
in Diotima's speech in the Symposium f i t remarks made in the Lysis. I do not 
intend here a final solution to the numerous problems of the Lysis. I just mean to 
point out assertions made in this dialogue on the subject and object of desire that 
are obviously close to some statements in the Symposium.40 For this purpose I base 
myself on two assumptions concerning the Lysis in general that wil l not receive 
demonstration here due to the limitations of my approach: 
a) Although the concrete phenomenon of (f>iA,ia and of being fylXoc, are taken as 
the starting point of the analysis, the argument shifts to an examination of desire in 
general.41 Nevertheless, this does not hinder the consideration of the particular 
case of §iXia in the light of the general conclusions.42 
subjects of desire might also be seen as objects of desire and not as subject and thus appear as 
beautiful; but for this it is not necessary to reformulate anything of what Plato proposes about the 
structure of Eros. 
4 0 The aspects of the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon and of Diotima's speech in the 
Symposium that match with assertions in the Lysis will be indicated by footnotes. 
4 1 For example, in Lys. 221d2-el eitiBun'ia and k7ii9vueiv with its participial forms are used to 
describe the desire of the subject for his object. See also in Lys. 221e3-4 the interchangeable use of 
epooQ, <t>iA/ux and kmSuuioc in order to refer to the desire for xo diKelov as a possible candidate 
for being (j)iXov and so an object of desire. 
4 2 Thus, for example, at the end of the dialogue (Lys. 223b4-8), Socrates turns back to mention the 
<j)iAAa existing between him and his two young interlocutors. The apparently equivocal use of the 
term ((>iA.iot and <t>iXoq is not due to Plato's confusion on this point. The ambiguity allows Socrates 
to keep moving from the level of friendship as interpersonal relationship to the level of desire in 
general. This flexibility of the term also helps him on many occasions to create new ct7Copiai and 
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b) Similarly to what we have seen in the eXeyxoc, by Socrates of Agathon, 
through the apparently aporetic discussion, a description of certain characteristics 
of the subject and object of desire is given through the successive arguments of 
the dialogue.43 In this sense the dialogue is at the same time aporetic and 
'euporetic'.44 However, the assertions are left open to further development and 
correction at the end of the dialogue. 
2.3.1. The distinction between subject and object of desire 
Socrates' dialogue with Menexenus starts from the assumption that tyikicL has to 
be mutual (Lys. 212b3-5). This assumption seems to have the problematic 
implication that, in that case, you can love someone who hates you and hate 
someone who loves you (Lys. 213b7-c4). In spite of its paradoxical result, in this 
section there is a first discrimination between the subject of desire (b (|)iA,o3v) and 
the object of desire (b tyikoviiEVOC,) and an initial inquiry on the relationship and 
characteristics of one and the other.45 
2.3.2. Object of desire 
As shown above in the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon,46 in the Lysis it is 
often hinted that the object of desire is the good and the beautiful. However, a 
more concrete reference to what the good and the beautiful would be remains, to 
so to take the examination further on and keep his audience in a state of acknowledged ignorance 
on the subject treated. 
4 3 On the constructive aspects of the eXeyxoq see above 2.2. 'Euporetic' k\ey%oq: positive 
assertions on the structure of Eros, pp. 28 ff.. 
4 4 On the 'euporetic' and 'aporetic' character of the Lysis and its dovetailing with the Symposium 
see Rowe (2000). Kahn (1996), pp. 264-267 has also pointed out the positive assertions of the 
Lysis which, according to him, anticipate the ones made in the Symposium. For more discussion 
about the Lysis see Robinson & Brisson (eds.) (2000), pp. 157-236. 
4 5 See above 2.2.1. Eros intentional/relational structure, p. 32. 
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use Plato's own words, "elusive" (kinapoc,) (Lys. 216c7). In the Lysis there is 
also a formal description of the object of desire as the final end for the sake of 
which all that is loved is loved: 
a) Through the argument on the supposed <|)iA,ia of things that are like (Lys. 
213e4ff.) a first assertion is made in relation to the object of desire being the good: 
the like loves the like only when the like is the good (Lys. 214d3-7; 215a3-5).47 
b) At the end of the argument on the supposed ())iA,ia between opposites it is 
asserted again that what the subject of desire, who is neither good nor bad, loves is 
the good (Lys. 216d3-4), which coincides with the beautiful (Lys. 216d2). The bad 
and "the neither good nor bad" are excluded as objects of desire (Lys. 216e6-7). 
c) In the most obviously instructive section there is a formal description of the 
object of desire: the original or first object of love (6 eaxiv Ttpanov tyiXov) is 
that for the sake of which all the other things we call (J)iA.a are tyiXa (Lys. 2\9cl-
5; 220M-7). In other words, in a teleological understanding of human motivation, 
the object of desire is what is put at the top of hierarchy of ends and means. The 
absolute end would be what does not require a further reference in order to be 
wanted or desired:48 
4 6 See above 2.2.5. The object of Eros: the beautiful and the good, pp. 36 ff.. 
4 7 The apparent aporia based on the self-sufficiency of the good so that friends, because of being 
good and alike, would not need each other will be removed by discriminating between a subject of 
desire who is essentially deficient and the object of desire, which is self-sufficient and identified 
with the good. 
4 8 Similarly in Diotima's speech the good seems to be identified with happiness as a final end that 
does not require further reference (see 205al-3). Beauty itself is also recognized by the lover who 
has gone through the whole erotic ascent and attained the contemplation of it as "the very beauty, 
that all his previous toils were for" (210e5-6) and "the final goal of matters of love" (210e3-4). The 
relationship between happiness and Beauty as the aims of epcoq can be understood in the following 
way: a) fepcoq as such aims at what is beautiful and achieves maximum development if it ever 
attains contemplation Beauty itself; b) but simultaneously, by procreation in Beauty itself, the 
lover achieves the good universally desired and, in consequence, happiness and a god-like 
immortality as far as this is possible for a human being. 
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O-UKO-UV xo ye xcp ovxi tyikov ov tyiXov xivoq eveKa tyiXov eaxiv; ...\ir\ 
tyiXov xivoq eveKa xo tyikov tyiXov eivai. (Lys. 220b4-7) 
At the end of this part of the argument there is a new indication that this rcpooxov 
<J)iA.ov has to be the good: 
- dpa xo dyaGov eaxi (|)iXov; - e|ioiye SoKei. (Lys. 220b7-8) 
e) Finally, in the last part of the argument (Lys. 221e3-222e7), xo diKeiov is 
reintroduced as possible reference of b tyiXoq/xo tyiXov. I f xo diKeiov were 
assimilable to xo 6|ioiov, it would generate again the paradox that the love 
between similar entities brings (Lys. 222b3-cl). So it is agreed that xo diKeiov 
must be something different from xb b|U.biov (Lys. 222cl-3). At this point 
Socrates significantly tries to consider the possibility that xo dya06v is what 
belongs (xo diKeiov) to everybody (Lys. 222c3-5), which would imply that xo 
0'iXov is in fact the good which all we desire, being deprived of it. Unfortunately 
both Menexenus and Lysis choose to take Socrates's second option -the bad 
belongs to the bad, the good to the good, the neither bad nor good to the neither 
bad nor good (Lys. 222c7-dl). In this way they understand the assimilation of xo 
dyaGov and xo diKeiov in the sense that "the like loves the like" -the unjust is 
friend to the unjust, the bad to the bad, the good to the good (Lys. 222d5-7). This 
leads the argument again to the aporia of the supposed (|)iX,ia of things that are 
alike (Lys. 222dl-8). Nevertheless, the possible solution that xo <j)iXov is in fact 
xo dyaGov has been suggested by Socrates at Lys. 222c7-dl, despite Menexenus' 
lack of understanding. 
e) The "slipperiness" of the beautiful and, as a consequence, of the good is pointed 
out at lys. 216c7-d2: 
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eoiKe yovv p.aA.cxKcp xivi KOCI Xeicp K a i X.ucapo3. 810 KOU \ornq paSicoq 
SioXiaBaivei K a i SiaSvexai tijid^, axe xoiomov ov. 
This elusiveness is connected to the fact that, as well as the fact that dialogue 
offers no definitive solution to what b ^iXoq/xo tyiXov would be (including in 
the list of possibilities, the good) (Lys. 222e3-7), it is not established what the 
beautiful and the good refer to, either. 
2.3.3. Subject of desire 
The subject of desire in the Lysis is characterized in similar terms to the Eros of 
the Symposium which, being neither good nor beautiful, desires the good because 
of his own deficient condition:49 
a) The argument on tyiXXa between opposites (Lys. 215el-3) leads to the paradox 
that, in that case, a thing hating would be friend of a friendly thing, the just of the 
unjust, the good of the bad (Lys. 216b2-5). Nevertheless, a positive 
characterization of the subject of desire similar to the one in the Symposium 
begins in this section. The friend of the good -or in other words, what/who loves 
the good- turns out to be what is neither good nor bad: 
...aXXd T O |a,fixe dyotGov |i.fixe K C C K O V tyikov ofoxco noxe y\yvb\iEvov xou 
dyocGou50 Lys. 216c2-3 
b) After this, the possibility is considered that the cause of "the neither good nor 
bad" desiring the good, which is |j.£xa£\) between the good and the bad (Lys. 
220d4-7), is the bad: 
4 9 See above 2.2.3. Eros' lacking condition, p. 34 and 2.2.6.Eros is neither good nor beautiful, 
p. 37. 
5 0 "... it may rather be something neither good nor bad that will prove after all to be what we call 
friend of the good." I follow Lamb's translation. 
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to \ir\xe K C X K O V dpa \xr\x' dyaGov tyiXov Y ' i Y v e x a i x o x > dyaGoi) 5 ia 
K O C K C B 7Eapoucyiav. (Lys. 217b4-6) 
This thesis is submitted to successive corrections: 
-In "the neither good nor bad" the bad would be present accidentally, not 
essentially (Lys. 217e4-218a2). 
-After imagining a possible world where the bad did not exist, Socrates concludes 
that the reason for "the neither good nor bad" desiring the good is not the bad but 
desire itself: 
...T) emG'uiJ.ia xr\q fyiXiaq a u l a , K a i xo kniQv\xovv tyiXov eaxi xauxcp 
ov emG-unei K a i xoxe oxav emQv[ir\...(Lys. 221d3-4) 
In this way the good is desired not because of the presence of the bad but because 
of the lacking condition of desire: 
-...xo ys E T C I G U I A O O V oft dv E V S E E Q fj, xovxov E J I I G ' U | J , £ I . . . X O 8' E V S E E Q 
dpa tyiXov E K E I V O D ov dv E V S E E I ; f j ; - S O K E I (ioi. (Lys. 221d7-e2) 
This implies that deficiency or absence of goodness turns to be something 
different from badness. 
2.4. Conclusion 
So a similar characterization of the subject and object of desire seems to be 
present in both the Lysis and the EXe,y%oc, by Socrates of Agathon in the 
Symposium. In Diotima/Socrates' speech these ideas receive further development. 
3. Diotima/Socrates 'speech. The truest and best EyKc6|J.iov to Eros: Eros as 
(hiX6cro<|)o<; (201dl-212a7) 
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In the discourse of Diotima the description of what Eros is and the effects he has 
continues based on what has been agreed by Socrates and Agathon. There are, 
nevertheless, some important twists in the argument. On the one hand, although 
the exposition remains focused on erotic desire, the meaning of Eros is more 
clearly widened to refer in a more general sense to the intense desire that leads 
each life and not just to sexual passion. On the other hand, from the very 
beginning, the argument tends to be focused more and more on one kind of 
passion that, hopefully, can inspire our life: <|)iA,ocTO<|)ia or love for the truth. 
Diotima's speech ends with a sketch of what the maximum development of the 
love of truth would be like so that in this life contemplation of Beauty itself 
alongside production of true virtue would be attained, whereas, after death, god-
like immortality with permanent possession of the good and happiness might be 
achieved. 
3.1. Diotima as Socrates' mask 
The fictionality of Diotima has been nicely described by Robin5 1 through the 
image of a mask used by Socrates in order to proceed with his philosophical 
exposition about Eros and, at the same time, not to break the festive atmosphere 
by continuing with the eXeyxoc,, which is usually felt to be aggressive by 
Socrates' interlocutors.52 
There are many elements that confirm the fictional character of Diotima not only 
for us, the readers, but also for Socrates' audience:53 
a) First of all, there is one anachronism: Diotima's reference at 205d-e to the 
speech which Aristophanes has just given.5 4 
5 1 See Robin (1951), pp. xxii-xxvii. On the fictionality of Diotima see also Dover (1980), pp. 137-
138; Nussbaum (1986), pp. 177 and 467, n. 28; Waterfield (1994), pp. 99-100; Rowe (1998), p. 
173. 
5 2 See Men. 79b; Apol. 30e-31a. 
5 3 See also Levin (1975). 
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b) The content of the discourse is typically Platonic (especially the description of 
the Idea of Beauty itself at 210-21 lb and 21 le). 
c) Plato's choice of the name A i o x i | i a for this character seems to be closely 
related with what she represents in the text: an individual blessed by the gods 
because of her knowledge. 
But the reason why Socrates hides behind the fictional mask of Diotima is not just 
for reasons of politeness. As we have seen above, the character of Diotima allows 
Socrates to provide the example of an erotic philosophical attitude, which 
Agathon fails to offer. 5 5 In this way, Socrates, who has claimed not to know about 
anything except tot epcotiKd, can present himself as ignorant and needing to 
learn in a typical example of his irony.5 6 
In addition to this, the character of Diotima presents certain peculiarities that are 
related to what she represents in the text: 
4 Nails (2002), pp. 137-138 suggests that Diotima might be historical character. She tries to justify 
Diotima's reference to Aristophanes' speech by suggesting that the speech might be based on an 
authentic but lost work of Aristophanes. Her supposition does not seem very likely. Taylor (1960) 
[1926], pp. 224-225 also suggests that Diotima is an historical character. His main argument is that 
Plato never uses invented characters in his works. However, see Brisson's answer to Taylor's 
arguments (Brisson (1998), pp. 29-30). 
5 5 See Rowe (1998), p. 168. 
5 6 See Vlastos (1987), who distinguishes between the usual sense of irony as a rhetorical figure 
-i.e. to mean the opposite that what is stated- and the particular meaning of Socratic irony, which 
would be to assert and deny at the same time so that a sort of riddle is formulated to the listener. He 
bases his interpretation in an analysis the meaning of eipcove\)6|j,evo<; at 216e4. If we take 
Vlastos' idea, it is possible to think that through the use of Diotima's mask, Socrates would be 
simultaneously asserting both his knowledge and his lack of knowledge about xa epcoxiKOC. This 
riddle may be understood in this way: Socrates has knowledge to teach about Love in the sense that 
he can give a report on what an erotic ascent to Beauty itself would be like so that he can motivate 
people to embark on a philosophical life. But, at the same time, he does not have knowledge to 
teach about Love because the real acquisition of this wisdom depends on each person undertaking 
a philosophical way of life and going through the steps sketched in the erotic ascent. 
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a) She is a Mantinean woman (yovcaKoq MOCVXIVIKTIQ Aioxi|j.a<;) who is 
oo§r\ on these things (i.e. x a epcoxiKd) and many others (201d2-3). 
MavxiviKTiQ does not indicate just her homeland but suggests as well that her 
wisdom is that of a |idvxi<;, i.e. that she possesses a power of intervention with 
the gods (such as in the case of the ten years' postponement of the plague for the 
Athenians, 201d). In other words, Diotima, similarly to the daimonic-intermediary 
Eros (202e-203a), is in contact with the gods and brings the mortal realm into 
communication with the immortal and vice versa. 
b) Plato seems to choose the name A i o x i f i a because of its connotations.57 The 
components of her name can mean either 'honouring Zeus' or 'being honoured by 
Zeus'.58 This might be connected with the fact that she provides an example of 
someone Q£0§ikr\c, because of her knowledge of xa epooxiKd and so of her 
having arrived at the contemplation of divine Beauty itself and the enjoyment of 
its consequences.59 
c) The place of wisdom is occupied by a woman.60 This may look astonishing 
when one considers the inferior position that women had in ancient Greek 
society.61 In relation to this we must remember that according to Socrates in 
/?e/?.451c-457b men and women are approximately the same intellectually and 
morally.6 2 Moreover, we must think, that, although ordinary women were regarded 
5 7 Dover (1980), p. 137 says that, although the name Aioxiuoq was more common, Aioxiuxx is 
also attested from Boeotia in the early classical period (similarly Brisson (1998), p. 28). 
Differently Blair (1996) thinks that it is a name invented by Plato. 
5 8 See Dover (1980), p. 137 who compares the term Aioxiua with adjectives such as Seoxiuxx; in 
Pindar and £ev6xiiJ.o<; in Aeschylus. See also Brisson (1998), p. 28. 
5 9 See below 3.4.3. The science of Beauty itself, pp. 75 ff.. Diotima must possess this science 
since she is described as wise on xd epcoxiicd. 
6 0 See Halperin (1990). 
6 1 See Foucault (1985), pp. 22-23 and chs. 4 and 5 of Pomeroy (1987), pp. 57-92. 
6 2 On this point see Dover (1980), p.137. 
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as socially inferior, it is common in Greek literature of the time that women 
appear in charge of priesthood and religious wisdom.6 3 
Al l the above features of Diotima's character seem to imply that from this point of 
the argument onwards the description of and eyKCOiiiov to Eros involves a 
superior form of wisdom and contact with the divine, which is directly connected 
with the conception of Eros as philosopher. 
3.2. Eros as (|)i.A,6ao(|)0£ 
In Diotima's speech the assertions made in Socrates' dialogue with Agathon are 
picked up on and reformulated in order to describe a particular, in fact the best 
kind of kpcoq: epco^ - tyiXbaofyoc,. For this purpose Plato transforms the concept 
of piexa^u |j.£xac;\) initially refers exclusively to something 'intermediate', i.e. 
between two things and/or which, having a hybrid nature, can associate with 
things of opposite characteristics. But in the Symposium, by connecting the notion 
of jj,exa^-6 with 6p9f] 86£a and, especially, with the notion of a 5od|ioov, it 
tends to mean not just something intermediate but 'intermediary' as well, i.e. 
something that joins two realms, in this case the philosophical Eros that links our 
mortal domain with what is immortal and divine. In the myth of Eros' birth all the 
remarks previously made about Eros' nature and about his being an 'intermediary' 
5ai|iCGV are brought together in order to give a dynamic description of the 
philosophical Eros. 
6 3 On women as possessors of wisdom in Plato see Blair (1996) who refers to the following 
passages in the Platonic corpus: Crit. 44a; Ap. 21a; Menex. 235c-236b; Theaet. 210c; Phaed. 60a; 
Men. 81a; Phaedr. 244a-b; Symp. 201d-e; Gorg. 512e. The goddess of Parmenides' poem and of 
the tablets of Thurii who report some Orphic beliefs are also cases of wisdom -in many cases 
superhuman knowledge- as an attribute of a female characters (see Eggers Lan (1987), p. 37, n.23). 
On this point see also Brisson (1998), p. 28. Saxonhouse (1984) also makes an attempt to defend 
that also in the characters of Socrates and Alcibiades in the Symposium female and male 
characteristics coexist. 
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3.2.1. Eros as |XExa^\): intermediate and intermediary 
As we have seen, in the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon Eros has been 
described -similarly to the subject of desire in the Lysis- as something deficient 
(in the present time and if not, at least, in the future) in the beautiful and the good 
that it desires and, thus, as neither good nor beautiful. 
Diotima's dialogue with Socrates takes this last assertion as its starting point: 
...b v EpcoQ...O'UT£ KaX.6Q...o\)xe ayaQbc, (201e5-7) 
This does not imply that Eros is then ugly or bad (see 202bl-2). He is rather 
xi iiexa^u, between, these things (202b4-5).64 
In this way, first of all, from being just something neither good nor beautiful Eros 
comes now to be something neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly. This 
distinction supposes the distinction between contrary and contradictory terms that 
is explicitly drawn at Soph. 257b.65 
Secondly, Eros is described as something between what is good and beautiful and 
what is bad and ugly. But what does this mean? In order to give an answer to this 
question, I shall make a brief review of the basic meaning of | i£xa£\) and of its 
philosophical meaning in passages of the Gorgias and Lysis in order to compare it 
with its sense in the Symposium. 
6 4 Similarly in the Lysis the subject of desire is what is neither good nor bad (see Lys. 216c2-3). 
6 5 When Plato explains at Soph. 257b that not-being is not something opposed to being but only 
different he says: "The negative particles, oi) and \ir\, when prefixed to words do not necessarily 
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3.2.1.1. The meaning of \iezat,x> 
The components of the term |iexa^\) -the prepositions |0.exd and avvfevv-
mainly share the meaning of 'association', 'to be with ' . 6 5 The primary meaning of 
|X£Xa£\) seems to be rather 'between', which is connected with one of the 
possible meanings of |i.£X&. But, in fact, the connotation of 'association' can also 
be present, indicating coexistence of opposite qualities.67 
3.2.1.2. j i e t a ^ u as 'intermediate' in Gorgias 467e ff. 
In Plato's use of i i e x a ^ in general we find the habitual meaning of 'between' 
two positions (spatial meaning) or two moments (temporal meaning).68 
In a more philosophical context fj,exa£i) can mean 'between' in two different 
ways: 
a) In reference to a process that takes place between two states, as in Phaed. 71a 
12-13; Theaet. 188a2-3; Parm. 156e8-157a2. 
b) In reference to entities which, being between entities of opposite kinds, usually 
-but not always- combine opposite qualities. Here the meaning of 'association' of 
\X&XCL\X> is more obviously present. 
This last case is exemplified by a passage at Gorg. 467e-468a69 which refers to 
what, being iiexa^t) xo\)xcov (i.e. the good and the bad), is O X J X E ocyaGov ovxe 
imply opposition, but only difference from words, or more correctly from the things represented by 
the things, which follow them" (Jowett's translation). 
6 6 Chantraine (1968), s.v. \iexah,x>. 
6 7 See LSJ (19409), s.v. (xexdc, ovvfevv. 
6 8 See PI. Charm. 155c4-5; Phaed. 58c5; Rep. 393b7-8. 
6 9 The case of Prot. 346d is similar but xdc \xeaa is used instead of xd \iexa^v. 
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K O C K O V (Gorg. 467e). These intermediate things (xa (lexa^)) can sometimes 
partake of the good, sometimes of the bad and sometimes of neither (they are, 
thus, neutral) (Gorg. 468a). What interests Plato here is when these "neither good 
nor bad" intermediate activities are executed for the sake of the good (evEKCt xox> 
dYCcGcn), Gorg. 468b3-4), i.e. when they are intermediate good means for a good 
final end. In this case, the intermediate activities are not neutral but partake of the 
good, insofar as they are good means for attaining it. However, two other 
possibilities are kept open: if these activities were done for a bad end, they would 
participate in the bad; i f they were done neither for a bad nor for a good purpose, 
they would be neutral.70 
In short these entities, being neither good nor bad, are 'intermediate' or (lexa^u 
in two ways: 
-They are between good and bad entities. 
-They are in a hybrid condition so that they can become associated either with the 
good or the bad or neither of them. 
3.2.1.3. ILEXCL^V in Lys. 220d4-7. 'Intermediate' and 'intermediary' status of 
the subject of desire 
In the Lysis fiexa^'U is used only once in order to describe us, human beings, as 
subjects who, being neither good nor bad, desire the good: 
dp' oftxco nk^VKe xe K C X I tyikeixai xdyotGov 8ia to K O C K O V b<t>' tuxcov, 
xciov (xexa^u ovxcov xox> K C C K O - 6 xe K O C I xdyaGcu, ocbxo 5e eauxcru 
e v E K a oi)8e|a.iav xpeiav e^ei; (Lys. 220d4-7). 
7 0 Differently D. Frede (1993), p.405 considers that the "neither good nor bad" intermediate 
entities of this passage of the Gorgias are always neutral. 
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A reference to what has already been said and what is said afterwards in the 
dialogue is required in order to establish what | i£T(x£\ ) probably refers to here. At 
217b the possibility that we, as subjects of desire who are neither good nor bad, 
love the good because of the presence of the bad has been introduced. Based on 
this thesis it is suggested in the present passage that we, intermediate creatures 
between the good and the bad, desire the good because of the presence of the bad. 
But, i f we accept the results of the argument developed immediately after this 
(namely that we do not love the good because of the bad but because of desire 
itself (221d)), what is said in this passage could be rectified in the following way: 
we, as subjects of desire, who, being neither good nor bad and so intermediate 
between the good and the bad, love the good because of desire, i.e. because we 
lack what we desire (221d-e). 
Thus, the subject of desire is 'intermediate' (\iExa^v) and neither good nor bad in 
the ways identified above in Gorgias: 
-because we are between what is absolutely bad and what is absolutely good; 
-because the bad (and, as logical consequence of the argument, the good) can be 
present in us but just accidentally (otherwise, we would tend to be completely bad 
(or good) (see 217b ff.)) . So we are sort of hybrid entities that can be both good or 
bad. 
However, there is a new element in the concept of |iexa^\) which, if we consider 
the passage in the context as I suggest above, is implied at 221c-d:71 and that is 
1 D. Frede (1993), p. 406 thinks that, in a different way from the Symposium, in the Lysis "the 
intermediate desires the good only if there is a menace of some evil. Without such a menace, there 
is no need for the good (220d)". Differently from her, I think that the solution of the Symposium in 
relation to the concept of intermediary is at least suggested in the Lysis. I also disagree with her 
with respect to the incompatibility of the concept of intermediary as it appears in the Symposium 
and the thesis defended in the Phaedo, particularly, according to her analysis, the 'argument from 
the opposites' demonstrating the existence of the soul (see D. Frede (1993), p.404. Contrary to this, 
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that the neither good nor bad because of its lacking condition (and not because of 
the possible presence of the bad) looks for and desires the acquisition of that of 
which is deprived. In this way the desire of the subject who is neither good nor 
bad and is deprived of the good turns out to be not just an 'intermediate' but 
'intermediary', i.e. a means for trying to obtain and possess, at least temporarily, 
the good. In the Symposium this meaning of (lexa^t) receives further 
development. 
3.2.1.4. Eros as (xeta^i) in the Symposium: comparison with 6p8f] 56£a; 
Eros as a Saificov; Eros as (fuXoao^OQ. Eros as 'intermediate' and 
'intermediary' between the divine sphere and the human realm 
a) Eros is [lexa^v like bpQr\ 86£ct (202al-10) 
bpBTi 86£a (202a9) or T O bpGa 5o£d£eiv (202a5) is the state of mind of 
having correct beliefs that happen to coincide with reality (to xov bvxoq 
Toyyxocvov, 202a7-8). This is an irrational state (dXoyov npdy\ia, 202a2), given 
that it is not possible to give a rational account (X,6yov 8oovai, 202al) of these 
beliefs in question. This cognitive state is fieta^i) because it lies between two 
opposite states of mind: 
-eTiiGTrpT), a cognitive state in which is possible to offer a rational account 
which consists in giving the foundations of these beliefs.72 This explanation would 
be ideally based on the Ideas and so be equivalent to ao<J)ia or (|)p6vr|0"iQ.73 This 
state of mind is fully possessed only by the gods (see 204al-2). 
the yv%r\ in the Phaedo seems to play a very similar role to the Eros-(|)iA.6<TO<t)0<; in the 
Symposium, i.e. what communicates the human realm with the divine domain. 
7 2 See Men. 98a and Theaet. 201c ff. 
7 3 So a full explanation would be the account that is possible to give after the whole dialectical 
journey. This includes the moment of catching sight of the Idea or principles. On this point cf. Sier 
(1997), pp. 62-63. 
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-&|J.a9ia, a cognitive state in which not only is it impossible to give a rational 
account but also the beliefs which characterize it do not coincide with reality, i.e. 
are false. As we are told later, the fundamentally wrong belief in the state of the 
d|O.a0f)<; or person in the state of &|j.a0ia is the idea that it is not necessary to 
look for foundations for what he believes and so he does not recognize his 
ignorance (204a3-7). 
So, 6p9r| 86£a is fj.exa£\) in the sense of 'intermediate' in two ways: 
a) it is placed between knowledge and ignorance; 
b) it is a hybrid state of mind that combines characteristics of the other two: the 
rightness of wisdom and the lack of grounds of ignorance. 
In addition to this, i f we consider the state of mind of right belief not just statically 
but in regard to its possibility of looking for the rational account which it lacks -
and so of becoming (jJiAoacxj/ia as described at 204bl-c8-7 4, the state of 6p9r| 
56c;a can also be seen as an 'intermediary', i.e. as an inceptive cognitive state 
which might take us in the direction of emaxTpri or ao<j>ia.75 Nevertheless, 
from what is said at 202al-10 this implication of the concept of right opinion can 
only be speculation. 
Thus, through the comparison of Eros' iiexcL^v condition with that of 6p9fi 
86^a Eros becomes associated with its place between knowledge and ignorance 
7 4 On the coincidence of bpGn SoJjot and <t>iAocro<)>ia see Rowe (2001). 
7 5 At Rep. 583c the cognitive state of 56£ct is similarly considered a [iexa^,v state of mind 
between 'knowledge' (ejuaxfiuri) and 'ignorance' (&Y v o l o 0- The difference is that, given that 
this 56£(X is not opBTj, there is no guarantee that from this state someone will move to a 
philosophical state of mind, i.e. stop believing only in multiple beautiful things and look for what 
make all of them beautiful: the Idea of Beauty (for a further development on this point see 
Chapter 2, Section III, 2. Higher Education, pp. 214 ff. and Chapter 3: Conclusion, pp. 264 
ff.). The state of Ctyvoia -ignorance in the sense of 'no knowledge of any kind'- is different from 
&|j.a8'ux -ignorance in the sense of 'stupidity'. 
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and it unites characteristics from the one and the other. Furthermore, the potential 
transformation of bp8r| 86£a into ao(f)ia, should the grounds of the right beliefs 
be looked for and attained, seems to prepare for the concept of <|)iA.oao<t)ia 
(204bl-c8). In this way, all these elements pave the way for the characterization of 
Eros as (|>i?i6c>0<])oq or lover of the truth, who is also placed between ignorance 
and wisdom. 
b) Eros: a 8cri|icov- iiexa^i) (202bl-203a8) 
Diotima teaches Socrates that Eros is not a god but a great 8ai(i.cDV and that, as 
such, is neither mortal nor immortal but "between" (|i£xai;\)) the mortal/human 
ambit and the immortal/divine sphere: 
...[iExa^v Gwyto-o K C X I aGavdxou. ...8ai|j.cov [isyaq... (202dll-13). 
The two characteristics of \ievxt,v as 'intermediate' appear again in this 
characterization: 
-a 8ai(ioov and, so Eros, is in the middle of two domains; 
-and, at the same time, its nature is a hybrid with characteristics of both: neither 
mortal nor immortal, neither human nor divine. 
But, above all, Eros as a 8ai|iCOV has, thanks to its hybrid nature, the active role 
of being a binding 'intermediary'76 between these two spheres: 
ep|j.r|vei3ov K C X I SiauopGiie-uov 0eol<; xa reap' dvGpcGrccov K C X I 
avGpcGJtOK; xa raxpa Gecov, [...] ev iieaop 8e bv d|i<l>oxepcov av(j.7rAr|poi, 
caaxe xo rcav ai>xo aincp awSeSeaGai (202e3-7) 
7 6 This aspect of Eros was already stressed by L. Robin in his classical work La theorie 
platonicienne de V amour (Robin (1908), pp. 9-23). For 8cduove<; as creatures that communicate 
between human beings and gods see Hesiod, Erga 109,122, 252. 
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Thus, the intermediary Eros (who is no longer a god, but simply a 8ai|XCOv) 
bestows upon us -mortal, human creatures- the facility of access to the gods, who 
are the only ful l possessors of the good and the beautiful, and so happy (202c6-9) 
immortal (208a8-bl) and wise (204al-2). In this way, the argument is again 
shifted from a description of desire in general and of epoo<; as erotic desire toward 
an account of Eros as (()iA,oa6(|)Oi;, which is also 'intermediary' insofar as it is the 
desire for achieving a god-like condition through the attainment of wisdom and 
the truth.7 7 
3.2.2. The myth of Eros' birth: Eros as tyikoootyoc, (203bl-204c6) 
In a delightful myth Plato recreates a primordial symposium of the gods during 
which Eros was not only celebrated in speeches (as in the present party at 
Agathon's) but actually conceived and generated. In this story all the previous 
exposition of his nature and characteristics is assembled and extended in order to 
offer a portrait of Eros fyikoaofyoc,. As on other occasions, a myth proves to be 
for Plato a suitable resource for blending and developing in an intuitive form 
elements already worked out through dialectical arguments. 
The lacking nature of Eros is now represented in his maternal FlEv'ia-like 
features, as a result of which he is "always with lack as his companion" (203c), 
while his intentionality towards the good and the beautiful is symbolized by his 
paternal IlopoQ-like features (enifiovkbc, e a t i T O I Q KaXoiq K C C I dyaGbiq, 
203d4-5) and by his conception at the birthday party of the beautiful Aphrodite 
(Sio 8f) Kod xr\c, ' A(()po5ixT|<; dicoA.o'uGcx; K O U Gepdrccov Y&YOVEV 6 
Epcoq, Y£vvr|9ei<; ev xoi^ EKeivr|<; yeveGAAoiG, iced d|a.a fyvcei kpaoxr\q 
See below 3.4.3.3. The Idea of Beauty as ethical principle: wisdom and virtue, pp. 79 ff.. 
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cov jcepi xd KCLXOV KCLI xr\c, ' A<|)po8'ixr|<; KaXr\q ovar\<;, 203cl-4). 7 8 
Furthermore, we might reasonably suppose that his conception from parents who 
are gods79 and in the course of a divine party establishes a primeval connection 
between Eros and the divine. 
As a result of the intercourse between Flevia and Ylbpoq from which Eros 
originates, his being equipped with opposite characteristics is also explained: 
KCti oijxe &><; d0dvaxo<; Tte^uicev cute cb<; G V T I X O Q , aXXa xoxe |iev xr|Q 
ocbxT|<; T)|j.epaq 9dA,A,ei xe xai £fj, oxav eimopfiarj X O X E 8e 
&7io0vfjGK£i, raxAav d v a p u u a K e x a i 5ia X T J V xcru raxxpcx; tyboiv, xo 8e 
7Copi^6|ievov d e i imepKel, oaaxe o\)xe dTiopei "Epax; rcoxe o m e 
nXovxei, ao(()ia xe ax> d|j.a0ia<; ev |ieaop eax'tv. (203d8-e5). 
In this passage, the hybrid nature of Eros is again exemplified by his "neither 
mortal nor immortal" condition, which has already been established as a typical 
feature of his being 5odfj.CGV- f i exa^u Here this immortality-mortality -i.e. his 
periodical death and renaissance- is directly linked to the attainment of his object 
but unavoidable, subsequent loss of it. This feature of Eros is directly connected 
with his prospective structure80 and temporal condition established in the dialogue 
7 These characteristics of Eros as the god and erotic desire and of desire in general are established 
through the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon as we have shown above: 2.1. Eros' 
intentional structure, p. 27, 2.2. Eros' lacking condition, p. 29 and 2.5. The good and the 
beautiful as objects of desire, p. 31. 
7 9 Eros' father, nopoq, is a god (203b2-3). I levia , Eros' mother, would be also in principle a 
goddess though of a peculiar kind insofar as she is 'lacking' by nature. Such a deprived condition 
is quite anomalous in the case of a god (actually IlEv'ia's features are the reason why Eros lacks 
the stability of a god). Her bizarre status as a goddess might also be suggested through the fact that 
she is not actually present at the party but arrives at the end to beg (but what else could she do 
being Poverty?). 
8 0 See above 2.2.5. Prospective structure, pp. 34 ff.. 
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between Socrates and Agathon, as a result of which the acquisition of his object in 
the present can never be guaranteed in the future but a new effort is required in 
order to keep it. 
Simultaneously, in this same passage 203d8-e5, this mortal-immortal condition, 
which could be extended to desire in general,81 appears associated with his being 
situated in an intermediate place, like bpGr) 86£a (202a9), between wisdom and 
ignorance (aofyiaq xe av &|aa8iaq ev fieaq) eaxiv, 203e5) and so with his 
being fyikbcofyoq, i.e. his being aware (unlike the ignorant or stupid (204a3-7)) of 
his lack of wisdom and his eagerness to possess it. In this way, the object that the 
Eros-philosopher attains but also loses turns out to be the good and the beautiful 
(ercipODA-OQ eaxi xoiq K O C ? I O I < ; K O U a/vaGou;, 203d4-5) manifested in the 
form of wisdom (eaxiv...xcov KOcA-AAaxcov t | ao())ia, 204b2-3). While his 
maternal aspects (see 203c6-d3) symbolize the limitations on his getting and 
keeping his object of desire,82 his paternal features mean the possibility of -his 
'resources' or 'means' for- getting what he pursues,83 though ephemerally (xoxe 
( J . E V xr\q abxr\q r||iepa<; GaAAei xe Kod £f}, oxav eiwcopfiaT), xoxe 5e 
8 1 Because all desire is directed to attaining its object but, even if the achievement of the object 
takes place, there is no guarantee of permanent achievement. On the extension of characteristics of 
Eros to desire in general see above 2.2.2. Erotic desire as a species of desire in general, pp. 32 
ff.. 
8 2 This is expressed in the myth with charming images of lack of shelter: "...far from delicate and 
beautiful... hard, dirty, barefoot, always sleeping in the ground, without blankets, stretching out 
under the sky in doorways and by the roadside." (203c6-d3). 
8 3 The ri6po£-like features of Eros -"schemer after the beautiful and the good, courageous, 
impetuous, intense, clever hunter, always weaving new devices, both passionate for wisdom and 
resourceful in looking fo it, philosophising all his life, a clever magician, sorcerer, an sophist"-
indicate both Eros' intention of attaining wisdom and the good and the beautiful and his resources 
for actually reaching them. As Albert (1991), pp. 53-54 shows, through a philological analysis, the 
term fyikbaofyoq, like other compounds with fy\Xo-, indicates fondness for but also frequent 
contact with the object of fondness. So Eros should be able to attain his object of desire, though in 
a restricted way because of his Ilevia-features. 
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&7to8vfiaK£i, 203el-3): wisdom (204b2-3), good and beautiful individuals 
(203d4-5) (and, as a consequence, happiness and immortality, which are also 
attributes of the gods).84 
Thus, Eros' 8ai|ia>v- (J.exa^\) condition is reinterpreted here as being 
(|)iX,6ao(|)o^ in the following way: his being between what is mortal and immortal, 
what is human and what is divine is now represented as his being an 
'intermediate' between wisdom and ignorance (wisdom being an attribute only of 
the gods (204al-2)). He has a hybrid nature that combines rievia-like features 
and IlopoQ-like features, especially -as the daimonic Eros- that of immortality-
mortality, in as much as he attains and loses his object (wisdom). His being a 
"fastening" or 'intermediary' between gods and human beings is represented now 
through his condition as fyikOGofyoc,, i.e. his awareness of lacking divine wisdom, 
which makes him desire to achieve its possession and so direct him in that 
direction (204bl-8). 8 5 
3.3. Eros' works and effects 
Some interpreters think that the section 204dl-209e4 on the works of Eros has to 
be taken playfully or, at least, sceptically due to its lack of internal logic or 
connection with the rest of Diotima's/Socrates' speech.86 However, many scholars 
8 4 For happiness and beauty as attributes of the gods see 202c6-8. For immortality 202dll-el, 
208b. In section 204dl-209e4 we find further developments in relation to these points: the object 
of desire is happiness in the form of the eternal possession of the good; this ownership of the good 
can be partially attained by procreating in beauty. 
8 5 In the Lysis (j)iXoao<t)ia is significantly brought in many times as an example of <|)i?da: first of 
all, Socrates' philosophical conversation with young Lysis and his friend is supposed to be an 
illustration for Hippothales of how one has to treat his beloved (206c); at 215d the ignorant 
person's loving for the one who knows is presented as one of the examples of friendship between 
opposites; at 218b-c lovers of wisdom are mentioned as an example of what is neither good nor 
bad. 
8 6 A good representative example of this tendency would be Wilamowitz, who describes this 
section as a "geistreiches Spiel" (cited by Wipper (1965), p. 143). Dover also treats this section as 
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in the last century recognized a strong bond between this part of the argument and 
what precedes and follows it, though being aware that Diotima's description of 
Eros is in many ways astonishing and that the successive statements do not derive 
from each other in a strict logical way. 8 7 I follow here this last line of 
interpretation on the assumption that, in this section as well as in the rest of the 
speech, Plato is interested not in presenting an analytical deduction of statements 
about what desire is but in constructing and establishing the basis of a new 
hermeneutic through different ways of arguing, according to which epcoQ becomes 
a force that engages our whole existence and has its maximum expression in the 
search for the truth. 
The previous characterization of Eros as directed toward the good and the 
beautiful and as 'intermediary' with the divine, as a result of his innate 
deficient/resourceful condition, is reformulated in this section in terms of a search 
for the eternal possession of the good in the form of happiness and immortality 
(204elff.) through procreation in beauty (206b7-8), which could be briefly 
rendered as a craving of Eros, in spite of limitations on his capacity for attaining 
his object, for being god-like. At the same time, by means of the assertion that we 
are all lovers, since we all love the good, and, especially, through the comparison 
of the meaning of epcoQ with the narrower and wider sense of the term nov^oic, 
(205a5-d8), epcoq is explicitly understood from this point onwards not just as 
erotic desire but as an intense desire that guides each person's life to the 
attainment of the good and, in consequence, of happiness and immortality. In this 
a piece of sophistry which, nevertheless, should not be reproved since it is at the service of ideas 
that Plato considered valuable (Dover (1980), p. 145). Santas (1988) finds certain inferences of the 
argument "puzzling" (see Santas (1988), nn. 35 and 39, pp. 53-54). 
8 7 See, for example, Robin (1951) pp. lxxxv-lxxxvi and Wippern (1965) pp. 123-124. Rowe, 
though pointing out the often paradoxical and playful character of Diotima's assertions, recognizes 
that at 204dl-209e4 a serious doctrine is meant "She is dealing in metaphor and paradox, and also, 
towards the end, [... ] in irony. But at the same time there is no mistaking the hard and serious core 
that underlies the play of ideas here;..." (Rowe (1998), p. 178). 
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life immortality can only be obtained vicariously by the creation of a new being, 
so that Eros turns out to be fundamentally a creative force (206blff.). Two 
different ways in which this passion is channelled are described here -the 
eagerness for biological procreation and the zeal for fame and honour through 
cultural procreation- and, through them, two ways of understanding how the 
eternal possession of the good, happiness and immortality can be achieved by 
human beings. The subsequent description of the "Higher Mysteries" (210al-
212a7) wi l l show that the search for wisdom in Beauty itself (and so (j)iX.oao(|)ia), 
which takes us to the production of true virtue and close to a god-like happiness 
and immortality (in this life and, maybe, in an after-life), is, in fact, what more 
perfectly brings us close to obtaining the real good that we all desire. 
3.3.1. Reformulation of the object of Eros: eternal possession of the good, 
happiness and immortality 
a) In the previous sections the interchangeability between the good and the 
beautiful as the objects of Eros has already been established (201a-b; 203d) 
(though without the relation between the two ever being precisely determined). 
Now, in this section on the works and effects of love (204dl-209e4) to KCtXov is 
replaced by xo dyaGov: 
-...epa b epcov, [Aioxifxa £<|>r|v], xoov Kataov- xi epa; 
K c d eycu eircov oxi yeveaGai ai)xo3. 
-dXAxx... xi eaxai eiceivcp op dv yevr|xai xd K O C A X X ; . . . [nvvQ&vo\iai] 
(bcnep &v el Tig jiexa^aXobv dtvxi TOV rcaAov TOO dyocBcp xP&Hevog 
TcovGdvoixo- (|>epe, do ScoKpaxe^, epa b epcov xoov dyaGojv xi epa; 
- yeveaGai, fjv 8' eyco, a-bxep. (204d5-e4) 
In this way the good turns out to be most properly the object of desire (see also 
205dl0-206bl4), while beauty is the medium through which, by procreating in it 
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(oi) Tov KaA,oi3 6 epco<;...<dAAa> T T I Q yevvr|CTecD<; K a i T O D T O K O U ev top 
KaXcp, 206e2-5), that object can be, in a way, attained: 
<xo epyov T O D T O dyaGov aiyxcp e i v a i de i> kc%\ yap T O D T O T O K O Q ev 
KaXcp...(206b7-8) 
b) It has also been previously established that Eros is desire for a continuous 
possession of his object so that, even i f attained in the present, its preservation is 
still desired in the future (200c5-e9). However, this assertion is at this point 
strengthened since what is desired now becomes the eternal or permanent 
possession of the object of desire, the good (which would be at the same time a 
permanent desire):88 
...di dv9pc67ioi TdyaGcu epcoaiv [.. .]. K O U e i v a i T O dyaGov aircolq 
epcoaiv [. . .] . K O U &o \iovov e i v a i , aXXa K a i dei e i v a i [ . . . ] . b epcoq TO"6 
V V 
T O dyaGov ai/ccp e i v a i aei. (206a3-13) 
The possession of the good entails happiness -the final end of every desire: 
KTfiaei yap [...] dyaGcov d i e"b8ai|j.ove<; e"b5ai|xove<;,... (205al). 
In fact the eternal possession of the good is equivalent to the desire for permanent 
happiness, i.e. a happiness like that of the gods (nxxvTai; 0eouQ...e'u8ai|iova<; 
e i v a i K a i KaXo-6<;...<Kai> ei)8ai|j.ova<; . . . T O U Q TdyaGa K a i Ta KaX.a 
KeKTT||xevoiQ, 202c6-ll). 
8 8 On how de l seems to indicate both -we wish for permanent possession of good things and we 
always wish for their permanent possession- see Rowe (1998), p. 179. 
62 
c) Eros has already been described as "neither mortal nor immortal" (202dll; 
203d8-el) and the ephemeral possession of his object of desire is depicted as his 
way of attaining a partial immortality (203el-6). At present, in this context, 
immortality -understood as continuous existence (ideally as an unchangeable 
identity with itself as in the case of the gods' immortality, 208a8-9)- comes to be a 
requirement of this eternal possession. It is for this reason that, the desire for the 
good also implies the desire for immortality. Thus: 
dGavaaicxQ 8e dvayKaiov jiexa dyaBo-u ...eircep xov dyaBoi) eauxco 
eivai dei epcoQ eaxiv. dvayicaiov 5T| EK X O U X O U TOX* Xbyov K O C I xfj<; 
dGavaala^ xov epooxa eivai. (206e8-207a4) 
So, as a conclusion from a)-c), what Eros desires most of all is happiness with the 
eternal possession of the good, and immortality seen as a requisite for or actually 
consisting in this permanent possession (procreation in beauty being the means of 
obtaining these things in this life). In short, Eros yearns to be god-like.89 
3.3.2. Eros as the leading passion of one's life 
In the section on the works and effects of love (204dl-209e4) the meaning of the 
term 'epcoQ' is explicitly broadened, but at the same time, eagerness and intensity 
are kept as its distinctive marks, so that epooc; does not refer exclusively to erotic 
desire but also fundamentally to the 'current' of desire or passion that dominates 
each person's life. This transformation of the sense of epcDQ is achieved in a 
variety of ways: 
8 9 So happiness as the eternal possession of the good is a final end (205al-3) in a similar way to the 
TCpcoxov tyiXov of the Lysis. The initiated philosopher is the only person who might be able to 
know that this happiness that we all wish for consists, in fact, in procreation in Beauty itself so that 
he attains the good universally desired so far as is possible for a human being. 
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a) The replacement at 204el-2 of T O Kakov by T O dya86v makes possible the 
assertion that the love for the good is common to all of us and in that sense we are 
all lovers, people in love: 
- xoL\>xr\v 8f| T T | V ^ovXr\aiv Kcti T O V epGOTa T C U T O V nmepa K O I V O V o i e i 
eivai navTcov dvGpdmcov, K a i ndvxac, Tdya9a poiAeaGai ai)ToiQ 
eivai del, r| ncac, Xeyeiq; [...] xi 8f] ouv [...] ov Kdmag kpdv tpaju£i/, 
eiTuep ye ndmet; tcov avrcou epcocri Kai del [ . . .]; (205a5-bl) 
As we have seen above in 3.3.1., as lovers of the good, what we all desire is 
happiness through its eternal possession and, as a consequence, immortality 
(which makes this eternal possession possible). 
b) The comparison of the meaning of 'epco<;' with the meaning of 'JUoir|c>i<;' at 
205a5-d8 emphasizes that epcoq has to be taken in a wider sense and not just as 
'sexual passion'. If we understand 7toir|cnQ as "what causes whatever to pass 
from not-being into being", then all kinds of productive activities could be seen as 
forms of it, although the word is normally reserved only for one of its 
manifestations: poetry (205c4-9). Similarly, all of us are lovers -insofar as we all 
desire the good and happiness- and look for it in different ways, although what is 
denoted by the term 'epcoi;' is normally restricted to 'sexual desire' (205dl-8). 
Consequently, the term epcoq, while still retaining the intensity and eagerness 
characteristic of it in normal use, now clearly refers to the passion that dominates 
each person's life for attaining what is good.90 
c) At 206bl the argument turns back to sexual passion, exemplified in the 
eagerness of living creatures for procreation and their regard for their offspring 
(the procreation KOtTa T O acofxa as a means of achieving vicarious immortality) 
9 0 So Plato is not referring with epcoq here to "momentary impulses but wishes, desires, aspirations 
that determine the ultimate goals of life", i.e. an "over-all desire or wish for what is taken to be 
good" (Moravcsik (1971), p. 290). 
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but only to extend immediately the meaning of epcoQ to cultural creation 
(procreation Kocca xr\v \\fvxr\v, which is considered as a higher kind of erotic 
expression). 
Thus, the wider sense of epcoQ as the passion that involves our whole l ife, 9 1 along 
with its specific feature of zeal for beauty, are kept in this section.92 
9 1 Rowe (1998), pp. 181-182 interprets the whole passage as being about 'generic' epco ,^ maybe 
keeping its specific trace of eagerness, and supposes that animals' specific zeal for procreation is 
just a metaphor for exhibiting this more general sense. Differently, Santas (1988), p 34 and 
Waterfield (1994), p. 86 suppose that at 206b Plato refers again to specific fepcoq or sexual passion 
so that cultural procreation would be a sort of 'sublimation' in a Freudian sense. I am nearer 
Rowe's understanding of the passage because I do not think that Eros/fepco^ can be a sublimation 
of inferior expressions to superior ones. But I would emphasize that biological procreation is, 
nevertheless, here meant as a humble expression of something which, even in this precarious form, 
is in a way divine. (On this point see Fierro (1999), p. 148.) 
9 2 In other words epco? is always anov5r\ or 'intense desire, eagerness' (208b6). On this passage 
see Dover (1980), p. 151. 
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3.3.3. Eros' epyoc: different ways of working to obtain the good that we all 
desire 
3.3.3.1. Procreation in beauty: Eros' limited way of attaining his object of 
desire 
Thus, we all are lovers of the good. Moreover, we all want to possess it forever 
and benefit from eternal happiness. In consequence, we all want to be immortal 
(and exist forever) so that this enjoyment might be endless. In short, we all want to 
be like the gods. However, as we have already seen, Eros (and each of us as 
subjects of desire) is originally limited in the pursuit of this ambition because of 
his innate deficiency and mortality. And here again he confronts his own 
limitations: immortality for the eternal possession of the good and happiness wil l 
be unattainable. In our actual existence, in contrast to the gods, who are always 
absolutely the same, this can only take place through perpetual replacement and 
substitution so that what perishes leaves behind something new: 
xovxop yap xco xpoTtcp nav xo BVTIXOV acp^exai, ox> Tiavx&Ttaaiv xo 
ai)xo a e i cbaitep xo Geiov, aXXa xco xo arciov K O U 7caX,aio\)|j.evov 
fexepov veov feYKaxa^e'meiv oiov ai)xo fjv. (208a7-b2; see also 207d2-el) 
This impulse to be immortal finds expression in the leaving behind of a new 
creature that, replacing the one who dies, confers immortality 'through another' 
(Hackforth:9 3 Vicarious' immortality). This tendency is already present in us just in 
virtue of our being alive, insofar as our somatic and psychical identity is retained 
only through a continual renewal of the components of our body and our soul 
(207d2-208b6). So, paradoxically, the mechanism for keeping alive and, even 
more, of attaining some kind of survival after death is not achieved, as the self-
preservation instinct sensu stricto might imply, by the unfeasible ambition of 
See Hackforth (1950). 
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holding what we have attained and possess at the present.94 The continuance of life 
is made possible only by accepting the inevitable departure of any thing desired 
that has been obtained so that room -i.e. emptiness, lack- is left for both the re-
emergence of desire and the resulting search for a substitute for the lost object. 
These departures are 'small deaths' -signs of our mortality- and in the case of 
defending one's offspring at the price of one's life may imply actual death. 
The way in which this replacement takes place is by continuous procreation in 
what is beautiful so that creativity comes to be a necessary counterpart of life. As 
we have seen above in 3.3.2., Eros/epcoq now involves our whole life and is 
directed to the good and happiness, though retaining his/its particular feature of 
being intense desire for beauty. In this way, the passion for procreating in beauty 
in order to attain immortality, which in principle exists in all of us, becomes a 
specific means by which possession of the good and happiness can be sought.95 
3.3.3.2. Different ways of attaining vicarious immortality and, alongside it, a 
certain possession of the good: procreation KOCTCX TO aco(J.a and procreation 
K a r a xr|V \\fv%r\v. The speeches previous to Socrates' 
Although everybody is passionate for the good and happiness, we do not all 
understand it and look for it in the same way. As we are told at 205d3-5, people 
target it in different ways: some people focus their epcDQ on physical training, 
others on business, others on philosophy: 
dk'k'ox. (iev aXXr\ xpejiojievoi noXXa%r\ en'crircov <i.e.xov epcbxoo, f ] 
K a r a %pr||j.aTicT|4.ov t) K a r a fyikoyviivaoxiav t | K a r a (J>iA.ocro<|)iav... 
See Robin (1951), p. lxxxvi. 
See Robin (1951), p. lxxxiv, lxxxii. 
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Moreover, insofar as all of us "are fertile" (Kuouaiv), i.e. can potentially 
procreate (xiicxeiv) in a biological and/or cultural sense (206clff.), two different 
ways of trying to attain immortality by procreation in beauty and, in tandem with 
it, of possessing the good and happiness are available to all human beings: XOKOQ 
ev KaX.cp K a i Kaxa xo aco|i.a K a i Kaxa xr|v yv%T\v (206b7-8). While most 
people focus their epcoq on achieving immortality in relation to the body (208el-
5), others are passionate about becoming immortal through leaving behind works 
of culture and amazing deeds through which they gain undying memory and fame 
(209al; see also 207cl-208el). Thus, there are two main possible and different 
routes for the 'current' of desire or epcoq which drives each one's life. One does 
not exclude the other (since people can procreate biologically and also conceive of 
cultural objects); however, only one of them dominates. This implies that human 
beings can be of fundamentally two different types according to how they 
understand (at least unconsciously; they may not be aware of it) and, in fact pursue 
and passionately desire immortality as a requirement of the eternal possession of 
the good. 
So, on the one hand, we have that epCDQ for immortality which is present in 
animals when they procreate, give birth and then take all kinds of risks in order to 
protect their progeny who wil l replace them after their death (207c9ff.). In a great 
part of human beings their 'current' of desire also 'flows' through the same 
channel so that men and women, being pregnant or fertile (Kvricxai) in their 
bodies, are focused on begetting, giving birth ( X I K X E I V K a i yevvdv) 9 6 in what is 
9 6 According to Dover I'IKTEIV refers to the ejaculation of semen by the male and probably the 
emission of something like semen by the female in the moment of orgasm and not to "the complete 
process of creating a child" which would include what we normally call 'pregnancy' (Dover 
(1980), p. 147). However, Pender (1992) has shown that in Diotima's speech Plato refers to four 
different kinds of pregnancy: two physical -a 'female' type (the normal state of pregnancy of a 
woman after intercourse) and a 'male' type (ejaculation) - and two spiritual, both of which are 
metaphors of the two types of physical pregnancy. Differently Brisson (1998), p. 65 thinks that "a 
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beautiful and harmonious so that they become, in a way, immortal through their 
offspring. It is in this sense, i.e. as a means of procreation, that sexual intercourse 
between man and woman turns out to be something divine. The beautiful medium 
would be in this case an attractive sexual partner. 
On the other hand, there are some people who, being fecund in their souls, desire 
to engender illustrious deeds and cultural creations. A l l of what they do -
formidable acts of virtue such as Alcestis' death for her husband, Achilles' for 
Patroclus or Codrus' on behalf of his children (208cl-d9); beautiful creations such 
as Homer's and Hesiod's poems (209c7-d4); Solon's and Lycurgus' beautiful laws 
and works (209d4-e4)- are a result of the desire of people who are inspired by 
(|)iX.oxifJ,ia (208c3) and expect to gain fame in this way and so become in a way 
immortal by surviving in the collective memory after their death (208cl-d2). 
Procreation (XOKOQ) also takes place at this level by contact and association with 
the beautiful (6c7tx6|j.£Vo<; yap o i | i a i xo\> KaA.o\) K a l b\iika>v ai)x6p, & 
raxtaxi EKvei xiicxei K a i yevva, 209c2-3) and the 'children' (raxi8a<;, 
209dl) are here spiritual productions. 
The source of inspiration for these procreators (Y£VVT|x6pe<;, 209a4) is the 
physical and moral beauty possessed by an individual -whether this person is 
present or not ( K a i raxpcov KOCI dTCobv |i£|j.vrpevo<;, 209c3-4). 
As both forms of procreation in beauty involve a certain attainment of immortality 
and so are, to a certain extent, divine, we must suppose that through them human 
beings at least come nearer to the possession of the good we all desire. This means 
that, insofar as desire for biological procreation in beauty is normally present in 
most human beings, all of us could achieve a minimum and certain attainment of 
une conception masculine de Peducation associee a I'ejaculation, Diotime oppose une conception 
feminine comme procreation". 
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the good. Creativity at a cultural level, from its lowest to its highest forms, offers 
an immortality of better quality and takes us even closer to the possession of the 
good (the 'offspring' is better and lasts for more time (209c); these men are god-
like (BeiOQ, 209bl) 9 8 and honoured as such after death (209e)). In this way the 
natural attraction that we all feel for beauty becomes a first 'bridge' to the divine 
inherent to every human being. 
The benefits of Eros mentioned by the speakers previous to Socrates -the moral 
improvement of the lover and the beloved supported by Phaedrus and also by 
Pausanias in the form of homosexual love; the defence of medicine as an art 
concerning the epcoQ of the body and of the universe by Eryximachus; the 
etiology of human sexuality as a search for a lost unity traced by Aristophanes; the 
inspiration that love affairs but also poetry find in Eros (Agathon)- can be 
included in these two kinds of procreation in beauty, and the speakers themselves 
-especially the comedian Aristophanes, the poet Agathon, the physician 
Eryximachus- can also be described as spiritual progenitors of this sort. In a more 
general way all culture and creativity have to be seen as originating in human 
desire for immortality by procreation in beauty as a way of attaining the eternal 
possession of happiness and the good. 
9 Since animals also look for biological immortality, there will be in them something like a 
tendency to the good. However, as animals either do not have reason or only an embryonic form of 
it, they cannot really desire the good (as it is reason which is able to recognize and desire the 
good). For this point see below Chapter I I , Section II, 1.2.1.1.2.Cognitive capacity required by 
the appetites, pp. 130 ff.. 
9 8 Burnet (1901) and Dover (1980) prefer the emmendation fl9eoi; ('bachelor', 'unmarried') 
following Parmentier. But Bury (1932), Robin (1951), Vicaire (1989) and Rowe (1998) take Geioq 
which comes in the papirus and the manuscripts and fits better with the usual Platonic 
consideration of the poets -as well as of people like diviners, prophets and politicians- as 
individuals in a way inspired by the divinity but without knowledge (see Men. 99c cited by Bury 
(1932), p. 121; see also Rowe (1998), p. 190; a similar idea at Phaedr. 244a ff.). 
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However, even all these spiritual expressions of procreation of wisdom and virtue 
still remain attached to the beauty present in an individual, the procreator not still 
being able to understand the unity of beauty and even less Beauty itself. Only i f 
we follow Diotima further 'up', are procreation and attainment of immortality of a 
superior kind revealed, taking us as close as is humanly possible to the possession 
of the good and happiness: through a philosophical life, in which reason gains an 
increasing comprehension of the unity of Beauty so that the love for the truth 
receives maximum development, we may be able to glimpse eternal Beauty, attain 
the most perfect kind of vicarious immortality by procreating authentic virtue and, 
after death possibly gain a god-like immortality of the sort that Eros longs for. 
Thus (t>iX,oao(()ia or love of wisdom comes to be the truest expression of Love. 
Those who stay in the "Lesser Mysteries" only achieve procreation of what are, by 
contrast, "images of virtue", i.e. a sort of wisdom and virtue but not real 
knowledge and perfection. 
3.4. True love: the erotic ascent to Beauty itself 
3.4.1. The Higher Mysteries 
How reason's love for the truth can be developed is described by Diotima as an 
initiation into the higher Mysteries of love (xa...xeXea fcjcojr/ciKCX 210al), i.e. 
similar to the e7i07ixeia in which the sacred objects were presented to the 
initiated person in the Eleusinian mysteries.99 In this way, the stages of education 
of the philosopher on the way to wisdom are presented as stipulated 'steps' toward 
a final revelation. The use of the metaphor and of the language of the mysteries 
also allows Plato to suggest that access to Beauty itself is not just the completion 
of a mere epistemological ambition but, simultaneously, an access to something 
9 9 Several scholars have pointed out the use of the language of the mystery religions at Symp. 210a-
212a (Cornford (1950), p. 77; Dover (1980), p. 155, O'Brien (1984) pp. 203-205 and cf. also his 
references to other scholars at p. 203 n. 49; Rowe (1998), pp. 192-194, Brisson (1998), pp. 65-71). 
The philosopher is also described as an initiated person in Phaedr. 249c and Phaed. 69b-c. 
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divine, which brings, along with knowledge, the maximum satisfaction of the 
desire for the good and happiness together with 'first-rate' immortality, i.e. an 
achievement of Eros's object/s of desire as fully as is humanly possible. The erotic 
behaviour of ordinary people, who procreate in beauty in relation to the body or to 
the soul, constitutes a preliminary 'step' or a stage of "Lesser Mysteries" that 
precede this higher initiation, 1 0 0 should this conduct be understood in the "correct 
way" (edv lie, bp0cB<; M-exiri, 210a2),101 i.e. as a first attempt to find immortality 
in order to possess the good forever and, in conjunction with this, happiness (in 
other words, in order to be like the gods). The representation of a ful l development 
of a philosophical life through the image of the mysteries also makes it possible to 
introduce the idea that only people especially qualified are able to undergo i t . 1 0 2 
3.4.2. The erotic ascent: stages previous to the contemplation of beauty itself. 
The ascent can be seen as erotic for two reasons: firstly, the epco<; that inspires 
this lover operates as usual out of lack of its object of desire: in this case, wisdom; 
secondly, the passage through each 'step' and progress to the next one is attained 
through natural attraction to beauty and love for the good. The passion for 
attaining fu l l wisdom is what keeps this lover moving to the following stage since 
the comprehension of what beauty is, achieved in the stages previous to the 
contemplation of Beauty itself, proves to be incomplete. However, desire for the 
truth is not enough for this ascent to the knowledge of Beauty itself: reason's 
100 KXVVX uev ovv xa epomica tacoq, c5 E<DKpaxe<;, K&V <yo u.vr|6eir)<; (209e5-210a2) 
implies that the works of Eros described in the preceding part can be taken as a prelude of the 
"Higher Mysteries". 
1 0 1 Although this conditional can also refer to the correct comprehension of the person initiated in 
the higher mysteries. 
1 0 2 Diotima (actually Socrates) establishes this idea from the beginning: xa 8e xeXea 
eiro7txiKd...o-UK oi5' e'v oioq x' &v fein? (210al-2). It is also expressed through the fact that 
the grasp of Beauty itself depends on the eventual fulfilment of certain conditions and on the 
execution of certain prescriptions (cf. Fierro (2001b) pp. 32-33). 
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cognitive function as well its desire for the truth are required in order to 
generalize, and so identify the unity of beauty at each level and stimulate the 
desire for knowledge by showing new possible objects of love. 1 0 3 In other words, 
this lover is a philosopher. Since this love is what takes someone nearest to the 
attainment of the object of desire of all human beings -the good, happiness and a 
god-like immortality as a requirement for the other two-, (|)iA.oao(|)ia turns out to 
be the most authentic expression of £pco<;, which is naturally again an 
'intermediate' and 'intermediary' between the mortal and the immortal, the human 
and the divine realms. The subject who carries out the ascent is an initiated youth, 
who is helped by a tutor -an advanced philosopher- who correctly leads him up the 
scala amor is (210a). 
The steps of the scala amoris are: 
a) Physical beauty: ...dno EVOQ km ovo K a i crao Svoiv Em rcdvxa xd 
KaX.a acb|j,axa...(211c3-4). The entrance to the first stage is, when young, 
through attraction to beautiful bodies (KaXa ac6|j,axa, 210a6). The mere 
attraction to physical beauty is quite common in everybody - i n fact we have seen 
in the "Lesser Mysteries" that most people feel attracted to beautiful bodies and 
desire to procreate in them. The difference is that, under the guidance of his tutor, 
the initiated lover only procreates beautiful discourses (Xbyovq KaXauQ, 210a8) 
-without having sexual intercourse with the beloved- and that he extends his love 
for a single beautiful body to many of them. In this way, he arrives at the 
understanding that the beauty manifested in all the bodies is "one and the same" 
(ev xe K a i xavxbv, 210b3) and despises the passion for one body, so that a sort 
of 'disindividualization' of physical love takes place.104 The recognition of what 
the beauty of bodies is may consist in the understanding of what makes any body 
beautiful -the appropriate proportions that make a body harmonious and graceful, 
1 0 3 See Moravcsik (1971), pp. 288 and 290. 
1 0 4 See Robin (1951), p. lciii and Nussbaum (1986), pp. 179-181. 
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for example- and in the Xoyoi that express this understanding in words. In a more 
general sense it can be considered a sort of aesthetic education.105 Nevertheless, 
the most valuable lesson for starting to develop a philosophical mind is the 
comprehension that beauty is something beyond the particular bodies. 
b) Beauty of the soul and of habits and activities: ...ano KaA,cov aoo(J.dxcov km 
xa Kdka e7UTT)5ei)|LiaTa... (211c4-5). In the next stage of his erotic-
philosophical education the lover learns to value the beauty of the soul as being 
superior to physical beauty.106 In order to procreate beautiful speeches that can 
make young men better107 he needs ecu 9edcraa0ai t o ev XOIQ 
E7UXT|5e"u|iaai K a i xoiq v6|ioi<; KaXov K a i xcn>x' ' I 8 E I V 6XI nav ai)xo 
ai>xop auyyevei; eaxiv (210c3-5). This might mean that in order to understand 
better what makes an individual virtuous -and so beautiful in relation to his soul-, 
he needs to comprehend in a more general way what kind of laws and activities 
for a community can promote this individual perfection and what kind of beauty 
they would need to have in common.108 At the end of this stage the lover probably 
goes beyond his attachment to individual physical beauty (see ...xo 7tepi xo 
Q C D | i a KaA.ov afiiKpov x i +|ynaT|xai e iva i , 210c5-6) and so is ready to move 
to a more abstract level. However, this does not mean that he rejects physical 
beauty but just that he values and understands it in the light of a more spiritual 
beauty. 
c) Beauty of the sciences: ...arco xcov E7tixr|Oe'U|j.dxoov e m x d Katax 
| i a 9 f p a x a . . . (211c5-6). Now the lover needs to consider different kinds of 
knowledge in order to understand the beauty that is inherent in them (ejr.iaxr||a,CDV 
1 0 5 See Robin (1951), pp. xcii and xciii and Moravcsik (1971). 
1 0 6 Some physical beauty is still needed at least so that the lover does not find the beloved 
repulsive: ...edv eitieiKtiQ cbv tnv ^fv%i]v xiq K6LU aniKpov av6oq (210b8-cl). 
1 0 7 The young men that become better through these words at 210c2-3 can include the lover as well 
as his beloved (in case he is a young man as well). The beloved has to be potentially a virtuous 
person in order to possess the kind of beauty that the lover will learn at this stage to appreciate. 
1 0 8 Similarly Robin (1951), p. xciii. 
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K&XXoq, 210c7), i.e. what constitutes each of them as sciences or their perfection 
as such. This leads him to a comprehension of the immense beauty common to all 
of them (npoq noXv ...xo KOLXOV, 210c7-dl), i.e. of what makes them, in a more 
general way, sciences. This comprehension of the excellence of sciences in 
general makes him definitively abandon the understanding of beauty through 
particular instances (see 210dl-3: ...p:r|K£Ti T O raxp' evi, dbcnep 6iKexr\q, 
dyarcoov Jcai5apioi) K&XXoq f\ avQpcbnov xivo<; f\ eni.xr\dei)[iaxoq evoq, 
oouA,ei)COV (|)a\>?iOQ f j K a i ap.iKpoA.6yoq...). Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that he leaves either physical beauty outside his scope of understanding or, 
especially, beauty of soul and of laws and institutions (i.e. the previous stages) but 
that he acquires a new -better- comprehension of them from a wider point of view. 
The beautiful discourses and magnificent thoughts that are procreated at 
this level (KOXXOVC, K a i KaXovq Xoyovc, K a i 
(ieYaA,07ipejiei<;...5iavofi|iata ev (|)iXoao(|)ia d(|)06vcp, 210d5-6) must refer 
to the intellectual developments made by the lover in relation to the beauty of the 
sciences in general, "ev fyiXoootfia" seems to indicate that at this stage the lover 
has arrived at a more complete development of a philosophical mind in which he 
is able to operate with different kinds of sciences and understand the kinship 
between them. 
Especially after this last stage, the lover has developed and fortified his rational 
capacity for understanding the unity of beauty and the desire for wisdom that 
propels this enterprise. He is now prepared for the final stage: the revelation of 
the science of Beauty itself. 
His spontaneous attraction to beauty and desire for wisdom have facilitated the 
whole progress. However, all the previous stages by which the lover achieves 
contemplation of Beauty itself are described as "toils" (di e|0,7Upocj9ev ndvxeq 
J C O V O I , 210e6). Thus the erotic ascent, though inspired by the best kind of passion, 
implies a life of arduous toil in order to catch a possible glimpse of the Beauty 
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which the philosopher longs for. As the old proverb asserts: xaXeivx xoc KCtXd 
(SeeffiMa. 304e8).109 
3.4.3. The science of Beauty itself 
...drcd xclov |xa0Tpdxcov kn E K E I V O x6 |id8r||j.a xeXEvxf\ar\, 6 eaxiv [...] 
xov KaA.au |id0ri|j.a... (211c6-8) 
3.4.3.1. The Idea of Beauty itself 
At the end of the ascent the lover/philosopher finally arrives at the object of his 
labours: a knowledge unique of its kind ([dav xoiatxr|v, 210d7), being above 
the other sciences, and having as its object what is beautiful in itself. From 210e 
we find an extensive description of what the Idea of Beauty would be l ike 1 1 0 and 
especially of what it would not be like. 
a) Pureness and 'disindividualization' of the Idea: The things that are beautiful 
(xa KaA,d) do not have beauty as their single property: because of being 
individual things, they necessarily are a 'bundle' of properties111. Only the Idea of 
Beauty, which is in no way instantiated (oi)8' av ^avxaaOficTExai ocbxcip xo 
KCXXOV dlov rcpoacmtov xi abSs x e ^P e G ° ^ 8 E aXXo ovbev cov aco|j,a 
|i.£xe%£i, ovbk. TIC, Xbyoq oiibe nq £Jciaxfi|j.T|, ovde nov bv ev EXEpcp 
xivi, diov E V £cbcp r\ E V yr\ t) E V oi)pavcp r) E V xcp d^Xcp..., 211a5-bl), is 
uniquely beautiful and, in this sense, pure and perfectly beautiful. For the same 
reason Beauty itself, being non-instantiated, is absolute: it is beautiful in every 
1 0 9 Thus, I agree with D. Frede (1993), pp. 409 ff. that in the Symposium Plato introduces beauty as 
something that can awaken in everybody the desire for the good but I disagree in that the task of 
looking for the good that we all desire is, in consequence, out of enchantment and without effort -
in opposition of the Republic. The difficulty of pursuing the real good is stressed in the 
Symposium, especially in relation to the philosopher. 
1 1 0 See Nehamas (1999), p. 303. He says that here we find the most vivid and extensive description 
of a Platonic Form. 
1 1 1 See McCabe (1994), pp. 131-161. 
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way (oi) xr\ jiev KaXov, TTJ 5' d iaxpov; . . .OUOE 7ipo<; |iev t o KaXov, 7tpo<; 
5 E TO aiaxpov..., 211a2), it does not vary according to time ( . . . T O T E |iev, T O T E 
8 E OV, 211a3) or place (ox>8' ev0a [ I E V KaAov, ev0a 6E d iaxpov, 211a4) or, 
indeed, according to who is judging the thing as beautiful (d)Q T ia i |J.£V bv 
KOLXOV, T i a i 5E a iaxpov, 211a4-5). Thus, Beauty itself is beautiful and this is 
without qualification, while particular beautiful things are only beautiful in 
relative or qualified terms.112 
b) Identity and immutability of the Idea: The Idea of Beauty is eternal and 
uniform, remaining always the same without alterations ( ae i bv K C U obxs 
Yvyv6|i£vov obxe ditoA.A,ti|j.£vov, ovxe ai)^av6(j.evov ovxe <j)0lvov... 
H-OVOEISEQ OCEI 6V, 211al-bl). In this sense it is by itself (orino KOC9' avxo 
|j,£0' avxov...bv, 211bl). The Idea does not suffer any alteration as a result of the 
participation of the beautiful things (jtdvTOt KCtA.a E K E ' I V O D |i£T£XOVTa 
Tpojiov Tiva T O I O V T O V , oiov yiyvoiievaiv T E TCDV aXXcov K a i 
dJuoX.X,\)|j.Evcov | i f | T E T I KXEOV \ir\XE EAXXTTOV Y'vyvEcrOai jxr|5e raxaxeiv 
H-T |8EV, 211b2-5). 
c) The divine character of the Idea: The features of the Idea of Beauty are 
summarized at 211el-4 and at the same time its unique and divine character is 
underlined: ... aired TO KaX.6v ' I S E I V EiXiKpiV£<;, KaGapov, d|i£iKTOV, 
dXX.d |0.fi avanXe&v aapKcov T E dv0pco7tivcov K a i x P c o M - a ' c c o v K a ^ -
6iXXr\q noXXr\q (j)A,Dapiar; 0vr|Tfi<;, aXX'avxo TO 0E1OV KaXov Svvaixo 
\iovoei5eq KaTiSeiv. 
In short this science of Beauty itself is presented as only attainable with great 
efforts after all previous steps have been undergone and described as a sudden 
1 1 2 The difference would be that in the form of Beauty the predicate 'beautiful' would apply 
without qualification, while it would be applied with qualification to the instances of beauty (on 
this point see Moravcsik (1971)). This takes us into the issue of self-predication of the Forms. I 
will not consider this problem since it is out of the scope of the aims of our discussion here. 
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revelation of something which is not only uniform, identical, pure and common to 
all kinds of beautiful things -like a an Aristotelian universal- but also wonderful 
(e£od<j)VT|<; Kax6\|/£xai xi 0a\)[iaax6v XT)V §VG\V KOK6V, 210e4-5) and 
divine (TO 9 E I O V KaX,6v 211e3). Nevertheless, what exactly the connection of 
the previous steps is with this final stage from an epistemological point of view, 
what each of the stages in fact consists in and what kind of relation exists between 
the beautiful particulars and Beauty itself remains an unsolved mystery in this text. 
3.4.3.2. Beauty and Goodness 
From the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon on, the good has been presented 
alongside beauty as the object of Eros/epocx;. At 204elff. (see also 206a3ff.), in 
fact, the good replaces beauty, which becomes a medium of procreation for the 
attainment of immortality, happiness and permanent possession of the good. 
However, here in the erotic ascent, the object of love is again clearly presented as 
beautiful things and, above all, as Beauty itself. Although the exact relationship 
between the good and the beautiful is never established, a tentative interpretation 
does nevertheless seem to be required. For this purpose I wi l l briefly take into 
account what other texts suggest on this point. 
In Rep. 6.508e3-509a7 beauty is an attribute of knowledge and truth, which have 
the Form of the Good as their cause, but, above all and to a higher degree, is an 
aspect of the Good: 
- [xf|v xou dya9ov iSeav] dixiav 5' kniaxf\\xr\Q ouaav Kai dA/n9eia<;, 
cb<; yiYvcoaKO|j.evT|Q |j.ev Siavoo-u, ofoxco 8e KaA,6v dji^ oxepcov OVTGOV, 
yvojaeax; xe Kai aXxfiziaq, aXXo Kai KdXAaov exi T O U T C O V t|yo\)|j.£vo<; 
amo [i.e. T O dya96v] bpQ&q T|ync7TV [...] 
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- d|xnxavov K&XXOC, [...] Xkyei^, ei e7r.iaxfpr|v (lev K a i dA/nGeiav 
Ttapexei, ai)x6 8' imep xavxa KOXXEX eaxiv 1 1 3 
This implies that, although the Good cannot be reduced to what is beautiful, 
everything beautiful has to be good in order to be considered really beautiful. 
In Phaedr. 250b5-6 Beauty is referred to as the only Form which stands out 
because of its blaze (see K&Xkoc,... Xa\inpbv) when we, being in a disembodied 
condition and following the gods in their revolutions through the heavens, have 
caught some sight of them in the place above the heavens. In consequence, Beauty 
is also here, in our incarnate existence, the most visible of things (see Phaedr. 
250c-d). As emphasised, a few lines later, Beauty of all Forms has the privilege of 
being eK(t)aveaxaxov... K a i epaanicoxaxov (Phaedr. 250d7-8). 
I f we take these passages from the Republic and the Phaedrus together, everything 
seems to suggest that Beauty would be a gleaming, resplendent aspect of what is 
good and really exists. In the Symposium beauty is what awakens attraction. This 
erotic attraction to what is beautiful is, in fact, part of a generic desire for the 
eternal possession of the good in the following way: the attraction to beauty 
derives, in fact, from passion for procreating in it; through this procreation, the 
subject of desire attains a vicarious immortality and so a kind of permanent 
possession of the good. In other words the epcog for beauty contributes to the 
attainment of what is good insofar as procreation in beauty assists us in the 
attainment of the good universally desired. 
1 1 3 "-... you must conceive it [i.e. the Form of the Good] as being the cause of knowledge, and of 
truth in so far as known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be 
something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it. [...] -An inconceivable beauty you 
speak of [... ] if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet it surpasses them in beauty." (I 
follow here Shorey's translation). 
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For the above reasons it can be concluded that when we feel attracted to 
something beautiful and pursue it, we are also, albeit unawares, pursuing 
something good. This ostensible attraction to beauty and the enthusiasm it 
awakens in us for its pursuit is what Plato seems to register as a natural auxiliary 
to the universal search for the good. But this natural attraction is not however 
sufficient i f we want to come as near as possible to the attainment of the good: a 
rigorous training of reason is required in tandem with it i f we wish to have access 
to higher levels of beauty and, concomitantly, of the good. 
Thus, i f we accept that everything which is beautiful has to be good, when in the 
erotic ascent the lover-philosopher comprehends the single beauty common to all 
beautiful bodies, he also understands their goodness or perfection: i.e. what makes 
them beautiful qua perfect. Similarly at the stage of understanding the beauty of 
soul and habits and activities, he would understand what makes souls, habits and 
activities beautiful qua perfect. And once again at the stage of discernment the 
beauty of sciences, the initiated person would realize what makes the sciences 
beautiful qua perfect. This explains why, although what is generalized and 
identified by reason is the same at all levels, i.e. the unity of beauty, some levels 
are harder than others and, in fact, it may take a whole life to understand them. It 
also means that, i f someone catches a glimpse of Beauty itself, he not only 
understands what makes all different kinds of things beautiful but also what makes 
them perfect. 
3.4.3.3. The Idea of Beauty as ethical principle: wisdom and virtue 
But why are the attainment of the knowledge of Beauty -the most visible aspect of 
the Good- and all the efforts that that presupposes so important? The answer is the 
typical Socratic one: all of us desire the real good but only those who know what 
this is can attain i t . 1 1 4 This answer, translated in erotic terms in the Symposium, is 
1 1 4 In Socrates' preliminary conversation with Lysis it is also suggested that in order for Lysis to 
become able to do whatever he wants and be happy, he has to become wise (Lys. 208e4 ff.). This 
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as follows: all of us feel attracted to beauty and want to procreate in it and thus 
attain an immortality that enables us to achieve eternal possession of the good and 
happiness. However, only those who are able to know Beauty itself can procreate 
real virtue and not just "images" of it, thus getting as near as possible in this life to 
the attainment of the real good, and of happiness. This means that a subject able 
constantly to produce real virtue would be someone who has been able not only to 
undergo the first stage of the erotic ascent, so that he understands what is beautiful 
(and good) for the body and the soul (i.e. for the individual). He has also been able 
to move to the next stage and enlighten himself as to what habits and activities are 
beautiful (and good) for the community and, afterwards, to move further 'up' and 
understand, in a more general way, what is beautiful (and good) in the context of 
the sciences and finally to attain the knowledge of Beauty itself. Thus his life wi l l 
consist in virtuous acts procreated in the light of this knowledge, whereas people 
who do not develop their passion for the truth remain attached to beautiful 
instances and cannot differentiate them from Beauty itself and consequently they 
do not always procreate in the most appropriate way and in the most appropriate 
medium. I f they do perform virtuous acts, they do it by chance and not out of 
knowledge. In this sense they are able to produce only "images of virtue" by 
comparison with what the philosopher is able to procreate (authentic virtue 
founded on knowledge). This would be the case of the different kinds of creators 
mentioned at 208e5ff. and also of poets like Aristophanes115 or Agathon who, in a 
way, have reported some things which are true about Eros but, because of their 
lack of knowledge, fail to understand when and why they speak the truth. 
In this way a progressive enlightenment of reason, allowing the truth of what is 
really beautiful (and good) to be attained depends on a parallel development of the 
desire for the truth so that this 'current' of desire may finally gain control over our 
lives. As we have seen above, epcoi; is a force that dominates and determines our 
will make of him an optimum subject of desire (he will do what he wants) and, at the same time, an 
optimum object of desire since, being wise, he will be good and useful in human terms (Lys. 210e). 
1 1 5 For more on this point see Fierro (1999), pp. 147-148. 
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whole life but flows in different ways in different human beings: some have their 
life dominated by a physical passion; others by a creative passion with the aim of 
obtaining fame and honour. If someone is to have his life dominated by passion 
for the truth and so get as close as possible to the attainment of the real good 
through the wisdom that he may obtain at the end of the road, this needs a long 
development of the kind described in the erotic ascent. In this way Plato 
transforms the hermeneutic of desire in such a way that our realization as subjects 
of desire -i.e. in the attainment of what we want- depends upon understanding 
ourselves as subjects who desire the truth above all. 1 1 6 
3.4.3.4. Human limitations in our actual existence on the access to the Idea of 
Beauty itself 
In contrast to the Phaedo, where the possibility of full attainment of truth in this 
life seems to be denied (see Phaed. 65a9-66b7), and in accordance with the 
Republic where the philosopher, as he leaves the cavern, contemplates the "sun" 
-i.e. the Good- (Rep. 516b4-7), the Symposium clearly asserts the possibility of 
knowledge of Beauty itself in this life. 1 1 7 
The attainment of this knowledge seems, nevertheless, to have limits. First of all, 
in earlier steps of the argument it has been established that a) Eros' prospective 
structure makes him deficient in relation to the future insofar as, even if he attains 
what he desires in the present, there is no guarentee that he will also attain it in the 
future (200b9-e6); b) because of his lacking-rievia condition, Eros is constantly 
obtaining and losing his object of desire (203e2-4) so that his characteristic kpya 
have to consist in perpetually replacing what is constantly lost through procreation 
(207c8ff). c) Moreover knowledge (e7tiaxfi|a.T|) that has already been acquired 
requires continuous replacement through the exercise of memory in order to be 
See Part Five: "True Love" of Foucault (1985), pp. 228-246. 
See 211dl-3, 211e4, 211b5-6 and 211c9-dl. 
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kept integral in our minds (208al-7). Thus, even in his access to Beauty itself, the 
philosopher-as-lover must be constrained by these limitations, d) The term 
e£ou(|)VT|<; (210e4) used to describe the "sudden" vision of Beauty indicates a 
temporal point of view of how the attainment of wisdom is both possible and 
limited: On the one hand, it refers to the abrupt move into an eternal reality where 
we lose our temporal limitations. However, for us as human beings and merely 
deficient subjects of desire this access to eternity only lasts for a moment: only the 
divine exists forever and is always identical to itself (208a8-bl).118 Moreover, at 
this level, Eros keeps operating by procreation (and thus by constant replacement 
of the object through which immortality and possession of the good are attained). 
However, the 'offspring' is of a superior kind: real virtue and not images of it. In 
short, full possession of the object of love at least in our actual existence is not 
possible. 
However, in spite of these limitations, there are many suggestions that the 
knowledge of Beauty that takes place in this life has certain degree of permanence 
(ivct118bis yv<x> oared xeXevxwv 6 eaxi K C C X O V . kuxavda tov piov, [...] 
euiep nov aA.A,o0i, (3ICQT6V dvdpd>Kco, 9eco|ievGp aind T O KCXA .6V , 211dl-
3; fyavXov |3iov, 211e4; oxav 8fi T I Q [...] E K E I V O TO KaA,dv apxiTKXi 
KccGopdv, 211b5-6; ...iva 1 1 8 b i s yvep aired TEXEVXWV 6 eaxi K O C X O V , 211C9-
dl). This seems difficult to reconcile with the above. An illustrative example from 
the Meno 97aff., which is used in that dialogue to trace the difference between 
emaTrpT) and bp0T) 56^a, may be of help in understanding this. In that 
1 1 8 On this interpretation of e£od<|)vr|<; in correlation with 11671? as different ways in which Plato 
refers to both the possibility of knowledge and its limitations see Steinthal (1993). Similarly in 
Aristotle while God is always happy by enjoying his being vor\ai$ vof)C>eco?, human beings only 
enjoy this condition sometimes (Met. XII, vii, 1072b). Velasquez (1986) suggests that the 
e£od<|>vri<; indicates that the contemplation of Beauty itself is something radically different from 
the kind of understanding achieved in the previous levels. 
n 8 b i i \ v a Lamb, Dover; vva Kod Bury; KOU Burnet (following the the mss.). 
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dialogue we are told that, while bpQr\ 86^a cannot refer to an ocma in order to 
justify its Tightness, e7UC"tfi|j.r| implies both the possession of right beliefs and 
reference to a justification of them. This justification is compared with the 
situation in which someone is able to say what the road to Larisa is like because he 
has actually walked it, whereas the person with bp8r| 86£a would be like 
someone who describes the road in terms of what someone else has told him. 
Similarly, the philosopher who has contemplated Beauty itself can always refer his 
comprehension and behaviour to it, even if he cannot keep contemplating it, 
because he has actually followed the stages of the erotic ascent and caught sight of 
this reality (out of time and always existent). However, because of the limitations 
which have been highlighted above, even the philosopher who has arrived at the 
end of his journey will need to go on repeating at least part of his journey. 
Nevertheless, with the help of the marks of his previous itinerary, his path to a 
new direct contact with what is really beautiful and good might be easier for him. 
Thus, as even the attainment of an eternal reality is not permanent, there is no 
annihilation of epco '^ 'lacking condition';119 for at least in this life, a final 
completion and unending fulfilment of its lacking condition is unattainable for 
human beings. 
3.4.3.5. Immortality through procreation in Beauty and eschatological 
godlike immortality for the philosopher at Symp. 212a2-7 
As shown above at 3.3.3.1. and 3.3.3.2, although everybody desires immortality as 
a means of attaining eternal possession of the good and, alongside it, happiness, 
Diotima teaches Socrates that, at least in our present existence, we are able to 
attain only a sort of immortality, which consists in procreation ( T O K O Q ) or 
1 1 9 By contrast Robin (1951), p. xcvii and ch. 2 of Rist (1964), pp. 16-55 (see esp. pp. 31-34) think 
that, after contemplating Beauty itself, epcoq becomes overflowing love. Similarly Osborne 
(1994), especially in chapters 3 and 4, pp. 52-116. See also her criticism to Vlastos and Nygren, 
pp. 222-226 and and Armstrong (1961) and (1964). 
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generation (yevvriai^) in beauty so that we leave behind a biological or spiritual 
replacement of ourselves. 
But in dialogues like the Phaedo,120 Plato maintains that proper immortality, i.e. 
the soul's continuing to exist on its own when after death we stop being a 
compound of soul and body, is also open to us. He distinguishes there basically 
two kinds of immortality: a) ordinary eschatological immortality, which consists 
in a shadowy existence of an inferior degree after death and is open to all human 
beings, except the philosopher; b) a god-like immortality which consists in an 
existence to a higher degree after death in company with the Ideas and belongs 
only to the philosopher. 
Threre has been a big debate about what kind or kinds of immortality are meant at 
Symp. 212a2-7,121 once the lover has attained contemplation of Beauty itself. The 
passage at issue says: 
f) oi)K ev0\)|Lifj [...] 6xi evxocuGoc a-bxop ia.ovaxo'0 yevriaexai, bpcovxi 63 
bpaxdv xo KCXA,6V, X I K X E I V O U K eiSootax dpexfji;, dxe OVK eid(bXox> 
e(|)a7rxop:evcp, OLXXOL aXr[Qr\, dxe xov aXr\Qox>q e<t>a7txo(j.evop- xeicovxi 8e 
dpexfiv aXr\Qr\ K O U 9pe\|/a|j.evcp mdpxei 8eo<j>iA.ei yeveoQax, K C C I 
eiTiep xcp OLXXQL) dvGpcbjccov dBavdxcp Kai E K E ' I V C D ; 1 2 2 
1 2 0 For more on this point in the Phaedo see Fierro (2001a), 27-30. On the different kinds of 
immortality in the Republic, see Chapter 2, Section TV, pp. 244 ff. and Conclusion, pp. 270 ff.. 
1 2 1 The statement of the status quaestionis here is a reduced version of Fierro (2001a), 32-34. 
1 2 2 "Or do you not recognize [... ] that it is under these conditions alone, as he [the lover] sees 
beauty with what has the power to see it, that he will succeed in bringing to birth, not phantoms of 
virtue, because he is not grasping a phantom but true virtue, because he is grasping the truth; and, 
that when he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue, it belongs to him to be loved by the gods, 
and to him, if to any human being, to be immortal?" (Rowe's translation). 
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In the first part of the twentieth century scholars tended to take for granted that at 
Symp. 212a2-7 Plato was alluding to an eschatological immortality for the 
philosopher similar to the one described in the Phaedo.ni But in 1950 Hackforth 
challenged this view and, through a more faithful analysis of the text, underlined 
that in the passage at issue Diotima describes the philosopher's activity just as 
procreation (ykvvr]Gic, or T O K O Q ) in beauty and so in the same terms that she 
described immortality in the previous part of the speech. Since, in addition to this, 
Hackforth does not find any reference to the eschatological immortality described 
in the Phaedo, he goes so far as to conclude that "Plato had come to feel doubts 
about the validity of that final argument for the soul's immortality" in the Phaedo 
and so had a "relapse into temporary scepticism" about personal eschatological 
immortality, together with the doctrine of avd|ivr|cn.<; on which it is partly 
grounded. It is for this reason that in later works -Republic X, Phaedrus, Laws-
Plato would have adduced other arguments in order to prove that the soul is 
immortal.124 
Hackforth's interpretation has had a fundamental influence on all interpretations 
of this passage of the Symposium after him. In general scholars have tended, at 
least partially, to agree with him, although some have introduced variations to 
Hackforth's extreme conclusion about a period of scepticism in Plato on this 
point.125 Luce maintains that at 212a2-7 "immortality in eternity", i.e. 
eschatological god-like immortality of the kind that appears in the Phaedo is 
"latent but not abandoned".126 O' Brien1 2 6 b i s asserts that literal and godlike 
1 2 3 See especially Bury (1932), pp. xliv-xlvi. However, Bury also pointed out that in the 
Symposium immortality of the soul in the sense of the Phaedo or the Phaedrus is not expressly 
stated. 
1 2 4 Hackforth (1950), p. 45. Hackforth (1955), p. 21, in spite of the criticisms received, some years 
later still maintains his position. 
1 2 5 So Morrison (1964), p. 44. 
1 2 6 Luce (1952), p. 140. See for a similar position Guthrie (1975), pp. 387-392, Dover (1980), pp. 
149-150 and also Rowe (1998), pp. 184-185. 
i26bis 0 . B r i e n (1984), 199-201. 
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immortality as a prize from the gods is meant at Symp. 212a2-7. In his recent 
translation of the Symposium Gill also says that at 212a2-7 an eschatological 
immortality for the philosopher of the kind that is described in Phaedo is 
suggested, but "as a bare possibility" and as "a product of an extended process by 
which the mind or soul becomes purified from the body".128 However, Hackforth's 
thesis is still defended nowadays, as for example by Sedley.129 
In short we can say that two interpretations of the text are open to us: 
a) On the one hand, Diotima says that, at the end of the erotic ascent, when the 
lover of wisdom catches sight of Beauty itself, he procreates (TiKteiv) in it. This 
coincides with the description of immortality through procreation in beauty that 
has been precisely defined in the rest of Diotima's speech. 
b) On the other hand, the lover who reaches this final step in the erotic ascent is in 
contact with orind T O KaA,dv (211d3; 211el; 211e3), 6 ecru Kakbv (211c8-9), 
which is eternal by being uniform, unchangeable and by itself,130 non-spatial,131 
pure, clean, unmixed132 and thus different from beautiful particulars.133 So he is in 
1 2 7 Evangeliou criticizes severely Hackforth's proposal (cf. especially Evangeliou (1985), pp. 209-
211) but not with very happy arguments. It will be clear from my discussion how I diverge from 
him. 
1 2 8 Gill (1999), p.xliv, n. 65 and and pp. 79-80 nn. 123 and 125. See also Waterfield (1994), p. 90. 
1 2 9 Sedley (1999), p.310 n.2 says, as Hackforth does, that Diotima's account does not leave any 
room for belief in an immortal soul but he adds that Diotima's exposition must not be assumed to 
be identical to Plato's view. 
1 3 0 . . .ain6 KGC8' cdrzb jie0' co/ccu uovoei8e<; del 6v... (211bl-2). 
1 3 1 ... .oi>8e rcou bv ev fexepop xivi, oiov ev £opcp f) ev vfj f| ev oupccvcip f\ ev top aAAcp... 
(211a9-bl). 
1 3 2 ...eiXiKpiveq, KocGapov, &u.eua;ov... (21 lei) . 
1 3 3 ...ovSccO (JjavcaaBfiaeixxi avrco x6 KCXA.6V O I O V rcpoaamov ti oi>5e x e^P e? oi)8e 
&XXo ovSkv cov ccojxa \ i E i k x e i - (211a5-7). 
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contact with a Form that has all the characteristics of the Forms in the Phaedo, 
which might be seen as bearing upon the possibility of his achieving the highest 
kind of eschatological immortality that is described in this dialogue (and not just 
the survival through reincarnation that is available to all human souls according to 
the Phaedo). 
Some interpreters have thought that only a) is justified in this passage; whilst 
others propose that both a) and b) can be defended. I claim, however, that it is the 
case that both kinds of immortality are meant in this passage. The claim itself is 
not new but I think I have a decisive argument, one which is predominantly 
founded on a consideration of the Greek text at 212a2-7 (especially of the use of 
tenses). 
a) In 212a2-5 we read: 
fi oi)K fevGuufi [...] 6xi kvxavQa ai)xo3 [iova%ov yevf\aexai, bpcovxi <ft 
bpaxdv T O KaXov, X I K X E I V OVK eiScoAxx apexTi<;, a x e o i ) K ei5cGX,ou 
ec()aJixo|j.8vcp, aXAxx aA,T|8fi, a x e xov dAr|8o\)<; echaitTOfievco...; 
Here Plato clearly refers to an immortality which consists in the replacement 
through procreation in beauty of what is lost (2.2.2). This is how, as has been 
previously established, epcoQ of the beautiful comes to be for the eternal 
possession of the good (cf. 204e-205a) and, as a consequence, for immortality (cf. 
3 4 In Phaed. 65d4-8 it is asserted that "something just itself, something beautiful, something 
good" exist. Each of these things (the equal itself, the beautiful itself, i.e. what each thing is) is 
unvarying and constant, never admits change and is uniform and by itself, is invisible and known 
only by reasoning (78dl-79a5). This dimension of reality is also described as the pure, the 
everlasting, the immortal and changeless (79d2). For a good summary of the so-called 'theory of 
Forms' in the Phaedo cf. Gallop (1975), pp. 93-97. In the Symposium Beauty itself always exists, 
identical to itself, immutable, absolute, pure, uniform; and so it is essentially and necessarily 
eternal. 
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206e-207a). However, as we have seen, it is not possible for the lover to possess 
the good for ever and to acquire full immortality -i.e. to be always absolutely the 
same, in the way that the divine is (cf. 208 a8-bl): he can only attain a precarious 
immortality -as it is only a vicarious one- through procreation in beauty (cf. 206b-
209e) either according to the body or, better, according to the soul. At 212a2-5 
Diotima adds that, if someone contemplates the Beautiful, the production of true 
virtue (not images of it) will come to be a fact -Y£VT ] r j£T,ai- for him, insofar as he 
grasps true Beauty (instead of a phantom of it). The infinitive T I K T E I V and the 
participles bp63im and £(|)a7tXO|J.£VCp are in the continuous aspect, which means 
that the actions are in the process of happening at the same time as the action of 
the main verb. As a consequence, this production of true virtue must be a process 
that takes place together with the grasping of true Beauty. Then the initiated 
person who completes the erotic ascent, like all human beings, has immortality 
just through procreation and constant replacement, although it is a best kind of 
immortality because the product -true virtue- is, by comparison, better than the 
"image" of virtue (i.e. virtue not founded on knowledge) which might be produced 
by ordinary men. In fact, this initiatory experience can be understood as a sort of 
anticipation of the real god-like immortality that might be attained by the 
philosopher after death. 
b) In 212a5-7 we read: 
T E K O V T I 5e &p£xf|v ocA.r|9f| K O U 6p£V|/a|j.Evcp imdpxei 6eo(|)iA,£i 
Y£V£a0ai , Kai einep TOO CLXXCO dvBpdmcov dBavdxcp K O C I E K E I V C O ; 
Here we find aorist participles being connected with a verb in the present 
indicative tense (vnap%£i), which expresses the end point of these actions in the 
past.135 This means that only after someone has produced ( T E K O V T I ) and nurtured 
(9pE\j/a|iEVCp) true virtue, does it belong to him, if to any human being, 
1 3 5 See Goodwin (1966) Section 143 (p. 48): "the aorist participle generally represents an action as 
past with reference to the time of its leading verb". 
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yeveaBoa 0eo(j)iA.f|Q and aBdvaxcx;.136 This dGavaaia comes about for the 
initiated -the philosopher who has grasped Beauty itself- after the production of 
true virtue (i.e. after the immortality through procreation which is open to him). 
Insofar as in the Phaedo Plato says that those who in life have been initiated 
(69c6-7) and have been "lovers of truth" (68a7-bl) are the only ones who after 
death attain the best kind of existence (i.e. an existence in which the soul is by 
itself, lives with the gods, is in contact with the Forms and achieves an 
immortality which is superior to a just survival through reincarnation), it seems 
highly likely to be this very kind of existence after death for the philosopher that 
Diotima is referring to in Symp. 212a5-7. 
Nevertheless, what this god-like immortality consists in remains unexplained in 
the Symposium. The eschatological myth of Book 10 of the Republic offers more 
enlightenment on this point. 
3.4.3.6. Generosity of indigent epooq 
One classical reflection on Plato's theory of love suggests that epcoQ inspires acts 
out of selfishness, insofar as its works are carried out in order to provide at least a 
provisional satiation of its innate emptiness. In contrast to this, the Christian 
concept of dya^r) is a generous love through which a human being gives himself 
to the other and to God in imitation of God's amorous and giving gesture to 
human beings.137 Following a similar line, Plato's love has been accused of taking 
individuals simply as a 'means' for the satisfaction of its lacking condition or as 
1 3 6 8eo<t>iXf|Q yevkoQai (rather than eivoci) suggests that the godlike immortality of the 
philosopher is a prize from the gods that he attains because he has previously gained their 
friendship through having a virtuous life (see O'Brien (1984), pp. 198-201). 
1 3 7 The classical text for this concept of ayaur] is St. Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, 13. 
This criticism to Plato's concept of love had already been pointed out fundamentally by Nygren 
(1932-1939). 
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mere 'steps' for access to the contemplation of Beauty itself.138 Some interpreters 
try to redeem Platonic love by discerning a transformation of Eros' indigent 
condition following the contemplation of Beauty itself, a transformation of such a 
kind that it becomes generous in a god-like way as does love in the Christian 
dyocjiri.1 3 9 However, if as proposed above, Eros/epcog fails to get rid of his 
lacking condition even after the eventual achievement of the knowledge of Beauty 
itself, the notion of his transformation in an 'overflowing' love has to be 
discarded. 
However it would seem that an evaluation of the theory of Eros in the Symposium 
with categories such as 'selfishness' and 'generosity' as contrary concepts misses 
the point of Plato's proposal. If it were true, as Diotima/Socrates says, that we are 
fundamentally subjects of desire, it is useless to disqualify as "selfishness" the fact 
that we act out of our need to fi l l our primitive emptiness, for what other thing 
could we do if our essential constitution is such that we are always deficient of 
something? On the other hand, this deficient condition does not prevent 
generosity. As we have seen above, according to Plato's theory of epcot;, because 
as subjects of desire we do not have, it is necessary for us to procreate i.e. to gain 
some permanence by leaving behind ourselves productions for our benefit but 
especially for the benefit of others (and this even at the cost of one's own life in 
some cases, as in the case of the animals that defend their "offspring" with their 
life or Alcestis and Achilles dying for their loved ones). This concept of 
'generosity', is, nevertheless, completely different from that of dYOC7lT| since it is 
not based on any overflowing condition but rather operates out of deficiency. In 
other words, for human beings, because of our essential lacking condition the only 
way of possessing the good in a certain way is to produce beautiful -good- things. 
As a consequence of this, a human being who recognizes himself as subject of 
desire is obliged to be productive, i.e. generous. 
Vlastos (1973). 
See above n. 119. 
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As for the criticism that Plato's theory of desire reduces the individual to an object 
as a result of the beloved being a mere means for climbing to the contemplation of 
Beauty itself140 and thus being in himself not valued as such but only as an 
instance of what is really beautiful,141 this also fails to understand Plato's proposal. 
First of all, in the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon and in 
Diotima/Socrates's speech the interest is in describing what erotic desire and 
especially love for the truth would be like -what it is like to be a subject of desire 
and particularly a (|>iA,6ao<|>o<;. For this reason there is no explicit treatment of the 
consequences of this proposal for the understanding of interpersonal 
relationships.142 However, this simply means that the interest of the argument does 
not lie in this particular topic and not that the importance of interpersonal 
relationships is necessarily underestimated. Secondly, some elements seem to 
indicate actually that self-comprehension as a subject of desire, far for making us 
treat others as objects, rather makes us understand them as subjects of desire as 
well. For example, Socrates -the specialist in erotic matters- treats Agathon as a 
subject of desire for the truth when he tries to help him to accept his lack of 
knowledge about Eros's nature. Through the fictional dialogue between Socrates 
and Diotima, a similar example is provided, Socrates now being in the role of 
subject of desire. Finally, the disindividualization that takes place in the erotic 
ascent does not mean that other individuals are simply used as 'means' by the 
subject of desire, so becoming objects for his attainment of Beauty itself. It is, on 
the contrary, precisely because a distinction can be made between the object of 
desire -beauty, the good- and individuals, that it is possible to consider individuals 
not as objects but, in the case of human beings, as other subjects of desire like 
1 4 0 Vlastos (1973). 
1 4 1 Nussbaum (1986), pp. 176-184. 
1 4 2 Rowe (1998), pp. 7 and 188-189. Gill (1999), p.xxxviii also points out, against Nussbaum's 
interpretation, that the ascent implies interpersonal love. He follows Price (1981) and (1989), pp. 
15-54. On the reciprocity of epcoi; see also Halperin (1986). 
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ourselves with whom maybe we can co-create in beauty, given that they also 
desire the real good. 
Socrates' behaviour with Alcibiades gives a more complete illustration of the way 
that Platonic epoaQ works in interpersonal relationships. 
4. Alcibiades' speech (212c4-222b7) 
The traditional interpretation143 of this speech as being fundamentally an 
illustration of Eros-<|>iA,6ao(|>o<; through the portrait of Socrates that Alcibiades 
offers there has been challenged in some works of the end of the twentieth 
century. Nussbaum144 suggests reading it as a criticism of the non-human love of 
the philosopher described in Diotima's speech: Alcibiades' passion for Socrates 
would represent the normal feeling of intense love for an individual in contrast to 
the dispassionate attitude of Socrates towards him, as a result of 'being in love' 
with what is beautiful. In this way, by adding this final speech, Plato may have 
intended to create a dramatic tension between these two ways of understanding 
love. Reeve145 also suggests that the introduction of Alcibiades' speech is critical 
in the sense that hints that Socrates' method is a failure since he has not succeeded 
in initiating his favourite disciple into a philosophical way of life. 
Similarly to the traditional interpretation, I maintain here that this speech seems to 
illustrate, on the one hand, through the portrait of Socrates, what the philosopher 
who has attained contemplation of Beauty itself is like and what kind of 
1 4 3 Bury (1932), pp. lx-Ixiv, Robin (1951), pp. ci-cviii, Dover (1980), pp. 164-165, Rowe (1998), 
pp. 205-206, Waterfield (1994), pp. xxxvii-xi, Gill.(1999), pp. xxxv-xxxix, Brisson (1998), pp. 
51-55. 
1 4 4 Nussbaum (1986), ch. 6, pp. 165-199 (see esp. pp. 198-199). 
1 4 5 Reeve (1992). Socrates would have failed to lead Alcibiades to the attachment to the beauty of 
his individual soul to the love for beauty in general. This failure of Socrates as a teacher of erotic 
matters would have led Alcibiades to his disastrous end. 
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interpersonal relationship he establishes through this understanding with his 
beloved. On the other hand, the character of Alcibiades exemplifies what a 
talented personality would be like if he does not develop the 'currents' of his 
desire in an appropriate way. 
4.1. Socrates: Eros-<|>iX,6ao<|)OQ and procreator of "true virtue" and beautiful 
words 
Socrates is presented in Alcibiades' speech, as many interpreters have pointed 
out,146 as having the characteristics of the Eros-(|>iX6ao(|)0<;. He shares Eros' 
riEv'ia-features by being: "far from beautiful" but, in fact, ugly like the Silenus 
(203c6-7; cf. 215a7-bl)147; "dirty and barefoot,...always sleeping on the ground, 
without blankets", as when on the expedition to Potidaea Socrates walked about in 
the cold of winter without wearing any shoes and being barely covered by his 
himation (203dl-3; cf. 220b3-5148); he is also poor and, in fact, disdainful of 
material resources (203c7-d3; 204b7; cf. 216d8-e2.). He also has Eros' EIopcx;-
like characteristic: like him, he is "a schemer after the beautiful and good", insofar 
as he likes to be around beautiful young men (203d4; cf. 216d2-3, see also 213c4-
5); "courageous, impetuous and intense", as when he shows outstanding valour at 
Potidea and Delium (203d5; see also 219d3ff.); he is also "both passionate for 
wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophising all his life", since he is 
able to keep reflecting ceaselessly (203d6-7; cf. 220c and the attribution to 
Socrates of (|)p6vT|0"i.<; at 219d6); "a clever magician, sorcerer and sophist", since 
he charms all kinds of people with his words (203d8; cf. 215b8ff.). He is also a 
See above nn. 119 and 139. Special treatment on the comparison of Eros and Socrates in 
Osborne (1994), pp. 86-111. 
1 4 7 Alcibiades' comparison of Socrates with Marsyas and the Silenus suggests that he is not at least 
physically beautiful. However, he thinks him beautiful in his soul (216e7-217a2). 
1 4 8 See 174a3-5 where Aristodemus says that Socrates' wearing sandals and making himself 
beautiful is something unusual. 
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8oci|J.6viO(; man (203a5; cf 5ai|iovicp ax; aA/r|9coQ, 219b7-cl), and his divine 
words make evident who are in need of the gods and of being initiated (215c5-6). 
As this shows, there are many elements in the text which suggest that the character 
of Socrates has attained contemplation of Beauty itself. At 212a2-5 it is said that if 
any person should achieve contemplation of Beauty itself, he would be able to 
produce "true virtue" instead of what is by contrast "images of it". Through the 
portrait of Socrates given by Alcibiades, what the "production of true virtue" by a 
philosopher would be like is also indicated. 
Socrates is presented as exercising an amazing CTG0<|)poawr| (216d7; 219d5) and 
supported by an outstanding courage (dvSpeia, 219d5), which enables him to 
endure hardship (Kapxepeiv) when others fail to do so (220al):149 he can drink in 
large amounts but without ever getting drunk (214a, 220a), feels no attachment to 
material wealth (219el-2, 216d8-el), is able to resist the cold of winter when 
being deprived of normal shelter in order to keep his feet and body warm (220a6-
cl), has surpassed the famous Greek generals Alcibiades and Laches in his valour 
during the battles of Potidaea and Delium (220d3-221cl) and has shown 
extraordinary endurance in day-long reflection and investigation (awvo-qcoLC, 
...CJKOJCCOV, £nxcov, (hpovti^cov, 220c3-7). Moreover, his astounding behaviour 
does not seek prizes and glory that might be gained from men (220e6-7): the 
reward of his acts must lie elsewhere. In other words, Socrates does not just 
happen to be moderate or courageous at times (as Laches or even Alcibiades) but 
he also knows how and when his endurance and moderation have to be employed 
and what the real reward of this is (the possession of the real good, happiness and, 
maybe, a god-like immortality). In this sense he is a "procreator of true virtue" and 
not just of images of it. Above all, he is able to produce "words" (koyovq) 
superior to any of those produced by the great orators like Pericles (215e4-216a2): 
words of such a nature that all kinds of people -young boys, mature men, women 
At the end of Diotima's speech Socrates especially emphasises the courage of Eros (212b8). 
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or slaves come to feel "possessed" when listening to them (215dlff.). Indeed they 
make many of them like Alcibiades (216c) think they are living in an unworthy 
way (215e7-216c3). In short, since Socrates has knowledge, his words are the only 
ones which can produce "real virtue". Thus, someone able to see "inside" 
Socrates' words discovers that his discourse is like statues of the gods (TCC E V T O Q 
dydX|J.aTa) and full of amazing beauty (216e5-217a2; see also 215a2-3). 
Furthermore, these words are the only ones that have intelligence and "are to the 
highest degree divine and contain within them the greatest number of statues of 
virtue" (Geioxdxcnx; K C C I nXelcxa dYdA,|a.aT' dpexfji; ev aircoiq 
E X O V K X Q , 222a3-4). Many aspects of his behaviour are not only praiseworthy, as 
in the case of other men, but also so startling150 that the 'singularity' -&t07cla- in 
what he does and says is one of his most essential characteristics. His dxo7iia 
and superhuman actions must have -so Plato will want to suggest to us- their 
origin in the uncommon experience of having attained the knowledge of Beauty 
itself. 
4.2. Loving and lovable Socrates 
As said above, Alcibiades' report of how Socrates has behaved with him and what 
kind of effects this has produced within him is the best example of what an 
"erotic" interpersonal relationship with a philosopher would be like. 
In principle, as Alcibiades presupposes, the kind of relationship that he looks 
forward to establishing with Socrates fits the traditional pattern of the time, as 
described, for example, in Pausanias' speech: Socrates looks to be an epaatf iq, 
i.e. an older man who would willingly offer his wisdom and experience to the not 
1 S 0 There is a reiterated use of Sofuua and its derivatives in reference to Socrates' aspects or words 
in Alcibiades' speech: 220a4 and 7, 220c6, 221c6, 213d3. 
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so young but still highly attractive151 epd)|J.£VO<; Alcibiades in exchange for 
sexual enjoyment of his beauty152. 
However, through his conduct Socrates operates a transposition of the traditional 
roles, in such a way that, as Alcibiades complains, he -i.e. Socrates- becomes the 
beloved, while his supposedly erotic partners -Alcibiades, but also Charmides, 
Euthydemus, Agathon (222al-b8) and his faithful follower and Epaazf\c, 
Aristodemus- become the lover. Thus, although Alcibiades still expects to be able 
to bestow his favours upon Socrates in the conventional way of the beloved, he is 
the one who pursues and tries to seduce Socrates, so acting as if he were the 
lover.153 
However, Socrates is not just playing hard to get with Alcibiades: not only does he 
refuse his initial advances but, actually, he also declines when Alcibiades finally 
makes him a straight proposal of sexual intercourse (218c7ff.). Socrates is, in fact, 
still a lover, for he openly claims to be in love with Alcibiades (213c7-d4). 
However, his love is of a different kind. His main concern is to lead Alcibiades to 
the recognition that something is lacking in his life and, then, open up within him 
the desire not of amorous intercourse with Socrates but of a better life through the 
practice of philosophy. It is precisely this effect that Socrates' words and company 
have had upon Alcibiades as well as upon many other people: 
1 1 We do not know exactly when the whole incident took place. But Alcibiades might not be an 
adolescent anymore but a young man, given that, though still being at the bloom of his beauty and 
youth (217a3), he surely does not behave in his attempt to seduce Socrates like a raxi5iKdc in his 
puberty. 
1 5 2 On the characteristics of the homosexual relationships in Plato's time see: Dover (1980), pp. 3-4 
and (1978); also Part Four: "Erotics", Chapters 1 and 2 of Foucault (1985), pp. 185-214 and 
Brisson (1998), pp. 55-65. 
1 5 3 In the Lysis Socrates practices his same strategy of leading the beloved to the role of the lover 
during the dialogue with the two young boys Lysis and Menexenus, in place of the kind of thing 
that Hippothales has tried to do in order to gain Lysis'love (see Lys.205a9-206c7). 
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a) Socrates' words produce an overwhelming commotion in Alcibiades's life 
(215el-216a2). 
b) He makes Alcibiades recognize that his way of living is not worthy and that "he 
is lacking himself', insofar as he does not take care of himself but worries about 
the Athenians' matters (216a2-7). 
c) He is the only person who engenders a feeling of shame in Alcibiades for his 
way of life (216a9-b3). 
d) Above all, by not accepting sexual intercourse with Alcibiades, Socrates 
teaches him that the beauty of wisdom the latter sees in him is superior to his 
physical beauty, which he is so proud of (216e7-217al), and thus not 
exchangeable for it (218e6-a4). Alcibiades -even as he flees from a philosophical 
way of life (216b5-c3)- has at least learnt his lesson regarding this, as he 
recognizes Socrates' "inner" beauty as both amazing and superior (see again 
216e7-217al). 
e) He tries to make Alcibiades reflect that, in reality, the beauty which is valuable 
is not Alcibiades' physical beauty or not even the kind of beauty which Socrates 
possesses (and which Alcibiades is trying to obtain through an unfair exchange) 
but a kind of beauty that can only be properly seen with "the eye of the soul" 
(219a2-4). This seems to suggest that Socrates is trying to lead him to a 
'dis-individualization' of beauty such that he might be initiated in erotic matters. 
By refusing to treat Alcibiades as his unique beloved -as the latter complains 
(213d2-3, 222dl-2)- he is helping him to 'dis-individualize' his own beauty and 
thus not to consider himself as an object. 
f ) He suggests to Alcibiades that they should "think things out and do whatever 
appears to the two of us to be best" (219M-2). Thus, Socrates is interested not 
only in personally attaining the good but also in helping Alcibiades to do so as 
well. 
g) In general, Socrates has awakened within him -as within many others- "the 
madness and Bacchic frenzy of philosophy" (218b2-5) and 'bitten' his heart and 
soul with love for the truth (217e6-218a7) 
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In other words, Socrates, far from treating his beloved Alcibiades as merely an 
instance of beauty in order to climb toward the contemplation of Beauty, wants 
him rather to discover himself as a subject of desire and, more precisely, as 
someone who desires the truth and needs to change his life in order to do this. 1 5 4 
Unfortunately, Alcibiades, in spite of a correct superficial registering of the 
peculiar events of his love life with Socrates, nevertheless fails to understand their 
real meaning and refuses to redirect his strong epcoi; to better goals. 
4.3. Ruinous love: Alcibiades 
As shown in the analysis of Diotima's speech, 'philosophy' or 'love for the truth' 
proves to be the most complete way of developing our passion for beauty and, 
alongside it, our desire for the real good and immortality. Nevertheless, 
Eros/epco<; also acts as an 'intermediary' between the mortal and the divine in his 
lower expressions, such as procreation in beauty in relation to the soul and even to 
the body. These latter realisations also bring us closer in some way to the good, 
insofar as we gain through them a kind of immortality. 
However, it is the case that not only might most of us not develop our love for the 
truth but, in many cases, our appetites might not be correctly developed either. 
Similarly, our desire for fame and honour may not always be orientated in such a 
positive way. Alcibiades provides a good example of an unsuccessful orientation 
of epccx;. 
As shown above, Alcibiades has deeply felt the effects of Socrates' love and the 
kind of striking change that his words might bring into his life. However, 
1 5 4 The coincidence of the steps between the erotic ascent and Alcibiades' description of his 
courtship of Socrates has been pointed out (see Bury (1932), pp. lx-lxiv). This means that 
Alcibiades also understands the pattern of the erotic behaviour, although he is not able to transpose 
it into terms of the search for the truth. 
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Alcibiades refuses to succumb to the charms of philosophy but rather persists in 
avoiding being convinced by Socrates of his need to transform his existence in a 
radical way (216a-b). 
In contrast to this possibility, he leads a dissipated life governed by an 
unrestrained indulgence of the appetites. For example, he arrives at Agathon's in 
such a wild state of intoxication that he needs the help not only of his attendants 
but also of the flute-girl in order to find his way (212c4-e3). Furthermore, far from 
refraining himself from drinking to excess, he in fact proposes and insists upon 
drinking more (213e-214a). Moreover, although he has performed courageous 
actions on the battlefield, having received a prize for bravery from the generals 
(220d-e), what caused him to behave in this way was simply his "desire for the 
honour that comes from ordinary people" (216b). In addition to this, although the 
guests at Agathon's party do not know, Apollodorus's audience and the readers do 
know about the more serious consequences incurred by Alcibiades as a result of 
his misdirected desires. Alcibiades and his friends wi l l be implicated in the crime 
of the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries and in the mutilation of the 
Herms155 not long after the celebration of Agathon's victory is supposed to take 
place. By the time that the introductory conversation occurs, Alcibiades, in his 
unfortunate expedition to Sicily, has partly provoked Athens' final downfall in the 
Peloponnesian war. 1 5 6 
Finally, although Alcibiades accurately remembers details of Socrates' merits and 
of his behaviours toward him, he fails to understand the real meaning of Socrates' 
love for him because of an improper use and development of his strong desires.157 
When Alcibiades reveals the various ways in which he has tried to seduce 
Socrates (217a f f . ) , he reveals that he had never been able to give up his belief that 
On this point see Murray (1990). 
See Rowe (1998), p. 206. 
See Szlezak (1993), pp. 91-93. 
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Socrates was seeking the enjoyment of a physical encounter with him. 1 5 8 
Consequently, he missed the chance of initiating himself into a philosophical way 
of life. 
See Rowe (1998a, pp. 206, 209, 210 and 213 on the diverse ways in which Alcibiades 
misunderstands Socrates' intentions. 
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5. Further questions 
The Symposium offers an understanding of human beings as they are constituted 
by the leading passion of their lives or epcoQ. It also presents philosophy as the 
most satisfactory way of developing this leading passion so that it takes us, so far 
as is possible, toward the attainment of wisdom and, in tandem with it, to the real 
good, happiness and immortality. 
However, some suggestions that we find in the text remain incomplete: 
a) First of all, although all human beings desire the real good, the leading desire of 
each life runs in different directions: some people focus their epcoQ upon 
procreation in beautiful bodies and thus attain immortality by leaving individuals 
of the same species behind; others feel passionate about attaining immortal fame 
and honour and posterity as a consequence of the procreation of amazing deeds 
and cultural productions; few of them have their life led by (|)iA,ocTO(|)'ia or love 
for the truth and, if they attain contemplation of Beauty itself, procreate "true 
virtue" and not "images of it", as the poets who are not philosophers do, given that 
they do not possess knowledge.159 In this way it is philosophers who approach the 
state closest to that of the divine condition in this life. Furthermore, we have seen 
that an individual like Alcibiades may have his strong passions completely 
misdirected, in such a way that his epcoQ does not bring him closer to the good 
and immortality but, in fact, even finally leads him to self-destruction. 
How and why the 'currents' of desire are organized in different ways in different 
individuals is not explained in the Symposium. Further developments and 
elucidations of these points can be found in the Republic in the tripartite theory of 
the soul and in the distinction made between different kinds of individuals -lover 
1 5 9 This would be the case of the different kinds of Stiuic/upyoi mentioned at 208e5ff and also of 
some of the speakers previous to Socrates like Aristophanes and Agathon. 
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of wealth, lover of honour or lover of the truth- according to which 'stream' of 
desire rules their lives. 
b) Secondly, the erotic ascent sketches what the education of an individual should 
be like in order that he may have love for the truth as the leading passion of his 
life. However, no account of what these steps or Beauty itself more precisely 
consist in is developed in the Symposium. Again these stages can be recognized in 
the programme for earlier and higher education traced in detail in the Republic. 
c) Additional information about what "procreation of true virtue" by the 
philosopher would be like can also be found in the Republic: the coincidence of 
the just man and the wise man makes clear why the philosopher, who has all his 
sources of motivation appropriately organized, is the only one who can exercise 
both these virtues and the other two -i.e. bravery and moderation- in a perfect way. 
The production of true virtue takes place in each individual but also disseminates 
itself in and has effects on others. 
d) Finally, as we have seen above, Plato suggests the possibility of a god-like 
immortality after death at the end of the erotic ascent (212a5-7). However, no 
explicit information is given about what this state would be like. The reflections in 
Republic 10 on the immortality of the soul when deprived of its bodily aspects, 
and on its final destiny within a cosmological order and in the light of the 
development of its love for the truth during its embodied existence, offer further 
clarification on this point. 
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XPtA-erax xa Kahx 
PI., HLMa. 304e8 
CHAPTER II 
The psychological make-up of the human being according to the leading 
desire of his/her soul in the Republic, development or destruction of our 
essential rational condition.160 
Abstract of argument of chapter 
dXXd p,r)v 6xa> ye eig tv xi at eni6vp.iai atpoSpct ptnovciv, icfiev TCOV 
on eiq xdXXa xovxcp cxcrdevicrxepai, dbcmep pevjua erceicre 
d7ra%£X£VjU£voi/.161 
Through the 'hydraulic' image of the soul the human being is described as 
constituted by two main 'currents' of desire: the 'stream' of reason that runs towards 
the desire for the truth and the real good and another 'current' towards the bodily 
pleasures and the changeable. According to which 'current' is the stronger two 
possibilities are open to us: either to become lovers of the truth as far as possible 
and, with it, to develop our nature as rational beings and to attain what we all 
desire, i.e. the real good; or to become lovers of honour and lovers of wealth (and 
eventually even a tyrant governed by an kpcoq especially protects the unnecessary, 
1 I follow Griffith's translation, unless otherwise indicated. The lines of the passages are given 
according to Burnet's edition of the Greek text 
1 6 1 "Besides, we can be sure, I take it, that the stronger a person's desires are in one direction, the 
weaker they will be in other direction. Like a stream when it gets diverted." (6.485d6-8). At 
6.485dl0 ff. it is said that these desires can flow in the channel of learning, as happens in the case 
of the philosopher. So ca eitiSvuica have to be taken at 6.485d6 as 'desires' in general and not 
only as 'appetites' of the EJII0U|J.T|I;IK6V. 
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lawless appetites) and in this way to weaken or even corrupt our essential 
rationality. 
The 'tripartite' theory of the soul in Book 4 is a description of a human being from 
the point of view of desires in conflict within him. In this sense there are three 
'aspects' (eiSrj) or 'parts' (p£prj) within us: the emOvpri'ZiKOV, the 9vp,o£iS£$ 
and the XoyicrtiKOV. Between these three aspects a conflict takes place that can be 
summarized as follows: there is often a contradiction between a desire represented 
by and originating in the 'pull' of the appetites and another desire based on the 
'pull' of reason according to its calculations; in this conflict the 'spirited' part 
sometimes supports reason in a fight against the appetites, sometimes not. In this 
latter case the dvfioeideg either is already weakened by the appetites, so that it 
defends as honourable only what the appetites aim at and, in this way, though being 
a natural ally of reason, runs into the 'current' of the appetitive part; or, being 
strongly developed but not rationally trained, it initially leads the soul, fights for 
victory and honour but is finally weakened and dragged along by the appetites, 
which have had the chance to evolve without limit. 
The reason why these desires create a conflict is that opposite courses of action can 
result from them: in other words, the conflict of desires derives from a conflict about 
what is to be done. However, Plato is not interested in all conflicts of this kind but in 
the decisive conflict for the human being: whether the 'current' of the appetites is to 
become stronger, so that we lose our chance of being what we truly are -rational 
beings- and of achieving what we all desire, i.e. the real good; or whether reason's 
'stream' of desire towards the truth and the real good is fortified, nourished and 
helped with the strength of the 'spirited' part, so that we become rational beings as 
far as possible. 
As can be reconstructed especially from what is said in Books 4, 8 and 9, each of the 
parts has its proper characteristics and object or objects of desire: the appetitive 
part is <piAo%pr/juaTOV and <piXoK£p8£g, i.e. is primarily related to objects of our 
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physiological needs and, derivatively, to wealth as a means of supporting these 
needs; the 'spirited' part is <j)iX6viKOV and (/}iX6xifJ.ov, i.e. fights for victory and 
honour; reason is (piXoficxOeg and Qikdcofyov, i.e. desires the truth and, with it, 
the real good. Insofar as through primary education the desires of the three parts of 
the soul are trained in a certain way and can be either developed and fortified or 
enfeebled and even inhibited, the earlier education described in Books 2 and 3 has a 
decisive influence on which of the two main 'streams' of the soul becomes the 
stronger. 
Which leading desire governs our life decides the development or deterioration of 
reason, which constitutes our true nature. If the stream of the appetites is the 
stronger, reason still makes calculations and judgements but cannot establish 
what is really good on its own; it has to calculate according to what the aim is for 
the dominant part: satisfaction of physiological needs, acquisition of wealth if the 
appetitive part already dominates; or victory and honour, in case of the 'spirited' 
part's guidance in the soul, a guidance which ends, anyway, in the spirited part's 
enfeeblement and the the appetites' empowerment within the soul. Besides, "what 
is base in us" (which includes, according to Book 10, the appetites and their 
pleasures together with other affections of the soul, such as perception -especially 
deceptive perceptions- and overdeveloped emotions) puts the soul in contact with 
the changeable and causes reason to produce distorted judgements based on 
appearances and degraded versions of reality. In this way reason is debilitated 
and eventually even corrupted. Conversely, if reason's 'current' towards the truth 
and the real good leads the soul (a leadership for which not only reason's 
education in right beliefs and good harmonies but also the appropriate training of 
the appetites and the 'spirited' part are required), reason can consider things on 
its own, as far as possible, and try to attain full knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the 
individual good and the political good based on the Good of reality in general. 
This is the case of the lover of wisdom who is described at the end of Book 5 and 
whose higher education in mathematics and dialectic is explained in Books 6 and 
7. The lover of wisdom -the (f>iX6- ao<j)OQ- is the person who achieves a maximum 
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development of the desire for the truth and the real good and, with it, of his most 
essential aspect as a human being. Since knowledge of the Good is also a 
condition for knowing what is good for the individual and for society and is, in 
this way, a condition of individual and social justice, alongside the maximum 
development of his rational condition the lover of the truth also achieves 
fullfilment and perfection in relation to all his "aspects" or "parts", considered 
either separately or together as whole. 
At the end of Book 10 the eschatological myth puts aside our bodily existence, on 
which the existence of the irrational parts depends. Thus this after-death story allows 
us a picture of ourselves from the point of view of the love for the truth, i.e. from the 
point of view of how successful we have been in developing our authentic nature: to 
be rational beings. This eschatological view is constructed in the light of an 
understanding of the universe as a cosmic order in which the human being is 
inserted and participates with his good and evil actions, being punished or rewarded 
according to them. 
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Section I: The deduction of the parts of the soul from a conflict of desires 
Introduction 
The soul, i.e. ourselves,162 consists in a unity that can be analysed into three 
aspects or kinds,1 6 3 as is clearly expressed through the comparison of the soul with 
creatures of many forms that have grown together into one such as Chimaera, 
Scylla or Cerberus: 
X C D V xoiomcov xivd... oiai \ivQokoyox>vxa\ TuaXaiod yeveaGai fyvaeic,, 
f\ xe Xi|iaipa<; K O U r\ "LKVIX^C, K O C I Kep^epov, K O C I dAAai xive<; 
avxvai Xeyovxai (jv^ine<pvKviai iSeai noXXai eig ev yeuecjOat164 
In other words three forms of the soul develop, in some way, together: 
cruvarcxe x o i v w a ired eig kv xpia bvxa, Scrre TTTJ cvjuTretpvtceuai 
dXXrjXoig.^5 
1 6 2 The soul is identical with us, insofar as on many occasions Plato refers indiscriminately to 'the 
soul' or 'usl(see Annas (1981), p. 54). The adouoc would be the external, physical aspect of us. 
1 6 3 The 'parts' of the soul, into which Plato analyses the soul, have been often understood as 
'faculties', 'powers' or 'principles' (in relation to this there is a good summary in Moline (1978), 
pp. 1-2, n. 2). Plato's use of eiSoq (and yevoq) as well as l^ epo? to refer to the parts of the soul 
seems to suggest appropriate to say that there is a distinction into different 'aspects' or 'kinds' (see 
LSJ, s.v. eiSoq, yevoq, ixfepo?). 
1 6 4 "One of these creatures the ancient stories tell us used to exist. The Chimera, or Scylla, or 
Cerberus, or any of the other creatures which are said to be formed by a number of species growing 
into one." (9.588c2-5). 
1 6 5 "Now join the three of them into one, so that they've grown into one another in some way." 
(9.588d7-8). 
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so constituting a single creature: the human being (9.588el). 
Each of these three aspects of our soul has a proper desire: the desire for wealth 
and profit in the case of the appetitive part; the desire for victory and honour in the 
case of the 'spirited' part and the desire for wisdom and learning in the case of the 
rational part. 
This analysis of the soul into three kinds or forms from the point a view of desire 
already appears in Book 4, in which the three parts are differentiated according to 
the conflicting directions of their proper desires. From 4.436bl-4.439e3 two parts 
are distinguished according to what is for Plato the fundamental conflict within 
the human being: the e7ri0D(XT|XiK6v as the aspect of us related to appetites such 
as hunger, thirst, etc. and directed to the bodily and changeable independently of 
their goodness or badness; the desires of the XoyiCJTiKOV which, being the result 
of what reason considers, through calculation, as the right thing to do, are often at 
odds with the appetites. In this way reason is not something different from desire 
that merely provides us with information for our actions: it is actually an aspect of 
us with its own desires and impulses.166 Then, from 4.439e4 to 4.441c3, a third 
part of the soul is distinguished: the 9\)(ioei5eq. This part of the soul is 'bivalent' 
in the sense that can take part in the fundamental conflict of the soul on one side 
or the other, that is, its aggressiveness and desire for victory can be used either to 
fight against the appetites forming alliance with reason, or to go for victory and 
honour against reason's advice, and so be finally weakened by and dragged by the 
'stream' of appetites in their direction. 
Which 'stream' of desires predominates at a certain moment determines what 
course of action is to be done at that time. However, the purpose of the analysis of 
the parts of the soul in Book 4 as it concerns desire is not only to offer a theory of 
1 6 6 Similarly Cooper (1999) and Kahn (1987). Lovibond also says that the soul is "an organ of 
desire or striving" (Lovibond (1991), p. 36). 
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action but also to pave the way to showing the two possibilities open to us as 
human beings: either to have a life led by the desire for the the truth and the real 
good of the rational part with the help of our 'spirited' aspect and so to fu l f i l our 
essential rational condition as far as possible; or to live a life under the rule of 
desire for honour or the government of the appetites and so weaken or destroy 
reason together with its highest desires. 
1.1. The deduction of the £ T C I 0 U | J . T | T I K 6 V and the X o y i c m K O v from a 
conflict between the opposite direction of their desires 1 6 7 
The distinction between the appetitive part and the rational part at 4.436a8-
4.439e3 is based on the description of a conflict within the soul between opposite 
desires. Insofar as the argument is quite long, I have subdivided it into the 
following steps to allow a clearer understanding: 
a. 4.436b5-4.437al0: Assertion of the principle of opposition. Examples. 
b. 4.437b l-4.437d5: Application of the principle of opposition to the case of the 
soul. Differentiation of opposite desiderative tendencies: positive desiderative 
expressions in the case of the £7ri9\)|ir |TiK6v and negative desiderative 
expressions, which restrict and in this sense are opposite to the appetites, in the 
case of the XoyiaxiKOV. 
c. 4.437d6-4.437e8: Description of the desires of the en:i8'U|a.r|XiK6v as desires 
just for their objects "in themselves" -thirst for drink, hunger for food- without 
specific characteristics (such as heat, magnitude, etc). 
d. 4.438bl-4.439e3: Further analysis of the desire and objects of desire of the 
E7C10\) |1T|TIK6V in order mainly to exclude goodness as a possible specific 
characteristic of its objects of desire. The desires and objects of desires of the 
1 6 7 Plato's argument here may or may not withstand a strict evaluation of its logic (see for example 
R. Robinson's criticism of the 'argument of the opposites' at 4.436b-4.437a (Robinson R. (1971), 
answered by Stalley (1975)). I just try to concentrate on the implications for the psychological 
theory that is in play in the Republic. 
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£7ti6u|j.r|XiK6v are considered in their essence as cases of the relative terms. The 
specific properties that these appetites can have are explained through the 
presence or absence of these properties in the subject of desire but not as part of 
the appetite itself. Goodness being one of these specific characteristics, it is left 
out as a specific aspect of any appetite. The consequence of that is that the 
eTtiB'U i^Ti'tiKOV is blind to what is good and bad, and that the recognition of and 
desire for the real good comes to belong exclusively to the A-oyicxiKOV. In this 
way, the basic conflict within the soul in question here is between the desires of 
the e7ii9'U|iT|TiK6v that looks for its objects independently of whether they are 
good or not, and the desires of the A,oyi<7XiK6v, which, insofar as it recognizes 
what is good and bad, can be opposite to those of the e7Ui8t)|a.T|XiK6v. 
a. The different parts of the soul are established in Books 4 of the Republic 
through the application of the so-called 'principle of opposition': 
5f)?tov oxi xocuxov xdvavxict 7toieiv f\ 7idax,eiv K a x d xa inov ye K a i 
npbq xa inov OX>K kQEXr\aei a\ia, dbaxe dv nov e-bpiaKCOjj.ev ev O C U X O I Q 
xocuxa Y i Y v ° l - i e v a > eia6|j.e0a oxi ov xccbxov fjv aXXd nXexo).168 
Some illustrative examples are given in order to clarify how different parts can be 
recognized in a unity through the principle of opposition.169 After the analysis of 
1 6 8 "It is obvious that nothing can do two opposite things, or be in two opposite states, in the same 
part of itself, at the same time, in relation to the same object. So if this what we find happening in 
these examples we shall know there was not just one element involved, but more than one." 
4.436b8-cl. See also 4.436e8-4.437a2. 
1 6 9 If a man stands and at the same time moves his hands and head, he can be simultaneously in 
motion in relation to his hands and head and at rest in relation to the rest of his body (4.436c8-dl). 
This means that, although the man is a unity, it is possible to recognize in him two different kinetic 
states. Similarly a top stands still and at the same time is in motion when with the peg fixed in one 
point it turns round (4.436d4-7) and so here too it is possible to recognize, in the top taken as a 
whole, two different states in relation to its movement. Finally, in relation to any circular motion it 
I l l 
these examples the principle of opposition is considered a plausible way of 
recognizing different aspects in a unity and taken as a hypothesis that can be used 
for further investigation (4.437a4-9). 
b. In a similar way to the previous examples, opposite desiderative movements 
can be distinguished in the unity of the soul, namely the desiderative expressions 
of the appetites on the one hand and restrictions to these appetites, which are 
opposite desiderative expressions to these appetites, on the other hand. 
The soul can have activities or states at odds, as for example to assent and to 
dissent; to strive after a thing and to reject it; to embrace and to repel: 
-dp' <dv> ovv [...] to £7uive\>eiv xcp avavevEiv K O C I T O e^ieaSoti X I V O Q 
Xxxpeiv xcp draxpveiaBai K C C I T O TcpoadyeaGai xcp djucoGeiaGai, rcdvxa 
xd xoia-uxa xcov evavxicov aX7<.f\koiq 0eir|Q eixe 7r,ovr||j.dxcov eixe 
7ia6r||idxcov; oi)5ev yap xavxr\ Sioiaei. 
- aXX [...] xcov evavxicov.170 
What must be underlined is that the examples of actions and passions of the soul 
that are given here consist of opposite desiderative tendencies of the soul. These 
desiderative drives can be positive urges, where the soul strives towards the 
attainment of what it wishes or negative drives, where the soul rejects and repulses 
something. 
can be said that the same things in respect of a straight line are at rest, because the things don't 
incline to either side on the line, but in respect of the circumference move in circle (436d8-e6). In 
this case again we have a unity -any thing that moves in a circle- and two different kinetic states. 
1 7 0 "-Very well. Now think about things like saying 'yes' and saying 'no', desire and rejection, or 
attraction and repulsion. Wouldn't you classify all those as pairs of opposites? Whether they are 
activities or states will be irrelevant to our purposes. -Yes, as opposites." (4.437bl-6). 
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In this section of Book 4 of the Republic all appetites like thirst, hunger, etc, i.e. 
desires which are related to our appetitive aspect, are referred to the positive 
drives of the soul. 
- x i o\)v; fjv 8' eycb- 8i\j/fjv K a i 7t£ivfjv K a i O X C D Q xaq ETtiG-uiiiai;, K a i 
a-G xo E G E A - E I V K a i xo |3cn)A,£a0ai, ov i rdvxa xocoxa eic, E K E i v d Jtoi dv 
GeiriQ t& E \ 8 T | xd V U V 8 T I Jie^Qevxa; diov d e l xfiv xov emQv[Lovvxoq 
\\fx>%r\v oi)%i fixoi e())iea8ai <^f\aeiq E K E ' I V O V OX> d v Ejci9a)|ifj, f] 
npocdyeaQai xovxo 6 dv |3o<Ar|xai di y£V£a0ai , f) a v , KCX0' oaov 
£ 0 E A , E I x i d i nopioQr\vax, E T T A V E - U E I V X O D X O Tipdc; a\)xf)v cbaTCEp X W O Q 
EpCOXCOVXOQ, £7COp£YO|J,EVTlV a m O V xfj^ yEVECECOQ; 1 7 1 
At the same time there are opposite expressions of desire in the soul which are 
negative and opposite to the appetites: 
xi 8E; TO afiovXeiv Kai firj eOeXeiv jurjS' emOvjusii/ OVK eic, xo 
djccD0Eiv K a i d7UEX,a\)V£iv an avxf\$ K a i E I Q draxvxa x d v a v x i a 
E K E I V O I Q GfiaojiEv;172 
So what has been established through steps a) and b) of the argument is that, 
according to the principle of opposition, there are conflicts in the soul between 
desires with opposite directions, the positive desires being identified with 
1 "-What about hunger and thirst - I said- and desires in general? Or wanting and being willing? 
Wouldn't you find all those a place among categories we just mentioned? Won't you say, for 
example, that the soul of the person who desires something either reaches out for what it desires, or 
draws what it wants towards itself? Or to the extent that it is willing to have something provided for 
it, that it mentally says 'yes' to it, as if in reply to a question, as it stretches out towards the 
realisation of its desire?" (4.437b7-c6). 
1 7 2 "What about not wanting, being unwilling, and not desiring? Won't we classify them with 
rejection and refusal, with all the corresponding opposites, in fact?" (4.437c8-10). 
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appetites, i.e. desires that concern the E7rA0V|i.r|XiK6v. The important point here 
is that later (4.439b) desires opposed to the appetites are attributed to the 
A , O Y I O " T I K 6 V . In this way the basic conflict in the soul comes to be between the 
desires of the eniQv\ir\xiKOV and the desires of the A-oyicxiKOV, and not just 
between reason and desire. 
c. At 4.437d8-e8 the unqualified character of the desire and of the objects of 
desire of the £7TA0U|i.T|XiK6v is established. 
The positive desires which are taken as examples of the appetites that belong to 
the eniQv\LryziKbv -thirst, hunger- are desires that look for their objects without 
qualification, i.e. thirst is just desire for drink and similarly hunger just for food: 
a-uxo 5e T O 5 i \ j / f jv oi> \if\ Ttoxe aXkov y e v r i x a i Em0v|j.ia f\ ovnep 
izetyvKEv, aviox) Jcc6|a.axoQ, K c d a v xd jce ivf jv ppoo|iaxo<;; - ouxcoq, e§r\, 
abxf\ ye r\ £jn.0D|j.ia eKcxaxri abxau [ibvov E K d a x o D ox> 7ce<|>UK£v, iov 
8e xoiou f) x o i o v x d Trpoayiyvoiieva. 1 7 3 
The fact of being thirsty for 'hot' or 'cold' drink, for 'much' or 'little' drink is related 
to other circumstances, mostly the presence or not in the soul of heat, plenty, etc, 
but not to the essence of the desire -thirst- and its object (4.437d8-e8). 
The unqualified character of the desires and objects of desire of the 
e7U0i)|JT|XiK6v -thirst, hunger, etc- is the crucial point that is established here, 
insofar as it paves the way to avoiding an important objection: the possibility that 
1 7 3 "-But thirst itself cannot possibly be a desire for anything other than its natural object, which is 
purely and simply drink -any more than hunger can be a desire for anything other than food. 
-That's right -he said- Each and every desire, in itself, is a desire only for the thing which is its 
natural object. The additional element in each case is what makes a desire for this or that particular 
kind of object." (4.437e4-8). (Griffith's italics.) 
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the desires of the eJCi0'O|j.r|XiK6v can be instances of a universal appetite for 
good things and so look for good drink, good food and so on: 
( i f ixoi t ic; [...] dtaKeicxcuq f p a c ; 6vxa<; Qopv$i]Gr\, COQ OVSEIC, TCOXOU 
kiiiQv\x£i aXXd xpTjcrrov noxov, icod ob G'IZOV aXXd ^prjetov a i x o u 
ndvteq yap dpa rcou ayaQcou kmOvpovoiv e i oftv r| 5 i \ ) /a e7r,i9v|j.ia 
e a x i , xpriczov dev e \r | e i x e jrcb|i.axoq e i x e aXkoxs oxoa) e a x i v E7i:i0'U|j.ia, 
K a i a i QtXkux oijxco. 1 7 4 
So what has been concluded up to this point -from a) to c)- is that the desires of 
the e7ii0D(xr|XiK6v, which 'pull ' in the opposite direction to the desires of the 
A-oyiax iKOV, have unqualified objects of desire and, in consequence, objects that 
can be either good or bad. 
d. In the last part of the argument from 4.438bl to 4.439e3 the fact that the 
appetites and objects of desires of the e7tt9D}i.r|XiK6v are without qualification 
receives further development in order to determine, as we anticipated above, the 
sense in which the fejci8\)|j.T|XiK6v never desires the good. A fundamental 
consequence that is derived from this is the blindness of the desires of the 
eJCi9u|ir|XiK6v in relation to what is good or bad, the recognition and desire for 
what is truly good apparently belonging only tojhe A-oy iax iKOV. 
First of all a more general principle about relative terms is established: 
1 "We don't want to be interrupted by objections we haven't considered. [... ] So here's one. No 
one desires drink, but rather good drink. None desires food, but rather good food, since everyone 
desires good things. So if thirst is a desire, it must be a desire for something good. Either a drink or 
whatever else it is a desire for. The same goes for other desires." (4.438al-5). 
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dA.A,d iievcoi [...] baa y' eoxl xoiocuxa d l a e i v a i xcu, x d \LEV Ttoid 
axxa TUOIO-U xivbc, eaxiv, d>g k f io i 8 O K £ I , x d 5' ocbxd & K a a x a aanou 
eKdaxov ( I O V O V . 1 7 5 
Some examples are given in order to explain how relative terms can be either for 
something without qualification or for something with qualification.1 7 6 After this 
point has been clarified the argument returns at 4.439al to a desire of the 
eJU0U|J.T|XiK6v: thirst. In this case it is also possible to make the distinction 
between the case of a particular thirst for a particular kind of drink and thirst itself, 
which is always just for drink itself and looks for its object independently of 
whether it is great or small, good or bad: 
OVKOVV noiov> |i.ev X I V O Q 7ccb|j,axo<; TCOIOV x i K O C I 5ivj/o<;, Sixyoq 5' ofiv 
a-bxo o-uxe noXXov ovxe bkiyov, ofae dyaOov O\)TE KCXKOV, cbS' evi 
Xoyco 7ioio \ j xivoq, akX a i i t o v 7C(6|iaxoq \xbvov avxb Si\|/oq Tte^uKev; 
[...] xo-u 5i\i/oovxo(; d p a r| \\tx>%r\, KaG' oaov 8iyr\, OVK &X\O X I 
Po<)X,exai f) m e i v , K a l xovzov bpeyexai K a i e j t i xo-uxo bpiaq. 1 7 7 
Only after this point in relation to the independence of the desires of the 
ejuGvunxiKOV from specific qualities including goodness has been established, 
does the argument go back to an instance of opposite desires in the soul of the 
kind that were described at 4.437b ff. (see b. above), namely the case when there 
1 7 5 "Yes, [... ] but if you take all things which are such as to be related to something else, I think 
that qualified instances are related to qualified objects, whereas the things themselves are each of 
them related only to an object which is just itself." (4.438a7-b2). 
1 7 6 See 4.438b4-dl0. 
1 7 7 "So for any particular kind of drink, isn't there also a particular kind of thirst? Whereas thirst as 
such is not thirst for a large drink or a small drink, nor for a good drink or a bad drink -nor, to put 
it briefly, for any specific drink at all. No, the object of thirst as such is, in the nature of things, 
simply drink as such, isn't it? ...Then, all the thirsty person's soul wants, in so far as he is thirsty, is 
to drink. That's what it reaches out for, and makes for." (4.439a4-bl). 
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is something that holds back the part of us that is thirsty. Here, according to the 
principle of opposition, it is possible to distinguish between a beast-like impulse 
without qualification that bids the man to drink and another simultaneous 
desiderative movement towards not drinking. 1 7 8 
Like the hands of the archer which simultaneously push and pull the bow, two 
desires pull in the soul in two different directions when a man, although he is 
thirsty (i.e. desires to drink), does not want to drink (oi)K e8eX.eiv Ttieiv, 
4.439c2-3). 
e) The conclusion of the argument is, then, that two parts can be differentiated 
according to these two opposites desires: on the one hand, an appetitive aspect of 
us, which is incapable of calculation -e7ti9D|J.r|XiK6v and d^oy icyxov- , which 
draws and drags us 5 i d 7ca0r||4.dxa>v xe K a i voar| |j .dxcov (4.439dl-2) and q> 
e p a xe K a i ne iv f j K a i K a i 8 i \ j / f i K a i rcepi xdQ aXXac, Em6i)|j.ia<; [...], 
nXripcoaecov xivcov i]5ova>v e x a i p o v (4.439d6-8); on the other hand, a rational 
part of our soul (the A -oy iax iKOv) , which "masters and inhibits" ( K p a x o v v K a i 
K C G X C U O V ) impulses that come from the appetitive part through the calculation of 
reason (xo \xkv KCOA.'UOV x d xo iavxa eyYiyvexai, o x a v eYY&vrixai, £ K 
Xoyio[LOV, 4.439c9-dl). 
What matters is the reason for the conflict in the soul that is in play here, i.e. why 
these desires pull the soul in opposite directions or, in other words, what these two 
opposite directions consist in. We can suppose that, insofar as it has been 
1 7 8 o-bxow el rcore xi ai>Tr|v &v8eA.Kei Sivj/doaav, exepov dv xi ev a i r t f j E I T | a"bxo{j 
xov diycovxot; Kai dyovro? cbaitep Bipiov km. T O J I I E I V ; ("And if there is anything at all 
holding it back when it is thirsty, would this have to be a different element in it from the actual part 
which is thirsty, and which drives it like an animal to drink?") (4.439b 3-5). See also 4.439c5-7: ev 
xfj \l/u%fi cti>Tc3v T O KeXe-uov, eveivca 5e xd KCoA-tiov meiv "[Can't we say] there is 
something in their soul telling them to drink, and also stopping them [to drink]?" . 
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emphazised that the appetites of the eJCi8\)|xr|Ti.K6v desire their objects without 
qualification and specifically without the qualification of their goodness or 
badness, the X O Y I C T X I K O V has to be the aspect of us which is able to recognize 
and desire what is good and advise and desire not to do 1 7 9 what the 
67ii9\)|iT|XiK6v wishes to do. This capacity of the XoyiaxiKOV to recognize the 
good, which is implicitly suggested here, is clearly asserted a bit later at 4.442c5-
8,1 8 0 while its desire for the real good in relation to this capacity is widely treated 
at 6.504e4 on (see especially 6.505dll-506a7). Nevertheless, the rational part's 
understanding of the good coincides with its object of desire -the real good and the 
truth- only when reason can consider things on its own. When rationality is 
subdued and so corrupted by appetites, anger and, more general, what is evil in us 
(like over-developed emotions, deceptive sense-perceptions, etc.), it still declares 
on what is good. But it inevitably does this in a wrong way (in spite of still 
desiring the real good and the truth), insofar as reason, being overwhelmed by 
desires alien to it, establishes what is good according to these desires and is at the 
1 7 9 Here only negative desiderative expressions are attributed to the Xoyt-OXiKOV (or later to the 
SuuoeiSei; when it is associated with reason (see 4.440c ff.: OVK eGeXei Jipo? xovxov ccbxcru 
eyeipeaSai b 8UH6Q)) probably for the following reason: the desire for the good derives from 
our rational aspect so that, when being considered in relation with the irrational tendencies, it 
appears essentially as imposing a limit on the unlimited tendencies of the appetites. So at this level 
the XoyicmKOV can only reveal negative expressions and is restrictive. However, the rational and 
'spirited' desires can be positive as well: for example, the positive desire for learning the truth or 
the positive desire to face the enemy in a battle. It is also possible (and in fact quite frequent) that 
appetites can constrain a man contrary to his reason and rule him (4.440a) and in this sense be 
negative desires. 
1 8 0 co(|)dv 8e Y e E K E ' I V C D top auxKpop |aepei, top 6 fjpxev i' ev cfbxai K O U T O U T C C 
itapfiYYeXXev, &xov av K&KSIVO emanjjUTji' 'ev ainop xr)v TOV ovfiQepovTog EKCta-ccp 
ie Kai 6A.C0 tap KOIVCO CT<))C3V alrccov -cpicBv 6VTCOV. ("But wise by that small part that ruled in 
him and handed down commands, by its possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is 
beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.") I follow here 
Shorey's translation. Henceforth I will continue by following Griffith's translation. 
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same time misled in its judgements by the influence of the changeable and the 
bodily.181 
So we can summarize what has been got from the text about the £7U0U|J.T|TIK6V 
and the XoyicraKOV in this way. A conflict takes place in the soul whenever the 
desires of our appetitive aspect go in the opposite direction from desires for not 
doing what the £7U0D|J.T|TIK6V wants to do. The appetites of the £7CI6\)(J.T|XIK6V 
look for their objects as such without further specification: hunger looks for food 
as such and thirst for drink as such without stipulating what kind of food or drink 
is required. A fundamental consequence of this is that the appetites of the 
£7ii0\)|j.T|XiK6v do not look specifically for good objects and so are characterized 
as blind to what is good and bad, which only reason can discriminate. In this way 
the £7C10\)|IT|XIK6V can desire objects that are established as not desirable by 
reason, insofar as the XoyicmKOV can desire and want and advise to do the 
opposite of what the £7C10\)IJ.T|TIK6V wants. Thus the fundamental conflict that 
takes place in the soul is not to be described as a battle just between reason and 
desire but more precisely as between two main tendencies of our desires: the drive 
of the rational desires towards what reason considers the good and the appetites of 
the £7Ci0\)|ir|XiK6v, which seek their objects independently of their goodness.182 
This battle of desires with opposite directions within the soul is decisive for each 
human being, insofar as its result determines not only what is to be done at a 
particular moment but, in particular; which desires will lead our life and so 
whether we develop our essential rational condition of being lovers of the truth or 
not and get close to what we all desire: the real good. 
1 8 1 On this point see below Chapter 2, Section II, 33. Reason as the organon of judgement, pp. 
180 ff.. 
1 8 2 This incapacity for the discrimination of what is good and bad by the appetitive part has as one 
of its fundamental consequences that this aspect of us cannot establish a limit by itself but needs 
the rational part with its desire for the good if it is to acquire the appropriate limit (9.586e4-
9.587al). 
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1.2. The deduction of the 6\)(xoei5e<; from a conflict of its desire for victory 
either against reason or on the side of reason against the appetites of the 
£niQv\ir\TiK6v 
As for the 6i)(j.oei5e(;, this is deduced from a conflict of its proper desires with 
the desires of one of the two other parts. For this 'form' of our soul, which has as 
its distinctive object of desire victory, fame, honour, two possibilities are open. 
Either it can look for its proper objects only when reason approves them as 
appropriate (i.e. the 'spirited' part has been trained to fight only when it is right to 
do it so). In this way it contributes to the drive of the X-oytcrxiKOV and is in 
conflict with the ejti9i)p.T|XiK6v. Or, i f it lacks appropriate training, it can reject 
reason's counsel about what is good and go for its objects wrongly and blindly. In 
this way the 0 V | A O £ I 8 E Q comes to be in conflict with reason (see 9.586c7-d2) and 
can even easily lose its proper goals and move into the course of the 
eKi0\)(J.r|XiK6v. The examples that are given from 4.439e to 4.440d, in order to 
establish the 0D|i.oei5eQ as a third and different part of the soul, illustrate these 
possible directions of the 0\)H,OEI8E<;. 
The 0"U|U.OEi5e<; is a natural ally of reason in the sense that, when appropiately 
trained and developed, it is always against the appetites when reason is opposed to 
them: 
xaiq 8' £7u0v|a.ica<; ocbxov KOivcovf]aavxa, a ipcmvxoi ; Xbyov |j,f] 5eiv 
d v x u c p d x x E i v , o i | i . cd ae ol>K d v (|)dvai yevo^ikvov TCOXE E V aa/oxcp xaO 
xoio-uxc/u dia0£CJ0ai, d i | i a i 8' oi)8' E V dAAxo.183 
183"Spirit siding with the desires, on the other hand, when reason has declared its opposition, is not 
the kind of thing I imagine you'd ever claim to have seen, either in yourself or in anybody else." 
(4.440b4-7). 
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This alliance of the 0U|aoei5eQ with the A-oytcrxiKdv (which is given as a proof 
that the 0D|J.O£i.8e<; is a different part from the £7U0D|J.T|XIK6V ) can take 
different forms and with different results. This can be seen from the illustrative 
cases that are offered. 
The first example is Leontius' conflict between his appetite for the sight of dead 
bodies (iSelv £7Ui0\)|J.oi, 4.439e9) for which he felt a morbid attraction184 and his 
rejection, indignation, aversion (d|J.a 8e av 8va%£paivo i K a i d7toxpe7roi 
eavtov, 4.439e9-10), i.e. his desire not to do so. In this case the 8v|i.oei5eQ is 
associated with reason's desire for the good -the desire not to see the dead bodies-
in conflict with an irrational desire -the desire for seeing dead bodies. However, 
although anger fights in alliance with reason -i.e. according to what the rational 
part considers as the right thing to do- in order to defeat the appetites, finally 
Leontius' appetitive inclinations succeed and he goes to see the corpses (4.440al-
3). The 0t)(J.oei5e^ expresses its aggressiveness and desire for victory in the fight 
and desire for victory over the appetite to see the dead bodies, i.e. it fights and 
looks for success but in a way that is considered appropriate by reason: 
. . . K a i xecoq | i ev jud^oitb xe K a i rcapaKaAAWtxoixo...185 
What this example illustrates is that our 0U|i6<; can fight against the appetites (in 
this case unsuccesfully) 
...b Xoyoq a r | | j . a i v e i TTJU bpyf\v noXepeiv evioxe zaig knidvu'iaiq foq 
d U o 6v dUcp. 1 8 6 
1 Leontius' morbid attraction for dead bodies is perhaps related to his erotic inclination for very 
pale young boys (see Adam (1965) I , p. 255). 
1 8 5 "For a time he struggled, and covered his eyes." (4.439el0-440al). 
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This association of the 0"U[xoei8e<; with the A,oyiO"TiK6v can also be successful. 
For example, take the case at 4.440cl-5 of a man who has acted unjustly 
( & 8 i K £ i v ) and for whom it is therefore fair to suffer hunger and cold (which we 
must suppose has to be very unpleasant for his appetitive aspect insofar as its 
desires look for satisfaction independently of their goodness or otherwise, and in 
this case their satisfaction is denied). The nobler this man is, the less angry he 
becomes because of his sufferings and his anger does not want ( o i ) K e9eA,ei) to 
rise against what he is suffering justly: 
...OVK kdeXei rcpdq x o m o v avxov e y E l p e a B a i b 6vfiog...m 
In this case the G U J I O E I S E Q does not want its object -to resist and get rid of 
sufferings and win. In other words it gives up its desire for victory in this case 
according to what reason establishes as good and desirable, namely to suffer 
because of acting unjustly. This presupposes that the 'spirited' part has been 
correctly trained, so that it does not 'fight' on every occasion but only when it is 
appropriate to do it. 
For a similar reason, in the case where the same just man has been treated unjustly 
( d 5 i K E i a 9 a i ) , his 0V|J.O£I8E<; under the same conditions of suffering boils with 
rage and grows fierce against unjustiee and in favour of what is just: 
x i 8E OTOCV a 8 i K £ i a 8 a i xvq t i y n x a i ; o i ) K E V T O V T C G £ E I T E K a i 
X a X E n a i v E i K a i a u | j . | j . a x £ i TOO S O K O O J V T I S i K a i o p K a i , 8 i d T O 7 i £ i v f j v 
K a i 8 i d T O pvyouv K a i raxvTa T d T o i a m a Tidc%z\v, imo | i .£va>v K a i 
1 8 6 "... it shows that anger can sometimes be at war with the desires, which implies that they are two 
distinct separate things." (4.440a5-6). 
1 8 7 "... his spirit ... refuses to raise any objection..." (4.440c5). 
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V I K O C K a i oi) Xr\y£i xcov yevvaXcav, npiv d v f] 5 ia7tpd£r|xai f) 
xeXE\yzf\ar\ r\ &amp K \ ) C O V i m o voixeco? imo xcu Xbyov T O O nap' a m o p 
dvaK^riGei^ 7cpa\)v8T\; 1 8 8 
This means that the 6v|J.O£i8£Q' desire for fighting for victory, being 
appropriately trained, now addresses itself to defending what is good and just 
according to reason and is only calmed when reason indicates that it should be.1 8 9 
However, in spite of being a natural ally of reason in its fight against the appetites, 
the 8\)|i.oei8eQ can be overdeveloped -and at the same time reason may not be 
sufficiently developed and the appetites not trained to keep within appropriate 
limits- and so drive for its goals -victory and honour- without reason's guidance 
(9.590a9-bl), being in conflict with reason. In this case, without the 
aggressiveness of the 'spirited' part fighting against them according to reason's 
commands, the appetites can easily grow without limit. The consequence of this is 
that the 'spirited' part itself is finally weakened and so dragged in the direction of 
the appetites' stream (9.590b6-9). 
How the desires of completely unreasoning anger (TO aXoyicTTCOQ Qv[iov[LEVov, 
4.441c2) can be in conflict with the desires that arise from the calculation of 
reason about what is good and bad (so being different from the A . O Y I O " T I K 6 V ) is 
exemplified with one line of the Odyssey: airfioc, 8k nXrfeaq K p a 8 i r | V 
1 "And about someone who thinks he is being wronged? While this is going on, doesn't he boil 
with rage at hunger, cold and any hardships of this kind? Doesn't he ally himself with what he 
thinks is just, and endure all these things until he wins through, refusing to give up his justified 
indignation until he either achieves him, or dies, or is called back and pacified by reason within 
him, like a dog being recalled by a shepherd?" (4.440c7-d3). 
1 8 9 The fact that the 0uuoei8£q can become moral indignation does not mean that it becomes 
identical to reason. See especially 4.442b5-9. It still goes for victory and honour but, when it is led 
by reason, it does so, for example, over the pull of the appetites. 
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t|vi7ca7iE iivScp.1 9 0 This line refers to Odysseus' desires for immediate revenge 
on his maidservants and the suitors and, at the same time, his comprehension that 
it is better to wait for the appropriate time to do it. This means that the 
0D|i.oei8e<; of Odysseus without the advice of reason -that is, without its being 
trained to fight only when it is appropriate to do it- would seek victory over the 
suitors right now, but this is not the best thing even to attain the 6u(ioei8e<;' aim. 
We can suppose that, i f the GviioeiSe^ wil l accept the guidance of the 
XoyiaxiKOV, it would also go for revenge and victory over the suitors (i.e. its 
object of desire, which in this case seems to be approved by reason), but when it is 
appropriate -good- to do it according to the calculations of reason. 
So in Book 4 the 9v|i,0£i8e<; is treated as a third form of the soul, one with which 
we feel anger (9i)|j.cn>|A£9a, 4.436a) and fight for victory and which can take the 
side of reason's desire for the truth and good or blindly go for its own goals, being 
finally weakened and pulled in the direction of the appetites (in spite of being a 
natural ally of reason against them). This means that our self-assertive and 
aggressive tendency191 can look for its proper objects -victory, honour, fame- in 
two possible ways. One possibility is that the 'spirited' part 'fights' or does not 
fight according to what reason establishes as good or not. In this case sometimes 
its aggressiveness is used to fight external enemies -as in the example of Odysseus 
with the suitors- but only when it is the right moment to do it; or to fight against 
'internal' enemies -the appetites -as in the case of Leontius or of the just man that 
suffers unjustly. On other occasions, the 'spirited' part also, being an ally of 
reason, gives up its aggressiveness i f this is the right thing to do, as in the case of 
the noble man who suffers because he has behaved unjustly and so bears his 
sufferings and is not angry because of that. Another possibility is that the 'spirited' 
1 9 0 "He smote his chest, and thus rebuked his heart." (4.441b6). 
1 9 1 I t is 'aggressiveness' in the sense that is readiness to confront something or someone (see below 
Chapter 2, Section II, 2.1. Aggresiveness and assertiveness as characteristics of the'spirited' 
part, pp. 148 ff.). 
124 
part (not being appropriately trained) refuses the guidance of reason and so the 
8\)|i.oei8eQ goes inappropriately for its own goals (9.590a9-bl), as would be the 
case in the example of Odysseus i f he had taken revenge over the suitors without 
waiting for the appropriate moment to do it. When the 'spirited' part cannot 
follow reason's advice and blindly tries to achieve its goals it is easily corrupted 
by the irrational beast-like desires in us (9.590b6-9) in the sense that its zeal and 
rage is finally weakened in the pursuit of the appetites' ends (physiological needs, 
wealth). 
In this way the S D J I O E I S E Q seems to have such a condition that, when it is 
appropiately developed and trained, participates with its proper ardour (9u|l6<;) 
and desire for victory on the side of reason's fight against the appetites of the 
£7u8i)|ir|TiK6v. But when the 'spirited' part is overdeveloped and not 
commanded by reason, finally weakens and is dragged in the direction of the 
appetites that have grown without limits. This bivalency in its direction itself 
distinguishes the 9\)|J.O£i8£<; from the other two parts, insofar as they have a 
unique general inherent tendency: the £71I6'U(ITIXIK6V always looks for its proper 
objects in a beast-like way independently of their goodness or badness and the 
XoyicxiKOV always goes for goodness and truth according to its calculations. 
The 8i)|iOEi8£(; is different from the other two parts because, while it looks for its 
proper objects -victory, honour, fame- it can either fight against the appetites on 
the side of the rational desires or go for its goals without reason's orientation. 
In this way the existence of the 8i)|j.O£i8£<; is inferred from a conflict of desires 
in the sense that the pursuit of its proper objects of desire can lead the 'spirited' 
part in opposite directions: either in the tendency of the desires of reason, fighting 
on its side, or in the 'stream' of the appetites of the £7Ei9'U|J.T|TiK6v, after having 
irrationally gone for victory and being at last weakened because of the overgrowth 
of uncontrolled appetites. So it becomes a decisive factor in the final configuration 
of the soul in the sense that its ambition for victory can strengthen the 
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performance of an individual for the attainment of the good that is established by-
reason (and so drain its powerful stream into reason's channel) or carry out the 
most savage actions and even lose its own desire for victory and honour when it 
refuses the guidance of the XoyicrxiKOV. 
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Section II: Characteristics and proper desires of each part 
Introduction 
In the previous section I have tried to show how the three parts of the soul in Book 
4 are distinguished according to how they take part in the fundamental conflict of 
the soul; the appetites of the £7ti0U|J/r|XiK6v drive the soul towards the 
changeable and the bodily, while the rational desires of the XoyicrxiKOV drive it 
in the opposite direction, towards the truth and the real good, and for its part the 
0U|ioei8£<; with its desire for victory and aggressiveness 'runs' in one direction 
or the other. From this account an understanding of the human being in terms of 
leading desires or passions that can dominate his soul starts to emerge. Book 9 
concludes the account with the distinction of three basic types of human beings: 
lovers of wealth, lovers of honour and lovers of the truth or philosophers. 
Now, in the present section, I intend to carry out a more analytical description of 
each of these three aspects and of the desires that constitute them according to 
what is said especially in Books 4, 7, 8 and 9.1 9 21 also suggest the way in which 
education influences the development or inhibition of their proper desires. 
1 9 2 1 have often used what is said about the city in Books 4, 8 and 9 for a better understanding of the 
individual's soul. The text itself, regardless of the logic of the proposal to compare the city and the 
individual, invites us to do this: a) The study of the quality of justice in the state in order to 
examine it in the individual is established as the principle of research (2.368e2-369a3). b) The 
individual and the city have been shown to have the same parts and in equal number and so similar 
affections and dispositions can be found in both cases (4.441x4-7; see also 4.435b; 4.435e). c) In 
addition the description of the forms in the city on many occasions gives psychological information 
about the individuals that compose the groups and not just sociological information about how the 
groups work as such. I think that the difference between the sociological and the individual 
descriptions in the Republic is rather that in the first case we have the description of societies ruled 
either by love for wisdom, love for honour or love for wealth (with its three variations, i.e. 
oligarchy, democracy and tyranny), where the leading desire is based on the individual or group of 
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Afterwards, basing myself on this analysis of the parts of the soul, I hope to show 
in Section III how the earlier education of the guardians described in Books 3 and 
4 and the higher education described in Books 6 and 7 are meant to develop the 
proper desires of the three parts appropriately, so that the desire for the truth and 
the real good of the rational part leads the soul, and an unfolding of our rational 
condition and the satisfaction of our universal desire for the good are achieved as 
far as possible. A picture of us according to our success or failure in developing 
our essential rationality and love for the truth is traced in the eschatological myth 
of Book 10. This is examined in Section IV. 
l.The e7ii0D|iT)XiKdv 
1.1. Proper desires of the appetitive part: physiological needs; desire for 
wealth 
The ETCiGuiiriTiKOV with its multitude of desires is "the largest part in each 
person's soul", 1 9 3 as in the city the wealth-loving part of it is also the biggest part 
(4.431a8). Its own diversity (7toA/U£i8iav, 9.580dll) makes it impossible to give 
it a single name and so it is called according to the central and strongest aspect, 
namely the intensity (a(()o5p6xr|xa xoov kniQv\LiG>v) of its many appetites 
(9.580e2-4). In this sense, desires for "the pleasures of nutrition and generation 
and their kind", 1 9 4 such as thirst, hunger, sex and the like (9.580e3-4), which are 
individuals that rule the society. In the second case we have portraits of individuals governed by 
these leading desires. However, I do not imply by this that the Republic is simply a psychological 
treatise: I think it is a political work, as well as in a way also a treatise on education and on art, but 
based on a psychological theory. 
1 9 3 ...b 8f| nkeiaxov xfjq vi/uxfji; E V eKdaxcp eaxi... (4.442a5-6). 
1 9 4 ...km8uuo0uEv...To3v itepi %r\v tpo((>f|v xe Kai yevvriaiv r|8ova>v K C U baa xcnrcoov 
ctSeXxjxx... (4.436al0-bl). 
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related to a basic need for survival and self-preservation, are the most obvious 
(evapyeozdxaq) desires of this part of the soul (4.437d3-4).195 
The (|)iA<o%pfpaTOV, which becomes "a virtual synonym of the 
ejci9\)(iTixiK6v", 1 % is a sort of derivative manifestation of the £1TA0V|J .T |TIK6V . It 
is a "wealth-loving form" of the soul rather than just a "money-loving one", 
insofar as this aspect of us is related to a desire for the appropiation of 
commodities in general, i.e. of %pfi(i.axa ('goods, property') and not just 
specifically of money.197 As a result of its tendency to accumulate wealth it is also 
called "the gain-loving part" (the <j)iXoK£p5e<;),198 insofar as the making of a 
profit is a fundamental way to acquire more wealth. 
1.2. Irrationality of the appetitive part 
An essential characteristic of the appetitive part is its being dA-oyicrcov 
(4.439d7), i.e. incapable of calculation and, in this sense, irrational. This 
irrationality of the £7r.i8D|rr)TiK6v can be understood in two ways: 
-The intensity, urge and bestiality of its appetites. This bestial urge and blind drive 
require, nevertheless, a minimum cognitive capacity in order to recognize the 
object of desire. 
1 9 5 In relation to sex, hunger and thirst as typical desires of the EJti8\)(ir|XlK6v see also 4.439d6-
8. 
1 9 6 See Shorey, vol. I (1946) [1930], p. 380, note b. 
1 9 7 See, for example, the extension of the desire of our appetitive aspect to all kind of property at 
8.547b3-4, where it is said that the bronze and iron races pull "eJii xP"n|xaaxin.6v K(xi yf\q 
Kxf jdv Kai O I K I C C I ; " . 
1 9 8 ctp' oGv Kai xfiv r)8ovT)v ainov Kai <|>iMav ei (|xxi|xev eivai zov KkpSovq... Kai 
KaXoivxeQ airco <|)iA,oxpTpaxov Kai (j>iXoKep8e<; bpBcoi; av KaXdi^ev; ("So if we were 
to say that the thing it took pleasure and delight in was profit, ... [a]nd if we were to call it money-
loving and profit-loving, would we be justified?") (9.581a3-7). 
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-Its insatiable and limitless nature, insofar as it is actually incapable of behaving 
according its own good as understood in relation to the whole soul, i.e. according 
to the limit required for its appetites. 
1.2.1.Irrationality as a bestial urge 
Appetites, in principle, have their origin in physiological needs and drive in an 
intense (9.580e2-3) and beast-like way (cbcmep Gipiov, 4.439b4) towards the 
replenishment of a state of emptiness of the body. This urge of the appetites does 
not require any "intervention or detour through reason"199 and is actually related to 
the fact that they seek their objects without qualification and particularly without 
reference to the goodness/rightness of their objects and so without any 
calculation,200 as we have seen in Section I. In fact the basic instinct of 
aggressiveness of the 8v|J.O£i5e<; is irrational in a similar way. However, while 
the 'spirited' part can be a helper of reason in its search for the truth and the real 
good, the intensity of the appetites of the £m9'D|J.T|TiK6v inevitably pulls the soul 
to the bodily and changeable and often against calculations made by reason.201 
1.2.1.1. Cognitive capacity of the e7r,i9D|i.T|TiK6v202 
Although the appetites' drive is bestial and wild, some cognitive capacity seems to 
be required in order to enable them find and get their objects of desire. Let us 
consider now what this cognitive capacity would be like and compare it with 
reason's cognitive capacities. 
1 9 9 Cooper (1999), pp. 196-197. 
2 0 0 See above Chapter 2, Section I, pp. 107 ff. . 
2 0 1 See 4.439c9-d2, d6-8. 
2 0 2 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 3.3. Reason as the organon of judgement, pp. 180 ff . for 
further development of what is treated here. 
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1.2.1.1.1. Tripartite division of the soul in the Republic from the point of view 
of desire 
Apart from the double attribution to the rational part of the desire for the truth and 
the real good and, at the same time, of its capacity of examining, arguing and 
calculating, in the Republic there is no consideration of the relation between the 
three parts of the soul and the cognitive capacities of the soul. In fact the absence 
of an account of this kind is not surprising, insofar as the division of the soul into 
three parts is mainly designed, as shown in Section I, from the point of view of 
desire and not from of the point of view of cognitive capacities. However, we can 
speculate as to what kind of cognitive capacity the e7Ci9\)|iT|TiK6v might require 
-without necessarily attributing this cognitive capacity to the appetitive part- and 
what intellectual activities -such as judgement, calculation, etc.- can only be 
ascribed to the rational part; even when the appetites influence -and distort- the 
way that reason works. 
1.2.1.1.2. Cognitive capacity required by the appetites 
We can, at least plausibly, suppose that the intense urge of the appetites, while 
being without calculation, requires the minimum cognitive capacity of 
discrimination, insofar as human beings, as well as animals, need to be able to 
distinguish their objects of appetite. Even a butterfly has to be able to discriminate 
'flower' from 'not flower' and 'nectar' from 'not nectar' in order to get the object 
of its desire, the food it needs to sustain its one day of life. For this kind of 
identification sense-perception seems to be required in order to register those 
objects that can provide for physiological needs. Moreover, appetites are related to 
the changeable and the bodily so sense perceptions, which take place in this same 
metaphysical realm, are likely to be the kind of cognitive activity that assists the 
appetites in the identification of their objects of desire. Insofar as appetites (and in 
fact any desires) are experienced most of the time before the actual presence of the 
object of desire, it is also necessary to suppose some kind of representation of the 
object of appetite to make the agent to look for it. However, raw sense perceptions 
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together with these internal representations do not seem to be sufficient: they 
would also need to be assisted by some kind of elementary rational discrimination 
or judgement, so that, even in the case of animals like a butterfly, some sort of 
XoyiatiKOV would be involved. 2 0 3 According to the explanation proposed here 
we do not need to presuppose that the cognitive capacity required by the appetitive 
part would be an aspect of the appetitive part itself: in all cases the senses would 
be instruments through which reason makes judgements.204 
1.2.1.1.3. Reason's judgements and opinions influenced by the appetites 
References to judgements and beliefs of the appetitive part can be taken rather as 
judgements and beliefs which reason, that is the aspect of us that judges, produces 
from the sense information -and maybe the internal representations- that are 
present to the appetites.205 These opinions and judgments are often wrong because 
the appetites connect the soul with the changeable, their object of satisfaction and 
pleasure -in this case the physiological needs are again the more obvious example-
being always in the realm of the changeable.206 Similarly, the suggestion that the 
k7iiGD|j.T|xiK6v, being <{)iXoxpfi|iaxov and <j)iA.OKep5e<;,207 might make 
calculations in terms of means and ends,208 insofar as wealth is desired as a main 
instrument for the gratification of the intense physiological appetites (9.580e5-
2 0 3 I f this means Plato attributes some kind of primitive XoyiaTiKOV to animals, we may notice 
that his scheme of rencarnation seems to involve some such attribution in any case. 
2 0 4 On the vagueness in Republic in relation to the general function of cnoQr\aiq see Murphy 
(1951), p. 243. 
2 0 5 Differently Sorabji (1993), pp. 9-12. 
2 0 6 See, for example, 8.559bll where Socrates suggests that the unnecessary desires are harmful for 
the body and also for the intelligence and reasonableness of the soul. See also below in Chapter 2, 
Section II, 3.3. Reason as the organon of judgement, pp. 180 ff . my interpretation of the 
epistemological consequences of the analysis of the authentic and inauthentic pleasures in Book 9 
and of the division of the parts of the soul in Book 10. 
2 0 7 See here p. 128 above. 
2 0 8 Price (1995), pp. 60-62 and 50-51. 
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581al; 8.554a5-8) can also be understood in different way. As seen above, the 
appetites drive towards their objects independently of their 'goodness' or 
'badness'. It is actually reason, as servant of the appetites and overcome by them, 
which wi l l make calculations in terms of means and ends according to a goal alien 
to reason (as in the case of the oligarchic man at 8.553dl-4). In this way, the 
appetite for wealth as such, although it does not have a physiological origin, wi l l 
mantain the pattern of the physiological needs from which the love for money 
originates, in the sense of being a pressing and irrational drive for money (i.e. 
without calculation and reasoning about how good and benefitial this is). For 
example, in the case of the greedy or avaricious person (which we may think of as 
the extreme case of someone dominated by his desire for money), besides 
calculating with his reason, which serves his dominant appetite, in order to get 
more and more wealth, he wil l also normally have an unlimited fondness for 
money -since reason does not rule- as an irrational resource of pleasure on its own, 
in a similar way to someone addicted to food or alcohol.210 A hypothetical 
explanation of the origin of these non-physiological appetites, taking into account 
the role that habituation wi l l have in the education of the appetitive part (see 
8.559b8-cl),211 may be drawn as follows: first reason may establish the search for 
money as an appropriate means when the satisfaction of the appetites dominates a 
person's life; but afterwards the habitual search for money in order to satisfy the 
appetites creates or develops an appetite and irrational tendency towards wealth on 
its own. 
2 0 9 See above Chapter 2, Section 1,1.1. The deduction of the e7ti8\)H.T|TiK6v and the 
A-oyiaxiicdv from..., pp. 109ff.. 
2 1 0 In the case of the 'appetite for philosophy' of the democratic man (8.561d2) we can also think 
that he wants knowledge or culture -the current meaning of <|)iAo<TO<j>ia- as something to be 
consumed like food, drink, etc. but without any real commitment to learning and looking for the 
truth. A similar contemporary example might people who buy books of 'general culture' and 
accumulate them on shelves without any intention of seriously reading and studying them. 
2 1 1 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3. The education of the appetites, pp. 139 ff . , especially 
1.3.1. Habituation of the appetites (pp. 140 ff . ) . 
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The e7r,i6D|j.r|Ti.K6v's lack of capacity to calculate is fundamental for 
understanding its irrational condition as an incapacity to establish its own limits. 2 1 2 
1.2.2. Irrationality as insatiability and unlimited multiplication of the 
appetites 
The £7ti8\j(j,r|XiK6v's incapacity for calculation or its being aXoyicyxov seems 
to be connected not only to its urgent and bestial drive towards its objects but also 
to its failure to find its appropriate limit -it is a7tX,T|C7x6xaxov (4.442a7)- and 
satisfaction, insofar as the limits that the appetitive part requires can only be 
established by reason's calculations. Besides this, even when the appetitive aspect 
is limited to appetites that are necessary for basic survival, it wi l l never be an 
active helper of reason in attaining the truth and the real good -as the 'spirited' 
part can be: in the best case, its necessary appetites would just contribute to 
maintaining the indispensable physical support. 
1.2.2.1. The limitless tendency of the £7U8 'D|J.T|XIK6V in the origin of the 
luxurious city 
There are some hints of this tendency of the E7ii9'0|J.r|XiK6v not to respect or 
recognize limits and develop unnecessary desires in what is said in relation to the 
transition to the 7tpa)xr| nbXiq to the xpax|)a)CTa J I 6 X . I I ; . 2 1 3 The state originates 
from the fact that we are in an essential state of need (%p£ia, see 369c2) and a 
condition that is lacking rather than self-sufficient (tijioov eicaaxog OVK 
atraxpKriQ, &A,Xa noXX&v evSefi^, 2.369b6-7). As a result of this each 
member of the community is in charge of providing one service that is needed by 
2 1 2 For the kn\.Qv\ir\z\.Kbv the best is to get as much as possible. But, from the point of view of the 
calculations of the rational part, which takes into account the whole soul, the good thing for the 
appetites is to have limits. 
2 1 3 Thus, I assume that the description of the first city and the luxurious city not only offers an 
explanation about the origin of the state but also helps the understanding of the psychological 
structure of the individual. See n. 192. 
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him and the others, instead of all (2.369cl-4). In the pure natural state of the 'first 
city' the appetites are limited to the satisfaction of minimum and necessary needs, 
like food, housing and clothes and the like in order to take care of the body 
(2.369dl-10), in a way more similar to what happens to animals, whose 
inclinations are naturally limited to what is necessary to keep them alive. With the 
emergence of the luxurious city unnecessary appetites arise and human beings 
develop tendencies for things that they do not really need.214 It is worth noting that, 
for example, Glaucon's complaint, from which the exposition of the luxurious city 
originates, is precisely focused on the simplicity of the diet and the basic way of 
satisfying the desire for food, which is one of the most representative examples of 
the appetites of the £7U6U|ITIT;IK6V , in the first city (2.372c4-d3). The fact that the 
members of the luxurious city abandon themselves to the acquisition of unlimited 
wealth2 1 5 also suggests the development of the unlimited tendencies of the 
2 1 4 From 2.369b5 to 2.372d3 Socrates develops the description of the 'first city' (rapco-cr) noXiq) 
that would represent an ideal human community based only on necessary human needs. The ideal 
state would come to be through purification of the unhealthy and luxurious city (xp\)<t>63aav 
7i6A.iv, 3.372e3). This is probably related to the fact that Plato considers it impossible in the forms 
of social organization available to him that people could ever restrain their demands for natural 
needs. Therefore he imagines his ideal state just as the best possible improvement from the given 
situation of a society (and a human being) that has already developed unlimited needs. The 
principle of specialization of labour of the first city is extended to the luxurious city but now taking 
in account unnecessary as well as necessary needs. In it, besides the farmers, builders, weavers 
(2.369d7-8), cobblers (2.370d3), carpenters, smiths, craftsmen (2.370d5-6), sailors, traders 
(2.371all-b2), shopkeepers (2.371d4-5) and wage earners (2.371e5), needed in the first city, there 
are imitators of all kinds (2.373b5), manufacturers of all kinds (2.373c8), tutors, nurses, beauty-
shop ladies, barbers, cooks, chefs (2.373c2-4). Finally, because of the need for more territory due 
to the enlargement of the city, an army comes to be necessary (2.373e9-374a2). For the 
constitution of this army people who might have more skill and competence in this specific task 
than anybody else (2.374d8-e2) -the guardians- are required, while for the government of the city it 
is philosophers trained in dialectics that are needed. 
2 1 5 ...ectv teal eKEivoi 6c<t>o3aiv alrcouq erci xprmdxan/ Kffjcuv dcneipov, imeppavrei; 
xov xcov ctvayKcdcov 6pov.... ("... if they too give themselves up to the pursuit of unlimited 
wealth, not confining themselves to necessities....") (2.373d9-10). 
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eJii8\)|J,T|TiK6v with the emergence of the luxurious city. Besides, the 
requirement of limit and selection in the satisfaction of desires such as thirst and 
hunger appears clearly formulated in relation to the appropriate diet for the 
guardians.216 Even the houses of the guardians must be conceived only to protect 
them from the coldness of winter and the heat of summer (415e6-7). Actually the 
guardians are the ones who have more strict limits imposed on the desire for 
wealth through the stipulation of common property and little wealth (4.416d4-
417b8). At 3.404e3-4 ff . it is shown that many physical diseases also derive from 
this tendency of our appetitive part to become unlimited in its desire and in that 
sense without possible satisfaction.217 For example, in the luxurious city the 
natural desire for eating (in order to keep oneself alive) is replaced by a corrupted 
desire for looking for pleasure through eating (4.404dl). So the necessary desire 
for eating degenerates into an unnecessary desire, which cannot find the 
appropriate limit and it seems that it is in this sense that it is unable to recognize 
its own good. 
1.2.2.2. Necessary and unnecessary appetites 
The distinction, in the discussion of the appetitive part in Book 8, between 
necessary and unnecessary desires (xd dvayKaio-u^ EKiQv^iac, K C C I TCXQ |a.fi, 
8.558d9) gives a further development of this point that not all our appetites are 
inevitably guided by our needs. 
a) Necessary desires: These are either desires that we cannot suppress because 
otherwise we suppress our own existence or desires that, without being absolutely 
indispensable, are in some way beneficial to us. In other words our nature compels 
1 6 The quantity and quality of the drink and food is determined according to what is beneficial not 
just for the body but especially for the whole soul in order to keep its harmonious state (3.404a9-
b2). 
2 1 7 From 3.405a on together with the discussion of the requirements of the best kind of medicine for 
the ideal state, there is probably incidental criticism of the medical practice of the time. 
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us to seek their satisfaction or at least their satisfaction does us some good. 
Thirst, hunger, sex219 -some of our physiological needs- are basic expressions of 
this kind of desires in the sense that we cannot eradicate them without eliminating 
ourselves. The derivative desire for wealth of the appetitive part,2 2 0 seems to be 
the most obvious example of the necessary desires as the ones that are helpful, 
insofar as wealth is clearly something useful for doing other things and in this 
sense it represents in general the desire for the acquisition of material things 
(9.580e5-581al), including those necessary for one's own survival. Their utility, 
in the sense of being productive (%pT|ai|J.6<;), is another characteristic of the 
necessary desires.221 
However, even these necessary desires of our appetitive aspect have a tendency to 
exceed their function and in this sense to become unnecessary and harmful: 
hunger can become a search for food that damages the body and, as a 
consequence, the soul.2 2 2 Something similar could probably be said about sexual 
2 1 8 oi)Kow ocq xe oi>K d v oioi x eiuev djr.oxpev|/ai, 8iKcda>(; d v d v a y K a i a i KCCXOIVTO, 
m i d e a l ditoxeXoibixevav 6<t>eA.o0cjiv t |udi ; ; xcnraov yap dii(|)OTepa)v e^iecrflca "rpcov 
Tfl ( j i w e i dvdyKT|. f) oi); ("Is it the ones we can't deny which can properly be called necessary 
-plus the ones whose satisfaction does us some good? Our nature demands that we try to satisfy 
both these classes, doesn't it?") (8.558dll-e3). So Plato does not have a wholly negative 
consideration of these desires (differently ch. 1 of Gosling (1983a), pp. 20-22). For example, 
hunger with appropriate limits does not necessarily lead to gluttony. Similarly in the 'first city' 
physical needs are limited to what is necessary. 
2 1 9 At 8.559c3-7 it is explicitly said that the appetites nepi d(()po5iaicov, like others, can be 
profitable - i f they help production. 
2 2 0 Love of money is the typical desire that governs the oligarchic man, who in a more general 
sense is governed by the necessary desires of the eju8u|xnnic6v (see 8.554a5-8). 
2 2 1 . .EKE'IVOU ; 5e xPTPocticrciKdq 5 i d TO xpi"|cri|io\><; itpbc, x d kpya Eivai . | ("...the others 
[i.e. the necessary desires] are productive, because they contribute to some function....") (8.559c3-
4). 
2 2 2 See, for example, 8.559bl0-ll where it is said that the excess of food damages the body and is 
also an obstacle to intelligence and temperance. 
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desire: it is a desire which is necessary for procreation but -very easily in human 
nature- surpasses the limits of this function. The love of wealth can also become a 
desire for the possession of material things beyond the proper limit. This happens 
embryonically even to the timocratic man 2 2 3 but is an inherent characteristic of the 
oligarchic man. 2 2 4 This very voracity for wealth of the oligarchic man paves the 
way for the growth of the unnecessary desires in the democratic man.2 2 5 This is 
also the reason for the development of the tyrant governed by a destructive ruling 
passion or fepcoq (see 9.573d ff . ) . In other words, it seems that the starting point 
for becoming a tyrant is the transformation of the necessary desires into 
unnecessary by the rejection of the limit that must come from the XayicrciKOV 
according to its judgement of what is good and bad. 
b) Unnecessary desires: These desires are for "spendthrift" and "expensive" 
(6tvaX.coxiKoi)226 pleasures i.e. pleasures that spend but do not produce wealth.2 2 7 
These desires do no good and sometimes even harm.2 2 8 An example would be the 
appetite (e7ii8\)ja,ia) for more than the necessary or good kinds of food (like 
roasted meat 4.404c2). Because of the sterility and potential harm of these desires 
2 2 3 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3.2.1. The secret growth of the desire for wealth in the 
timocratic man, p. 143. 
2 2 4 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3.22. The emergence of unnecessary desires in the 
oligarch man, p. 144. 
2 2 5 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3.3.3. The overcome of the democratic man's soul by the 
unnecessary desires: the tyrannical life, p. 145. 
2 2 6 See LSJ, s.v. &VOCXOOTIK6<;. A later sense of the word -not in Plato- is 'consuming'. The idea 
of calling the pleasures of the unnecessary desires 'spendthrift' (ctvaXcmiKoi) is that they just 
spend or consume but do not produce anything good and can even be harmful (like the drones). 
227 ...%a>v ev aircop tjSovcov, baca ai/aXamicai ntv, x P ^ a x i c m K a i 5e \xr\- ai 5r| OVK 
d tvayKa ia i K£KA/n.VTai- ("...those desires within him which are extravagant and not money-
making -the ones called unnecessary desires.") (8.558d4-6). 
228 &q yk Tiq dmxXXd^eiev &v, e i ueA.exo3 EK vkov, Kod Jtpoq obd&v ttyaObv 'evovaai 
Spoocuv ("What about the desires you can get rid of, if you work at it from childhood, the ones 
moreover whose presence does you no good -may even perhaps do you some harm?") (8.559a3-6). 
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they are said to govern the drones, i.e. persons who do no useful work and live off 
others or, in other words, whose life is led by the desire for not producing 
themselves but for taking from others. In this sense these desires are 
unproductive. 
A sub-species and extreme expression of the unnecessary desires is represented by 
the lawless unnecessary desires of our appetitive aspect that are mentioned at 
9.517a-7-8. In this passage it is established that something else must be said about 
the nature and number of our appetites. The tendency of the unnecessary desires to 
go beyond limits has its utmost expression in appetites that normally appear just in 
dreams and do not respect even the most basic cultural laws, for example the 
prohibition of incest, of the unjust and cruel murder of another human being i.e. 
desires that do not recognize even basic social limits and legality.2 2 9 Although 
these desires can be suppressed or at least weakened in a few people (9.571b-c), 
the bestial and monstruous tendency is a constitutive part of all us, as is clearly 
said at 9.572b: 
6 8e f3cruA,6|ie0a yv&vai xoS' eaxiv, cbg dpa 8eiv6v xi KCCI dypiov rcai 
&vo[xov km9vfj.icov eiSog kKdcrccp iuearu KOCI %dvx> SOKO-UCTIV ti|a.cov 
evioi<; jiexpiou; e l v a r t o w o 8e a p a ev xoiq \mvoir; y iyvexa i 
evSriXov.2 3 0 
2 2 9 tcov jj.fi &vaYKcdcov T]8OVO3V xe Kcd em9\>M.ia>v 5oKc/uai xivkc, u o i e t v a i 
Jiapdvouoi ("Among the unnecessary pleasures and desires there are some which seem to me to 
be violent or lawless.") (9.571b4-5). 
2 3 0 "What we need to know is that there is in everyone a terrible, untamed and lawless class of 
desires -even in those of us who appear to be completely normal. This becomes quite clear in our 
sleep." (9.572b3-7). 
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In other words a tyrannical monster lives inside every man and only philosophy 
can make us, who are potential wolf-like creatures,231 into god-like beings. 
1.3. The education of the appetites 
13.1. Appropriate education of the appetites 
At least in our actual existence, the appetitive part cannot be completely 
suppressed so that its bestiality and blind urge continue to pull the soul in the 
opposite direction to reason's desire for the truth and the real good. However, a 
man can achieve release from the unnecessary appetites through appropriate 
training 2 3 2 and impose appropriate limits on the rest of his appetites. In this way 
the stream of the appetites is reduced as much as possible in order not to interfere 
with reason's search for the truth and the real good, and also not weaken the 
'spirited' part. 
This training is one of the aims of the earlier education of the guardians described 
in Books 2 and 3 and seems basically to consist in a habituation of the desires, 
which is attained by stimulating or atrophying them in the appropriate way. 2 3 3 The 
The tyrant, who has completely released his lawless appetites not in his dreams but in his life is 
compared with a wolf (8.565d9-el). On our potentiality for being tyrants that only philosophy can 
really constrain see ch: 1 of Gosling (1983a)7 p.20. 
2 3 2 . . . f i nepcc xomoov K a i dX-Xoicov e5eauoncov f i xoiomcov eju0\) | i ta , Svuaxr} Se 
KoAa£ojuew} kK vecov Kai noaSevon&vri etc xcou noXXoov dnakXdxxeaOai ("...the 
appetite that exceeds these [i.e. the necessary desires] and seeks other varieties of food, and that by 
correction and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases....") (8.559b8-cl0). (I 
follow here Shorey's translation. Henceforth I wi l l continue by following Griffith's translation). 
2 3 3 Gill (1985) thinks that, whereas the earlier education of the young guardians concentrates on the 
education of love of wisdom and of the 'spirited' part and higher education focuses upon the 
development of the rational part, there is essentially no training of the appetitive part in the 
programme of education of the Republic. On the contrary, I think that there is a programme for 
appropriate training of the appetitive part in the earlier education so that, as adults, the young 
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right education of the other two parts also helps to develop the appetites within 
appropriate limits. The musical education of the rational part contributes to this 
aim in the following way: some of the right beliefs which are contained in the 
stories that the young guardians are told support the inculcation of the habits that 
they have acquired; imitation of good characters and narration are the only ways 
admitted for telling the stories not only in order to fortify the development of 
reason's love of wisdom but also to avoid the over-development of base things of 
the soul such as the appetites; only rhythms, harmonies and instruments that 
promote unchangeableness, familiarity with goodness and beauty and good states 
of the soul are admitted, while the ones that encourage the appetites are avoided. 
The training of the 'spirited' part for fighting against the appetites also plays an 
important role in keeping the appetites within the appropriate limits. 
13.1.1. Habituation of the appetites 
What the young guardians see and hear (2.378bl-5; 3.386al-4; 3.388d2-7; esp. 
3.390a8-d5) is the model to be reproduced in their own lives. For this reason,234 
from the very beginning, they hardly know about other kinds of behaviour, 
whether in stories or, probably, in real life as well ; 2 3 5 they only know the 
appropriate ones -i.e. people who do not eat too much, do not drink too much, are 
not too fond of sex- and tend to reproduce and copy those habits and patterns of 
character. This means that, in relation to their appetites, the young guardians 
develop and employ just useful appetites with appropriate limits and in this way 
guardians can become just men in whom the appetitive part causes less trouble because it is wisely 
satisfied -being neither starved nor over-indulged-, as described at 9.571el-2. 
2 3 4 The fact that habits are acquired by reproduction of what the young person sees outside him is 
clear in the case of the philosophical natures that are corrupted because of what they witness in 
different kinds of public assemblies (6.492a-493 a2). 
2 3 5 At 3.395d3 it is said that imitation creates a "second nature", i.e. a permanent condition but 
acquired by the means of culture and education, not naturally bestowed to the individual. Although 
this refers exclusively to artistic imitation, it can be extended to describe the reproduction of the 
behaviour of the people that surround the child. 
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only these appetites are stimulated, while the others wi l l be atrophied or not 
promoted in any way (see especially 9.571el). In this sense no force wil l be 
needed later to repress the appetites (9.589b 1-3) (as it is needed in the case of the 
timocratic (8.549bl-5) and the oligarchic man (554d2-3)) insofar as the appetites, 
being already appropriately constituted, wi l l naturally tend not to be unlimited but 
"held in check by the laws and by better desires in alliance with reason" (9.571b6-
c l ) and, being rightly satisfied, wi l l not interfere with reason's work (9.572a3). 
The rational patterns or appropriate limits for training their appetites come from 
the educators, whose reason has already been appropriately trained together with 
the rest of the desires of their souls236 (the 'outside-inside' process of education).237 
For example, an appropriate diet determines and limits hunger or the appetite for 
food and drink through habituation: i f from the beginning of his life a person only 
eats certain kinds of things and in a certain way and amount, his appetites and 
tastes for food and drink develop in that way (3.404a9-c9 and especially 8.559a3-
b6). In the case of the young guardians, they are not allowed to be drunk (3.403e4-
6) and they have to abstain from sweetmeats and avoid Syracusan and Sicilian 
style of food and Attic pastries since their variety encourages disease (3.404dl-
e4). Similarly medicine in the ideal city would only contribute to keeping the body 
in good health but not to curing the body from the excessive replenishments of its 
unlimited and unnecessary appetites. In this way medicine does not promote their 
infinite multiplication (3.406cl-408c4). Similarly, the attachment to material 
belongings is not stimulated in the guardians (3.416c5-417b8) in order to try to 
impose appropriate limits to the desire for wealth from the very beginning. 
2 3 6 See 590e2-591a3. 
2 3 7 According to Lear, education consists in a double process of 'internalization' -"the process of 
taking cultural influences inside the psyche"- and of 'externalization' -the process which is "going 
on primarily in adults who have already formed themselves through prior cultural internalizations" 
(Lear (1992), pp. 181 and 193). 
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1.3.1.2. Right Xoyoi as a support of right habituation of the appetites 
The musical education of the love of wisdom of the rational part also contributes 
to the development of the young guardian's habits within appropriate limits. 
While their appetites are trained in the right way, through the stories that they hear 
they also acquire right beliefs such as that controlling the appetites is the right 
thing to do. In other words the A,6yoi that they learn corroborate and express in 
words what they actually at the same time acquire through the reproduction of 
kinds of behaviours and the development of good habits. The case of the appetite 
for wealth is one of the clearest examples of how an appetite is constituted both 
through right practice and habituation and the acquisition of right beliefs: the 
young guardians actually live with few material facilities (3.416c5-417b8) and 
simultaneously learn, through the stories they hear, that to desire to possess too 
much is not good, insofar as stories that show meanness and excess in the appetite 
for wealth in gods or men are condemned.238 
Moreover, imitation of noble characters and narration as the only ways admitted 
for telling stories in the musical education of the young guardians help to avoid 
actual reproduction of bad characters such as people with unrestrained appetites 
and excessive contact with the bodily and changeable; contact which promotes 
the base things of the soul such as deceptive perceptions, overdeveloped emotions 
and appetites. Similarly, in relation to rhythms and harmonies: on the one hand, 
the musical modes, such as Dorian and Phrygian modes, and harmonies that are 
preferred encourage bravery and rationality (3.399a3-c4) and put the soul in 
contact with the unchangeable (3.397c6-d5) and the good and the beautiful; but, 
on the other hand, the avoidance of modes such as the Ionian and Lydian modes, 
because they encourage laziness and luxury (3.398e2-399a2), also contributes to 
inhibiting an inappropriate overdevelopment of the appetites. 
2 3 8 Examples of excess in drinking (3.389el3-390a7), eating (3.390a8-b5) and having sex 
(especially in the case of the gods) (3.390b6-c7) have to be avoided. 
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1.3.1.3. The 0D|iO£i8ec;' help in the control of the appetites 
The 'spirited' part is developed through physical training (3.410bl-3; d3-9). In the 
ideal education of the guardians, the 9vjxoeiSe<; has its aggressiveness habituated 
to struggle for the aims of the AoyicmKOV, such as the 'fight' against the pull of 
the appetites: for example, to resist hunger and coldness if it is necessary, although 
the appetites wi l l pull in the opposite direction (see, for example, 4.440cl-5). In 
this way it contributes to reason's control over the appetitive part. 
1.3.2. Inappropriate education of the appetites 
However, most people are unjust and have their appetites promoted in their 
unlimited multiplication beyond what is necessary through an inappropriate 
education. In Books 8 and 9 the evolution from the best kind of unjust life -the 
timocratric way of life- to the worst kind of life -the tyrannical existence- has its 
roots in an increasing degeneration of the appetites. This deterioration starts with 
the presence of the repressed -necessary- desire for wealth of the timocratic man 
and evolves into the ruling epcoc; that protects the lawless desires in the tyrant. 
The words that the child hears and the kinds of behaviours that he has witnessed, 
and the kind of education or lack of education that he has had play a fundamental 
role in this degeneration. 
1.3.2.1. The secret growth of the desire for wealth in the timocratic man 
In the case of the timocratic man, although he loves honour, fame and victory, he 
secretly desires wealth and possession of material things as well, being avaricious 
in the way that oligarchs are (8.548a5-6).239 Although he prizes wealth, he cannot 
possess it openly and so secretly he runs away from the laws like a child from his 
2 3 9 Actually the deterioration of the aristocratic regime into a timocratic regime, as the first form of 
unjust regime, seems to have its origin in the admission of the desire for wealth by the rulers. New 
generations of the golden and silver races originate from copulations out of season so that these 
superior men deteriorate and accept into the government the tendency e m ^P^l-icmauov K a i 
yf iq KT/rjaiv K a i caidac, (8.547b3-4), which comes from the bronze and iron races. 
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father (8.548a6-b2). His secret love for wealth becomes more obvious in old age 
(8.549a9-bl). This secret love for wealth has its origin in what he listens to and 
sees (8.550a5) in his early childhood -namely, his mother's and slaves' criticisms 
of his just father's lack of interest for money and private prosecutions (8.549c2 
f f . ) ; so that, while his father waters and encourages the growth of the rational 
principle in his soul, the others promote the appetitive and the 'spirited' (8.550b6). 
Besides this, his reason is weak, insofar as he has not had an adequate musical 
education240 and so has not been trained by persuasion but by force (8.548b7-c2; 
8.549bl-7).2 4 1 A l l this means that, on the one hand, the 'spirited' part, though 
developed through activities such as physical training, war (8.547d6-548a3), and 
hunting (8.549a7), has not been habituated to be an auxiliary of reason and pull 
against the appetites and, on the other hand, reason has not been in contact with 
beauty and goodness through a right musical education. A l l this paves the way for 
the development of the appetites without limit as in the case of the appetite for 
wealth. 
1.3.2.2. The emergence of unnecessary desires in the oligarchic man 
The oligarchic man, similarly to the oligarchic constitution, prizes wealth more 
than anything (TG3 xPTpotxa nzpi nXexczov TtoieiaGai, 8.554a2). Although 
he normally satisfies only his necessary desires, some other more negative desires 
that he normally represses in order not not to lose his fortune arise in him in 
certain circumstances in which he can do injustice (8.554b6-d8) and he can keep 
them in control only by force (8.554d2-3; cl-2). These unnecessary desires have 
evolved within him because of his lack of education (&7tai8e\)CTiav 8.554b8), 
which makes his rational part and his 'spirited' aspect weak and feeble, as they are 
described at 8.553d4-7; 8.554dl0-l; 8.554e7; 8.555a6. 
2 4 0He is imoauo\)a6T:epov (548e4-5). 
2 4 1 For this reason, though being a lover of music and fond of speeches, he lacks culture (8.548e-
8.549a), and welcomes reason only i f it brings honour. 
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1.3.2.3. The overcoming of democratic man's soul by the unnecessary desires: 
the tyrannical life 
Democracy has its origin in a further evolution of the desire for wealth (8.555b8-
10). The democratic man is bred with a taste for necessary appetites -because of 
his father's love for wealth- but also for the unnecessary appetites -because of the 
kind of associates with which he is surrounded (9.572cl-e4). Besides this, because 
of the lack of culture of his father, the democratic man grows up with the citadel 
of his soul empty of -and so unprotected by- beautiful studies, customs and words 
(xfjv TOO veou xf|<; yvxiyq, otKpoitoXiv [...] Kevf iv |xa0rpdxcov TE Kod 
e7riXT)8eDia.dxcov KCX^CDV K O U koycov aXr\Qa>v, 8.560b8-9) so that, with the 
XoyicrxiKov and the 9\>|i.O£i66<; weakened, his obsession for getting more and 
more wealth helps the invasion of the unnecessary desires in his soul (8.560a9-
b2). 2 4 2 In the case of the tyrant, his unnecessary appetites, but more specifically the 
lawless desires, are encouraged early in his life by the people that surround him 
(ocyoiievov xe eiq n&cav 7iapavo|iiav, 9.572d9-el). Finally these lawless 
and unnecessary desires are led by a passion that rules the soul and protects them 
(epcoxdc xiva...xo3v dpycov Kai...em9\)|iUDV, 9.572e5-573a2) in the sense that 
all worthy opinions and appetites are destroyed (9.573b), with the result that the 
life of the tyrant becomes focused only on gratifying his wasteful appetites at any 
price (9.573e-574a). So at the opposite end of the spectrum from the life led by the 
passion for the truth -the life of the philosopher- we find the tyrant: a man led by a 
tyrannical passion (fepcoQ) engendered by his lawless desires. 
1.4. Conclusion 
In the symbolic image of the soul in Book 9 there is a illustrative summary of the 
characteristics of the e7ti9v|iT|XiK6v and its constitutive desires: 
2 4 2 At the political level this is reflected in the following way: the avarice of the oligarchic ruler 
causes the drones (8.552b6-e8), who finally will eliminate the oligarchic men, who represent the 
necessary desires (8.564al0-e8). 
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nXdiTS x o i w v jj-iav |iev i8eav Bipiou U O I K ' I X O V Kai TcoX.VKetJxxXo'u, 
T||j,epa>v 8£ 0r|pia>v k%ovxoq Ke^aXdq Ki)Kka> K a i aypicov, K a i 
bvvaxov (j,eTa(3dXXeiv K a i tyveiv e £ a b x a u ndvxa x a v t a . 2 4 3 
Its having the aspect of a 9f)p represents its bestial urges, while the multiheaded 
character of the beast symbolizes the multitude of appetites that constitute it. The 
gentle heads of the monster wi l l be the necessary desires and the wild ones the 
unnecessary, especially the lawless ones. Then there is a reference to the 
possibility of transforming the appetites. This may be interpreted in a positive 
way: with reason's introduction of limits and laws, i.e. with appetites 
appropriately habituated, the wise and just man, with the help of the Gvjioeiiieq, 
also rightly trained, only has necessary desires and the unnecessary are suppressed 
or at least weakened. But it may also be understood in a negative way: with 
appetites not educated within appropriate limits the necessary desires become 
unnecessary and the unnecessary and lawless desires evolve further. The 
possibility of the unlimited reproduction of the appetites of the £7CI9'U|J.T|T;IK6V is 
symbolized by the many heads that can grow from this beast-like aspect of us. 
Let us now return to the 'hydraulic image' of the soul at 6.485d6-8. There it is 
asserted that our desires in general244 need to be diverted from our earlier 
childhood into the channel of learning through education 6.485d3-4 and be 
concerned with the pleasures of soul (not of body) so that the person can become a 
philosopher or lover of wisdom (6.485dl0-el). In order that the 'stream' of 
reason's desire for the truth and the real good should be the stronger, one of the 
conditions (together with the acquisition of right beliefs in relation to the 
3 "Start with a single species, then. A complex, many-headed beast, with a ring of animal heads 
-some gentle, some fierce- which it can vary and produce out of itself." (9.588c7-10). 
2 4 4 eiti9v(iiai here refers to all our desires, not only the appetites of the EftifruuTyTiKOV. See n. 
161. 
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management of appetites) is the appropriate habituation and limitation of the 
urgent appetites of the £7ri9\)|i.r|TiK6v. Thus, their 'current' (which is normally 
big and with tendencies to become even bigger and unlimited) is diminished and 
they grow within appropriate limits. In this way they let reason rule, insofar as, 
they do not make the soul spend most of the time solving their potentially infinite 
concerns. In addition to this, the reduction of the appetites is also beneficial for the 
development of reason given that it contributes to decreasing the soul's connection 
with the changeable as well, which connection blocks reason's search for the truth 
and the real good, as a result of reason being in contact with appearances. At the 
same time when the appetites develop within the appropriate limits the 
aggressiveness and self-assertiveness of the GuixoeiSe^ are not overdeveloped 
because it can be appropriately trained and, in this way, supportive of reason's 
goals through its 'fight' against the appetites. Otherwise, without appropriate 
training in combination with a corrupted reason, the 'spirited' part becomes wild 
and, in the end, as the appetites evolve in a limitless way without reason's control, 
the 8\)|j,oei5£<; is weakened by them so that the appetites' powerful 'stream' in 
the soul can potentially become so strong (9.572e5-573a2) that a ruling epcoQ that 
is directed to the gratificaton of the lawless unnecessary desires can lead that life. 
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2. The e-OM.oei8e<; 
2.1. Aggressiveness and assertiveness as characteristics of the 'spirited' part 
The 0\)|ioei8e<; is the part of the soul with which someone feels anger (TO 8e... 
cp 9\) | iovrai , 4.439e3).245 This aggressiveness is understood as strength to 
confront and face the dangers of the world -its possessor can be a horse, dog or 
any other creature (including a human being)- and can be defined in a more 
general sense as a sort of primary disposition of self-assertion to confront all sorts 
of external and internal situations:246 
ctv8peio<; be e ivai dpa eGeA-fiaei 6 8-oiioei8f]q eixe \nnoc, eixe 
KVOOV f) aXko bxiovv £cpov; i) obK kvvevdriKag cog djuaxdv xe icai 
duiKTjxoy Ovjuog, ov napdvxog y/vxrj ndaa npdg ndvxa d<po/36g x£ 
taxi KCCI dtjxxrjxog ;247 
2 4 5 In Homer 0U|4.6? is a "source of action, especially vigorous action, and the seat of emotion, 
especially those emotions (anger, for example, but also on occasion sexual passion) that motivate 
vigorous and bold action" (Cooper (1999), pp. 199-200). 
2 4 6 Similarly Hobbs (2000), p. 9. 
2 4 7 "But is any living creature likely to be brave -whether horse or dog or anything else- if it 
doesn't have a spirited and energetic nature? Haven't you noticed what an irresistible and 
unconquerable thing spirit is? With spirit, any living creature is fearless and invicible in the face 
of any danger." (2.375all-b2). Here "ctvSpeioq" is used in a wider sense than in the Laches and 
in other parts of the Republic, for example 4.429c5-d2 and 4.442bll-c3. Furthermore animals and 
slaves without the appropriate education cannot be called truly "brave" (4.430b6-9). See also 
2.375a9 ff. where it is already established that the aggressiveness of the 0v|^ oei5eq is good only 
when properly directed by the love of wisdom. Similarly in the Laches at 196e Socrates says that if 
otvSpeia is a sort of EJUCTrpri animals cannot have it. Nicias agrees and adds that his definition 
of courage does not apply to children either because they are ignorant about what is to be feared 
and what is not. So Nicias establishes a difference between courage, which implies knowledge, and 
audaciousness, which is common among men, women, children or animals. 
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Similarly in the city the 0 |^a.oei8e<; is xoxrzo TO [xepoq b nponoXe\iei xe K a i 
a x p a x e v e x a i i m e p a i )Tf j<; . 2 4 8 In other words the GujaoeiSeQ represents an 
instinct to fight or to be angry, as is indicated through the use of TTJV bpytiv to 
refer to it (4.440cl-8) and verbs like | idxo| iat (439el0), 7toXen.eco (4.440a5-6), 
bpYi£on.ai, eye'ipoiiai, £eco, xP^ercaivco and OV\I\L&%(£> (4.440C2-8) to 
describe actions proper to the 'spirited' part of the soul. 2 4 9 
This impulse to face dangers, which is represented in the symbolic image of the 
soul as a lion (9.588d),250 is di[i(X%bv xe K a i dviKT|TOV (see 2.375bl), in the 
sense that it seeks and desires renown and predominance: 
T i 5e; TO GviioeiSeQ ob npbc, TO KpaTeiv |j.evToi ())a|iev K a i V I K & V K a i 
el>8oKi|j.£iv de i bXov oopj i f iaGai ; 2 5 1 
Thus the Gv^oeiSeq has as its inherent desire the desire for victory and honour 
(<|>IA,6VIKOV a i r ed K a i (|)IX,6TI|10V, 9.581b2). The relationship between its 
desire for honour and its desire for victory seems to be that the desire of the 
2 4 8 " ... the part which makes war in the city's defence, and serves in its army..." (4.429b2-3). 
2 4 9 In Books 2 and 3 the tripartite theory of the soul is already present, although it has not been 
openly developed yet (for which reason Hobbs (2000), p. 7 prefers to speak in these books of 
Buubq instead of the GvuoeiSei;). 
2 5 0 I.e. an animal known for ferociously facing any danger. It is also represented as a snake since 
this was an animal usually thought as a protector and defender of sacred places (see Griffith 
(2000), p. 310, n.21). The comparison to a wild beast is also related with the irrationality of this 
part of the soul. 
2 5 1 "What about the spirited part? Can we say, by contrast, that its sole and constant aim is power, 
victory and reputation?" (9.581a9-10). Something similar is expressed at 4.440c7-d3 but only in 
relation to the fight of the 9uuoei8e<; on the side of reason. 
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0U|iO£i8e<; consists in the ambition to be successful and victorious in getting 
what is worthy of being honoured and fought for. 2 5 2 
2.2. 'Bivalent' condition of the 9U(J,OEI8££: aggressiveness against or in 
favour of reason 
The 6\)|i,0£i8ec; can strive for honour and victory using its natural and inherent 
assertiveness in two different ways. Either it can be divorced from reason and so 
easily be overwhelmed by our irrational beast-like desires, or it can be guided by 
reason, and so only seek its objects when it is appropriate according to what is 
good and what is not. Let us consider these two possibilities of the 9\>|J,0£I8E<;, 
which we described in Section I as a sort of bivalent condition of the 'spirited' 
part of the soul. 2 5 3 Firstly, let us examine in the first place how the 9UH.O£I8EQ 
works when it is independent of the rule of our rational aspect.254 
For this reason Cooper (1999) pp. 202-206 says that all the motivations that have their roots in 
the GuuoeiSfe? have in common the desire for "competitive success and the esteem from others 
and oneself that comes with it" (p. 205). Similarly Hobbs (2000), p. 30 says that in Plato's 
Republic the 9i)UO£ is essentially "a tendency to form an ideal image of oneself in accordance with 
one's conception of the fine and noble. This ideal of oneself also needs to be confirmed by social 
recognition". 
2 5 3 See above Chapter 2, Section 1,1.2. The deduction of the 9\>noei8eq from..., pp. 119 ff. 
For the 8\4iO£t8e£ as an obscure concept and state that Plato fails to distinguish from noble 
courage see Robinson (1995) p. 45, who follows Cornford. For a good recent account of the status 
quaestionis in relation to this point see Hobbs (2000), pp. 3-6). I try to show here that a coherent 
interpretation of this part of the soul is possible. 
2 5 4 For the independence of the 'spirited' part in relation to the advice of reason see the example of 
Odysseus (4.441b) in Chapter 2, Section I, 1.2. The deduction of the OuuoeiSfcq from..., pp. 
119 ff.. 
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2.2.1. The GuiioeiSeq divorced from reason 
2.2.1.1. The 'spirited' part's rejection of reason's 'advice' 
The rejection of reason's advice means two things: a) the 'spirited' part has not 
been rightly trained to fight and defend only appropriate goals (see below Section 
II, 2.4.The education of the 0V|AOEI8E<;, p. 167 f f . ) ; b) the 'spirited' part rules 
the soul and does not allow reason to establish what is good and bad on its own 
but has it working to achieve the 'spirited' part's aims, i.e. victory and honour. 
Besides insofar as the 9v|iO£i8£Q looks for material -inauthentic- pleasures, as 
the appetitive part does, it makes the A-oyicmKOV be in contact with what is 
changeable and with appearances and so to hold false opinions and judgements 
(see 9.586c7-d2 and below Section II, 3.3.1., pp. 180 f f . ) . 
I f the aggressiveness (TO ctypiov) of the 'spirited' part has been developed 
through physical training -yv\ivaGXiKf\- but not trained through habituation to 
attack what and when it is appropriate to attack (against the 'pull ' of the appetites, 
against the enemies of the city) and, at the same time, there has been a lack of 
stimulation of the love of wisdom through the artistic education -li-OVaiKf)- (and 
maybe lack of control of the appetites as well), the person becomes hard and 
ruthless (CKXr\p6c,...xe KCCI xaXenoq)255 instead of brave (av8p£io<;) (3.410d6-
9). In this case the 'spirited' part rejects reason's advice -i.e. a) it does not attack 
appropriate enemies because of not being correctly trained; b) it does not allow 
reason to establish what is good by dominating the soul- and goes directly for its 
own goals like a beast: 
But too much artistic education without physical training also dissolves the 'spirited' part 
(3.411a5-c3). This is not desirable either because in that case the person becomes too soft and 
gentle (3.410d). An appropriate blend of the rational principle and the 'spirited' principle is the 
most profitable for the guardian: 2.375c6-8; 3.411e4-412a2; 6.503b7 ff. 
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H.iaoA.OYOQ Sf) o1|j,ai b xoio-6xo<; y^Yvexai Kai diic/uacx;, Kai rceiGbi 
jiev 8 id Xoycov oi)8ev exi xpfixai, (3ia 8e Kai aypioxrixi ouciTtep Gipiov 
jcp6<; Tidvxa Siarcpdxxexai, Kai ev djiaGia Kai aKaioxr|xi |iexd 
dppDG|iia<; xe Kai dxotpiaxiag £ri.256 
In fact the greatest crimes are performed by natures of great ardour ( E K veaviKfj^ 
tyvce&q, 6.491e4-5) but corrupted by a deficient education (xpotyr\ 8ioA,ojJ,evr|Q 
yiyveaGai, 6.491e5), i.e. not appropiately trained or orientated by reason. 
In the case of the lover of honour at 9.586c7-d2 we find a similar situation: the 
G\)|j,oei8e<; looks for its proper pleasure without being guided by reason and so 
the desire for honour makes the man envious and his love of victory makes him 
violent: 
xi 8e; rcepi xo G\)p,oei8eQ ob% exepa xoia\)xa dvdyKTi yiyveaGai, be, 
dv avxb xoxno 8ia7tpdxxr|xai f i (|)G6vcp 8id (|)iXoxi{4.iav f) pia Sid 
^iXoviKiav f] GDIXCO 8 id 8vaKo^.iav, 7cXr|CT(j.ovfiv xijj.fi<; xe Kai V I K T I Q 
Kai G V I I C U 8IC6KCOV OLVEV XOYICJIIO-U xe Kai vov ;257 
2 5 6 "Someone like this becomes an enemy of rational argument, I suspect, and an enemy of music 
and literature. He abandons any attempt at persuasion using rational argument, and does everything 
with savage violence, like a wild animal. He lives his life in ignorance and stupidity without grace 
and rhythm." (3. 411d7-e2). 
2 5 7 "What about the spirited part of the soul? Aren't the same sorts of things bound to happen to 
anyone who concentrates on that? Love of honour leads to envy, love of victory to violence, and 
bad temper to anger. Without reason and understanding, he sets out in pursuit of his full measure of 
success, or victory, or anger." (9.586c7-d2). 'The same sort of things' refers to what happens to the 
'lover of wealth', who cultivates insane passions because, in their ignorance of the truth, he goes 
for just illusory pleasures (9.586d2). 
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The possibility that the 9D|10£I8E<; can look for its aims without the advice of 
reason is also illustrated in the description of the timocratic ruler, whose soul is 
governed by the desire for honour. He bases his claim to rule on his exploits in 
war and the preparations that he makes for it (5.47d4-548a3), i.e. just on honour 
and victory, 2 5 8 and actually rejects the advice of reason.259 
2.2.1.2. The corruption of the G V J I O E I S E Q by the appetitive part 
Once the 0D|J,O£I8EQ is out of the control of reason, it can easily be corrupted by 
the appetitive part, which finally enfeebles it and makes it work for the aims of the 
appetites. This is clearly shown in the case of the timocratic man, within whom, 
although he values honour and fame above everything else, appetites evolve 
secretly and open the way for his psychological transformation into an oligarchic 
man dominated by his necessary appetites, particularly by the appetite for 
wealth.2 6 0 
In this way the £7TA6D|J.T|XIK6V can finally subject the 8D|J.O£I8E<; and govern the 
soul and, as a consequence, the 'spirited' part wi l l lose its own ambition for 
honour and victory and become weak and feeble: 
xputbfi 5E K O U |xaX.0aKia OVK ETC! TV\ c n n o u xauxcn) xakdaei XE KOCI 
dvECJEi v | / £ Y £ x a i , oxav EV ai)xop S E I X U X V E | i7 io i f | ; [ . . . ] KOA,OCKEKX 8E KOti 
2 5 8 Victory, honour and courage are the criteria of what is the best for the lover of honour (9.582e4-
5). 
2 5 9 The rejection by timocratic for men of knowledge and culture is underlined: they fear to admit 
wise men (8.547el); they have been educated by force -not by persuasion- and value physical 
training over philosophy and discussion (8.548b7-c2). The lover of honour in general is said that to 
regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar and low, and again that of learning, save 
insofar as the knowledge confers honour, as nothing at all (9.581d5-9). 
2 6 0 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 13.2.1. The secret growth of the desire for wealth in the 
timocratic man, pp. 143 ft'.. 
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aveXeuBepicc abx oxav TIC, TO ofbxd xovxo, xd ©VIXOEISEQ, m o xop 
6x^a)8ei 0Tpiop no\r\ KOU, EVEKOC x P T l l J - a x c D V K o t l ^H? E K E I V O V 
djcXriatiat; 7tpo7tT|A.aKi£6|i£vov £0i£r| E K VEOD avxi XEOVXOS 7rA0r|Kov 
yiyveaGai; 2 6 1 
The two stages of the corruption of the 'spirited' part -over-development of its 
wildness and later its weakening-, when it is not guided by reason, can be 
understood as follows: when the 0VJJ.O£I8E<; is not appropriately trained through 
habituation in enduring and resisting the right things, the aggressiveness and self-
assertiveness of the 'spirited' part can be directed to wrong goals (for example, 
aggression against one's own fellow-citizens (2.375b9-c4)). In this case the person 
is savage and stubborn but not brave (since real bravery includes enduring and 
fighting when it is right to do so, i.e. according to reason's right beliefs as a 
minimum or reason's knowledge of the real good and the truth as a maximum).2 6 2 
But, at the same time, if the 0D|iO£i8£<; has not been rightly trained to resist the 
'pull ' of the appetites according to reason's advice, the appetites can evolve 
without limit and overcome the soul, i.e. finally have the soul and its other parts at 
their service. 
2.2.1.3. Irrationality of the 'spirited' part 
Insofar as the 0U(4.O£i8£<; goes for its goals without calculation -even when it is 
guided by reason-, it acts like the £7U10\)|IT|XIK6V, in a beast-like way (doajUEp 
2 6 1 "And luxury and timidity? Aren't they the vices arising out of atrophy and slackness of this 
same element [i.e. the lion-like or snake-like], introducing cowardice into it?...Aren't flattery and 
meanness of spirit the result of subjecting this same spirited element to the mob-like beast? In their 
desire for money and the constant satisfaction of the beast's needs, don't people allow the spirited 
element to get used to being trampled on, right from their childhood, so that it turns into a monkey 
instead of a lion?" (590b3-9). 
2 6 2 See Chapter 2, Section II, 2.2.2. The 6uuoei5eq orientated by reason: dvSpeia, pp. 157 
ff. 
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(ftpiov, 3.41 l e i ) and is, hence, irrational -dA,oyic>T6v- like the appetitive part, 
and unlike reason (4.441a5-6). Besides it is also irrational like the appetitive part 
in the sense that, without correct training, the 'spirited' part can develop beyond 
appropriate limits and turn into irritability and blind stubbornness in getting its 
aims (victory and honour): 
OUKOOV Koci TO dKoAxxaTaivEiv oiei 8id T o i a i k a naXax vj/eyeciGat., 
O T I d v i e T a i ev Top TOIO-UTCO TO SEIVOV, TO |ieya E K E I V O K a i TCOAA)EI8£<; 
6p£|i|a.a, TtEpa %ov SEOVTOQ; [ . . . ] r\ 5' ai)0d8£ia K a i SUGKOA/KX xj/EyETai 
ox>% bxav TO XEOVTCSSEQ TE K a i 6(J>EGO8£Q a i ) l ; r | T a i K a i a \ )VT£ivr |Tai 
dvapiaoaTCDQ;2 6 3 
However they are irrational in a different way and to a different degree: while the 
8i)|iO£i8£<;, i f rightly habituated, can go for its objects of desire -victory and 
honour- as a helper of reason's calculations in its search for the truth and the real 
good, the £7r,i0DfJ,r|TiK6v, even when it has been trained within appropriate 
limits, never goes in the same direction as reason but always drags the soul into 
the course of its appetites. Moreover, as we have seen above, the enlargement of 
the irrationality of the 6D(J,OEI8E5 opens the way to an increase of the irrationality 
and unlimited tendencies of the appetites. The over-development of the 'spirited' 
part as pure savagery and violence is connected with the fact that, i f the 
0D|i.O£i8£Q has not been correctly educated, it wil l no longer be a helper towards 
what reason determines as what is good and bad. Reason's 'advice' wi l l in the best 
case involve the resistance of the 'spirited' part to the pull of appetites. I f the 
GDJIOEISEI; does not fight against the appetites, this makes the appetites stronger 
"And do you think the reason why lack of discipline has always been regarded as a fault is that it 
gives that terrible creature, the great beast with many heads [i.e. the kJuSvuriTiKOV], too much 
freedom? [...] And the vices we call obstinacy and bad temper-aren't they caused by the lion-like 
or snake-like part straining or waxing beyond measure?" (9.590a5-bl). 
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and allows their infinite multiplication and finally weakens the 'spirited' part, so 
that the EmGuiO-riTiKOV conquers the soul. So the appetitive and 'spirited' part are 
both irrational but in different ways. 
The eici0'U|iTixiK6v, for its part, always tends to seek the unlimited satisfaction of 
its desires, insofar as the unnecessary appetites, and the necessary ones, when they 
have grown beyond their limits, try to pull the soul in their direction. Even in the 
best-educated man -the future philosopher-ruler and guardian of the ideal 
city-, in whom the "spendthrift" appetites have been suppressed and the others 
harmonized, the maximum rationalization of the eniQ\)[i.r\xiK6v consists only in 
the containment of these appetites within their appropriate limits as established by 
the AoyicmKOV. In this way his appetites play an essential role for keeping him 
alive (for example, the desire for food is necessary and good for the agent's life 
and health). However, they are never active helpers of reason in the attainment of 
its own aims (the truth, the real good) in the sense that they never pull the soul in 
reason's direction. 
But i f the GvH-oeiSef; has been developed through a suitable gymnastic regime 
and rightly trained, and the rational part has received a good musical education 
that provides the A,oytcn;iK6v with appropriate harmonies and right beliefs about 
what is honourable and what is not, what is worth fighting for and what is not, 
what is to be feared and what is not,2 6 4 the OVJIOEISEQ can be an active helper of 
reason and contribute with its strength to the XoyicrciKOv's achievement of its 
goals: the individual good and the political good in the context of an 
understanding of reality as a whole as founded on the Good. This leads us to refer 
to the second possibility for the 0\)(IOEI8E<; -i.e. striving for its goal, victory and 
2 6 4 See below in Chapter 2, Section III, 1. Primary education, 1.2. Education of the love of 
wisdom through u o v a i K T ) : acquisition of familiarity with the beautiful and the good, pp. 204 
ff.. 
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fame, orientated by reason-, which is related, as we wil l see, to a reformulation of 
the concept of dvSpeia. 
2.2.2. The 0V|1O£I8EQ orientated by reason: dvSpfila 
The 9v|J.oei8£Q can play a fundamental role in the attainment of the good, insofar 
as it can actually be trained to give its aggressive strength and desire for victory to 
the accomplishment of what is decided by reason as the right thing to do by 
reason. In other words it fights for goals established as good by reason: 
dp' cuv [...] Kai xovc, e^ coGev 7toA,e|J.icn)<; xovxco dv KdA-Xiaxa 
(huXaTToixriv imep aK&or\<; xr\c, yv%r\c, xe Kai xov oa>\iaxoq, TO juev 
f5ovX.ev6jj.evov, TO 8e nponoXejiovv, 'endfxevov [8e] TCO dpxomi Kai TTJ 
dvdpeia eniteXovv rd povXevQevza;265 
In this sense the 'spirited' part is a nautral 'ally' of reason.266 
2.2.2.1. AvSpeia as 'bravery' in fighting against the appetites 
The 0V|J.O£I8EQ as associated with reason's desire for the real good and the truth 
seems to coincide with real courage, insofar as authentic dv8peia is defined as 
the preservation by the 0D|J,O£i8££ of what is to be feared and dared through pain 
"Aren't these two elements also the best defenders, for body and soul in their entirety, against 
external enemies? One makes the decisions, the other does the fighting, under the leadership of the 
ruling element, using its courage to put those decisions into effect!" (4.442b5-9). See also 
4.441e3-6 about how the XoyiaxiKOV and the 8\JUoei6e? together dominate the appetitive part. 
2 6 6 See above p. 119 ff.. 
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and pleasures according to the declarations of reason (much as is concluded in the 
Laches)261: 
K a i dvSpeiov 8fi oi|xai xcuxcp xcp ixepei KOLXOVIIEV eva eKaaxov, oxav 
a \ )XO\) xo 6\)noei8e(; Siaacp^T] 8id xe X/UTCGOV K a i T|8ov63v XO W O XGOV 
A-oycov (Burnet) [or xo-o Xoyov (Shorey)] Ttapayye^ Gev Seivov xe K a i 
| i f i . 2 6 8 
2 6 7 When the Laches ends, there is a positive but provisional result as to what d v S p E i a is: it is a 
8wa(i.i£ which is the same in all cases, and which has been provisionally defined as an 
£iuaTT|UT| of the fearful and the hopeful and part of the eTttaxflUT) of what is always good and 
bad in which dpEXT] consists. However, in the Republic dv6p£ia is not just knowledge. On one 
side, reason provides right beliefs about what is to be feared and dared, which are derived in the 
fully-developed philosopher from his knowledge of the Good. But, on the other side, bravery also 
requires that the 8U|4.0£I6E(; provide its strength to keep these right beliefs from early childhood 
and to undertake the difficult programme of studies in the higher education of the philosopher-
rulers. 
2 6 8 "The title 'brave', I think, is one we give to any individual because of this part of him, when the 
spirited element in him, through surrounded by pleasures and pains, keeps intact the instructions 
given to it by reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared." (4.442bll-c3)). 
Similarly at 4.429b8-c2 in relation to dvSpfiia in the city: Kod dv8p£ia dpa noXic, (XEpei 
x iv i EavTrjq feaxi, Sid xo ev EKE'IVCO E X E I V Swautv xoiai)xr|v f] 8id TKXVXOQ CTCOCJEI 
xf)v Tiepi xciov SEIVOOV 66 |av, xavxd XE a b x d E i v a i Kai x o i a v x a , d X E Kai dia b 
vouo8£xr|<; napr\yyeXXev ev xfj raxiSE'ux. ("Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a 
part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve 
the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver 
inculcated in their education." (I follow here Shorey's translation. Henceforth I will continue by 
following Griffith's translation.) ' Av5p£ia means not only 'bravery, courage' but also 
'manliness' so that women appear to be excluded. However, the admission of women philosopher-
rulers in Plato's ideal city also suggests a transformation of dvSpfiia, so that it no longer connotes 
only 'manliness' (on this point see Hobbs (2000), pp. 13, 21, 374, 96-8, 244-8). 
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So the primary sense of avSpeia seems to be the orientation of the 8a)|ioei8e^' 
strength towards the preservation of what reason has determined as what is to be 
feared and dared. The way in which the 'spirited' part preserves the right opinions 
of reason would be a training of the 8\)|iO£i8£<; in habits that f i t with what reason 
establishes as what is to be feared and dared. The 9vfJ.O£iS£<;' right provision of 
its assertiveness and desire for victory in each case would contribute to giving 
firmness to reason's right beliefs on this point and, in consequence, to the 
acquisition of real bravery. The 0U|j.o£i8£<;' maintenance of correct beliefs about 
what is to be feared and what is not includes protecting them against the pulls of 
the appetites, which, 'dragging' the soul in the direction of the bodily pleasures 
and away from the pains, are the greatest corrupters of these correct beliefs.2 6 9 
This means that the 'spirited' part, by being trained to resist when the appetites 
drag the soul in the direction of the bodily pleasures, wi l l contribute to preserve 
reason's right beliefs and calculations. 
Thus the 9D|0,O£I8E<; can be described fundamentally as the part of the soul that 
can either be independent from reason and weakened by the appetites, as we have 
seen above, or fight on the side of the soul against its 'internal' enemies -the 
appetites-, in the shape of moral indignation.270 In this way Plato extends 
dv8p£ia -usually understood as fearlessness in relation to fighting in war- to the 
condition of the soul that makes it fight against the appetites on the side of 
reason's desire for the good and truth, so that bravery in battle actually comes to 
2 6 9 See 3.413c7-d5 where it is said that the guardians will be tested for their capacity for keeping 
their right beliefs without forgetting them or being deceived in spite of fear or attraction for 
pleasure, especially the belief that they have to do what is best for the state. See also 430al-b5 and 
502e2-503a7. 
2 7 0 As shown above (Chapter 2, Section I, 1.2. The deduction of the BvnoeiSec, from..., pp. 
119 ff.), the possible coalition of the 0u|ioei5e<; with the XoytaxiKOV against the appetitive part 
can take different forms and have different results. 
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be a secondary expression of courage. This 'external' expression of bravery is also 
restricted by what is good for the city 2 7 1 (which only reason can establish). 
2.2.2.2. The highest expression of dvSpeia: philosophical courage 
In the earlier childhood of the guardian the GufXoeiSei; supports reason's true 
beliefs about what has to be feared and dared -what we have described as the 
primary sense of avSpe'ux on p. 157. But these are right beliefs without grounds, 
insofar as the foundations of these beliefs have not been acquired, at least not yet. 
The highest expression of courage is in fact to direct the GufaoeiSe^' strength to 
reason's search for dialectical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the individual and the 
political good as a whole in the light of the Good of reality in general, which is the 
aim of the future philosopher-rulers' training in mathematics and dialectic.272 This 
2 7 1 See 2.375b9-c4 and 6.503a. In fact this 'right' bravery implies that on some occasions the 
appropriate thing may be not to face the enemy but actually to evade him, as was already 
established atLach. 190e-191c. 
2 7 2 The contrast that Plato establishes between philosophers and sophists can also be understood in 
the light of a desire for victory orientated by reason and its desire for the truth. At Gorg. 457d 
Socrates establishes an opposition between those (the sophists) who take part in the dialogue only 
moved by their desire for victory -the ^ i X o v i K O W t a ? - and those who are always orientated in 
the dialogue by their desire to investigate the subject that is discussed (^rixowtaq TO 
JtpoKeiuevov ev tcp X.6YCO). For Socrates the only real victory is to know the truth (505e-506a). 
In relation to this point in the Gorgias see Vigo (2001). Bravery in the search for the truth also 
appears in the Laches. At 194al, after Laches has researched on what dtv8pe'ux is and has finally 
but reluctantly defined it as "a wise endurance of the soul", Socrates says that, although they have 
arrived at a new aporetic point, in the definition of courage that they have attained there is 
something true that can be applied to philosophical research: 
"S.-But are you willing that we should agree with our statement to a certain extent? 
L.-To what extent and to what statement? 
S.-With the one that commands us to endure. If you are willing, let us hold our ground in the 
search and let us endure, so that courage itself won't make fun of us for not searching for it 
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can be considered as Plato's utmost point of transformation of the concept of 
bravery.273 The search for truth of the real philosopher is a fight for knowing what 
it is (izpoq xd 6v 7t£(|n)Kc6<; e\r| a\iiXXdaQax 6 ye OVXCOQ (j)iXo|j.a6fiq, 
6.490a8-9)274 and for this reason philosophical natures cannot be cowardly and 
slave-like.275 After the Gv|ioei8fe<; has been developed as the ally of reason in 
early childhood through physical training and moderated through reason's musical 
education,276 in higher education the philosophical character is trained and 
examined in all branches of knowledge to prove its intellectual courage (e'l Koci 
xd [ikyioxa n.a9fpaxa Swaxf) eaxou eveyKeiv £\xe KOCI 
drcoSeiAidaei, cbcroep di ev XOIQ aXXoic, d7io8eiA.icovxeQ, 6.503e3-
504al). 2 7 7 This strength for fighting to know the truth provided by the 9un.o£i8e<; 
is a fundamental prerequisite, together with the development of reason, for the 
fulfilment of the ambitious programme of higher education for the philosophers 
(6.503d7-9). But, at the same time, when the dialectician attains the knowledge of 
the real good and understands the individual and the political good as a whole in 
the light of the Good of reality in general, this implies that he knows (rather than 
just having right beliefs) about what is to be feared and and what is not. In this 
way dvSpeia in its ful l sense is only attained with knowledge. The portrait of 
Socrates that we find in the Euthyphro, Crito, Apology and Phaedo, in spite of the 
different subjects and approaches of these dialogues, reveals him as a character in 
courageously -if endurance should perhaps be courage after all." (I follow here Kent Sprage's 
translation in Cooper (ed.) (1997)). 
In this sense Socrates, who shows in his acts this wise endurance in which the philosophical 
bravery of searching for the truth consists, is the best example of bravery. 
2 7 3 In relation to this point see Hobbs (2000), pp. 239-240. 
2 7 4 "... the nature of the true lover of learning [is] to keep struggling towards what it is...." 
2 7 5 6.486b3-4. See also 6.490cl0 and 6.494b2 in relation to 6tv5peia as a requirement of the real 
philosophical nature. 
2 7 6 See below Chapter 2, Section II, A. The education of the 0u^oi8£<;, pp. 167 ff.. 
2 7 7 "...if it will be capable of enduring the most demanding ones, or if it is an intellectual coward, 
the way some people are physical cowards." 
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which otvSpeia has achieved its maximum development, insofar as he faces death 
without fear in defense of his passion for the truth, 2 7 8 which is the passion that has 
led his whole life and that ideally might lead the life of every man. 
As a consequence, when the desire for victory of the 'spirited' part is led by 
reason to what really is to be dared and what is not, the desire for honour of the 
8v|ioei8e<; is also directed by reason only to truly honourable things (for 
example, the studies that make him wise, self-disciplined and just (9.591c)). When 
the wise man is governed by reason, he accepts and welcomes only the honours 
that make him a better human being and rejects those honours that can damage his 
soul (9.592a; see also 9.586d-587a). In other words, when the 'spirited' part is 
governed by reason, it seeks the acquisition of authentic honours alone, i.e. 
honours received as a result of fighting against external and, above all, internal 
enemies -i.e. the appetites within the soul. These are the kind of honours that men 
of the ideal city and gods only grant to the philosophers, i.e. "brave" searchers for 
the truth. 2 7 9 Therefore the 'spirited' part of the soul is fully developed only when it 
seeks what is really honourable and worth fighting for. Otherwise it goes for 
inauthentic honours and victory and does not really fight for what it should 
ultimately fight for, being corrupted by TO ETTAGDIITIXIKOV. 
2 7 8 Socrates is the utmost example of ocvSpeta because he bravely faces death and accepts death 
for not giving up his engagement with the search for the truth (Socrates, as dramatis persona, in 
the four dialogues mentioned above "embraces death as the only way to achieve his identity of 
Athenian polis citizen and of philosopher concerned about the quest of the truth." (See Julia 
(2001), p.21). In Alcibiades' speech in the Symposium Socrates is also presented as truly 
ctv5peloq (219d3-221cl). 
2 7 9 On the honours for the guardians see 5.460bl, 5.468b2 10.612b7-c3. On the honours for the 
philosopher-rulers after their death, see 7.540b (commented on Hobbs (2000), p. 234. and p. 238). 
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2.3.Cognitive capacity required by the 0\)|j.OEi8e<;.280 
Similarly to what we have seen in relation to the appetitive part, insofar as the 
tripartite division of the soul present in Book 4 and kept in Books 8 and 9 is made 
from the point of view of the main current of desires of the soul, there is no 
specific treatment of the cognitive capacities required by the 9'U|j,0£i8&<;. 
However, it is possible in this case too to speculate on the point, taking into 
account the cognitive functions that are clearly atributed to the A-oyicrxiKOV. 
2.3.1. Beliefs on what is to be feared and dared as provided by reason 
(2.375el-376c5) 
The example of the well-bred dog at 2.375el-376c5 gives us good reason to think 
that right or wrong beliefs about what is to be feared or not, to be honoured or not 
are always provided by the A.OYICTXIK6V , which is the aspect of us that reasons, 
argues, etc. (see below 2.3. The A-oyicrxiKOV pp. 173 f f . ) , and comprehends 
rightly or wrongly what the good is. 
In order to be brave, the guardians, like dogs, should be naturally ((()\)aei) spirited, 
energetic ( m i \ir\v KCXI xd xfjq vjv%f\c„ oxi ye 0v|U.O£i8fi, 2.375b7281) and 
should have acute senses, speed and strength in order to be able to fight (dlov 
b£<)v xe JTOD 8ei avxoiv eicdxepov eivai npoq dia0r|aiv K a i kXafypov 
npbc, xd aia0av6|ievov 8icoKd0eiv, KOCI \G%vpbv ecu, edev 6er\ kXbvxa 
8iandx6c9ai, 375a5-7282). But, as in the case of a well-bred dog, their 'spirited' 
part should be mixed with love of wisdom so that they behave in the following 
way: 
2 8 0 For further development of what is treated here see below Chapter 2, Section II, 3 J . Reason 
as the organon of judgement, pp. 180 ff.. 
^'"And the mental requirement is that he should be spirited, or energetic." 
2 8 2 "Well, for example, each of them needs acute senses, speed in pursuit of what they detect, and 
strength as well, in case they catch it and have to fight with it." 
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6TI bv |iev dv \8r| ayv&xa, x,otXe7iaivei, cuSe ev KCXKOV 7lpo7le7l;ov0c6(;• 
6v 5' dv yvcbpiiiov, darcd^ETai , Kdv (j,Ti8ev jucbuoxe W avxov dyaGov 
7re7t6v0r|.283 
The aspect that %aA.£7iaiv£i is the 'spirited' part (see for example, 4.440c7-d3). 
But what recognizes (i§r\) the unknown (dyvcoxa) and the known (yvobpijiov) 
and so discriminates (bpi£6|j,£VOV) the familiar (xo o'nceiov) and the unfamiliar 
(TO dA.X6xpiov) according to intelligence (GVVEGIC,) and ignorance (dyvoia) is 
the aspect of us related to love of wisdom (2.376b3-6).284 This natural disposition 
of reason is developed so that the familiar and known is the beautiful and the good 
(3.400dll-402a4), while the 9u|j.O£i5£<; accompanies and supports -helps-
reason's commitments, insofar as it is developed through physical training and 
taught through habituation to fight and resist in the right way. This paves the way 
for the X,071CJXIK6V'S operation on its own and its governing over the soul, so 
that, i f the person is able to undertake the programme of higher education and 
become a dialectician, his rational part may attain a correct comprehension of 
what is truly good for each part of the soul and for the soul as a whole (4.442c5-8) 
-allowing each part to get its own pleasure- and for society in the light of the 
Good. 
283 «when it sees someone it doesn't know, a dog turns nasty, even though it hasn't been badly 
treated by him in the past. When it sees someone familiar, it welcomes him, even if it has never 
been at all well treated by him" (2.376a5-7). 
2 8 4 This suggests that for Plato animals have some kind of rationality, although they do not have 
reason (Xoyiau6q, Xbyoq, XoyicmKOv) like human beings in the sense that they cannot 
properly reflect and calculate. On this point see n. 203 above and Sorabji (1993), p.10. 
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2.3.2. The influence of the 'spirited' part on reason's understanding 
But where the 'spirited' part is not appropriately trained to work as a helper of 
reason285 and, besides, the love of wisdom of the rational part has not been 
appropriately cultivated, this situation has epistemological consequences for 
reason's performance. This is the case of the timocratic man, in whom rational 
capacity and love of wisdom are often not developed through the right musical 
education and, at the same time, the 'spirited' part is highly stimulated and 
increased but not correctly trained according to reason's prescriptions. Because of 
this psychological configuration, the rational part of the timocratic man cannot 
work on its own in order to establish what is good and bad, true and false and 
begins to consider fighting and winning as ends themselves, so acquiring a 
distorted understanding of reality as a whole. Secondly, reason, not being trained 
to consider the things by themselves on its own, can easily make false judgements 
since it is more in contact with the changeable and the appearances. This includes 
judgments and opinions about what is honourable and what is not. So the 
misconception about what is honourable belongs to reason, although it is a 
consequence of the domination of the desires of the BDJIOEISEI; in the soul and, in 
that sense, it can be said that it belongs to the 'spirited' part. In consequence, the 
fact that the 9i)|j.O£i8£<; is orientated at least by beliefs (ideally by right beliefs in 
early childhood and later by right beliefs with foundation, i.e. knowledge) does not 
mean that it is in some way rational.286 In this intellectual procedure the 
OuiaoEiSeq merely collaborates with its strength through a right process of 
2 8 5 Some interpreters (see Robinson (1995) p. 44) say that the 0t)uoei5e<; is considered 
exclusively as a helper of reason (see 4.440a8-b8). But the passage 4.440a5-6 clearly says that 
"sometimes" (evioze) the high spirited part fights against the appetites, not always: b Xbyoc, 
cnuaivei xr\v bpyr\v rcoXeneiv eviore xai<; feTuSuuica^ coq &XXo bv dXXco. 
2 8 6 Differently, Hobbs makes the distinction between beliefs that belong to the 'spirited' part and 
rational beliefs based on reasoning about what is good as a whole that come from reason (Hobbs 
(2000), pp. 21-23). Similarly to her Moline says that the BuuoeiSfeQ as well as the 
ertiGuurrtiKOV have "a minimal level of 'cognitive' capacity" (Moline (1978), p. 11) so that they 
can 'argue' with the rational part. 
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habituation, to mantain the right beliefs (or later with the attainment of the 
dialectical knowledge), but the beliefs belong to reason.287 When the 9\)(ioei8e(; 
rejects the government and advice of reason, as in the case of the person governed 
by the appetitive part, the honour-loving part also constrains the XoyiOTiKOV and 
the rational part cannot go after its own real and proper pleasure -the pleasure of 
knowing the truth- but has to address itself to illusory pleasures that are alien to it. 
The result is that the rational part, which naturally desires the truth and what is 
truly good, misunderstands what the good is and, in consequence, the 'spirited' 
part, as well as the other two parts, fails to find its own pleasure. 
2.3.3. Capacity of discrimination required by the 'spirited' part 
So, as in the case of the appetitive part, the 0O)|a,oei8eQ only seems to require a 
minimum cognitive capacity of discrimination in order to recognize what to attack 
or fight for and what not, just as, to use Plato's own comparison, a dog learns to 
discriminate between enemies and friends. In both cases aggressiveness and self-
assertiveness are educated in a stimulus-reaction way, which makes the reaction 
similar to an instinct, a physiological response. The XoyoQ that establishes who is 
enemy and who is friend comes from outside. In the case of the dog its trainer 
instructs the dog as to what/who has to be welcomed and considered as "friendly", 
but there is no possibility that the dog wil l ever get a comprehension of the 
principles involved; by contrast the human being is trained, when a child, in the 
right pattern of response and at the same time starts to acquire right or wrong 
beliefs that provide the understanding of what is to be feared and dared, in other 
words to identify appropriate targets for his aggressive or self-assertive reactions. 
The young guardians acquire right beliefs in this respect and, i f they finally 
become dialecticians, wi l l acquire a full comprehension and knowledge of them. 
In the case of the unjust man, reason is feeble and a servant of aims that belong to 
2 8 7 Similarly Hobbs (2000), p. 237. But she seems wrongly to consider that these wrong evaluations 
are made by the SuuoeiSeq (see n. 286 above). 
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either of the other two parts that are alien to reason. In this case the rational part 
calculates and reflects according to inappropriate goals; it also produces wrong 
judgements and acquires wrong beliefs because either of these parts connects the 
soul with what is changeable. In this way the A-oyiaxiKOV becomes weakened, 
not being nourished with right beliefs and knowledge and is exposed to a final 
destruction of its own capacity for right calculation but above all of knowing the 
truth and the real good that it in its essence desires.288 
2.4. The education of the 8v|xoei8eQ 
2.4.1. Appropriate education 
The alliance of the (h))iO£i8e£ with reason and reason's desire for the truth and 
the good (as well as how successful this alliance is i f it takes place) depends on 
agents not receiving the wrong education:289 
...oinox; Kod ev \\f\>%r\ xpixov xomo e a x i xd 9\)|ioei8e<;, eitiKO-upov 6v 
xcp A-oyiCTXiKop ^-uaei, edv [ir\ wib K O C K T ^ xpo<|)fj<; 8ia<j)9apTi;290 
2.4.1.1 Development and habituation of the 'spirited' part 
Insofar as the 8v(j.oet8ei; is developed as such mainly through physical training 
and hunting (3.410b3-9; 8.549a4-7), it seems to be the psychic dimension of 
2 8 8 See below Chapter 2, Section II, 3.3.2. xcov $ax>\a>v n kv f|H.iv, pp. 186 ff.. Thus, using 
Aristotelian terms, in these cases reason might achieve 5eivOTT|q (cleverness without virtue, EN 
1144a23) but without achieving $pbvr\aiq (in which intelligence presupposes virtue). 
m Similarly Robinson (1995), pp. 44-45. 
2 9 0 "Does the soul also contain this third, spirited element, which is auxiliary of the rational element 
by nature, provided it is not corrupted by a poor upbringing?" (4. 441a2-3). 
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certain physiological states. But the 'spirited' part has to be not only developed 
but rightly orientated. 
As in the case of the £7U0V|j.r|i;iK6v, this orientation basically consists in a 
training, so that the habit of running certain risks is developed and stimulated and 
coward or falsely-brave tendencies are suppressed and become atrophied. For 
example, the young guardians are taken to be spectators of war in order to 
encourage the "taste of blood" in them (7.537a4-6), so that their 0u|a.6<; is trained 
in the habit of reacting positively i f the risk of death must be faced, and the natural 
fear of death in this way becomes atrophied in them. 
2.4.1.2. Interaction with the education of the other two parts 
The education of the 'spirited' part is in interaction with the education of the other 
two parts. 
In the musical education291 through which the love of wisdom of the young 
guardian's rational part is educated (3.411c9-d5), he acquires right beliefs that f i t 
with the courageous habits that he develops. For example, the story-tellers must 
not give a completely negative image of Hades in their tales (3.386a6-387b5) so 
that the future guardians wil l not fear death. In this way, the habits acquired by the 
'spirited' part -in this case training for going through risky situations without 
fearing death- are accompanied by the learning of right beliefs, such as 
considering death as something that must be confronted when necessary. 
Other aspects of musical education, although mainly directed at developing the 
love of wisdom that belongs to the rational part, also have influence on the 
training of the 'spirited' part (as well of the appetitive part, as we saw before). In 
the telling of stories, only either pure narration or, as a second best, imitation of 
See below Chapter 2, Section III, 1. Primary education, pp. 204 ff. 
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"people who are brave, self-disciplined, god-fearing, free" (3.395c4-5), are 
admitted so that the young guardians learn to copy these models of behaviour. 
Rhythms like the Dorian and Phrygian, rhythms which reproduce in their musical 
structure how the prudent and the brave talk and the patterns of a courageous life 
(3.399b6; c3), also work as a sort of paradigm of behaviour to be reproduced by 
the guardians, and one that trains their 'spirited' part. The programme of higher 
education leading to expertise in dialectic and finally the knowledge of the Good 
also contributes to a further reinforcement of the 'spirited' part insofar as its 
strength is required for going through this difficult programme 7.535a9-bl. At the 
same time knowledge of the Good, and with it of what is good for the individual 
and for society, also allows the development of the virtue of dvSpeia as the most 
authentic expression of the 0D|ioei5e<;.292 At the same time there is an appropriate 
habituation of the appetites within the right limits, and this also favours the 
'spirited' part's 'fight' against them and keeping its position in spite of their pull 
in an opposite direction to reason. 
In fact part of the earlier education of the guardians is planned to make the three 
parts interact in such a way that the fundamental form of dv8peia, already 
explained above, can arise in them, i.e. with the 'spirited' part resisting the pull of 
the appetites and so keeping intact the instructions of reason about what is to be 
feared and dared (4.442bll-c3). The guardians to be that are selected at the end of 
the programme of earlier education are the ones who have been able to keep their 
right beliefs unchanged by pleasure, pain and fear (4.430al-b5), insofar as the 
avoidance of suffering or of a painful situation or the attainment of a pleasant 
situation is one of the reasons why someone can "unwillingly" (dKOvaiax;) lose 
their right opinions (the other two reasons are persuasion and forgetfulness, 
3.412el0-c3). Thus they must be trained to resist these temptations and later on 
tested in, and selected according to, their resistance, the test and selection obliging 
2 9 2 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 2.2.2. The 8vu.oei5&£ orientated by reason: otvSpeia, pp. 
157 ff. and Hobbs (2000), p. 243. 
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them to pass through fearful situations and also tempting pleasures (3.413c5-e5). 
Their success in this aspect obviously depends on a right training of the 'spirited' 
part, to prevent their being frightened about death or enduring cold, hunger, etc. i f 
necessary, so that this part helps to keep the appetites within appropriate limits 
and so easily accompany reason's right opinion about what is the right thing to do. 
2.4.2. Inappropriate education 
As for the wrong education of the 'spirited' part, two situations are possible. One 
possible situation, as for example in the case of the timocratic man, is that the 
9i3|i.oei8e(; is developed through activities such as physical training, war 
activities, hunting (8.549a5-7; 8.547d4-548a3) but without being specifically 
trained to fight against the real external and internal enemies (i.e. the enemies of 
the city and the 'pull ' of the appetites); at the same time the rational part is 
wrongly or poorly developed (as in the case of the timocratic man 8.548e4-549a7) 
and the appetites are not trained to keep within appropriate limits (8.548a5-c2.; 
549a9-b4). In this first case the person is wild and savage (9.590a9-bl; 3.411c4-
e2; 3.4103-5). The second possible situation has examples in the oligarchic man, 
democratic man and tyrant. In this second case the 'spirited' part is scarcely 
developed in itself, there is no musical education for the rational part and and the 
appetites are not trained to keep within the limit of necessity.293 The person 
becomes a coward (8.554e7-b6). The hidden overdevelopment of the appetites in 
the timocratic man makes him psychologically unstable so that he can potentially 
become a lover of wealth.2 9 4 
2 9 3 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3. Education of the appetites, pp. 139 ff.. 
2 9 4 At 8.549c-550b the wrong beliefs of the young timocratic man are presented as provided by the 
most influential figures of his social environment who are not governed by the XoyKTUKOV and 
so have a wrong conception of what is good (his mother and the slaves advise him to be divdpeioq 
by acquiring wealth; his father is governed by the XoyicmKOV but has no influence because he is 
socially isolated). See also Hobbs (2000), pp. 28-29. In other words Plato understands that the 
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2.5. Conclusion 
Therefore, in short, this impulse of assertiveness that struggles in its fight for 
victory and fame can develop in two different ways. Without reason's direction -as 
in the case of the lover of honour- it becomes pure savagery, being finally 
corrupted and weakened by the appetites (so that its possessor becomes a lover of 
wealth). Conversely, with reason's orientation and an appropriate training, it 
comes to be a fundamental ally of reason's desire for the truth and the good, 
insofar as it contributes with its strength, through appropriate taming, to the 
performance of reason's instructions. The primary manifestation of this alliance 
and submission of the 6u|i.oei8e<; to reason is dvSpeia, where this is a matter of 
supporting the right beliefs, i.e. the beliefs in the young guardians about what is be 
feared and dared, insofar as the 'spirited' part, being trained to run appropriate 
risks and fight for and against appropriate friends and enemies, supports with its 
vigourous performance the right beliefs of reason. From this fundamental form of 
bravery other expressions of dvSpeia are derived. Courage to face external 
enemies in the battle is not the only one of these manifestations; in fact, the 
fundamental expression of bravery is the 9\)|ioei8eq' battle against the appetites 
on the side of reason within the soul. AvSpeia is also required for the 
performance of the programme of higher education of the philosopher rulers. In 
fact the man who is brave in the utmost and ful l sense is the one who has had the 
courage to go through the higher education programme and looks for the 
knowledge of the Good that includes knowledge of what is to be feared and dared, 
insofar as this has its foundations on the Good of reality in general as discoverable 
by the dialectician. 
So, i f we now come back to the hydraulic image of the soul, we can see that when 
the wisdom-loving aspect of us gains the alliance of the 'spirited' part through a 
intellectual make-up of an individual does not emerge ex nihilo but from the society where he/she 
grows up. 
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right process of education, in which the habituation of the 'spirited' part is 
combined with reason's acquisition of good harmonies and right beliefs about 
what is to be feared and dared and what is not, the rational part gets the strength of 
the desire for victory that is proper to the 9u|i,0£i8e£, which helps to balance the 
strong stream of the desires of the appetitive part. But i f the 9v|i.oei8eQ seeks for 
its goals independently of reason and is not trained to endure when necessary 
against the 'pull ' of the appetites, its force is easily weakened by the stream of the 
£7ti9"0|iTlxiK6v and parted from reason's desire for the truth and the real good. 
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3. The A-oyicxiKov 
3.1. The leading desire of the rational part: desire for the truth 
The A-oyicmKOV is that with which we learn (iaav8dvo|j,ev), 2 9 5 reason (cp 
A-oyi^exai) 2 9 6 and judge (See 9.582d7297). Insofar as the XoyiaxiKOV is guided 
by the desire for knowledge, wisdom or truth, a desire which is an integral part of 
i t , 2 9 8 these activities of reasoning, learning, arguing and so on (which we usually 
call 'intellectual activities') are developed by the XoyicrxiKOV in order to attain 
its object of desire, i.e. the truth. In this way, the conflict that may occur in the 
soul is between 'leading' desires, mainly between the passion for truth (and the 
real good) of the XoyicrxiKov and the appetites of the 8m0U|j,T|XtK6v and/or the 
love for honour and victory of the 0D|iO£i5e<; (when the latter is not an ally of 
the A-oyiaxiKOv). 2 9 9 The fact that the intellectual activities of the A-OYtcxxiKOV 
are governed by its passion creates an unusual situation in the light of our 
philosophical tradition, in which reason has tended in general to be seen as 
2 9 5 cp uccv8di/ei dvBpcojioq 9.580dl0; co Y e uocvGdvouBv 9.581b5; ev dp <j>povelv 
eyyiyveTOi 9.57236. 
2 9 6 4.439d5. 
297 aXXd UT|V Kod 81' oft ye 5ei bpydvou KpiveaBai [...] XOOTO opyavov [...] -ecru 
<|>iA.oa6<t>ou ("And the instrument with which judgement should be made [...] belong[s]... to the 
lover of truth.") The A.6yoi are the bpyecvov which the philosopher uses to judge (see 9.582dll-
13). These arguments have to be produced by reason, which is the part of the soul that governs the 
philosopher. 
2 9 8 At 4.435e7 and 4.436e9 this part of us is characterized as "what loves learning" (TO 
<t>iXoua8e<; 4.436e9). See also 9.581b5-10: dXXd ur)v cp ye |iav8dvouev, Jtavri SfjXov 6TI 
7tp6<; TO eiSevca Tf)v dA/f)8euxv 6JET| E ^ E I nav de i TETCXTOCI [...]. ^iXonaSeq 5fi K a i 
<))iA.6ao())ov KaXouvre*; a-bTo KaTd Tpoitov dv KaXoi^ev; ("And of course it's obvious to 
anyone that the part we learn with is entirely and constantly intent upon knowing where the truth 
lies [... ]. Would it be in order, then, for us to call it a lover of learning and a lover of wisdom?"). 
2 9 9 See above Chapter 2, Section 1,1.2. The deduction of the 8vuoei8eq from..., pp. 119 ff.. 
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divorced from and often opposed to desire.300 However, this creates at the same 
time a problem about the relationship between rational desire and reason's 
intellectual activities. Plato does not say too much about it. What can fairly be 
inferred from the leading role of desire for the truth is that this passion constitutes 
rationality in the sense that all the intellectual activities -judging, reasoning, 
calculating- are motivated by this desire and in this sense based on i t . 3 0 1 This 
relationship is shown in the fact that the dialectical knowledge based on the Good 
is at the same time the maximum development of reason's capacity and of its 
passion for the truth. 
The A-oyicxtiKOV (like the other two parts) is common to all human beings, 
which means that the desire for knowledge exists in all of us (as do appetites and 
desire for victory and honour).302 But this part has the peculiarity of making us 
3 For Cooper (1999), p. 189 this division between, on one hand, beliefs that come from reason 
and provide information for action but not motivation and, on the other hand, desire or desires that 
provide motivation and impulse for action is a familiar modern theory that goes back to Hobbes. 
Kahn (1987), pp.78-81 traces back this theory to Aristotle, who divides the faculties of the soul 
into reason and desire (6pe|ii;) ( which is further subdivided into |3o\)A.T|cns, 9uu6<; and 
emSuuia. Cooper (1999) p. 190 claims that, in opposition to this tradition, for Plato there are 
desires of reason, which are "strong impulses of some kind which we experience simply and 
directly because we possess the power of reason". Similarly, though in more extreme form, Kahn 
(1987), p. 80: " [in the Republic] reason appears not as some distinct principle [from desire] but as 
a particular form of desire" (Kahn's italics). This line of interpretation had already been held by 
Nettleship (1963) [1898], p. 158 (cited by Guthrie (1975), p. 476). Differently from these 
interpreters and from my own proposal, Parry thinks that while in the Republic Plato makes 
"reason the ruler that establishes virtue in the soul by forcing or guiding the desire", in the 
Symposium he makes "desire the chief underlying force in the activity" (Parry (1996), p. 215). 
3 0 1 In this way for Plato human reason is "the synergetic union of the power to know and the power 
to love" (Nakhnikian (1978), p. 287). Similarly Moravcsik (1971) understands the erotic ascent of 
the Symposium as a process where philosophical epcoq "pushes the mind to new investigations" 
and "keeps the mind restless" (p. 292) about finally achieving contemplation of the Form of Beauty 
(pp. 294-295). 
3 0 2 Cooper (1999), p. 190. 
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human beings. In Book 9 this is symbolized by the image of the soul, representing 
the XoyicxiKOV in the form of a small man (9.588d). It is in this sense that, 
although the self or the person is the whole soul with all these parts,303 the rational 
part of the soul represents what we more authentically are.304 The fact that this part 
receives more or less development in each human being has the effect of making 
some men 'more human' than others; and the human being in whom rationality is 
fully developed can even become a god-like creature (9.589dl; 9.590dl). The life 
of a human being can be directed by other kinds of epox; (the love of honour in 
the case of the ( |)IX .6VIKOV or the (J)iX,OKep8e<; (9.581c4) or the love of wealth of 
the appetitive part). The development of our human and potentially god-like 
nature depends on our life being led by the epcoc; for the truth of the 
AoyicmKOV. The consequence of this is that the passion for wisdom is, between 
other possible leading passions, the most authentic expression of what we are.305 
3 0 3 This is similar to the conception of the human being as a compound of soul and body in the 
Phaedo. The soul in the Phaedo can either try to be by itself as far as possible (see 65b-c) or 
address itself to the cxoucx, which connects the soul with the changeable and generates appetites 
and aggressiveness (66b). This represents in another light the aspects of the soul other than the 
rational part that appear in the Republic. Similarly Robinson (Robinson (1995), p. 46), although he 
sees a change of perspective in the Republic with reference to the pleasures and desires identified 
in the soul (see pp. 55 ff.). 
3 0 4 See Robinson (1970), pp. 51 ff. 
3 0 5 This is the reason why, although Plato develops a theory of a 'tripartite' soul in the Republic, he 
says in Book 10 that the soul in its truest nature must only be considered in relation to its love of 
wisdom (see on this point Guthrie (1971), pp. 232-233). 
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3 . 2 . Desire for the truth and desire for the real good. The A . O Y U J X I K 6 V ' S 
understanding or misunderstanding of the real good 
This desire for truth converges with the desire for the real good 3 0 6 and, when it 
governs the life of an individual (as in the case of a philosopher), also makes 
possible the development and fulfilment of the desires of the rest of the soul in an 
appropriate and good way. 3 0 7 But how this desire for truth is connected with the 
universal desire for the good and how this passion leads the desires of the other 
parts of the soul in an appropriate way requires further explanation. 
As we find in many of the so called 'Socratic' dialogues, the desire for the good is 
universal; that is, everybody desires what is really good. This idea is expressed in 
Book 6 of the Republic, before the introduction of the allegory of the sun, in the 
following way: 
...dyotGd 8e cbSevl exi dpicei xd SOKOUVXCX KxdaBai, aXXa xd ovxa 
i^ nxcroaiv, xf]v 8e 86^av evxocuSa f]br\ ndq dxi|id£ei; 3 0 8 
But, although we all desire the good, insofar as our reason is capable of having 
both right and wrong conceptions what the good is, we cannot always achieve it. 
Thus in Book 6 of the Republic: 
3 0 6 Similarly Kahn (1987), p. 82: "This unity of theory and practice [i.e. that is characteristic of 
Plato's thought] has a consequence or presupposition that the knowledge of truth must also be a 
knowledge of value, of what is worth pursuing, so that the desire to know the truth will ultimately 
be a desire to know and possess the good" (Kahn's italics). 
3 0 7 9.586d4-587al. See also 4.443c9-4.444al; 9.591el-592a6. 
308 " ^ h e n j t c o m e s to things which are good, on the other hand, no one has ever yet been satisfied 
with the appearance. They want things that really are good; they all treat the appearance of it with 
contempt." (Griffith's italics) (6.505d7-9). 
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6 8f) SiooKei |j.ev drcaaa \\fv%r\ K a i xovxov eveKa jcdvxa Tipdxxei, 
d7ro|0,avxe\)O(j.evr| x i e i v a i , dTtopcuaa 8e K a i OVK £%OVOOL A.aPeiv 
'iKavco^ x i nox feaxiv oi)8e Jiiaxei xP^^aaGai (j.ovip.q) dice K a i rcepi 
x&XXa, 8id xcuxo 8e d7coxi)YX a v e i K a i xc*>v dAAcov e i x i bfyeXoq fjv, 
[. . .] . o i j i a i yovv ... 8 ' iKaid xe K a i Katax dyvoovneva bur} icoxe dyaGd 
eaxiv, oi) J I O X . X . O ' O X I V O Q d^ iov fyvXccKa KEKxfiaBai dv eavxcov xov 
xcuxo dyvoovvxa- |iavxe\)op:ai 8e |ir|8eva a i )xd Jtpoxepov yvcbaeaBai 
iKavcoq. 
Here we find the typical assertions of Socratic ethical intellectualism: we all desire 
what is really good -and do everything for sake of it; but what we actually do is 
determined by what we think and conceive as the real good and, consequently, a 
man's wrong doing "is involuntary and due to ignorance",310 "for he isn't wrong of 
his own w i l l " 3 1 1 . But this Socratic intellectualism receives a more complex 
treatment through the theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic.312 What I claim 
and try to show below, as at least a plausible interpretation of texts from the 
Republic, is that the A-oyicrxiKOV, being the small part of us through which we 
learn, reason, judge and can be wise 3 1 3 and desire the truth, is always314 in charge 
309 "Thjg j s w f o a t e v e r y s o u ] follows. All its actions are directed at this. It has a sort of divine 
intuition that the good is something, but it is in doubt, unable to get a firm grasp on what it is, or 
find any firm belief of the kind it has about other things. As a result it loses whatever benefit it 
might have got from those other things. [... ]. But if it's not known ... in what way just and beautiful 
things are good, and if in particular a guardian does not know this, what kind of guardian will 
justice and beauty have got for themselves? And I have an intuition that no one will have a 
satisfactory knowledge of justice and beauty without knowing this first." (6.505dll-506a3). 
(Griffith's italics.) 
3 1 0 Shorey (1946) [1935], vol. I I , p. 404, note b. 
3 1 1 oi) yap EKCOV auaprdvei (9.589c6). 
3 1 2 Cooper (1999), p.187. 
3 1 3 ao<j>6v 5e ye eKeivcp xco auixpcp jiepei (4.442c5). 
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of providing (rightly or wrongly) this comprehension of what is good, its 
understanding depending on which of the three currents of desires leads our 
lives. 3 1 5 In this way the strange situation of attributing some sort of rationality to 
those parts described as aAoyi t fTa is avoided. As said above, the tripartite 
division of the soul is mainly made in the light of the different leading desires of 
the soul and only in relation to the XoyicmKOV is there a clear and unambiguous 
reference to cognitive capacities as well. Besides, as shown above, the 
performance of the irrational parts can be explained by supposing only a minimum 
cognitive capacity (which need not be identified with either of these parts but 
would probably be a basic expression of the A,oyiaxiKOv). 
According to this interpretation, when the A-oyiGTiKOV is dragged about by 
desires alien to its aims -e.g. when wealth or honour, which are for the other two 
parts 'goods' (8.555b8-10; 8.562b3-4; 8.553dl-7), it is deceived in its conception 
of the good with the result that we do not actually direct our efforts to what is 
really good because the rational part wrongly conceives what is changeable and 
3 1 4 According to the epistemology that appears in Book 9 in relation to the distinction between true 
and false pleasures no cognitive capacity has to be attributed to the e7ti0\)|ar|TiK6v, pace Penner 
(see Penner (1971), pp. 101; 110), or to the 6uuoei5£<; (Hobbs (2000), pp. 22-23). All the 
intellectual work is in the hands of the X.oyi.cJxiK6v, which, when it is driven by desires alien to it, 
is in contact with the changeable and misconceives what the good is. See below Chapter 2, 
Section II, 3.3. Reason as organ of judgement, pp. 180 ff.. 
3 1 5 Similarly Cooper (1999), p. 202, n. 18 says that when reason is displaced by the GvuoeiSeq or 
the kJli0u|J.T|XiK6v, this fact "does not mean either that reason ceases altogether to function (see 
553d) or that the usurper actually begins to perform reason's functions of calculating what to do, 
declaring where the overall good lies and deciding accordingly. What happens instead is simply 
that, yielding to the importunities of the usurping desires (i.e. accepting the strength or frequency 
of these desires as criterion of the value of their objects), the person's reason comes to adopt, as its 
own general view of what is good for him, the overall plan of gratifying those desires first and 
foremost". 
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the pleasure that the changeable provides as the truest and most real thing.3 1 This 
explains why, although desire for the good is common to all human beings, those 
who are governed by the £ 7 U 8 ' 0 | J . T | T I K 6 V or the 9v(ioei8feq do not direct their 
lives to the real good. For this reason ocKpaaioc, which consists in the victory of 
the appetitive part over the rational part, as a permanent state of the soul would 
make the XoyicmKOV be in contact with the changeable and finally misconceive 
what the real good is. 
Only i f our soul is led by the desire for the truth that belongs to the ^oyiaxiKOV, 
as in the case of the person who practices philosophy, can we understand correctly 
what the good is. In this case the XoyicrxiKOV attempts to acquire knowledge of 
the Form of Good. This knowledge ultimately provides a comprehension of reality 
as a whole, a comprehension which also includes knowledge of the individual 
good and of the good of the state (i.e. a practical knowledge about how to live in 
individual and political terms, which Plato calls "justice"3 1 7). Insofar as this 
3 1 6 Thus I agree with Penner that in the conflict of the soul between the £7t:i8'Uur|TiK:6v and the 
XoyicciKOv (and also between the 9t>|ioei5e<; and the XoyiaxiKov -but P. considers the 
9-uuoeiSeq as an aspect of the £Ju8"U|j.r|xiK6v) there are two different conceptions of what it is 
good to do: one conception that is right and the other which is wrong (Penner (1971), pp. 97-100). 
But he also states that the wrong conception belongs to the eniQv\ir\ziKbv and the right 
conception to reason. By contrast, I claim that both conceptions of what it is good to do belong to 
the A -OyiaxiKOV, as it is the aspect with which we reason. While the right conception of the good 
action originates exclusively from reason according to its own aims, the wrong conception about 
what is good to do emerges from the XoyicmKOV's being dragged about by the appetites of the 
erciO'UUTiTiKOV (or the pure aggressiveness and desire for honour and victory of the SunoeiSe^) 
into the sphere of the changeable. This makes the XoyiaxiKOV misunderstand what it is good to 
do. In short the conflict is between desires -the desires of reason and the desires of the other two 
parts- but this conflict affects the epistemological condition of the person.. 
3 1 7 'Justice' means in the Republic that each part of the city or each part of the soul does its own job 
(4.443c9-e7). Only the XoyvatiKov can have the wisdom to know what is good for the soul (and 
also for the city and for reality in general) as a whole (4.442c5-8). 
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knowledge of the Good is a necessary condition for access to the real good, 
knowledge, i.e. the proper object of desire of the XoyicmKOV, is what is good for 
us in the first place.318 
A fundamental consequence of all this is that, according to the psychology of the 
Republic it is necessary, in order to know the truth and the real good (and so to 
obtain the real good that we all desire), not only to acquire understanding but also 
previously to have the rest of our desires trained in such a way that the soul can be 
directed by the desire for the truth. 3 1 9 This is the reason why the pedagogical 
project of the Republic does not consist just in an intellectual training but in the 
education of desires from early childhood onwards.320 
3.3. Reason as the organon of judgement 
3.3.1. Judgment as instrument of reason in the analysis of the authentic and 
inauthentic pleasures 
The epistemological implications of the analysis of authentic and inauthentic 
pleasures at 9.581c6 ff . seems to invite us to suppose that reason is always 
responsible for all kinds of judgement and especially of judgements about what is 
good. Three arguments are given in order to 'prove' that the pleasure of knowing 
the truth is the only authentic pleasure. 
3 1 8 So both things seem to be true: the desire for the real good leads us to desire wisdom and the 
desire for wisdom leads us to desire what is really good. 
3 1 9 For example, to train the appetites with the help of the 'spirited' part and reason's orientation to 
keep within appropriate limits and so to avoid dticpocaioc, which would make an obstacle to 
acquiring a permanent knowledge of what is good and true and might even provoke the corruption 
of reason. 
3 2 0 As Kahn asserts in the Republic and the Symposium "the process of enlightenment for reason is 
at the same time a process of reeducation for desires", where the rational desire leads (Kahn 
(1987), p. 101). On the need to cultivate the love of knowledge (<t>iXoua6ia) from early 
childhood on see, for example, 3.411d.l-5. 
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3.3.1.1. Reason's understanding and misunderstanding of the real good 
(9.581c6-585a5) 
The first argument, developed at 9.581c6-585a5, can briefly be summarized as 
follows. People like the lover of wealth (and the lover of honour) have no 
experience of knowing the truth -the only real pleasure- and do not use reasoning 
accompanied by wisdom; for this reason they -wrongly- judge (Kpiveiv) what the 
best things are by using money and profit (or honour in the case of the lover of 
honour) as criteria (9.582b2-583e9). In this way the lover of wealth (like the lover 
of honour) erroneously considers the pleasures which come from the bodily and 
are in fact "mere images and shadow-paintings of true pleasure"(9.583b3-7) as the 
best pleasures (9.581cl0-d8). In contrast with this the lover of wisdom, who 
judges (Kpiveiv) according to the best criteria of judgement -namely, experience, 
reasoning with knowledge (9.582a4-5)-, rightly establishes the knowledge of the 
truth as the most authentic pleasure. Insofar as non-philosophers have never 
moved 'upwards' and had the experience of knowing the truth, they wrongly 
believe (diecrBai) and judge (r\yei(yQ<xi) the absence of pain as real pleasure 
(9.583c3 ff . ; see especially 584e7-585a5) and thus hold unhealthy opinions ([ir\ 
byie l i ; 86^aq £%ox>o\, 9.584e8). It is only the philosopher who judges the 
things in the right way using his experience, knowledge and reasoning. 
This argument is fundamentally given in order to demonstrate that the only 
authentic pleasure is the pleasure of knowing the truth and that the material 
pleasures -an object of desire of the e7ti0aj(ir|XiK6v and also of the 0U|i.oei8e<;, 
especially when it is not an ally of reason- fail in being real pleasures. But the 
argument also implies an epistemological conclusion: that there is a right and a 
wrong way of judging (Kpiveiv) what the best and truest pleasures are. According 
to what is said at 9.582d7-9 the opyocvov of judgement is the instrument of the 
lover of wisdom, i.e. the arguments produced by reason. Besides this, if, as it has 
been suggested at 4.438al-5 and 4.439a4-7, the e7Ui9v|j.T)i;iK6v cannot make 
182 
judgements and calculations about what is good and bad (apparently only reason 
can), the most plausible conclusion is that it is to be only reason that either rightly 
establishes what the most authentic pleasure is -when judging on its own- or 
wrongly judges the bodily pleasures to be the authentic pleasures -when appetites 
or love of honour dominate the soul and reason is their servant and reason is 
forced to use what benefits these parts as the criterion for making its judgements 
(8.553dl-7). The idea that the right judgement of the philosopher about what is 
good and bad is based on wisdom (<j>povr|aic;) and reasoning (X,oyi^ea9ai) 
(9.582e7-9) seems to be a reference to the method of dialectic through which he 
arrives at the truth according to Books 6 and 7. 3 2 1 The philosopher's judgments 
about what is good and bad would be supported by the right beliefs acquired in his 
childhood (as the 6p0f} 56l;a of what is to be feared and what not, 3.430b) until 
he attains a definite understanding of the foundations of these right beliefs with 
the knowledge of the Good (in case this ever happens in absolute terms).322 In 
other words the philosopher has had his reason developed through an appropriate 
education; but we must suppose that the non-philosopher's reason, though without 
correct training, also makes judgments (they have a rational part after all). The 
difference is that these judgments are either wrong or only randomly right. 
We can say that what the appetites look for -food, drink, sex, money and the 
bodily pleasures in general- is 'their good' in the sense that those are the objects 
towards which they drive. But this does not imply any understanding from the 
appetites but just an automatic pull towards the object of desire. It is rather reason, 
which, being dominated by the appetites, or by the love of honour when this is 
3 2 1 For this interpretation of <t>povr|aic; in connection with Books 6 and 7, see Stokes (1990), pp. 
20-21. 
3 2 2 This is why at 9.585bl4 there is a reference to true opinion together with knowledge. "True 
opinions" are a necessary transitional state to make possible the construction of a just life 
addressed to the search of the truth and the real good until the knowledge of the Good is attained 
(if possible). See below Chapter 2, Section III, 2. Higher education, pp. 214 ff.. 
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also finally dragged about by the appetites, misunderstands what the real good is 
and makes its calculations according to a wrong general goal of life. 
For example, insofar as the oligarchic man is a man governed by the necessary 
desires of the e7ti9u|j.r|TiK6v, he wrongly conceives wealth as the good (8.555b8-
10; 8.562b3-4). So, his whole existence being aimed towards that goal, he uses the 
XoyicmKOV just to get wealth and only reasons and "examines" (CTKcmeiv) in 
relation to this goal: 3 2 3 
T O 8e ye o i fxa i XoyicmKov xe Koti GvjioeiSeQ x a M - a i evBev K a i E V 6 E V 
7r.apaKa6iaa<; xm' eiceivcp Kod KaxaSouA-coadiaevot;, TO nev ovSev 
dXXo ea Xoyi^ecrOai obde GKOKEIV dXX' fj bnoBev eB, kXavzovoov 
XpriiLidcTcov nXeico earai, T O 5 E aft 8av|j.d££iv K a i Tij idv |j.T|5ev aXXo 
f\ nXovxov T E K a i nXovciovq, K a i (|)iX.OTi(j,ela0ai |ir|5' ecf)' evi dA,A.op f\ 
kid xpTlM-dTcov KTfiaei K a i edv T I aXXo eiQ T C U T O (bepri.324 
Something similar happens in the case of the democratic man. The soul of this 
man, who has his life controlled by the desire for freedom to satisfy the 
unnecessary as well as the necessary appetites (8.562b9-12), is empty of true and 
beautiful speeches and good rules of behaviour (8.560b7-10). It is also void of true 
words that say that some pleasures are good and honourable and others base 
(8.561b7-c4). This emptiness of his soul is filled by arrogant and false discourses, 
which make a transposition in his soul in relation to what is good and bad. 
3 2 3 Also what is to be honoured and to be fought for -the target of the BuuoeiSeQ- is reduced to 
wealth. 
3 2 4 "As for the rational and spirited parts of the soul, he makes them sit on the ground, one on each 
side, below the desiring element, reducing them to slavery. The rational part he bans from all 
subjects of calculation or inquiry other than ways of turning a little money into a lot, while the 
only things he allows the spirited part to admire and respect are wealth and wealthy people. The 
only thing it may pride itself on is acquisition of money, or anything which contributes to this end." 
(8.553dl-7). 
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In the case of the tyrant there is a complete destruction of any remaining good 
opinion or habit (9.573a4-b4) and the best part of our soul - T O XoyicmKOV- is 
enslaved by a tyrannical passion (epcoi;) and is at its service (9.577dl-5), so that 
his right beliefs about what is good and bad are now overmastered by the opinions 
normally repressed in sleep and refrained by the laws (9.574dl-575a8), i.e. what is 
good and bad is subjected to the tyranny of the lawless desires. Again these 
evaluative -in this case wrong judgements about what is good and bad- have to be 
made by reason, which is now aimed in a wrong general direction. 
3.3.1.2. Right and wrong judgements made by reason 
But the last ' p roo f in the analysis of the authentic and inauthentic pleasures 
(585a8 f f . ) seems to imply an even wider epistemological claim. Here it is said 
that the bodily pleasures do not provide authentic replenishment because, when 
they produce pleasure by satisfying the emptiness of the bodily dispositions 
related to the desires of the e7ii6\)(j.r|tiK6v325 (like hunger and thirst and similar 
states that are f i l l ed by food, drinks, etc), the soul clings to mortal and changeable 
things. 3 2 6 This kind of thing is concerned with the bodily and partakes less of the 
truth and of reality than the things that properly f i l l the soul -knowledge, true 
belief, the whole of virtue- and are related to what is ever like itself and immortal 
and to the t ruth. 3 2 7 Thus, when soul is led by the appetites or the love of honour 
3 2 5 Finally the 8\)jioei8eq is weakened, overwhelmed and dragged by the appetites in their 
direction, when it is not led by reason. See 9.590b6-9. 
3 2 6 ...to UT|8eJtOT£ bixoiou Kai Bvr\xox>, Kai ai/co toicuxov Kai ev toiomco 
Yvyv6u£VOv...("...that which is connected with what is never the same, and mortal -itself 
possessing those qualities, and being found in the context of things with those qualities...." 
(9.585c3-5). 
327 ... xb 56t,r\q xe dXr|8o{)<; etSoc; Kai emo"Trpr|<; Kai vov Kai o-uAAf)P5T|v aG nd<yr]q 
dpexfiq [...] TO xov de i buoiou exbuevov Kai dGavdxot) Kai d^r|8e'ux(;, Kai a lno 
TOIOSTOV bv Kai ev xoiovrop Yiyvouevov... ("...the kind made up of true opinion, knowledge, 
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and is dragged towards the mutable and changeable, reason not only fails in 
judging which are real pleasures -and so what is good and bad- but also, in a more 
general way, as Gosling puts i t , 3 2 8 "untrue pleasures introduce an element of 
illusion and false judgement into life". This seems to imply that appetites give rise 
not only to reason's misconception of the good but may also make reason produce 
wrong beliefs and judgments in general, insofar as they connect the soul with what 
is mutable, changeable and less true, so that they are a source of falsehood or at 
least of something that is not absolutely true. A more general wariness about 
emotions, perceptions and the body's appetites that we find in the Republic also 
seems to be related to this point: insofar as they also connect the soul with the 
changeable, they may make reason produce false judgements, help the activation 
and growth of the appetites and prevent reason from considering things on its own 
and trying to attain real knowledge. In other words in the Republic, as much as in 
the Phaedo, two ways in which reason can operate are identified: reason 
inquirying "in company with the body" and staying in the realm of appearance; 
reason trying to get true knowledge by examining things on its own and so 
developing its essential power. 3 2 9 
understanding and in fact the whole of human excellence [. . .] . That which is connected with what 
is always the same, immortal and true, -itself possessing these qualities and being found in the 
context of things with these qualities...." (9.585bl4-c5). 
3 2 8 Gosling (1982), p. 128. 
3 2 9 As said earlier at Rep. 7.523al-525a2, although judgements through the report of sense-
perceptions at times can be right (7.523b), sensation often cannot be trusted -especially in cases 
such as distant appearances and shadow-painting (7.523al0-b4)- because contradictory judgements 
are made on basis of them. In these cases "thought" (vbr\ciq) and "calculating reason" 
(Xoyiouoq) (7.524b3-5) have to reconsider things on their own, independently of the senses, in 
order to get true judgements (7.524e2-525a2). Similarly in Phaed. 64c-67b the complaint about the 
senses is that the clearest knowledge requires us to think about things as much as possible a\nf[ 
xr\ 5iocvoiq -i.e. without the senses and, in a more general sense, without the body's concerns. 
Interest in the bodily leads to "a whole range of intelligent inquiry that [... ] fails to produce 
answers of timeless validity, or even adequate explanations of the phaenomena investigated" (ch. 
10 of Gosling (1983b), p. 173), i.e. fails to produce knowledge or at least lead towards it. As the 
'argument from recollection' tries to show (72e-77a), sense-perceptions can be useful for thought 
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3.3.2. xc6v fyavX&v xi ev tuj.1v in Republic 10 
However, there seems to be a serious objection to the interpretation that I propose. 
This originates in 10.602cl-608bl0, insofar as this passage, part of the argument 
against mimetic poetry (10.595c6-608bl0), which has been often considered as a 
proof that the appetitive part has beliefs and makes judgements.330 I shall now 
analyse all the sections of the argument that suggest this more usual interpretation 
in order to show later on how these same tokens can fi t with another interpretation 
more coherent with other parts of the same context and with previous contexts of 
the Republic. The reasons for thinking that in this part of Book 10 there is a 
reference to the eJliGuii-TiTiKOV as a part that judges and believes can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Two parts of the soul are distinguished: on the one hand, there is the 
A-oyiaxiKOV, which measures, calculates and weighs ((lexpelv, dpi0|i£iv Kcoi 
only if they awaken the need to get rid of them as much as possible and reflect and think about 
what is by itself. In the Theaetetus there is a more refined distinction: beliefs and judgements 
based on sense-perceptions clearly do not belong to the senses themselves but are the result of the 
mind's operation with what is provided by sense-perception (on this point see M. Frede (1987)). 
This does not contradict but seems rather to develop what is said in the Republic and the Phaedo 
(differently M. Frede (1987), p.4 and Burnyeat (1976), pp. 34-36). Murphy (1951), p. 243 thinks 
that at least the treatment of sense-perception in Republic 10 seems to anticipate the later treatment 
in the Theaetetus. 
3 3 0 See Penner (1971), 100-108; Moline (1978), esp. 10-15; Annas (1981), pp. 338-344; Many of 
these authors are mentioned by Janaway (1995), pp. 143-157, especially p. 144 n. 21and p. 146 n. 
25. In n. 21 Janaway also mentions some texts given by Burnyeat (1976) in order to support this 
point. But 9.574d5-575a6 implies evaluation of good and bad and only reason can do this 
according to what was established in Book 4, although in this case it does it wrongly insofar as the 
good opinions of the rational part are overwhelmed by the appetites. 4.442cl0-dl, which says that 
all the parts share the opinion that reason has to rule, can be taken as saying that appetites and the 
'spirited' element have been well trained in earlier education so that reason can establish what is 
the best thing to do without being 'dragged' about by them and considering their interests. Price 
also thinks that the e7ti9\)U.T|TiK6v has beliefs related to sensory appearances (Price (1995), pp. 
48-72). 
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i a x d v a i 10.602d6; see also [lexpcp K a i Xoyio\i(£>, 10.603a4) and is the best 
part of the soul (PeA/uaxov ... X T I Q \\fv%r\q, 10.603a4-5); on the other hand, 
there is "one of the base things in us" (xoov §ai)X(£>v..xi...kv r||iiv, 10.603a7-8), 
which holds beliefs in contradiction to measurements of reason (10.603al-8). 
Insofar as the same principle of contradiction used at 4.436b and 4.436e-437a for 
distinguishing the three parts of the soul is alluded to at 10.603al-2 and especially 
at 10.603d in relation to the distinction of the rational part from "the inferior 
aspect of us", it seems natural to suppose that, one aspect of the soul being the 
X,oyiaxiKOV, the other part is either the E7U0V|j,r|XiK6v and the 9\)|i.O£i8e<; or 
just the E7ti8\)|0.r|xiK6v.331 
2. This base part of the soul, which the mimetic art prompts, is related to the 
affliction that leads an individual into grief against the advice of reason (xo |J,£V 
dvxixEiveiv 8iaK8A,e,vx))j.evov Xoyoq K a i v6|a.o<; eaxiv, xo 8e EXKOV eni 
xdq Xvnaq ai)xd xo iz&Qoq, 10.604M)332. Similarly at 4.439dl-2 the appetites 
of the em9o)|i.r|XiK6v are associated with what draws and drags the soul through 
affections and diseases (xd...dyovxa K a i eAxovxa 8id TiaOTpdxoov xe K a i 
voar||j.dxcov)333. 
3. The same inferior aspect of us is also described as insatiable, irrational, passive 
and fond of cowardice (xo 8£...d7rAfic7xa)<; E%OV aincov dp' oi)K dXoyicrxov 
3 3 1 While Penner (1971) maintains that for this reason the model of the soul is essentially a 
'bipartite' model, Halliwell (1993), p. 134 connects the 'bipartition' of Book 10 with the fact that 
in Book 4 the 'spirited' part was shown as "capable of 'allying' itself with either of the others". 
However, as we have already seen, the 'spirited' part is different from the other two parts anyway 
insofar as it has its proper characteristics and desires. 
3 3 2 "... what drags him back to his grief is his misfortune itself...." 
3 3 3 "... the things which drive or draw them towards drink are the products of feelings and 
disorders...." 
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xe (j^croiiev eivai K a i dpyov K a i 8eiA,iaq tyikov, 10.604d8-10)334 and 
&V0T|t6v (10.605b8). This matches with previous descriptions of the 
eJCi8\)^ir|T;iK6v as fyvaei d7T,A.T|Gx6xaxov (4.442a6-7), dXoyiaxov (4.439d7) 
and agent of cowardice (9.590b3-4). 
4. Similarly to what is said about the EniQv\ir\HKbv, this base part corrupts the 
AoyiaxiKOV (see for example at 10.605b3-5) 
5. It is related to sexual pleasure, anger, craving, pains and pleasures (Kai Ttepi 
d<|>po5iaicov 8f) K a i Gviacu K a i Ttepi rcdvxoov xciov em0v|ar|xiKo3v xe K a i 
A/wiT|pa>v K a i r|8ecov ev x^ \|n)%f|..., 10.606dl-2)3 3 5, which are usually 
associated with the appetitive part and the 'spirited' part. 
6. The mimesis that affects this part of the soul is 7ioiKiA.T| (10.604el) and the 
appetitive part is described at 9.588c7 as being of a 7ioiKiX.ov type. This seems to 
suggest that the imitative art stimulates the appetitive part. 
However, in spite of these points (1-6 above), this problematic section 10.602cl-
608bl0 allows another interpretation that takes into account other aspects of the 
passage, mantains more coherence with what was previously established and 
avoids dealing with things such as desires, emotions, deceptive perceptions as i f 
they were the same thing. 
Although the same principle of opposition is used here as in Book 4 -see on this 
section 1. above- this does not imply that it is being used for making the same 
3 3 4 " ...which can never gets its fill of these things -won't we describe this as irrational, lazy and a 
friend to cowardice?". 
3 3 5 "Doesn't it apply also to sex, anger, and all the desires, pains and pleasures in the soul ... ?" 
(Griffith's translation slightly modified: I add "in the soul" = ev xf j V|/uxfj). 
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kind of division: 3 3 6 while in Book 4 (and again in Books 8 and 9) the aspects of the 
soul are distinguished according to their fundamental and distinct desires, in Book 
10 the soul is divided, at least in principle, into two parts according to two 
different and opposite ways of judging reality. The essential distinction that seems 
to be traced at 10.602cl-603a8 is between reason when it calculates on its own 
-'pure reason' we might say- and so is the best part of the soul; and reason when 
its judgements are based on sense perception, more specifically on deceptive sense 
perceptions.337 Thus at 10.602e4-6 it is said that deceptive sense perceptions 
appear to the same element -i.e. to the rational part- that, working on its own 
through calculations and measurements, has established things in a different way: 
rovtcp Se 7toXXdKi<; jiexpficravxi Kai ar||iaivovxi |j.ei£co dxxa eivai f) 
eXdxxco exepa exepcov f) l a a xdvavxia (haivexat d|j.a irepi xaftxd.338 
10.603bl0-c2 also suggests that this inferior part of us denotes an intellectual 
aspect of us (Sidvoia) that can be misled by mimetic art: 
...dXXd Kai E T C ' aftxo aft eX.8cop.ev xfj<; 5iavoia<; xoftxo cp 7tpoaofj.iX.ei 
t| xfj<; Tcoifiaecoq |ii|i.r|xiKfi, Kai i8co|nev (J)aftXov f) oTto-uSaiov eaxiv.339 
3 3 f i Similarly Halliwell (1993), p. 134. 
3 3 7 Similarly Murphy (1951), p. 243 says: " ...what he is saying in Book X could be put in this 
form, that the senses frequently misrepresent physical facts and lead us to false conclusions; these 
falsities we accept if we are careless, and we are especially likely to do so under aesthetic 
memerism; but a vigilant intelligence (though it cannot alter the sensation) will not be misled by 
erroneous suggestion". Differently Halliwell (1993), p. 134. 
3 3 8 "Quite often this element [i.e. the rational element] makes its measurements, indicates that one 
group of things is bigger or smaller than another -or the same size- but simultaneously finds that 
the same group of objects presents exactly the opposite appearance." (10.602e4-6). (A different 
translation according to which "indications would conflict in the person rather than in a single 
element" is also possible. See Griffith (2000), p. 323, n. 10). 
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This mental aspect is very unlikely to represent the e7Ui0\)|O.r|tiK6v. Again, in the 
opening of Book 10 at 595b3-7, concern is expressed about mimetic poetry 
because it affects the mind (Sidvoia) without the presence of the antidote of 
knowing the truth. This implies that the part affected is the same as the one that, 
when the person has a philosophical way of life, can know the truth. 
If so, at 10.603al-2 "one of the base things of us", referring to something that 
opines against reason, can better be described as an inferior and degenerated 
manifestation of the X.oyiaxiK6v than as the £ 7 U 0 V | J . T | X I K 6 V . 
However, this "inferior part in us" -opposite to the "best part of us", i.e. reason 
when it does its proper job of calculating and advising- includes not only this 
corrupted aspect of the rational part that opines and makes wrong judgements: it 
also embraces the deceptive sense-perceptions themselves that are the grounds for 
these wrong judgments. In this sense it is said that the mimetic art as a whole 
associates with this base element in us ((JJOCuXcp cuyyivoiaevTi, 10.603b4) and 
actually produces base offspring (({)oa)A,a yevva, 10.603b4) because it tries to 
affect our sight (Kocxd xfiv ovjnv, 10.603b6) in the case of painting -the 
perspective-painting (aKiaypa(|)ia) that stimulates deceptive perceptions like the 
ones produced by sight's deceit (xf]v 7tA.dvT|V xfj<; 6\|/ea><;, 10.602C12)- or our 
hearing (Kaxd xf)v dKofiv) in the case of poetry (10.603b6). Insofar as sense-
perceptions (especially deceptive sense-perceptions, and even more the copies of 
these misleading perceptions made by the mimetic art, copies which as such 
belong to an inferior level of reality) encourage attachment to appearances (to 
what is far from wisdom and the truth 10.603al0-b2), they contribute to the 
malfunctioning and final destruction of the rational part in its proper use. 
3 3 " ...but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see 
whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part." (I follow here Shorey's translation. Henceforth 
I will continue by following Griffith's translation.) 
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This "base aspect of us" -which is at odds with reason as the best part of the soul 
which calculates, measures, reasons and advises- also includes emotions such as 
grief: 
O U K O U V T O (iev dvxixeiveiv SiaKe^euotievov Xoyoq Kai vo^ioq eaxiv, 
T O 8e EXKOV eni xdq Xvnaq aired xo JcdGoQ; [...] evavxiag 8e oLyo^y^c, 
Yt-YV0M'evTl? e v ™ dvGpcbjtcp Ttepi xo a-bxo d|ia, 5vo (hajiev aired) 
dvaYKaiov eivai; 3 4 0 
The "ignoble in us" embraces not only grief but also what recollects grief and so 
encourages lamentations: 
xo 8e irpdq xdc, dva|j.vfiaei<; xe xov Jid0oi)^ Kai npoq xoiiq 68,op|j.oiL)Q 
<xyov Kai aiiXr\ox(n<; k%ov a-bxcov dp' OVK dX.OYiaxov xe (hfjaoiiev 
eivai Kai dpYOV Kai 8eiXia<; (hiA-ov;341 
When the poet reproduces these states of grief and pain, he nourishes this base 
element of the soul and, like the painter, produces things that are "in a poor 
relation to the truth". In this way he contributes to the corruption of the rational 
element (10.605a8-c4). This suggests that emotions are considered base mainly 
"Are reason and established customs the things that encourage him to resist, while what drags 
him back to his grief is his misfortune itself? [... ] And when a human being has opposing impulses, 
relating to the same at the same time, we say these must necessarily be two different elements." 
(10.604al0-b4). 
341 "Whereas the element which draws us towards mourning and the recollection of our sufferings, 
which can never get its f i l l of these things -won't we describe this as irrational, lazy and a friend of 
cowardice?" (10.604d8-10). 
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because of their harmful epistemological consequences on reason's capacity to 
calculate, reason and know the truth. 3 4 2 
In his nourishment of this ignoble part of the soul through the representation of 
sorrows and lamentations, the poet also gives pleasure to and satisfies this aspect 
of us, instead of starving it according to reason's advice: 
ei ev8v|j,oio oxi xo pia Kaxex6|ievov xoxe E V xaic; O ' I K E ' U X K ; 
ai)|i<j)opai(; Kai J U E T C E I V T I K O Q X O - U SaKp-uaai X E Kai d7co8i)paa6ai 
iKavcoQ Kai anorikr\oQr\v(xi, fyvcei 6v xoiomov oiov xovxcov EmBuiiEiv 
[•••]-343 
Something similar happens in the case of comedy (10.606c2-9). In a more general 
sense the imitative poet works on sexual appetites, passions, pains, pleasures and 
also anger -which is proper to the 'spirited' part- and in this way destroys what is 
the best in us: 
Kai rcepi d(j)po5iGicDv br\ Kai G D J I O - U Kai rcepi raxvxcov x63v 
E7ti6i)|j,T|xiKa)v X E Kai XmripcDV Kai T | 5 E C O V ev xfj v|/i)xfi, d df\ (|)ajiev 
jcdari Tipd^ei ruaiv erceaGai, oxi xoia-oxa f\[Laq TJ J C O I T I X I K T I (i.i(j.r|ai(; 
3 4 2 That is why in the earlier education the promotion of strong emotions through aritistic education is 
rejected. See for example, the rejection of the harmonies that reproduce patterns of feelings like 
mourning and lamentations (3.398dll ff.) and the dismissal of laughter as "a violent agent of change" 
(3.388d5-389bl). They ruin the rational part in two ways: a) because they put the soul in contact with 
the bodily and so help to nourish the appetitive part of the soul and make this current stronger; b) 
because they separate the soul from the unchangeable, which is the kind of realm akin to the rational 
part. 
3 4 3 "Think about it. Here we have this element which in one situation -in our private misfortunes- is 
forcibly held in check, though it has this hunger which can only be satisfied by weeping and 
wholesale lamentation, since these are the satisfactions this kind of thing by its nature desires." 
(10.606a3-7). 
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epyd^exar xpe(j)£i yap vxvxa dpSovaa, 8eov av%[xeiv, Kai dpxovxa 
t||iiv KaGiaxriatv Seov dpxeoGai ai)xd iva fiekxiovc, xe Kai 
ei)5ai|ioveaxepoi dvxi %eipov(ov Kai dGAxcoxepoov yiyvdi^EQa.344 
So xcov ())a\)X.cov xi ev ti(j.iv denotes aspects of the human soul and the human 
experience in the world as these affect and are capable of distorting reason. The 
coincidences of characteristics of this "base" element in us with characteristics of 
the appetitive part (see in this section 2.-6. above) is now understandable, insofar 
as the appetitive aspect is itself part of the "the ignoble in us". But "what is 
ignoble in us" also includes, as seen above, other affections and experiences -such 
as distorted perceptions and overdeveloped emotions- insofar as they also 
contribute to our judging reality according to the appearances and not according to 
what really is. 3 4 5 This interpretation of XCDV (jraiAcov xi ev r|(ilv also fits very 
well with the general aim of the whole section 10.595c6-608bl0, of showing that 
imitative poetry has to be rejected,346 insofar as it has an unhealthy effect on the 
3 4 4 "Doesn't it apply also to sex, anger, and all the desires, pains an pleasures in the soul which we 
say accompany any of our actions? Isn't the effect of poetic imitation on us the same? It feeds and 
waters these things, when they ought by rights to wither away. And it makes them our rulers, 
though if we want to be better and happier rather than worse and more wretched, they ought to be 
ruled by us" (10.606dl-7) (Griffith's translation slightly modified: I add "in the soul" = ev xf j 
3 4 5 Similarly Burnyeat (1976), pp. 34-35 says: "...Plato's view in Book 10 is that we can be set 
against ourselves in innumerable ways (603d), and in making his divisions he is clearly less 
interested in the precise identity of these various opponents of reason than in describing the 
disturbances they create in the soul. So it is probably a mistake to try to fit them or perception in 
particular into the earlier scheme of the soul". 
3 4 6 The problematic character of Book 10 has usually been pointed out. One of the most important 
problems is that poetry is mainly understood as imitation and that all imitation is treated as bad (see 
Murphy (1951), p. 224; Annas (1981), pp. 336 ff.). This disagrees with what is said in Books 2 and 
3 in relation to the use of poetry for the education of the young guardians and especially with the 
admission of certain kinds of imitation (394a). Tate's understanding of and solution to this problem 
-namely, that uiur|CTi<; can be good or bad; good imitation is accepted in the earlier education of 
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soul of its recipient, especially by encouraging misunderstanding in his soul and, 
above all, corrupting reason.347 This misunderstanding is created by the imitator 
through encouraging the wrong emotions, deceptive perceptions, appetites, etc. 
and thus nourishing his soul and the audience's soul with appearances 
(<t>ouv6|i£va, 10.596e4; (|)avxda|a.ata, 10.598b3-5), mere fakes (£I8CDX.CX, 
10.598b8; 10.599a7), simulacra of excellence (the term is ei8cotax dpexTiQ, 
10.600e5), something that is like the real but not real itself (diov TO 6v, 6v 8e 
oi>, 10.597a5), insofar as the imitator produces things three grades removed from 
reality,3 4 8 the imitator being three grades removed from the truth (10.599a2ff.) and 
having neither knowledge nor right beliefs (10.602a3-6).349 Besides this, according 
to the interpretation that I propose, a better connection between Book 10 and Book 
9 is possible, insofar as the attachment to appearances of Book 10 promoted by 
the guardians; bad education is condemned in Book 10- has been accepted by several scholars 
during the last century, although some, like Grube, Shorey and Nehamas, have disagreed (for a 
good summary of the status quaestionis and secondary literature's references see Nehamas (1982), 
p. 49 and esp. pp. 70-71 nn. 5-6). On how the good kind of uiixr)ffi<; has to presuppose knowledge 
of the truth by the poet see Rowe (1997), pp. 443-447. Discussion of this problem leads to a 
discussion of the meaning of u'l|JT|CHq in Plato's times and specifically in Republic 10 (see 
Murphy (1951), pp. 230-231; Nehamas (1982), pp. 56 f t ; Rowe (1997) p. 440). 
3 4 7 This is suggested in the two claims in which Book 10 opens: that, using previous analysis of the 
soul into 'parts' or 'aspects' it becomes now clearer why the mimetic art has to be rejected 
(10.595a5-bl); and that mimetic poetry is dangerous especially for the mind (Sidvoux) of those 
who hear it without the antidote of knowing the true nature of things (10.595b3-7). 
3 4 8 The metaphysical degradation of the product of the imitator is established through the 
comparison of all kinds of imitative poetry with painting, in which the metaphysics of the Forms is 
taken for granted. 
3 4 9 This is established through the argument of the user of an object as the best knower of it 
(10.601c-602b). For an analysis of the problems of the two first arguments of Republic 10 
(10.591c-601b; 10.601c-602b) see Annas (1981), pp. 336 f t and especially Janaway (1995), pp. 
133-142. Janaway highlights the point that the reflections in Book 10 about other craftmen like 
cobblers, shoemakers -and also about an hypothetical ideal craftman of the universe- are aimed at 
indicating that poets like Homer and also the audience that approves and celebrates them lack 
knowledge in the terms in which it has clearly been defined in the previous books of the Republic. 
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mimetic poetry is similar to -but shown as even worse than- the connection that 
the bodily pleasures (9.585dl-4) make with "what is never the same and mortal" 
(9.585c3-5) and with what has "a smaller share of both truth and of the being" 
(9.585d7-9), these pleasures being "not true or pure but a kind of shadow-picture 
(eaKiaypa(|)Ti[ievTi)" (9.583b5).350 
3.4. The XoyicixiKOV's performance in relation to each part of the soul 
The way in which the rational part operates in relation to each part according to its 
knowledge and desire for the real good, when it rules the soul, can be described as 
follows. 
3.4.1.The rational part's performance in relation to its own aims 
In the case of its own aims, when the A-oyicrxiKOV rules the soul (9.586d4-
587al), it looks for the truth (both the earlier and especially the higher education 
in mathematics and dialectic can be understood as belonging to this process of 
searching for the truth). Insofar as true and ful l knowledge consists in the 
knowledge of the Form of the Good, which comprehends the individual (as well 
as the social) good, its desire for the truth includes the desire for the good of the 
soul as a whole and also of each part:351 
3 5 0 This intepretation answers objections like the one made by Annas to the argument at Rep. 
10.602-605c (1981), p. 338: "How can the strength and importunate nature of one's desires have 
anything to do with one's being taken in by optical illusions?" 
3 5 1 The government of the XoyicrxtKOV implies, as Cooper (1999), p. 193 suggests, that the 
rational part desires "by appeal to its own principles [which are got from the knowledge of the 
Form of the Good] what things are good and how good they are". 
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...e%ov ax> KOtKeivo e juax fpr iv ev amcp xfjv xau cru|j.(|)epovxo<; eicaaxcp 
xe K a i 6Xcp xcp KOIVCO c$a>v a-bxcov xpicov ovxoov.352 
This leadership of the A,OYICTXIK6V over the soul (or society) allows each part to 
achieve its aims (in the case of the soul, its own pleasures) as far as possible. In 
the ideal state the just ruler would similarly have knowledge of what is 
advantageous for the city as a whole and for each part of society (4.428cll-4), i.e. 
would know what the common good is, what is good for each human being but 
undestood from a social perspective.353 As a dialectician, the philosopher 
possesses such a comprehension of individual and common good (i.e. of what 
Plato calls 'justice') in the light of the Good, which is discussed later in Books 6 
and 7. For this reason knowledge of the Good is the maximum good attainable to 
him; however, we must at the same time remember that knowledge of the Good is 
inferior to the Good itself. 3 5 4 This knowledge of the good -and with it the 
achievement of the real good that we all desire- requires the person already to be 
just, i.e. to have his soul ruled by the rational part. However, at the same time 3 5 5 a 
3 5 2 "...by its [i.e. the rational part's] possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is 
beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three." (4.442c6-8). (I 
follow Shorey's translation here. Henceforth I will continue by following Griffith's translation.) 
3 5 3 This knowledge of the philosopher in relation to the common good also implies the acceptance 
of the responsibility of &p%eiv and in this sense desire for ruling (but reluctantly 7.519d4-7 ff.). 
See n. 356 below. 
3 5 4 According to the analysis of pleasure in Book 9 the knowledge of the truth (we must think in 
any of its forms (9.585b9-c5) but especially in its maximum form, the knowledge of the Good) is 
the good for us because it is also the most authentic pleasure that we can obtain. In this section of 
Book 9 knowledge is not considered as being different from pleasure (which is the common point 
of view and the one that appears in the Gorgias or at 6.505b) but as the highest form of it. 
3 5 5 Here there is a paradox because, on the one hand, the knowledge of the truth and the good 
includes the knowledge that the rational part has to rule but, on the other hand, the achievement of 
this knowledge requires the rational part to be already ruling that life. This paradox can be 
understood in the following way: through education (an education such as the one described in the 
ideal city of the Republic) the individual has gradually learned to be governed by this part and at a 
197 
desire of the rational part for otpxeiv 3 5 6 seems to emerge from this knowledge and 
desire for the real good, insofar as the XoyioxiKOV knows that the rational part, 
being the only one that knows what is the good for each part and the whole, has to 
&PX£t.v over the other parts (4.441 e4). The agreement of the three parts over the 
rule of the A-oyiaxncov is called "moderation" (aco(|)poai)VT|) (4.442cl0-d3). 
3.4.2. The rational part's performance in relation to the appetitive part 
In relation to the 67ii8\)|i.T|XiK6v, as we have also seen above in the deduction of 
the parts of the soul in Section I, pp.17-18 in relation to the example of the man 
who wants and does not want to drink, the A-oyiaxiKOV can have forms of desire 
that restrict and master (Kpctxeiv) positive inclinations of the £7u8"0|j.r|XiK6v 
according to rational calculations ( E K A.oyiaiiO 'u). 3 5 7 Insofar as the 
certain point (when he knows the Good) is definitely governed by it and knows that the good for 
him and any individual is to be governed by this rational aspect. 
3 5 6 For a similar interpretation see Kahn (1987). This is slightly different from what Cooper (1999), 
p.192 proposes, insofar as he considers the desire for &p%Eiv to be a different desire from the 
desire for the truth. But the basic impulse of reason seems always to be the desire to know the truth 
and the real good and the desire to rule (ap%eiv) emerges just as a consequence of the 
understanding that it is good that rationality 'rules'. This is clearer in the case of the philosopher-
king and his 'desire' to rule the city. In fact, he can even feel certain reluctance to rule insofar as 
this government interferes with his enjoyment of looking for the truth in speculative terms. In fact 
the rulers of the ideal city must be lovers of truth but not lovers of rule (see 7.521b). However he 
desires to rule because he realizes that it is the better thing to do. On the other hand, the desire to 
rule does not belong exclusively to the rational part: the other parts also want to rule the soul in 
order to attain the objects of their desires. But while the work of ruling is proper to the rational 
part, the control of the soul is not essentially a task for the other two parts (because by definition 
they do not possess the knowledge to do it, although the 'spirited' part can be an 'auxiliary' for 
reason's government). See 4.442a4-5; b5-9; c5-8,444d8-e5. 
3 5 7 XoyiffxiKOV is one of Plato's many synonyms for the intellectual principle. See 4.441c, 
9.571c4, 9.587dll, 10.605b4-5. It emphazises the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed 
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e7ii8\)|i.T|XiK6v -even when it is restricted, through an appropriate training, to the 
necessary desires- looks for its objects independently of their specific qualities and 
especially independently of their goodness or badness (as I have attempted to 
demonstrate above),358 we must suppose that the restrictions of the A,oyicxxiic6v 
come from its knowledge of what is good and bad.3 5 9 So the 'pulling' is between 
two different sources of motivation: reason's desire for the real good and the 
appetites of the e7Ci8D(j.T|XiK6v, whose triumph over the soul would produce a 
false conception of the good in the rational part. I f the Xoyiaxucov is completely 
corrupted by the lawless desires of the £7Ei0D|j.r|XiK6v (as in the case of the 
tyranny), it is unable to recognize that some impulsions of the £7t;i9'U|J,r|XiK6v are 
bad. In this case there is likely to be no conflict between the appetites and the 
desire for the truth and the real good of the A.oyiaxiK6v, insofar as reason is 
already dominated by the appetites and in its proper function deteriorated.360 
3.4.3. The rational part's performance in relation to the 'spirited' part 
In relation to the rational part, as we have seen before, the 0D|j.oei8eQ is bivalent 
and can either follow rational advice or go against it (raxpd X,oyiC7|i6v, 4.440bl). 
When the A-oyicmicov governs the soul, reason's role in relation to the 'spirited' 
to blind passion" (Shorey (1946) [1930], vol. I , p. 397). In relation to the government of the 
AoyicxiKOV over the eJU0"Uurp:iK6v with the help of the 6"U|ioei8e<;, see n. 349 ad finem. 
3 5 8 See above Chapter 2, Section 1,1.1. The deduction of the eJti8v(ir|TiK6v and the 
X O Y I C T T I K 6 V from..., pp. 109ff.. 
3 5 9 As I have argued before, knowledge of the individual good is part of the knowledge of the Form 
of the Good (as Cooper says (see nn. 347 and 350), which is the truth looked for by the 
dialectician. So it is not 'other' than the desire for the truth as he says on p. 192. On how the 
Aoyicmicov operates in relation to the emGuuTruKOV in the just (wise) man see 9.591cl-e5. 
3 6 0 ...doq arco mxaj]c, XeXv[ikvov xe iced ctJttiA.Xayia.evov a'io"x^VTll5 K a * §povr\a£(Qq. 
(9.571c8-9). 
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part is to advise, to convince i t 3 6 1 to gain it as a natural ally 3 6 2 on its side. When 
the "koyioziKbv gains the GuiioeiSEQ as -i.e. persuades it to be- its ally, i.e. 
when the 'spirited' part has gone through a right process of habituation and, at the 
same time, reason has acquired right beliefs, the blockade of the desires of the 
£7r,i0U|ir|TiK6v that are not licit occurs by the combination of the rational counsel 
of the A-OYidtiKOV with the execution of these recommended actions by the 
0U|ioei8e<; (4.442b5-9). In other words the A-oyicrciKOV seems to provide the 
right beliefs about what is to be feared and dared, while the 0D|j.oei8eQ is 
habituated to directing its aggressiveness in the right way. In this sense reason 
guides the 'spirited' part towards the real good, insofar as the 0Dfj.oei8££' 
impulse and assertiveness towards victory contributes to the keeping of the right 
beliefs in the midst of pains and pleasures.364 Again, the understanding of what is 
honourable and what is not -i.e. the right beliefs about this- is provided by the 
XoyicraKOV. The Gv i^oeiSei; orients its assertiveness in that direction.365 
3 6 1 On ei>Pcn>?aa as a form of £.%iazf\\ir\ see 4.428b6. 
3 6 2
 . . . 0 " U | X | K X % E I TC3 8oKOwn Succdcp... (4.440c8). 
3 6 3 ...ccbro [i.e. TO 8vuoei8e<;] ev xf j zf\c, yv%r\c, ax&aei xiGeaQai id bnXa npoq TO 
XOYICTXIK6V. (4.440e5-6). 
3 6 4 This is what is called cxvope'ux at 4.442bll-c3. Terms like 'counsel' and 'persuasion' as 
regards the actions of the X O Y I O T I K O U in relation to the BuuoeiSeq seem to suggest some 
rationality in the 8vuoei5e<;. But this can be simply understood in the sense that the rational part 
provides right beliefs about what is honourable and worth fighting for. In this way the 
XoyioziKbv gives rise to the aggressiveness proper to the 'spirited' part. 
3 6 5 See for example 9.592a ff. on the guiding principle supplied by the rational part in order to 
direct properly the love of honour of the 'spirited' part. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Thus, i f we go back again the 'hydraulic image of the soul', we can see that, i f the 
Xoyt-CXiKOV, though the smallest part of us (4.428e7), has its desire for the truth 
and the real good increased through the right kind of education (4.431a3-c7), it 
governs one's life -as in the case of the lover of wisdom- and draws the stream of 
desires in that direction. 
cp 5fi npdc, xd n a G f p a x a K a i Jidv xo xoiouxov eppufiKaaiv, 7tepi xfiv 
xr\q \\fv%r\c, d i | i a i f|8ovT)v aircfji; Ka8 ' ax>xr\v eiev dv, xdc, 8e 8 i d xov 
ac6|xaxoq 8KX,emoiev, e i |1T) 7ce7iX.aa|ievcoQ aXX' d^T)6co<; tyikbcofybc, nq 
e \T i . 3 6 6 
So the possibility of not only desiring the good -which is common to all human 
beings- but also attaining what is really good -for which it is necessary to know 
what is really good- lies in the right development of the A-oyicixiKOV and its 
desire for the truth accompanied by an appropriate habituation of the desires of the 
other two parts. This development of reason is possible through the programme of 
education of the ideal city. In the earlier education reason incorporates right 
beliefs and appropriate harmonies in order to promote its love of wisdom and 
recognition of what is good and beautiful. At the same time, the desire for victory 
and honour of the 0D|iO£i8e<; is developed through physical training and trained 
through habituation in order to attack and defend in the correct way so that the 
'spirited' part becomes a helper of reason, one that can be easily 'convinced' to 
follow and execute reason's prescriptions and calculations. Simultaneously, the 
desires of the e7ci0\)|ir|XiK6v are also restricted through reproduction and 
3 "In someone whose stream flows in the direction of learning and everything like it, I imagine the 
desires will be concerned with the pleasure of the mind alone, just by itself. They will give up the 
pleasures arising out of the body. That's assuming the person is a true philosopher, a genuine lover 
of wisdom, not a pretend lover." (6.485dl0-el). 
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imitation of the kinds of behaviour belonging to self-control over the appetites and 
through a diet and use of material facilities that are reduced to cover the essential 
needs. In the higher programme of studies of mathematics and dialectic for the 
best of the guardians the desire for the truth is fully developed367 insofar as the 
dialectician tries to achieve knowledge of what is really good and bad -which has 
its highest expression in the Good. This provides a reflective understanding of the 
right beliefs acquired in earlier childhood and comprises the knowledge of the 
good of the individual and of the good of society from the perspective of the good 
of reality as a whole. In the next section I offer a more detailed description of the 
epistemological condition of the lover of wisdom (mainly according to Book 5) 
and of the kind of education that he has to receive in order to develop his love for 
the truth (mainly according to Books 2, 3, 6 and 7). In the final section of this 
chapter I take the eschatological myth of Book 10 as an evaluation in a 
cosmological context of how much we have developed the desire that constitutes 




Section III: Education for being a lover of wisdom 
Introduction 
According to what we have already seen above, the three parts of the soul and their 
proper desires can be developed or enfeebled (and even inhibited) through education. 
The development, inhibition or enfeeblement that results from education is described 
in Book 9 through images such as feeding/starving, fortifying/weakening, 
cultivating/not cultivating, taming/releasing in relation to how the just man as well as 
the unjust man treat their three parts (9.588e-589a; 9.589b; 9.589e-590a; 9.591b). 
Education determines which part and desire or desires -the love of wisdom of the 
rational part, the desire for victory and honour of the 'spirited' part or the appetites of 
the e7Ci8\)(J.T|i;iK6v- play the leading part in the life of the person. The 'spirited' 
part's desire for victory finally either makes reason's 'current' stronger, or 
contributes the strengthening of the 'stream' of the appetites, the 9u|J.O£i5e<;' 
situation being as follows: either it is trained to fight on reason's side and, in this 
way, fortifies reason's 'current' of desire for the truth and the real good. Or, i f the 
'spirited' part is developed but not trained to help reason, the 8v|j.O£i8£<; has just a 
precarious leadership within the soul because the appetites secretly evolve without 
limit, so that the appetites' 'current' finally weakens the 'spirited' part and reason 
and drags the soul in their direction. In this way the final result of the education of 
the leading desires of each part of the soul is that one of the two main 'currents' of 
desire is stronger: either reason's 'stream' towards the truth and the real good with 
the 'spirited' part's support or the appetites' 'current' towards the bodily pleasures 
and the changeable. Consequently, so long as education for being a lover of wisdom 
aims at making reason's 'current' as powerful as possible within the soul, it requires 
not only a specific nourishment of the A-oyicrciKOV itself but also the appropriate 
training of the constitutive desires of the other two parts. Only i f our fundamental 
sources of motivation for action (which are represented by the proper desires of the 
three parts of the soul) have been appropriately trained through a right education 
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from the very beginning of our lives, is a further development of the rational part 
through mathematics and dialectic possible, so that the 'current' of the desire for the 
truth and the real good, which constitutes our essence as human beings, not only 
dominates but gains its highest degree of strength. In this way, in agreement with the 
Socrates of the early dialogues, in the Republic a fu l l unfolding of ourselves as 
human beings requires an entire development of our intellectual capacities; but now 
this is possible only i f an appropriate configuration of the desires has already been 
acquired. I would like to summarize now some previous points especially with 
respect to the earlier education of the three parts, and then to refer more specifically 
to the earlier and higher education of the rational part and to the characteristics of the 
lover of wisdom. 
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1. Primary education 
Configuration of desires in early childhood for the leadership of love of wisdom. 
The development of the love of wisdom for recognizing the beautiful and the 
good368 
1.1. The specific training of the irrational parts 
The desires of the irrational parts -the eiii9\)|j.r|TiK6v and the 0u|i,oei5£<;- are 
educated mainly through habituation so that some inclinations are stimulated and 
others are atrophied or inhibited. The appetites for food and drink, for example, are 
trained to keep within appropriate limits through a correct diet (3.403e; 3.404b-e; 
8.559a-c) and similarly the appetite for wealth receives minimum stimulation as a 
result of a life with a small amount of material equipment (3.415e-416d). In the same 
way, 'spiritedness' itself is developed through activities like physical training, 
hunting (3.410b; 3.411d-e; 8.549a), familiarity with the field of battle (7.537a; 
8.547d-548a), and is orientated through habituation to resist and 'struggle' against 
the 'pull ' of the appetites (3.413c; 4.442b-c), fight only against the enemies of the 
city (2.375b-c; 6.503a) and, in the case of the philosopher-rulers, keep going in the 
difficult studies of mathematics and dialectic in spite of adversity (7.535a-d). In this 
way, on the one hand only the necessary appetites are developed, so that their 
unavoidable, powerful 'stream' towards the changeable and the bodily pleasures is 
limited and reduced as much as possible. On the other hand, the 'spirited' element is 
developed but at the same time trained to struggle on reason's side, so that the 
0U(iO£i8£Q makes reason's 'current' stronger. 
3 The earlier education of Books 2 and 3 deals with several aspects of the soul -for example, 
emotions such as grief and laughter- and not only with the three parts of soul, which are 
distinguished from the point of view of desire in Book 4. In the next sections the focus is mainly on 
how this earlier education determines the development of the desires that are proper to each of the 
three parts. Information about what encourages and what inhibits the development of the parts can 
also be gained from other books of the Republic. 
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1.2. Education of the Dove of wisdom through LVcruavKT): acquisition of 
familiarity with the beautiful and the good 
1.2.1. Words, ways, attunements and rhythms of the right musical education. 
Habituation of the irrational parts through the reproduction of appropriate 
examples and patterns 
The love of wisdom, which is the proper desire of the rational part, only develops if 
there is musical education. Otherwise, without musical education, even if this desire 
exists within the person, it may not wake up at all (3.411d): 
x i 8e ercevSdv &XA.O LIT|5EV itpdcTTT] iir|8e Kovvcovfj MOV)CTT|<; LXTJSCXLXTI; o i )K 
EV TV iced evfjv CLVXOX) <t>vA.oLia0£<; EV xr\ y v x f j , OCT£ OVXE |ia9fi|iaTO<; 
yevoLievov cbSevoQ OVXE ^T|TT]LI(XTOQ, ovie Xbyov LVETVCTXPV OVXE xriq, 
dXA,t|<; LiouavKfiQ, daGevec; T E iced K C D ^ V KCXV xv>§Xbv yvyvETav, dT£ o i )K 
£yevp6|X£vov ox>de TPE(()6LIEVOV O\)8E 8vaKa6avpo|i£V(ov TCOV dvaGTiaEcov 
ai)TO-o; 3 6 9 
So the purpose of jJ.ot)C>VKf| -which is subdivided into words ( d X.EKTEOV, 392c7; b 
Xoyoq, 400d4), the way in which the words are said (COQ X E K T E O V 392C8; TpOJiOQ 
xr\c, XE^ECoq, 400d6), attunements and rhythms (dpLXovvotQ Kav pViBLiov) 398d2)-
is primarily to educate the love of wisdom of the rational aspect of us and to produce 
a person with a good character and mind (400e). However, musical education also 
has an indirect effect on the habituation of the other two parts. 
"But suppose that is all he does. Suppose he has no contact with the Muse. Even if he did have 
some love of learning in his soul, it gets no taste of learning and enquiry, and has no experience of 
rational argument or any artistic pursuit. As a result, since it never wakes up and has nothing to 
feed on, and since there is nothing to purify its senses, it becomes weak, and deaf, and blind, 
doesn't it?" (411c9-d5). 
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a) & X.EKXEOV 
The contents of the stories that the young guardians listen to are selected in order to 
provide reason with right and true beliefs.3 7 0 Some beliefs fundamental for the future 
development of the rational part itself are provided. For example, the future 
guardians should ideally listen only to beautiful, true stories, which describe the 
divine as it really is. 3 7 1 The stories also have to provide examples of self-control and 
bravery (3.386a-387b; 3.390a-c; 3.395b-c; 3.390d-391c). In this way the young 
guardians also acquire right beliefs related to the appropriate management of 
appetites, the 'spirited' part and emotions. For example, they wil l learn that it is good 
not to eat and drink too much, not to give oneself up to lust and sexual pleasures, not 
to be mean.372 However, insofar as the examples given in the stories show the three 
parts already interacting, there is a simultaneous training of the irrational parts in 
right habits when the guardians reproduce these examples in their lives. So this part 
of the process of education can be described as an habituation of the young 
guardians' irrational parts through the reproduction of right examples in their lives 
accompanied with a simultaneous imprinting within their souls of Xoyoi that support 
these habituations. Not only the stories but also what the young guardians see and 
hear around them every day wil l determine how the different aspects of the soul are 
trained. According to this we must suppose that the young guardians are to be 
surrounded by adults who manage their souls wisely and so give the young guardians 
right examples to imitate,3 7 3 as is suggested at 9.590e-591a: 
3 7 0 In relation to the need for instructing the young guardians only in the truth see 2.376e-377b; 
2.378e; 3.391d-e). What the young guardians have learnt is called 56^a dtX.T|0fi? at 413a. 
3 7 1 The true characteristics of the divine are: a) the god (b 9e6q), being good, is only responsible 
for good (380 c8, dl); b) the god "is single in form and true, both in what he does and what he 
says" and he does not change himself or deceive (382e8-ll). 
3 7 2 Avoidance of overdeveloped emotions such as grief and laughter, which also interfere with 
reason's proper work, is also taught through the kind of stories that are chosen (3.387c-388d; 
388d-389a). 
3 7 3 In this concept of education the influence of society and culture on the development of the 
individual is fundamental. On this point see Lear (1992), pp. 186-190. He also explains the inverse 
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...TO (if) edv [i.e. nc&dac,] eXevQkpovc, e i v a i , eax; dv ev a-bxoi<; obcraep ev 
KOXEI TtoXixeiav Kaxaaxfiaco|a.ev, K a i to PeA.xio~xov GeparcevaavxeQ xq3 
nap rifj.1v xoiovxop dvxiKaxaGxf)cxa>|j.ev tybfaxKa 6|ioiov K a i dp%ovxa ev 
ainco, K a i x6xe br\ eX.e'OGepov d(|>ie|A.ev.374 
The idea that a second nature is created within the person through the examples that 
the individual witnesses and imitates is clearly expressed at 3.395dl-3 in relation to 
the imitative art but also to imitation in general: 
f] oi)K f)a8r|aai oxi d i fii(ifiaeiq, edv £K vecov 7i6ppoo 8iaxe^eacoaiv, e'i£ 
e0T] xe K a i (|)-6aiv K a G i a x a v x a i K a i K a x d aco(j.a K a i <))0jvd<; K a i K a x d 
xfiv S idvo iav; 3 7 5 
In fact one of the grounds for the strong distrust of imitative art as a "way" -d)Q (see 
below b), i))- of telling any story is that right actions as well as wrong actions are 
equally performed. In this way the future guardians either as poets and/or actors or as 
the audience of these performers may acquire inappropriate character traits. 
process: how culture is formed through the kinds of individuals who constitute the society (pp. 190 
ff.). 
3 7 4 "We don't allow them [i.e. the young guardians] to be free until we have established a regime in 
them, as in a city. We use the best element in us to care for the best element in the child, and we 
give him a guardian and ruler similar to our own. Only then do we give him his freedom."(9.590el-
591a3). 
3 7 5 "Or have you never noticed how imitation, if long continued from an early age, turns into habits 
and nature -of body, speech and mind?" (Griffith's translation slightly modified: <)>\)CTi(; = "nature" 
instead of "dispositions"; I add "or" = fp. 
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b) COQ X E K T E O V 
As for "how" the stories are told, |0.o\)aiKfi is again mainly directed towards the 
development of the love of wisdom of the rational part. However, the development of 
the rational part also includes consideration of how the ways of telling a story can 
promote or fail to promote emotions, appetites and other aspects of the soul that 
normally enfeeble reason. When the imitator 'copies' these experiences, these images 
weaken reason even more because of their inferior metaphysical level, as is argued 
especially in Book 10. Because of imitation's bad effects on reason, narration is 
preferred as the way of telling a story. The reason for rejecting the imitative art and 
for keeping narration can be summarized as follows: i) imitative art promotes 
diversity, which is considered dangerous because it is against the principle of 
specialization (3.394d). In other words, as imitation is normally of diverse things, the 
imitator and, as a consequence, his audience -the young guardians- may reproduce 
inappropriate patterns in their lives and acquire undesirable, vicious habits (3.396a). 
However, according to this principle imitation of the best characters -"people who 
are brave, self-disciplined, god-fearing, free" (3.395c; see also 3.396c-d)- is admitted 
(preferably mixed with narration). Differently from the imitative art, narration avoids 
the actual performance of behaviour that can be wrong or just unsuitable for the 
guardians -narrations may just tell about but not 'act out' these inappropriate actions-
and, in this way, preserves both the poet and his audience, ii) Besides this, as we have 
seen, in Book 10 a standard imitator (i.e. one who is not a philosopher) has neither 
knowledge nor, even, correct opinion (10.601e-602a) and, for this reason, he 
produces third grade versions of reality (10.598e-599a), so that he nourishes the 
rational part with fakes and appearances (10.596e; 10.597a; 10.598b; 10.599b; 
10.600e), and not with the truth. In fact imitation connects the souls of the audience 
with copies of what is base in the soul (such as deceptive perceptions (10.602c), 
overdeveloped emotions (10.606a-c) and appetites (10.606d)), so that the rational 
part in its proper function of calculating, arguing and measuring is enfeebled. For this 
reason only poetry that celebrates the gods and good men (10.607a) and so produces 
"images of true virtue" (10.606e) is admitted. In this case the real poet apparently 
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would need to be also a philosopher and know the Good in order to produce 
exclusively the right kinds of imitations.376 
c) &p|i.ovica iced p\)0|ioi 
The kind of attunements and rhythms that are used (3.398e-399a) also have an 
important role in the education of the love of wisdom in the direction of what is good 
and beautiful. In fact, it is even claimed that they can have a stronger effect on the 
soul than the rest of IIODCIKT], insofar as the harmony that this education brings with 
it (when it is the appropriate one) creates a natural familiarity with the beautiful and 
the good and a spontaneous rejection of the bad and ugly, although a reflective 
comprehension of what has been learnt is not yet possible: 
dp' o-0v...xo\)xcov eveica Kupicoxdxri ev ixoDCiKfj xpo<fyr\, bxi ndXiaxa 
KaxaSuexai eic, xo evxoq xfjq \\fx>xr\c, 6 xe pu0|j.d<; K a i dp|iovia, Kai 
eppcDp.£vec?xaxa arcxexai ccbxfjQ (|)epovxa xf|V ei>axr||aocr\>vr|v, Kai rcoiet 
eixjxfpova, edv xiq 6p9o3<; xpatyry, ei 8e \if\, xcbvavxiov; Kai oxi av XCDV 
TcapaX,ei7to(ievcDV Kai (if] KaXcoQ STpicrupyriGevxcov f| |a,f| KaXoo<; <t>\)vxcov 
b^vxax dv aiaBdvoixo b eKei xpa<|)eiQ coq e8ei, Kai 6p9o3i; 8f| 
5-oaxepaivcov xd p.ev KaXd ercaivbi Kai xaipcov Kai Kaxa8ex6|aevcx; Eiq 
xf\v vi/v%f|v xpefyoix dv an a-bxcov Kai Yvyvovto KaXoQ xe KdyaGoq, xd 8' 
aiaxpd \|/eyoi x dv bpQa>q Kai [iiooi exi veoq d>v, rcpiv A,6yov SuvaxoQ 
eivai taxpeiv, kXQbvxoq 8e xox> Xbyov dcrad^oix' dv abxov yvcopi^ cov 8i 
diKei6xT|xa [i&Xiaxa b o\)xa> xpa(hei<;;377 
3 7 6 On this point see Rowe (1997), pp. 443-447. 
3 7 7 "Aren't these two reasons [... ] why musical and poetic education is so important? Firstly 
because rhythm and mode penetrate more deeply into the inner soul than anything else does; they 
have the most powerful effect on it, since they bring gracefulness with them. They make a person 
graceful, if he is rightly brought up, and the opposite, if he is not. And secondly because anyone 
with the right kind of education in this area will have the clearest perception of things that are 
unsatisfactory -things that are badly made or naturally defective. Being quite rightly disgusted with 
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The selection of the musical modes and rhythms presupposes that there is a 
correspondence between the structure of certain states of the soul and the modes and 
rhythms.378 For this reason only the Dorian and Phrygian modes (3.399c) are kept 
because they "best imitate the voices of the prudent and of the brave in failure and 
success", either in times of adversity (Dorian mode) or in the periods of peace 
(Phrygian mode). The Ionian, Lydian and Mixolydian modes are rejected (3.398d-
399c) because their harmonies reproduce patterns of emotional states like mourning 
and lamentations and luxury and laziness (3.398d-399c), i.e. feelings that, when 
overdeveloped, block and even destroy the proper use of reason. According to this 
same criterion some instruments are discarded (the reed-pipe, i.e. the instrument of 
Marsyas) because they can play many modes and are too luxurious (3.399e). Only the 
lyre and the cithara -instruments of Apollo- are kept because their musical simplicity 
does not stimulate base elements. Similarly only rhythms that develop refinement are 
approved, while the rhythms that promote meanness of spirit, arrogance and madness 
are eliminated (3.400a-d) so that the right fJiou pi)0|J.oi -the rhythms of a self-
disciplined and courageous (KOGJJIOQ KOCI dvSpeioq) person- are admitted. 
1.2.2. Avoidance of diversity and contact with unchangeableness 
The avoidance of diversity (JioiKiAAct), which is present in the rejection of imitation, 
and the preference for modes (3.397b-c) and rhythms with slight variations (3.397b-
c; 3.399e) and for instruments that play few modes (like the lyre and the cithara 
3.399e) is related not only to the principle of specialization (the guardians have to be 
guardians and nothing else, the traders traders and so on), which has an essential role 
them, he will praise what is beautiful and fine. Delighting in it and receiving it in his soul, he will 
feed on it and so become noble and good. What is ugly he (i.e. the young guardian) will rightly 
condemn and hate, even before he is old enough for rational thought. And when rationality does 
make its appearance, won't the person who has been brought up in this way recognise it because of 
its familiarity, and be particularly delighted with it?" (3.401d5-402a4). See also 4.424c. 
3 7 8 For Plato there is "a real connexion between modes of music and modes of feeling" (Shorey, 
(1946) [1930], vol. 1, p. 398, n.b). In fact, his argument supposes that feelings and musical modes 
and rhythms can have a similar structure. 
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in the argument of Books 2, 3 and 4. The rejection of diversity and the preference for 
simplicity also seems to imply the idea that uniformity helps the soul to connect with 
the unchangeable (which is related to what is true) while diversity puts the soul in 
contact with the changeable (which stimulates the base elements in us and is related 
to appearances and falsehood). Musical diversity encourages diversity in the soul and 
this is not suitable especially for an appropriate development of the rational part.379 
But the need to connect the soul only with the unchangeable -as far as possible- and 
not with the changeable can be made explicit only when the major metaphysical and 
epistemological points -about what is truly real and how this can be known- have 
been developed in Books 6 and 7. The rejection of the representation of strong 
emotions and appetites in stories seems also to be related to the fact that these 
experiences promote undesirable change in the soul (for example, laughter is rejected 
for being "a violent agent of change" (3.388e-389a)). 
1.2.3. Familiarity with the beautiful and the good: recognition of beautiful 
bodies and souls and of beautiful habits, pursuits and virtues 
As is explained through the comparison of the young guardian with a well-bred dog, 
the love of wisdom -which is the desire that is proper to the rational part- recognizes 
what is familiar and is to be welcomed and what is unfamiliar and is to be rejected 
exclusively through knowledge of the first and ignorance of the second (KOUTOI iliac, 
OVK dv <j)iA,o|ia0£<; eir| auveaei T E Koci dyvoia bpi^ oiaevov TO xe dnceiov 
K a i TO aAAoTpiov; (2.376b4-6))380. In the case of love of wisdom TO T £ O I K E I O V 
would be the beautiful and the good and TO aXkbipiov would be its opposite, 
insofar as the main purpose of artistic education, in a general way, is precisely that all 
kinds of production or creation -not only poetry- have to be of what is beautiful and 
harmonious so that, through contact with these kinds of products, the young 
3 7 9 For the value of uniformity in the case of the divine and, by extension, of the soul see 2.380d-
381a. 
3 8 0 "How, I ask you, can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly 
and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?" (I follow here Shorey's translation. Henceforth I will 
continue by following Griffith's translation). 
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guardians are guided without their noticing it to "resemblance, friendship, and 
harmony with the beauty of reason" (EIQ b|ioi.6xT|X& xe K a i tyiXiav K a i 
a\)(j.(|)CDviav top KaA,6p Xby<x>, 3.401dl-3) and learn through experience to 
recognize the good and the beautiful (3.401bl-d3) and become familiar with it. 
The acquaintance of the true musician -the educator and the young guardian who has 
completed his/her first education (3.402cl-2)- with what is graceful, beautiful and 
good makes him or her able to prefer persons with beautiful souls and, i f possible, 
with beautiful bodies (3.402d)381 and to dismiss sexual intercourse with the beloved 
(3.403a-b). At the same time the true musician is also able to recognize the "forms" 
or "kinds" -ei5r|- of virtues such as soberness, courage, liberality and high-
mindedness (402c),3 8 2 thanks to the fact that he has not been in contact with 
representations of an evil character or of licentiouness and illiberality (3.401b) and so 
is familiar only with beautiful characters (f|8rj) and develops only beautiful pursuits 
(x& KaA,d 87TiXT|6e<)|J.axa) that tend to virtue. 3 8 3 
In this way, at the end of early education: a) the appetites have been trained to keep 
within the limits of what is necessary, so that their powerful 'stream' is decreased as 
much as possible and they do not interfere with and weaken reason; b) the 'spirited' 
part has been trained to fight on reason's side and, in this way, intensifies reason's 
'current'; c) the rational part of the young guardians has acquired right beliefs but, as 
The beauty of the body is always subordinated to the beauty of the soul (3.403d; 9.591c-d) 
3 8 2 1 take it that £i8r| does not refer here to the Forms but just means 'kinds' or 'types' -i.e what is 
common to the individual cases of virtue that the young guardians have personally experienced. In 
the case of the educators the recognition of what is common to individual virtuous acts would be 
based on a comprehension of this experience of particular cases of true virtue in the light of 
knowledge of the Forms. 
3 8 3 See 4.444e4. In the case of a bad aritistic education the person acquires bad habits and customs 
that destroy the virtue in the soul and even in society, as we can see at 3.424d. The similarity of all 
this section of Republic 3 to the first steps of the ladder of love in the Symposium was already 
pointed out by Raven (ch. 9 of Raven (1965), pp.119-130). 
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yet, in an unreflective way, d) the soul has been in contact as little as possible with 
diversity and as much as possible with unchangeableness through musical education; 
this helps the soul to develop only appropriate patterns of character and to acquire 
affinity with the unchangeable, which is related with what is real and true; e) in 
general, the love of wisdom has developed familiarity with and an unconscious 
recognition of what is really good and beautiful and graceful; f ) more specifically, the 
young guardian has learnt to recognize the beauty of bodies and value it only when it 
is attached to the beauty of souls, to dismiss sexual intercourse, to become familiar 
with beautiful habits and pursuits and to recognize universal characteristics of virtues 
in individual instances. From this background the best of the young guardians are 
ready to start their higher education in mathematics and dialectic. Through it they can 
acquire knowledge and comprehension of what they have learnt just through 
experience (3.401e; 3.396a; 3.409a-e).384 In this way music and poetry end, as they 
should, "in love and beauty" (3.403c) and reason's 'current' of desire for the truth 
and the real good may attain its most powerful development. 
3 8 4 While the young guardians must avoid the experience of evil, they will acquire as dialecticians 
knowledge of both what is good and what is bad. See especially the example of the judge of the 
ideal city at 3.409a-e: the future judges of the ideal state have to have only experiences of the good 
in their childhood and, afterwards, in their adulthood, acquire knowledge -not experience- of the 
good and the bad. 
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2. Higher education 
The development of reason's desire for the truth and the real good: 
being a lover of truth and a just man. 
Successful fulfilment of the desires of the other parts of the soul and the city. 
Introduction 
The programme of higher education in mathematics and dialectics is aimed at making 
a person develop as a lover of truth in a maximum way, i.e. to make reason's 
'stream' towards the truth and the real good as powerful within him as possible, so 
that he achieves the utmost unfolding of his essential rational condition and, 
alongside it, an internal state of justice through which each of the parts of the soul 
achieves its perfection (wisdom, bravery and moderation) and their desires are 
successfully satisfied as well (9.586e-587a). In a city governed by just and wise 
philosophers conforming to this model each of its parts and the society as a whole 
also attains the maximum perfection possible. In this way each human being gets as 
close as possible to the satisfaction of the universal desire for the real good, which is 
proper to our rational part. 
Earlier education has appropriately trained the desires of the irrational parts, so that 
they do not block and/or corrupt reason; it has also specifically stimulated love of 
wisdom within the soul through musical education. This first education starts the 
development of a certain capacity for abstraction as well, insofar as it makes the 
person able to recognize the "forms" or "kinds" -£I5T |- of virtues (3.402c), since the 
young guardians have not been in contact with representations of an evil character 
(3.401b) and have developed good characters (f|0r|) and devoted themselves to 
beautiful pursuits (xd KaA.d emxr]8EX>[iaxa) that predispose them to virtue 
(4.444e4-5). Thus, earlier education creates the circumstances to enable such a 
development of reason's desire for the truth and the real good through the 
programme of higher education. At the same time this higher education provides a 
basis for and perfects the results of earlier education. 
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The first target of higher education is to provoke in the soul a radical transformation 
-expressed through the metaphorical expression of "turning round" (7cepiaxpo(|)f| 
and rcepiaycoYTl, 7.521c) the soul "upwards" (eTcdvoooQ) (7.521c)- so that the 
world of generation is left behind and the soul is aimed at the truth (7.525c), i.e. at 
the Form of the Good (7.526e). In this way the capacity of the soul for 'seeing' the 
intelligible starts to be developed (7.518d) and reason trains itself to consider things 
on its own so that its essential desire to search for truth is manifested. In other words, 
i f we take concepts developed at the end of Book 5, the programme of higher 
education is an attempt to make young guardians lovers of the truth, 0iA-OCi6<j)Oi so 
that they do not stay attached to sensible particulars, as the "lovers of the opinions" 
or <j)iA.o56£oi (5.480a) do, but believe (voiai^ eiv) in the Forms, for example, in 
beauty itself, and are "able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the 
knowledge of it" (5.476c). 
For this "turning" the person is exposed not to sensations from which adequate 
judgements can be made but to perceptual experiences that contradict her/his 
reasoning. In this way he/she is led to admit the existence of, and to think and reflect 
on, something that is different from what is multiple and sense-perceptible and is in 
itself, unchangeable and knowable only through the intellect (7.524c), and to desire 
to go further in this new comprehension of reality. 
The image of the line and the allegory of the cave give a detailed description of the 
successive 'upward' steps of the philosopher -eiKOtaia, Ttiaxir;, 6idvoia and 
vo\)Q- towards his object of desire (i.e. the truth that consists in knowing the Good or 
at any rate a principle which does not require further foundations). I f the person is 
able to keep going, he/she ideally moves to the highest level of e7ti.cTxfi|J/n -vox>q-
and ascertains the goal of his studies and of life itself: knowledge of what each thing 
is in itself, its relation to the rest of the things that are in themselves and, above all, 
the foundation of everything in the Form of the Good, as the very last principle of 
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reality, knowledge and justice. So with the knowledge of the Good the philosopher-
rulers simultaneously attain -in case this knowledge were possible for anybody-
reason's essential object of desire: i.e. truth, what is absolutely real and what is really 
good. As a consequence of this knowledge, the other parts of the soul -and of the 
city- also achieve a real fulfilment of their desires, as far as possible, and alongside it, 
individual and social justice and the virtues that justice brings with it are attained. 
Thus, our whole life, not just our rational capacities, depends on how much we 
develop the love of wisdom of our rational aspect - for the development of which our 
other sources of motivation have also to be appropriately trained in early childhood. 
In this way, i f we imagine ourselves deprived of our corporeal existence and put in 
the perspective of eternity and of the order of the universe, as in the picture of the 
eschatological myth, we are for the whole eternity either rational, god-like creatures 
who have developed their love for the truth as much as possible or human beings 
who have missed their chance of revealing their essential rational condition. 
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2.1. Turning the soul 'upwards' for the development of reason's desire for 
the truth and the real good: deceptive perceptions as triggers for the 
awakening of calculating reason 
We all desire to possess the real good and not the appearance of it (&YOt0d 8e 
oi)8evi exi dpKEi x d SOKCVUVXOC KxdaGoci, dAAd x d ovxa Cjyzovciv, 
6.505d7-8) and do all that we do in the pursuit of it (6 dr\ SicoKei |j.ev d j caaa 
\|/\)%fi K a i xovxov ev£Ka Ttdvxa Ttpdxxei, 6.505dll-el). However, most of us 
fail in this commitment because of lack of sufficient understanding about what is 
really good (drcopcyocia 8k K a i OVK exovoa Xafieiv 'iKavcoq x i nox eaxiv, 
6.505el-2). In other words, the attainment of the real good and the truth that we all 
desire requires a special training of our rational part, which is the possessor of this 
desire. When reason progressively learns to consider things in themselves -
independently of sense experience- and eventually reaches knowledge of the Form of 
the Good and an understanding of reality based on it, the attainment of the real good 
that we all desire becomes, at least partially, possible. 
Earlier education has trained the irrational desires so that they do not block and 
corrupt reason's desire for the truth and the real good and, in this way, paves the way 
for higher education (see especially 7.519a-b). Moreover the young guardians have 
grown up in contact only with real beautiful and good instances (3.401 a-e) and have 
learnt only true beliefs, which include, for example, beliefs about what is to be feared 
and dared and about the immutable and identical nature of the divine. 3 8 5 Insofar as 
knowledge -i.e. what higher education promotes- aims at objects such as numbers 
and Forms which are in their essence unchangeable, the development of the soul's 
affinity with the unchangeable rather than with the changeable during earlier 
education also helps in the process of higher education and, in this way, prepares 
reason for the development of its essential capacities and desires. Moreover, like true 
musicians, who have been in contact only with examples of good character (3.401b) 
See Chapter 2, Section III, 1.2.1. a) & Xzxieov, pp. 206 ff.. 
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and so develop beautiful pursuits (xd ... KCxXd £mTr)5e,u|j.a'ca) that tend to virtue 
(4.444e4-5), the young guardians start to develop a certain capacity for abstraction 
through recognizing the "forms" or "kinds" -E\5TI- of virtues (3.402c). A l l these 
things contribute to starting to separate the young guardian's souls, as much as 
possible, from the sensible world and put them on course for wisdom and the real 
good. Thus, as said at 6.485d3-4, they have been educated from earlier childhood in 
order to become lovers of the truth: 
xov dpa xco ovxt (J)iXo|i.a9fi raxariQ dA.T|8eia<; 8el E-U8\)<; E K VEOX> bxi 
\1aX1axa bpEyecrBai.386 
The higher education tries to do the rest of the work. 
The first step of the programme of higher education is to turn the soul 'upwards' in 
the direction of the true 'light' of real philosophy387 or, in other words, a conversion 
of the soul from the world of generation towards what is true (ai)xfj<; xfjq \yv%Tj<; 
potaxcbvTiq |i.Exaaxpo<|>f) arco yEVEGEOic, ETC' dVpGEidv X E Kai cbaiav, 
7.525c5-6), towards the Form of the Good (xf]v xov dyaGcu i6£av, 7.526el). 
For this turning of the soul reason has to learn to consider things themselves, 
independently from the senses. Triggers that provoke in us this kind of thought (xd 
|i£v rcapaK?cT|XiKd xr\c, Siavoia^, 7.524d2-3; see also 7.523a f f . ) are certain 
kinds of perceptions, such as distant appearances and illusory painting (xd 
3 "The genuine lover of learning, then, must make every possible effort, right from earliest 
childhood, to reach out for truth of every kind". 
3 8 7 See on this point 7.521c6-8: . . . V J / D X T I ? Jiepiaycoyfi eic WKxepivf\c, zivoq r)|J.epa<; eiq 
dcXriSivnv, xou ovxo? aGaav ercdvoSov, f|v 6T) <\>iXoao^>iav dtXr|8fi §T\OO\IEV eivai. 
("... the turning of a soul away from that day which is a kind of night, and towards the true day 
which is the ascent to what is, and which we shall say is true philosophy.") 
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JtoppcoGev ...(|)aiv6|j.£va . . .Ka i x d eaKuxypacjyrpeva, 7.523b5-6)388 and 
perceptions of the smallness and bigness, thickness and thinness, softness and 
hardness that physical objects possess (7.523e-524al). This kind of perception 
"demands examination by the understanding, since perception produces no sound 
result" (xd 5 E raxvxdTiacn 8uxKeA.e\x>|j.£va £ K E I V T ) V [i.e. xf)v V 6 T | C I V ] 
£7iiaK£\|/aa0ai, dx; xfj<; dia0f]CT£co<; ovdkv V Y I E Q 7toio<)0"r|<;, 7.523b2-4); 
when we base our judgements on them, one thing and its opposite can equally be 
concluded. As we read at 7.524b ff. , for example, according to the senses something 
can be bigger in relation to one thing but smaller in relation to another. Because of 
this contradictory situation reason is obliged to examine things by itself so that it 
establishes, in this case, the great and the small, which for the senses appear 
confused, as different and separate entities. In this way questions such as x i cuv 
JCOX' Ecrri xd [ieya av KCCI XO G|iiKpdv awake in the soul (7.524cll) and, 
alongside it, a first comprehension of an intelligible dimension in reality (TO |J.£V 
vor|x6v) different from the visible one (xd 5' bpocxdv) takes place (7.524cl3) so 
that the rational part of the soul is directed towards searching for what we all desire: 
the real good and the truth. 
2.2. The upward "conversion" of the soul according to the end of Book 5: 
being a philosopher or lover of truth and the real good 
People who have gone through this "conversion" have awakened reason's universal 
desire for the real good and truth in their souls and so become philosophers or lovers 
of the truth. In other words, using the words of the end of Book 5, they are people 
Similarly at Phaed. 72e-77a in the argument from recollection sense-perceptions play a positive 
role as a trigger for a pure rational examination. However, permanent contact with this kind of 
experiences without training reason to examine them and to abandon them as false destroys 
reason's capacity according to Book 10. In fact one of the main reasons for rejecting the mimetic 
art is that it exposes the soul to this kind of sense experiences without the antidote of real 
knowledge. See above Chapter 2, Section II, 3.3.2. xcov fyavXaiv x i fev riulv in Republic 10, 
pp. 186 ff.. 
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who believe (vo|ii£eiv) in the Forms, for example, in beauty itself, and are "able to 
follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of i t " , 3 8 9 so that they would 
be able to distinguish beauty itself from the things that participate in it and vice 
versa390 and so "to approach to beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself' 
(5.476c). Thus, they are no longer like the majority of ((JiX-oSo^ oi,391 who stay 
attached to sensible particulars (e.g. the lovers of beautiful sounds and sights who 
remain on attached to "beautiful sounds and colours and shapes, and to everything 
which is created from these elements, but whose minds are incapable of seeing, and 
taking pleasure in, the nature of beauty itself (5.476b)).392 They are in love with the 
spectacle of the truth (5.475e) and "hungry" for wisdom and knowledge as a whole 
(5.474c; 475c). Thus, it is possible to speculate, though it is not asserted in the text, 
that they have moved from opinion (86^a), which is the general intermediate state 
((lexa '^u) between ignorance (ayvoioc) and knowledge (emcrcfpT|), to a new 
intermediate state -tyikoGotyiQL. 
3 8 9 In opposition to the a lover of beautiful sounds and sights, who is ...b... aired 8e KCtAAoq 
ufixe vouii^cov |J.r|xe, dv ziq riYTjtca ejii xr\v yv&aiv a k o i , Swctixevoq erceaSai.... 
("... [who] cannot recognise beauty itself, and cannot follow if you direct him to knowledge of it.") 
(5.476c2-4). 
3 9 0 xi 8e; b xdvavxia xoirecov r)yov>\iev6q, xe xi aired KaXbv K a i Swdnevoq KaOopdv 
K a i aired K a i xd eKeivou uexexpvxa, K a i ofcxe xd |iexexovxa aired oiree aired xd 
|a,exex,ovxa riYotijievog... ("What about the person who is just the opposite, who believes in 
beauty itself, who can look both at it and at the things which share in it without mistaking them for 
it or it for them?") (5.476c9-d3). 
3 9 1 6.480a. 
3 9 2 di (xev nov [...] <|)iA.f|KOoi K a i (|)iA,o0ed(xove<; xdq xe KaXdq <f>a)vd<; dcrnd^ovxai 
K a i xpoa? K O t l ox^cixa K a i raxvxa xd eK xo3v xoioircoov 8Tinio\)pYoi)|J.eva, odrcao 
8e zov KaXov aSvvaxoq airccov r| Sidvcaa xf)v tyvoiv 'i8eiv xe K a i daraxaaaGai. 
"Well, I imagine that audiences and spectators can take pleasure in beautiful sounds and colours 
and shapes, and in everything which is created from these elements, but that their minds are 
incapable of seeing, and taking pleasure in, the nature of beauty itself." (5.476b4-8). 
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The state of mind of the philosophers is, like any other person's, an intermediate state 
((lexocc^u) between knowledge and ignorance, since they do not have knowledge -
being just lovers of the truth; but, at the same time they are beginning to move from 
the regular state of 86£a, having acquired a relevant true conviction that the lovers 
of opinions do not have: the belief that the Forms exist and are the objects of 
knowledge.393 In this way they look for wisdom, leaving behind any understanding 
based just on sensible particulars. From the point of view of its aspiration this state of 
mind is <|>iA,0- ao<|>ia or "desire/love for the truth"; as the Symposium may perhaps 
allow us to suppose, philosophy, from the point of view of its cognitive contents, 
could also be described as opOf) 86£a as well . 3 9 4 For being in such a state of mind, 
the crucial thing is that, by believing and yearning for the Forms, a process of 
searching for the truth has started. The philosopher's strong passion for the truth and 
the real good is what keeps him going in his struggle to knowledge of what really is: 
dp' ovv Sf] oi) |iexpico<; d7toA,oYT|cr6|j.£9a oxi npoq xd 6v TCE^VKOX; eir| 
d|iiX,A,da9ai 6 ye OVXCOQ (|)T.X.o|ia9Ti<;, K a i o\)K emuevoi erai xoiq 
8o£a£o|j,£voi<; eivai noXXaiq eKdaxoiq, dXX' 101 K a i OVK d|ij3X\>voixo 
oi)8' dnoXiyyoi tov epcoxcx;, rcpiv ai)xo-o 6 eaxiv EKaaxoD xr\c, (jyuaecoc, 
&i|/aa9ai a> TrpoafiKei vy-ox^ ? E()xx7ixea9ai xov X O I O V X O D - rcpoafiKei 8s 
avyyEvzi- & nXr\aidaaq K a i liiyeit; xq> ovxi OVXCOQ, yEvvf\cac, vow K a i 
dX,fi9eiav, YVOITI xe K a i dXr|9cD<; c^pr| K a i xpe(()oixo K a i ovxco Xi\yoi 
cbSivoi;, upiv 8' oft;395 
3 9 3 That is why at Symp. 201d-204b the philosophical epcoQ is not just 'intermediate' but 
'intermediary' in relation to the divine world of wisdom. 
3 9 4 See Symp. 202a; also Rowe (2001), Sier (1997), pp. 66-67 and here Chapter 1,3.2.1.4, a) Eros 
is nexaJjv like 6p8r| 56£a (202al-10), pp. 52 ff.. 
3 9 5 "Wouldn't be reasonable for us to defend him by saying that it was, after all the nature of the 
true lover of learning to keep struggling towards what is, and that he did not waste time on what 
opinion sees, in each case, as many? Never losing his edge, never abandoning his passion, he kept 
on going until he had grasped the nature of what each thing itself is with that part of his soul -the 
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Ideally (j)iA.oao({u.a would lead to the completion of this process, i.e. aofyia. 
However, it is hard to say that Plato envisages the state of fu l l wisdom as possible in 
absolute terms: he rather seems to conceive it as an aspiration that we can try to fu l f i l 
as far as possible in our actual existence. Thus, the philosophers, like everyone else, 
remain in an intermediate state (\s.exaB,v) between ignorance and knowledge as well. 
However, the crucial difference is that from an initial philosophical state it is possible 
to start 'upward' on the dialectical path, while the standard state of dbcjx keeps 
people attached to sense-perceptions in such a way that they do not look for a better 
understanding. The whole dialectical, synoptic view as the maximum expression of 
knowledge, often attributed only to the gods,396 is, probably, more an aspiration than 
a real possibility, at least in our lifetimes, in which we cannot completely separate 
ourselves from the bodily and from our temporal limitations. Philosophers may 
obtain just provisional results, and in that sense themselves never go beyond what 
would still be an intermediate state in relation to knowledge. Nevertheless, they 
would have the advantage of having developed reason's desire for the truth and the 
real good as far as possible and with it the essential rational nature of their souls. 
The successive steps of the philosopher's ascent to his object of desire -the truth and 
the Good- are described through the images of the line and the cave. The programme 
of higher education in mathematics and dialectics is planned in order to take him 
through these steps so that reason's desire of wisdom wi l l attain its maximum 
development. 
part akin to it- which is equipped to grasp this kind of thing. And it was only when he used this part 
of his soul to get close to and be intimate with what really is, so engendering understanding and 
truth, that he found knowledge, true life, nourishment, and relief from the pains of the soul's 
childbirth?" (6.490a8-b7). 
3 9 6 See Rowe (2001). 
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2.3. Maximum development of reason's 'stream' through the programme of 
higher education in mathematics and dialectic: being a fully-developed 
philosopher or lover of the truth 3 9 7 
2.3.1. From e i K a c r i a to nioiic, at the stage of 56£a 
In order to start their journey towards the truth and to develop their rationality and 
love for the truth, the future philosopher-rulers have to move to a higher level of 
opinion -"conviction" or nioxic,-, leaving behind the state of "imagination" or 
e i K a a i a , in which comprehension is based on images (eiKOvei;, (J>avx&cT|j.axa) 
of sensible things (6.510a; 6.51 le; 7.534a) with no discrimination between images of 
sense-perceptible objects and sense-perceptible objects themselves (7.515b). Thus, 
the embryonic rulers get an understanding that comes to be based on the sense-
perceptible objects themselves and not on their images (6.510a; 6.511e; 7.534a) and, 
above all, they are able to distinguish sense-perceptible objects from their images 
(7.515c-d). 3 9 8 The fact that in the guardian's musical education the use of fxi|iT|aiQ 
has been proscribed (or allowed exceptionally, i.e. where the imitator reproduces 
good characters)399 might help them not to confuse sense-perceptible objects with 
their images. They also have the additional benefit that they have grown up acquiring 
only right and true beliefs, since they have been surrounded only by examples of real 
beauty and goodness, and familiarity with the unchangeable (3.403). Moreover, their 
irrational sources of motivation have been trained so that they are not an obstacle to 
reason's further development (7.519b). In addition, by being familiar only with 
beautiful characters and pursuits (f\Qr\ K a i E7tixr|5e\)|j.axa), they have acquired an 
3 7 What follows is a recapitulation of certain arguments of Books 6 and 7 which might be familiar 
to readers but, nevertheless, remain essential to my overall argument, as I try to show in the 
'Conclusions' in Chapter 3. 
3 9 8 Fine (1991), p.103. 
3 9 9 In earlier education narration is preferred to imitation. See above Chapter 2, Section III, 1.2. 
b) &q XeKxe6v, p. 208. 
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embryonic capacity of abstraction in order to recognize the "forms" or "kinds" 
-ei8r|- of virtues (402c2 ff . ) . 
2.3.2. The 'conversion' of the soul: reason's desire for the truth and the real 
good 
2.3.2.1.The shift to Sidvoia: turning the soul 'upwards' through an 
appropriate study of the beautiful mathematical sciences 
However, the real "conversion" of the soul starts, as we have seen above in Section 
III 2.2., through the fu l l development of reason's capacity to consider things 
independently from perceptual experiences (7.526a-b). This conversion initially 
occurs and is developed through the practice of the mathematical sciences -arithmetic 
(7.522c-526c), geometry (7.526c-527c), stereometry (7.528b-d), astronomy (7.527d-
528a; 7.528e-530c) and harmonics (7.530d-531c)- for a long period of time (7.537b-
d) and in the right way, that is in a way that helps the soul in its search for what is 
beautiful and good (7.531c).400 Arithmetic, for example, i f well used, develops 
understanding (7.52331-3)401 and helps in the 'upward' conversion of the soul £7rA 
TTIV xov bvxoc, 6ectv (7.525al-2), insofar as the discussion is rcepi ainoav tcov 
dpi9|J.G0V, (7.525d6402) and not about their visible and tangible representations. 
4 0 0 There are warnings against inappropriate use of each of these mathematical sciences (see 7.525d 
in relation to arithmetic's; 7.527a in relation to geometry; 7.528b-c in relation to stereometry; 
7.529c-530c in relation to astronomy; 7.531a in relation to harmonics). This means that these 
sciences are not useful by themselves for becoming a dialectician: an appropriate method of 
developing them is required. 
4 0 1 Kiv5we<>ei xcov npoc, xf|v vor|aiv CCYOVXOOV tyvoei e lvai cbv £r)xo-uuev, xp^cr^ai 5' 
obSeiq aindp bpBcoq, E X K X I K C D O V X I jtavxdnacn 7tpd<; obo'iav. ("It may well be that it is one 
of the studies we are looking for and that its natural tendency is to lead us towards understanding, but 
that no one makes the right use of it as the perfect instrument for drawing them towards being.") 
4 0 2 The objects of study of the mathematical sciences are, as I take it, not Forms: although they are 
unchangeable like the Forms (and for this reason these studies train reason for the future 
development in dialectic), they are multiple. 
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Through these beautiful sciences the person trains himself/herself to distinguish what 
is unchangeable and common to multiple cases from what is changeable and multiple 
and to reason about these unchangeable entities so that the soul is purified and 
becomes sighted (7.527d) and the foundations of the rest of the arts (xe%vai) that 
deal with the world of generation (7.533c) are known (7.522c). The person trained in 
this way may finally get a comprehension of the unity, kinship and affinities of all 
these sciences (eit i vr\v aXXr\k(£>v Koivcoviav d(|)iKT|i;ai Kod avryyeveiav, 
K a i aDXA-oyiaBfi xavxa fj eaxiv aXXf[koic, d iKeia , 7.531dl-3) and, as in the 
case of real astronomy, of a beauty different from and superior to the perfect but 
visible beauty of the skies (7.529c-d). This inferior kind of £.nicxr\\ir\ is called 
"understanding" or 5 idvo ia (6.51 le; 7.534a) and has the limitations of still using 
sensible representations in order to reason and just getting conclusions from its 
principles without speculation about the foundations of the principles used (6.510b-
511al). However, in spite of its limitation, this training helps to fortify reason's 
'stream' towards the truth and the real good, which is the goal of the highest science 
of all: dialectic 
...dbarcep GpiyKOi; xoiq naGfpaaiv r| 8iaXeKXiKf| tijxiv E T I & V C D KeiaGai, 
K a i o-bKex' aXXo xovxov (id6r|(a.a dvcoT-epco 6p9co<; dv ercixiGeaGai....403 
2.3.2.2.From Sidvoia to vovq: panoptic understanding of reality with 
foundations on the Form of the Good 
After this long training in mathematical sciences, the future philosophers are ready to 
move to a higher level of emaTfpr | : "intelligence" or vox>Q. In this mental state, i f 
it is possible for any human being, the supreme science (likyioxov |j.d9r||i.a, 
6.504e4-5; see also 6.504d), which is the science of the Good (6.505a2) may be 
acquired, a science which, in its maximum development, consists in a panoptic view 
4 0 3 "... dialectic sits as a kind of coping-stone on the top of our educational edifice, and [... ] there is 
no other subject left which we'd be justified in putting on top of it..." (7.534e2-4). 
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of the interrelation between the essences of the things based on the Form of the Good 
(7.532a-b; 7.534c). At this stage the mind operates without any sensible 
representation and, above all, gives up all assumptions and moves towards a principle 
that does not require further foundations: i.e., apparently, the Form of the Good 
(6.510b; 6.511b; 7.533c-d). 
The Form of the Good is the principle simultaneously of reality, knowledge and 
justice. As the image of the sun and the allegory of the cavern show, the Good, which 
is the goal of the dialectical studies of the guardians, is the ultimate dpXT) in three 
senses: it is epistemological cause -i.e. the Good is that through which things, more 
specifically intelligible things, are really known and understood, and that which 
makes them true (6.508d-e); it is metaphysical cause -i.e. the Good is that by which 
things exist ( K O U xd e ivcd xe K O C I xr\v o i x j i a v im' eKeivov [i.e. imo xov 
dtyaQov] OCUTOIQ rcpoaeivou, 6.509b7-8); and it is ethical foundation -i.e. the 
Good is the basis of all virtues and the real good that all of us desire (6.504d-505a). 
So with the knowledge of the Good the philosopher-rulers simultaneously attain -in 
case this knowledge were possible for anybody- truth, what is absolutely real and 
what is really good. With the contemplation of the Good the reality of Beauty and 
Justice is simultaneously 'seen' (7.520c), the Good exceeding in beauty even 
knowledge and the truth (6.509a). In this way reason's 'stream' of desire towards the 
truth has attained its maximum strength and development. 
2.4. Coincidence of the just man and the lover of the truth: the attainment of 
maximum satisfaction in our life as a whole through the development of 
reason's 'stream' towards the truth and the Good 4 0 4 
Through a posited attainment of knowledge of the Good not only is a maximum 
development of reason's 'stream' and its desire for the truth achieved: alongside it, 
the whole soul and its parts get the best satisfaction possible of their desires as well 
4 0 4 At 9.590d-592a the man whose life is led by love for the truth and the just man clearly 
coincide.See also 5.472al-7, 5.473c6-e5, 5.474b-c, 6.484a-485a and Fine (1991), p. 87; differently 
Annas (1981), ch. 13, pp.321-334. 
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as perfection in the form of individual justice and the virtues that justice implies 
(wisdom about what is good for the individual, moderation and bravery). At the same 
time, these lovers of the truth, these just individuals, are also the ones who, having 
knowledge of what is good for the city from the point of view of what is Good in 
general, can eventually bring social justice to the city and satisfy the desires of the 
different parts of the city as far as possible.405 
2.4.1.Foundations of the individual and social good on the Good 
The just man is a person within whom each part of the soul performs its own task 
(4.441 d-e). The task of the rational part is to govern the soul since it is the part of us 
that is able to acquire knowledge (erciaxTpTi) of what is appropriate for each part of 
the soul and for the individual as a whole: 
ao(j)6v Se ye eKeivcp xa> ajj-ixpco ixepei, xcp 6 fjpxev x ev OCUXGO KOCI 
xccoxa napi]yyeXXEV, e%ov ax> K & K E I V O emo-TrjjuTji*' ev aired) xfiv xov 
a\)|i(|)epovxoQ eK&axcp xe K a i 6Xcp xa> K O I V C D CT<|)GOV CCUXOOV xpicov bvxeov.406 
Similarly, a just city is the one in which each class performs its own task. In 
consequence the class of the individuals who possess the knowledge of what is good 
for each class and for the city as a whole is the class that has to rule: 4 0 7 
4 0 5 Thus, although the metaphysical knowledge attained by the guardians is based on a 'pure' 
-a-priori- speculation, this does not mean that is not applicable to sensible/concrete reality: the proof 
of this is that the philosophers, when they are obliged reluctantly (7.517c-d) to go back to the cave 
(7.519d; 7.540a), are the people who can much better judge about the sensible world by distinguishing 
"shadows" from "real objects" (7.520c). Moreover, in order to keep them appropriately trained in this 
respect, they are sent to do concrete tasks (such as to hold commands in war) after part of their 
dialectical training, so that they do not lack this kind of experience (7.539e). 
4 0 6 "But wise by that small part that ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its 
possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the 
community composed of the three." (4.442c5-8). I follow here Shorey's translation. Henceforth I 
will continue by following Griffith's translation. 
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xcp CTiaiKpoxaxco dpa eBvei Kai jiepei eavxTji; Kai xr\ ev xomcp 
ematrj^irj, xop rcpoeaxom Kai dpxovxi, 6A.T| ao(j>f| dv eir| Kaxd fyvoiv 
diKia0e1aa JC6A,I<;- Kai xouxo, dx; eoiKe, (jruaei bXiyiaxov yiyvexai 
yevo<;, do TipoafiKei xa-uxrn; xfjq eTciaxfifiTji; taexaXayxdveiv f)v |i6vr|v 8ei 
xcov dXXcov e7tiaxTui0Dv ao<f>iap KaXeiaGai.4 0 8 
This wisdom or knowledge which is required in order to bring individual and social 
justice is part of the knowledge of the Good. Thus, at 7.540a5-bl: 
...xoix; SiaacoGevxaQ Kai dpiaxevaavxaq raxvxa 7tdvxT] ev epyoi? xe Kai 
E7tiaxfi(j.ai<; jcp6<; xeXoq y\6r\ dKxeov, Kai dvayKaaxeov dvaKXavavxaq 
xfiv XTIQ \|/'ux'nQ otbyfiv eiq avxb drcopXevj/ai x6 rotai cpoog raxpexov, Kai 
\86vxa<; xo dyaGov ai)x6, raxpa5eiy|j,axi. X P C D M - £ V 0 ' ° ? kKeivop, Kai TC6X.IV 
Kai \8uoxa<; Kai eaanouQ Koa^ieiv xov ejciXoiTtov piov ev |j,epei 
EKdaxo^.... 4 0 9 
4 0 7 Their love for the truth also inhibits the rulers from being lovers of rule (7.521b) and actually 
they have to be obliged to rule in spite of their natural disposition to spend the rest of their lives in 
pure thinking on the Forms (7.517c-d; 7.540a-b). 
4 0 8 "In which case, the wisdom of a city founded on natural principles depends entirely on its 
smallest group and element -the leading and ruling element- and the knowledge that the element 
possesses. The class which can be expected to share in this branch of knowledge, which of all 
branches of kowledge is the only one we can call wisdom, is by its nature, apparently, the smallest 
class." (4.428e7-429a3). 
4 0 9 " ...those who have survived and been completely successful in every sphere, both in practical 
affairs and in their studies, should now be conducted to the final goal, and required to direct the 
radiant light of the soul towards the contemplation of that which itself gives light to everything. 
And when they have seen the good itself, they must make that their model, and spend the rest of 
their lives, each group in its turn, in governing the city, the individuals in it, and themselves." 
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2.4.2. Satisfaction and perfection of the desires of the soul as a whole and in 
its parts through the knowledge of the Good 
In other words, as said at 6.504d-505a, a right comprehension of the virtues (justice, 
courage, moderation and wisdom itself 6.504a) - i n the individual as well as in the 
city- demands their understanding with reference to the Form of the Good: 
eizei oxi ye r\ xox> a/vaGou 'i86a neyiaxov |j,d9T||ia, rccAXdiai; CHKT|KOCCQ, 
fj 8f| Kcd SiKccia m i xdXXa 7cpoaxpr|ad(j.eva xpfiai(i.a K a i &><^e.Xi[La 
yiyvexai. 4 1 0 
This means that, i f reason attains its object of desire (truth, the knowledge of the 
Good), alongside it, the other parts of the soul and the soul as a whole -and also the 
city and its different classes- also get appropriate satisfaction of their desires and 
attain their perfections or dpexai. Thus at 9.586e4-587al in relation to the parts of 
the soul: 
xcp (j)iA,oa6(()op dpoc e7to|j.evr|<; drcdcrr|<; xfj<; i|/i)%fi£ K a i |if) avxGiaCpvariq 
eKdaxcp xcp nepei imdp%ei eiq xe xdXX-a xd eccuxov 7updxxeiv K a i 
SiKaiop eivai, K a i br\ K a i xdq t|8ovd<; xdq eavxov ^Kaaxov K a i xd<; 
PeXxiaxaQ K a i EIC, X6 Swaxdv xd<; dX,T|6eaxdxaq Kap7co\)a9ai. 4 n 
4 "You've often heard me say that the most important branch of study is the form or character of 
the good -that which just things and anything else must make use of it if they are to be useful and 
beneficial." (6.505a2-4). 
4 1 1 "If the entire soul, then, follows without rebellion the part which loves wisdom, the result is that 
each part can in general carry out its own functions -can be just, in other words- and in particular 
each is able to enjoy the pleasures which are its own, and, as far as possible, the truest." 
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The rational part's knowledge of the individual good gives perfection to the appetites 
already trained in early education within the appropriate limits and the virtue of 
CTCQ(|>poG'6vr| fully emerges in the soul. Through reason's knowledge of what is good 
for the individual the 'spirited' element, which has already been habituated through 
primary education to work according to reason's right beliefs of what is to be feared 
and not, reaches perfection as well and the virtue of av5peia is achieved in ful l 
sense. 
In other words justice (SiKaiocrtivTi) implies the rule of the rational part in the 
individual and of the rational class in the city through wisdom (ao<|)ia or £7uaf ip : r | ) . 
The other two virtues -moderation and courage- also require as necessary condition 
reason's rule and knowledge: moderation (aco())poa\)vri) or the agreement of the 
three parts to reason's control over the soul (4.442c-d) requires, firstly, the early 
training of the appetites in their limits to prevent them from interfering reason's work 
but, afterwards, reason's actual government and knowledge of the individual good. 
Similarly courage (dvSpeict) or the 'spirited' part's endurance through pains and 
pleasures according to reason's prescriptions of what is to be feared or not (4.442b-c) 
is based on the appropriate training of the OupioeiSeq in early childhood to support 
reason; but, in order to attain its fulfilment it needs reason's actual control over the 
soul through the knowledge of what is good for each part and the whole. 4 1 2 
Insofar as knowledge of the Good includes not only knowledge of the individual 
good but also of the common good, in a society governed by the philosopher-rulers 
each individual (not only the philosopher ruler) would also achieve the maximum 
development of his desire of the good as far as possible. This is why justice and the 
virtues attached to it are attained by the city through the government of the wise 
4 1 2 The establishment of all virtues except wisdom requires habit and practice (e8ecj'i Kcd 
ctCTKf|cecuv 7.519d) but attains fulfillment only through wisdom: cf. Phaed 68b8-69a5. 
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philosophers who have the knowledge of the Good. By the fact itself that the city is 
governed by wise men the society possesses the virtue of 'wisdom' (4.428e-429a). 
Then there are those who have good dispositions but do not have the capacity for 
higher education so that they stay as auxiliaries and are governed by a desire for 
honour and guided by the right beliefs of the rational part. These men and women 
retain their conception of the things to be feared and dared according to what they 
learnt in their earlier education and provide the virtue of bravery in the social 
structure. Moreover, the society as a whole -the multitude as well as the minority that 
rules- have the appropriate limits imposed on it, their lives being mainly at service of 
the satisfaction of necessary appetites (and not by useless and especially not by 
lawless ones) (4.431c-d). In this way the society attains the virtue of 'moderation' as 
well, so that the best part of the city governs the rest of it and harmony arises in the 
city (4.432a-b). Social justice is a sort of result from these virtues and consists in 
each part of the society doing its own work (4.433d). 
Thus, the development of reason's 'stream' of desire for the truth and the real good 
through the programme of higher education in mathematics and dialectic not only 
makes attainable, as far as possible for a human being, the truth and the real good 
(reason's objects of desire). It also allows the satisfaction and perfection of the 
desires of the other parts according to what is really good and in this way of one's 
own life as a whole. Furthermore, i f the city were governed by the philosophers, not 
only the philosopher-rulers but also the different parts of society and their members 
would reach the maximum perfection possible to them. In this way, everybody would 
be as close as possible according to his capacities to the achievement of what we all 
desire: the real good. 
Although with an appropriate training the irrational parts are not an unsurpassable 
obstacle for reason's search for the truth and the real good, they do, nevertheless, put 
a limit on a ful l and permanent achievement of the knowledge of the Good. Only in 
an after-death existence in which we can imagine ourselves deprived from the 
'weight' of our bodily aspects and the parts of the soul associated to it, can we 
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consider ourselves in absolute terms in the perspective of reason's desire for the truth 
and in the light of how successful we have been in developing our essential rational 
condition. This picture is traced through the eschatological myth of Book 10. 
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Section TV: The eschatological myth of 'Republic 10': being what we desire 
forever 
Introduction 
Thus, a life based on wisdom and justice -i.e. a philosophical life ruled by reason's 
desire for the truth- brings us as close as possible for a human being to the attainment 
of the real good which is universally desired. In tandem with such an attainment a 
maximum satisfaction of the desires of the other parts of the soul is also achieved. 
Although the main turn of the argument of the Republic has been towards proving 
that this internal state of wisdom and justice has its reward in itself, the argument 
closes by adding some extra rewards that wi l l come from gods and men in this life. 
But, above all, through the eschatological myth of Book 10, the possibility of the 
highest prize of all is envisaged, also deriving from the development of reason's 
desire for knowledge: the promise for the philosopher of arriving, as closely as 
possible, to the possession of the real good universally desired in a post-mortem 
existence as well and, in short, for eternity within the framework of the justice of a 
mathematically ordered universe. Nevertheless, this diachronic, literal reading of the 
myth is not the only one. An alternative interpretation of the myth is also open to the 
reader: the portrait here offered of the soul in its discarnate existence and in the light 
of its rational essence could also be read in a synchronic way such that the promise of 
an -albeit temporary- attainment of a god-like condition here and now for those who 
have practiced philosophy would be suggested. 
But firstly let us review some preliminary points introduced in Book 10 before 
considering the eschatological myth. 
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1. Preliminary points to the eschatologicai myth: everlasting justice and 
injustice of the soul in the light of its desire for the truth and from the 
perspective of eternity 
In Republic 10, after considering the power of mimetic poetry to corrupt our rational 
part, the immortal condition of the soul is treated in terms of its essential nature and 
in the light of the development of reason's desire for the truth from the perspective of 
eternity and lasting effects of its justice or injustice in this life. These treatments 
together with other new issues are later used for the construction of the 
eschatologicai myth. 
1.1. The perspective on the just or unjust life in the light of eternity 
The main aim of the Republic is the demonstration of the value of justice in itself, 
whether other men recognize the just condition of the just person or not and even i f 
the just man has to suffer to be treated unjustly by others. From this pillar is 
suspended the treatment of several other subjects, such as political theory, the theory 
of art, education, epistemology, metaphysics, and the psychological theory itself that 
is our concern. At the end of Book 10 Socrates turns to consider the value of being 
just not only in the short time of our present existence but also in the light of eternity: 
Heyaq [...] b aycbv[...] xd %px\Gx6v f) K O C K O V yevecGai [...]. K a i \ir\v [...] xa 
ye pieyiaxa eTri-xeipa apexf|£ K a i 7r.poKein.eva dBXa ob 8ieA/r|Xv9ap.ev. 
[...]. xi 5' av [...] ev ye bXiycp %pbvo) pxya yevoixo; nac, ydp ovxbq ye b 
£ K 7tai86<; [ie%pi 7ipea(3\)xo-o X P o v o £ npoq raxvxa bkiyoq noii xiq av 
eiii. 4 1 3 
H3 « ^ g r e a t p r j z e i s a t s t a k e | | for t , e j n g g 0 0 C i rather than bad. [...] And that's without even 
mentioning the greatest of the rewards and prizes which are on offer for virtue. (...) Nothing great can 
happen in a short space of time.... And presumably, compared with eternity, our whole span of time 
from childhood to old age is a short space of time". (10.608b4-c7). (Griffith's italics). 
235 
Thus the consequences of being just or not according to the extent to which reason's 
desire for the truth has been developed are now projected not just into our present 
existence but also into the totality of time. 
1.2. The everlasting condition of the soul 
The representation of the consequences of our deeds from the perspective of eternity 
presupposes the assumption of the immortality of the soul: 
diei d9avdxcp TrpdyM-axi xmep xoacmxoi) 8eiv %pbvov eCTitauSaKevai, 
aXX' ob% bnep xox> raxvxot;;414 
For this reason a 'proof of the endless condition of the soul is required. According to 
the argument developed at 10.608d3-611a4 the soul always exists and is immortal, 
insofar as neither an evil alien to it -like the body's evils- nor its own evil -injustice-
can destroy it: 
OVKOVV bitoxe |j.T|5' ixj)' evbq dLizbXXvxai K O C K O U , |a,fixe O ' I K E ' I O D \ir\xe 
dA.Xoxpiov, SfjXov 6xi dvdyKri ocbxd dei 6v e ivar ei 8' de l 6v, 
d6dvaxov.4 1 5 
Independently of how happy and convincing this argument is 4 1 6 -or other possible 
arguments are (see 10.61 lb9-10)- as proof or demonstration for someone who does 
4 1 4 "Do you think that something which is immortal should be seriously interested in this period of 
time, and not in the whole of time?" (10.608c9-dl) 
4 1 5 "In which case, if it is not destroyed by any evil -neither its own [i.e. injustice] nor anything else's 
[i.e. the body's]- it is obvious that it must necessarily be something which always is. And if it always 
is, then it must be immortal." (10.610el0-611a2). 
4 1 6 This 'proof of immortality has been sometimes found particularly poor. See especially Annas 
(1981), pp. 344-349: "This is one of the few really embarrassingly bad arguments in Plato... "(p. 
236 
not take the immortality of the soul as a fact, 4 1 7 it has the merit of connecting the 
immortality of soul with the indestructibility of justice and injustice and so makes a 
persuasive introduction to the idea of the long-lastingness of their effects: 
...OVK dpa roxvSeivov <j>aveitai t] d8i.Kia, ei 9avdat(j,ov eaxai xcp 
Xa\x$avovxi -duaXXayfi yap &v e'^ n KaKoov- dX,X.d \1aXX0v o i i i a i 
aittTjv (|)avfiaea6ai nav xcbvavxiov...418 
1.3. Examination of the soul in its simple and purest nature: consideration of 
the soul in the light of its desire for wisdom 
In this representation of the soul the bodily aspects and miseries of the soul in our 
actual existence are put aside (as i f Glaucus were separated from the marine deposits 
that covered his real body and made him appear like a monster), so that the soul can 
be rationally examined in its essential nature: 
oiov 5' eaxiv xfj dA,r|9£ia, ov XeXcoPrnievov 5el ocbxd 9edaaa9ai vno xe 
xf)<; xox> o(b\iaxoq KOIVCDVIOCQ Kai aXXmv KaKcov, (barcep vvv t||iei<; 
9Ecb(ie9a, dXX' o16v eaxiv Ka9apdv Y!-Yv6|j.evov, xoicoxov iKavcoQ 
Xoyio\ia> 6ia9eaxeov, Kai KOXX> ye KdA-Aaov avxo ebpfiaei Kai 
evapYeaxepov 8iKaiocK)va<; xe Kai dSiKiai; 8i6\|/exai Kai Ttdvxa a vvv 
344). She is in general, in my view (and see also Halliwell (1993), p. 27, n. 38), unfairly over-
* 
severe and unsympathetic regarding the value of the whole Book 10. 
4 1 7 Thus Glaucon at 10.608d3-6: oi)K f|a8r)aai, fjv 8' eycb, 6xi aBdvaxoi; rpcov t| yxyxft 
K a i oi)8fe7toxe ajioAAvrai; - K a i bq ea(3A,e\j/aq uoi K a i 8at>u,daa? eute - ud Ai', OVK 
feycoye- ("Don't you know for a fact', I said, 'that our soul is immortal, that it never dies'. He 
looked at me in astonishment. 'Good heavens, no', he said. 'I don't know that for a fact....'). 
4 1 8 "Injustice will turn to be not such an alarming thing after all, if it really is fatal to anyone who 
catches it. It would be an escape from his troubles. But I'm much more inclined to think it will turn 
out to be the opposite...". (10.610d5-el). 
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5ifiA.9ojj.ev. vuv 8e ei7co|j.ev jxev dX.r|8fj jcepi OLVXOV, dlov ev top raxpovxi. 
(jxxivexai [...] XT^V \\fv%r\v f]|iei(; 9eco|ie9a 8iaKeifxevr|v vnb jrupicov 
KaKcSv. 4 1 9 
Such an a-priori examination of the soul requires us to consider the soul from the 
perspective of its love of wisdom because of which it longs for what is divine, 
immortal and eternal, being akin to it: 
e'i<; xf]v <j)iA.oao(|>iav ccbxfjt;, K a i evvoeiv GOV arcxexai K a i dioov e<j)iexai 
bjxiX.idov, ax; a v y y e v f ^ cGaa xep xe Beiop K a i dGavdxco K a i xcp d e i ovxi, 
K a i o i a d v yevoixo xcp xoiouxcp rcdaa e7cia7io|j.evT| K a i bnb vxi)%r\q xfji; 
bp|xf]<; eKKO|i ia9eiaa eK xov TCOVXOD ev op vvv eaxiv, K a i 
TuepiKpovaGelaa Trexpai; xe K a i oaxpea a vov a^xfi dxe yr\v 
eaxicojievTi, y£Tipa K a i TcexpcoSti TcoX.X.d K a i d y p i a TcepiTte^DKev wib xcov 
ev8ai(j.6vcov Xeyojievcov eaxidaecov. K a i x6x' dv xiq 1801 a-bxtjc; xfiv 
dX.t|9fi (|)<)aiv, eixe TCoX,\)ei8,n<; eixe li-ovoeiSfiQ, eixe OTCTJ K a i oTtax;-
vuv 8e xd ev xop dvGpcoTtivop piop 7ud0T| xe K a i e\5r|, coq eycpiiai, 
ercieiKeoQ a-bxfjq 8ieX,riX.<)9a)iev.420 
4 1 9 "But if we want to know what it [i.e. the soul] is really like, we shouldn't look at it in the form 
we currently see it in, crippled by its partnership with the body and other evils, but in its pure state. 
And that's something which can only be seen adequately by means of reason. We'll find it far more 
beautiful, and get much clearer view of justices and injustices, and all the things we have so far 
described. All we've said is the truth about the way it appears at present [... ] looking at the soul 
when it is afflicted with all these evils". (10.611bl0-d7). 
4 2 0 "[In order to consider the soul in its pure nature, we should look to] the soul's love of wisdom. We 
should bear in mind what it clings to, the kind of company it yearns for, since it is kin to that which is 
divine, immortal and always existing, and what it could become if it devoted itself entirely to this, and 
if this enthusiasm brought it up out of the sea in which it now is, striking from it the stones and shells, 
all those coarse accretions of earth and stone which have grown round it as a result of its supposedly 
'happy' feasting upon the earth. Then you should see the soul's true nature, whether is complex or 
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As we have seen in previous sections, through the development of the love of 
wisdom a person tries to attain the science of dialectics -the science of what each 
thing essentially is in relation to the other, with its foundations on the Good- and, in 
this way, to become wise, just and happy in his actual existence, as far as is possible. 
This development of the soul's desire for the truth is the only thing that counts when 
the soul is considered in its essential nature and deprived from its bodily aspects in 
the light of a possible post-mortem existence.421 
1.4. Rewards from the gods for the just man in the after-death existence of 
the soul 
I f this representation of the soul in its essential nature is done in the light of an 
eternal existence, it allows us to consider the value of justice not only in itself, as in 
the rest of the Republic, or even in light of the possible rewards and prizes from men 
and gods in this life (10.612b7-614a3): the rewards that are now taken into account 
are the ones which the just man, who has tried to be like the gods in his incarnate 
existence in as much as possible, would receive from the gods themselves after death 
(10.614a5-8) -the just man being beloved by them (Qeo^>iki]q, see 612e8-613a2)- are 
the ones now taken into account: 
OUXCDQ d p a i)7toA.T|7r,xeov nepi xov 8 iKaicm dv5po<;, edvx' ev rcevia 
yiYVTixai edvx' ev voaoi^ f\ x iv i dAAop xoov S O K O W X C O V KCCKCOV, coq xcroxco 
simple -or however exactly it is. For the moment, however, I think we have given an adequate 
description of the things that happen to it, the shapes it can assume, in human life" (10.61 lel-612a6). 
4 2 1 Thus there is no contradiction between the tripartite treatment of the soul in Book 4, which is 
more or less present in the rest of the Republic, and the consideration of the soul in its pure, simple 
nature in Book 10. Plato makes clear that in this case he is assuming a different perspective (on this 
point see Guthrie (1975), p.233 and Szlezak (1993), pp.72-75 and (1976); differently Robinson 
(1970), p. 43). In Book 4 the soul is considered associated with the bodily and so exhibiting its 
potentially irrational aspects, while in Book 10 it is examined simply in the light of its essential 
nature and desire for wisdom. 
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xavxa eiq dyaGov xi xeXevxf\aei Cfivxi f) K a i drcoGavovxi. ob yap 6f] 
\yjio ye GECOV Ttoxe dp.eXeixai bq dv 7tpoGDp.EiaGai kQeXr\ 5iKaio<; 
yiyveaGai K a i £7CIXT|8E\)CDV dpexfiv E ' K ; OCTOV Suvaxov dvGpctmcp 
bp.oio-uaGai GECD 4 2 2 
2.The eschatological myth: being what we desire in the light of eternity and in 
the framework of a cosmic order 
The post-mortem destiny of the soul is presented in Book 10 of the Republic through 
an eschatological myth fu l l of rich imagery. The value and function of this myth 
needs briefly to be outlined within the framework of Plato's complex attitude to the 
use of myths. 
Plato's abundant use of myth and his general reflections on poetry suggest that, 
though to be condemned when uncritically used,423 story-telling is valued and well-
considered if it is put at the service of philosophical teaching. Like the eschatological 
myths of the Phaedo, Gorgias and Phaedrus or the creational myth of the Timaeus, 
the myth of Republic 10 either expresses what is not in itself expressible by means of 
4 "In the same way, we must take it that if the just man falls into poverty or sickness, or any of the 
other things which are generally regarded as evils, it will turn out well for him either in his lifetime 
or after his death. He will never be neglected by the gods if he is willing to be serious about 
becoming just, practise virtue, and become as much like a god as it is possible for a man to be". 
(10.613a4-bl). 
4 2 3 In Republic II myths are condemned when they misrepresent the real nature of the gods. 
Superficial rationalistic interpretations of myths are also rejected for example at Phaedr. 229c ff. 
through Socrates' critical reflections on sophistic exegesis of the story of Boreas and Orithuia. As 
he says at Phaedr. 275b-c, in the end what really matters in relation to any story is whether the tale 
expresses something true or not. On this point see also Halliwell (1993), p.27, n.32 and Szlezak 
(1993), pp. 96-97. 
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a philosophical argument on its own 4 2 4 or suggests through images something not 
susceptible at present to a complete conceptual explanation.425 
We are told that this myth is a narrative once given by Er, a man who, by being able 
to come back from the kingdom of the dead, could remember what things are like 
there. Human beings normally forget these post-mortem experiences along with then-
previous lives given that all souls, before taking up again an incarnate existence, are 
obliged to drink from the River of Carelessness (raxpd xbv ' A[LeXr\za 7UOTa(i6v, 
621a5)426 and then to cross the River of Forgetfulness (Lethe, 621cl-2). Through this 
the soul is plunged into oblivion of its previous vicissitudes or blessings. The unusual 
nature of Er's experience underlines the hypothetical character of what we are told 
through this myth: in fact, nobody can assert anything concrete regarding a possible 
existence after death. However, the myth opens to us the possibility of a wider 
comprehension insofar as ideas that have already been treated in the previous books 
of the Republic and in the points inmediately before the myth are now brought 
together into a holistic picture with other new isssues. According to the myth, the 
development of our desire for wisdom (i.e. our essential condition as human beings) 
is taken into account not only under the perspective of an eternal existence -as in the 
preliminaries to the eschatological story- but also under that of a cosmological order: 
4 2 4 Thus [ivdoc, represents what Xoyoq fails to explain. Halliwell (1993), p.17 follows this kind of 
interpretation. 
4 2 5 In consequence a uu0o<; as a whole can potentially be rendered as Xbyoq. See esp. Gorg. 523a. 
However, because of its power of communicating the truth in an intuitive form, UU0O£ preserves 
its own characteristics and advantages over (see Szlezak (1993), p.98). Some scholars 
have even suggested that through myths, such as the one of Republic 10, Plato means to present 
alternative/opposite views to the ones developed through the philosophical arguments so that the 
reader has to arrive at his own conclusion regarding these debatable matters (see McCabe (1992)). 
4 2 6 1 think that the most appropriate way of understanding that the souls drink water from xov 
' A\ikXr\ta noxau6v is that they drink water of 'carelessness' in the sense that they are not any 
longer equipped with knowledge (if they ever were): they will need to strive for its acquisition in 
their new incarnate life. Forgetfulness of this knowledge takes place, more precisely, by the souls 
passing across the plain of Oblivion (621a2-3) and the Lethe river (621cl-2). 
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once our souls are in a disembodied state, our deeds during our incarnate life are 
either rewarded with a (periodic) ful l contemplation of the Forms or punished in 
ways that accord with cosmic justice; the choice of our future incarnate lives is 
presented as depending on the extent to which we develop our knowledge of what is 
good and bad in our present existence and as being woven into the destiny of the 
world. 4 2 7 
More specifically, four possible kinds of eternal existence -including both an 
embodied and disembodied states- are open to us according to the degree of 
development of our desire for the truth: a) those who have been philosophers in this 
life enjoy a god-like existence after death and, having knowledge, are able to choose 
a good kind of new incarnate life afterwards. I f they are again philosophers, they wil l 
escape again from the cycle of pain, b) Those who have had an ordinary life and not 
been always just are punished when in a disembodied state and do not have the 
knowledge to choose a better new kind of life. Nevertheless, they may do it and so 
manage to escape from the cycle of sufferings next time, c) Those who have not been 
philosophers but had a sort o/just kind of life are rewarded with celestial enjoyments 
but might prefer to reincarnate in the worst kind of existence due to their lack of 
knowledge and so come back to a cycle of misery, d) Those who have lived in an 
extremely unjust way are tormented forever and not allowed to enter a body again. 
Never again do they have the choice of escaping their existence of suffering. 
4 7 On the representation through the myth of a rationally organized universe see Guthrie (1975), p. 
558 and Halliwell (1993), pp. 17, 20 and 176-183. Plato's astronomical model might have a basis 
in astronomical conceptions of the time (see Halliwell (1993), pp. 180 and 19-20). However, his 
interest is not so much to give an astronomical description but to reveal the metaphysical 
implications of this astronomical order (see Halliwell (1993), p. 180). As McCabe (1992), pp. 63-
64 points out in relation to the Timaeus, Plato's conception of the universe goes beyond the data of 
sense-perception and presupposes a teleological/ethical understanding of it, either framed within an 
intentionalist model or a natural, organic conception of the cosmos. Similarly Sedley (1989) 
suggests that the eschatological myth of the Phaedo supposes a teleological conception of the 
universe and at the same time provides some specific cosmological explanations. 
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In this way, according to a literal reading of the story, the reader wi l l see it as 
describing the consequences of living or not living according to reason's desire for 
the truth and the real good or not in a post-mortem existence, which is part of an 
endless cycle of reincarnation within a mathematically ordered universe. 
2.1. Understanding the deeds of human beings in their embodied existences 
within the frame of a cosmic justice 
The myth describes the soul as continuously existing by always reincarnating itself 
again in a body after a thousand-year pilgrimage of either earthly sufferings or 
heavenly enjoyments in accordance with the merits or demerits of its previous life. 
There are obscure points in this story of reincarnation: e.g. about what kind of 
identity can be retained through different re-embodiments, especially i f memory of 
our previous 'lives' is removed.428 However, it has the fundamental merit of 
successfully combining within it two of the points previously proposed in Book 10: 
the imperishable condition of our souls and, alongside it, the indestructibility of the 
acts of justice or injustice committed in our embodied -present- existences. It also in 
some way represents the impossibility for human beings -even in the case of the 
philosopher- of escaping permanently from an impure, limited existence.429 
The doctrine of reincarnation allows us also to envisage, in some way, the sequence 
of life and death for human beings and animals as part of a continuous process 
pertaining to the whole universe within the perspective of eternity.430 The images of 
the myth presented at 616b-617d make us conceive this universe as being 
mathematically structured and subject to an inevitable order:431 the revolutions of the 
heavenly bodies -sun, moon, planets and fixed stars moving around the earth- are 
4 2 8 See Halliwell (1993), pp. 21-22. 
4 2 9See Halliwell (1993), p. 23. 
4 3 0 Similarly Archer-Hind (1973) [1894], pp. xiv ff. in his commentary on the argument from 
JKxXiYYeveaia in the Phaedo. 
4 3 1 See above n. 427. 
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described as being like whorls which, by virtue of being inserted inside the other, 
produce in their rotation the 'music' or 'harmony' of the cosmos. They are all moved 
by the spindle of Necessity, which 'weaves', with the help of her three daughters -the 
Fates-, not only the astral movements but also the destinies of human beings. Thus 
each human life with its bad or good deeds is now to be understood as having 
contributed to this cosmic justice and, in consequence, as receiving punishments or 
rewards for them according to the rational order of the cosmos which despatches 
souls to different areas of the universes so that they have their prizes and penalties 
distributed in mathematical proportions. This is expressed in the myth as follows: the 
disembodied souls are either rewarded with a journey of one thousand years through 
the heavenly regions or punished by suffering in diverse ways inside the earth for a 
millennium;4 3 2 the punishment or reward is ten times worse or better than the good or 
bad action committed in life (10.605a-c). The length of one hundred years is also 
attributed to a regular embodied existence. What matters here is not indeed the 
accuracy of the figures but Plato's intention of showing through them that human 
existence is integrated within a wider, metaphysical framework of cosmic justice 
which is mathematically determined. In this understanding both of two things are 
true: on one hand, we choose our destinies because the punishments and rewards 
depend on whether we have preferred to live our previous lives in a just or unjust 
way; on the other hand, the consequences of how we have chosen to live are 
contained within a fatalistic, cosmic organization, which transcends us and from 
which we cannot escape. 
But not only do our disembodied destinies depend on this greater order: our 
reincarnations and new lives are simultaneously determined by it, as well as by 
ourselves. After the souls, having returned from their happy or painful pilgrimage in 
4 3 2 The "sadistic hell", as Annas says (1981), p. 351 depicted for the incurable tyrants by Plato in 
Book 10 seems to contradict the advice given at 3.386b-c that is not to tell terrifying stories to the 
young guardians about the underworld as they must not fear death. Did Plato maybe think that this 
kind of terrorizing story was, nevertheless, beneficial for adults who have followed the long 
arguments of the Republic! Might he be suggesting that is in fact 'hell' to be forever at a distance 
from the good universally desired? 
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a disembodied state for a millennium, rest in a meadow, they contemplate the order 
of the universe and get ready to choose a new mortal existence. This selection is in a 
certain degree limited as it is made according to an order which is established 
randomly -the lots which lie on the lap of the Fate Lachesis and are haphazardly 
thrown by the prophet - so that the souls which are in the final positions have fewer 
types of lives available to choose from (617d). Moreover, once each soul has chosen 
its form of life -the types of lives also being kept on the lap of Lachesis-, Lachesis 
gives to each of them a 8 a i ( X C O V , 4 3 3 who wil l look after its life and execute its choices 
(10.620d-e; see also 617e). Then, after their destinies are tied to each soul and sealed 
by her sisters Clotho and Atropos, the souls go underneath the throne of Necessity 
(10.620e-621a). A l l these elements underline that our embodied existences are 
subject to a fatalism according to which our only choice seems to be the selection 
among the lives available to us at that moment. However, the development of or 
failure to develop virtue and love of the truth in our embodied existences -a 
development which makes us prefer the life of the just not only now but also after 
death- is up to us in as much as we are co-workers in and directly responsible for the 
weaving of our destinies. The god is not to blame. 
2.2. Kinds of existences for human beings from the perspective of eternity 
and the development of reason's desire for the truth 
As seen above, the doctrine of reincarnation present in the story narrated by Er sums 
up the points previously introduced in Book 10: the indestructibility of the soul 
together with its justice and injustice and its examination in its disembodied state 
from the perspective of eternity. The myth also picks up on another crucial point 
from the preliminaries: our soul in its purest, truest, simplest nature is constituted by 
its desire for the truth. The development of reason's desire for wisdom determines 
not only how close we get to the attainment of the real good in our present life but, 
4 3 3 Scducov comes from the verb Sotlouca that means 'to allot, allocate, distribute, assign 
portions', and fundamentally refers to a destiny given to a human being by the gods. On this 
meaning see/A/, s.v. Sodurov and Chantraine (1968) and Griffith (2000), p. 341, n. 28. 
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above all, in our post-mortem existence and future reincarnations. For the whole of 
eternity the dialectical knowledge of justice founded in the knowledge of the Good 
gained through a philosophical way of life is what takes us as close as is possible for 
a human being to the good universally desired and, in this way, to the reward of a 
god-like existence. Thus, although, as shown above, our deeds in our embodied 
existence meet an unavoidable reckoning in the cosmic justice of a universe 
mathematically organized and in this sense our lives are subject to destiny, we 
nevertheless choose how we take part in this inevitable fate by living or not living a 
philosophical life and, consequently, what we desire to be. 
2.2.1. Kinds of disembodied existence and necessary reincarnation according 
to the leading desire in our present life 
Er reports how, after we die as a compound of soul and body, our souls in a state of 
disembodiment are judged so that they are sent on a thousand-year journey either of 
enjoyment through the heavenly regions or of different degrees of suffering inside the 
earth. These delights or torments are described by the souls who have just returned 
from their millennial pilgrimage: 
5iKaaxd<; 8e (xexa -^u xotixcov K C C O T I C T G C X I , O \>Q, erceiSfi 8ia8iKdaeiav, xovq 
(xev SiKcdcnx; KeXeveiv Jtope-ueaGai xrjv eiq 8e£idv xe Kcti dvco 8id xo-u 
ot>pavou..xo\)Q 8e dSiiccnx; xfjv e'i<; dpiaxepdv xe K O C I Kdxco [...]. 
5iT]Yeicr9ai 8e aXXr\Xaiq xdq nev b5\)po|i.eva<; xe K C C I KXCLOVGOLC,, 
dva|ii|j.vTic7KO|i£va<; boa xe Kcxi diet rcdOoiev Kai iSoiev ev xfj vnb yr\q 
Jtopeia -eivai 8e xf]v Jiopeiav y\k\tvc\- xac, 8' a-G etc xo-o cbpavov 
emaBeiai; 8iT|yeia0ai m i Geai; a^rw&voxic, xd KaXXoq.m 
3 4 "In between were seated judges, who when they gave their judgements ordered the just to take 
the way which led to the right and upwards, through the heavens [... ]. The unjust they ordered to 
take the left hand, downward way. [...] As they (i.e. the returning souls) exchanged accounts, the 
first group were wailing and weeping as they recalled all the terrible things they had seen and 
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Thus, the myth suggests that in some way a life of justice wi l l be rewarded within an 
ordered cosmos by joining what is good, an unjust life with an existence "inside the 
earth" or, in other words, far from the god-like enjoyments of the heavenly regions. 
In this sense human life appears as a part of the destiny of a universe which Plato 
conceives as being ordered for (and by) the good. But, although this cosmic weaving 
operates far beyond our power to influence it, nevertheless, we have had our choice 
in our incarnate existence of living justly or unjustly and developing or failing to 
develop reason's desire for the truth and the real good. 
Similarly through its explanation of how souls reassume new incarnate existences the 
myth also depicts how the achievement of a just or unjust existence in this life 
through the development or failure to develop reason's desire for the truth meets its 
retribution in the general justice of the cosmos. Insofar as, at that moment, only if the 
person has previously practised philosophy, is he able to recognize and choose a just 
life, what we continue to be in our embodied existence depends once again upon 
whether or not in our previous incarnate life we have tried to achieve dialectical 
knowledge by the development of love of wisdom of our soul: 
. . . K C C I Sid xocuxa |idA,iaxa e7ci|a.eX.r|xeov 6TCCO<; eicaaxoi; t||a,cov X C D V dAAcov 
|ia9r||j,dxcov diaeA/rjaag xauxau xc/u |ia0fi|i.axo<; icai ^ T I X T I X T I ? K O U 
|ia9r|xf|Q eaxai, edv JtoGev dioq x' fj (laGeiv K O C I k^evpeiv xic, avxbv 
7ioifiaei Swaxov Kai eTciaxTpova, piov iced %pr\ox6v K C U Ttovipov 
SiayiYvcbaKovxa, xdv PeA.xico £ K X C O V Suvaxoov del 7uavxaxo-o dipeiaGar 
[...], cbaxe e£ drcdvxcov avxcov 5wax6v eivai a-uXXoyiadiievov 
a'ipeiaGai, Ttpd^ xf]v xfji; yv%r\c, tyvoiv d7to|3A.E7i:ovxa, xov xe %eipa> KCLI 
xdv dixeivco piov, X E I P 0 0 M-e y KaXovvxa bq ocbxf)v eKe iae d^ei, eic, xo 
dSiKcoxepav yiyveaGai, diieivco 8e 6axi<; eiQ x6 SiKaioxepav. xd 8^  
experienced in their journey -their thousand-year journey- beneath the earth. Those who had come 
from the heavens, by contrast, were recounting the wonderful things that had happened to them and 
indescribably beautiful sights they had seen." (10.614c3-615a4). 
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aXXa Tt&vToc xccipeiv e&aev ecopa.Kap.ev yap on £CDUTI re KOCI 
xeXevrrjaauxi CCVTTJ Kpaxiaxr] aipecrig.435 
So again the choice of the soul of its new incarnate life is determined by whether or 
not its desire for truth and knowledge of the Good was developed during its 
embodied existence. 
In this sense four kinds of existences from the perspective of eternity are open to us: 
a) People who have committed certain unjust actions in their embodied life receive 
punishment in their discarnate existence (10.615al-3). Given that they have not 
practised philosophy and achieved knowledge of the Good, they wil l probably 
continue failing to choose the best kinds of life. The new choice of life made by these 
souls is influenced by the habits, desires and experiences that have dominated their 
previous life (10.620a2ff.). For example, someone like Atalanta, who loved 
masculine pursuits, chooses the life of an athlete; Epeius, the designer of the Trojan 
horse, chooses the life of a female artist out of his love for arts; Odysseus opts for an 
uneventful, obscure life after the sufferings endured in his erratic, adventurous 
existence. Others prefer lives of animals: Orpheus chooses the musical life of a swan 
but avoids a human kind of existence in order to prevent being conceived in a 
woman's womb, due to his bad experiences with women in his previous life; brave 
Ajax takes the life of a courageous lion and Agamemnon the life of a royal eagle. As 
they cannot knowingly choose a just life, they never attain a permanent non-painful 
4 3 5 " It is why the greatest care must be directed towards having each and every one of us disregard all 
other branches of study, and be a follower and student of this branch of ours, in the hope that he can 
learn and discover who it is who will give him the ability and knowledge to distinguish the good life 
from the bad, and choose always and everywhere, out of all those possible, the life which is better. 
[...] Taking all these things into consideration, he must be able to choose, defining the worse and 
better life with reference to the nature of the soul, calling that worse which leads the soul along the 
road to greater injustice, and that better which leads the soul along the road of greater justice. He will 
not pay attention to anything else. After all, this is the crucial choice, as we have seen, both during his 
lifetime and after his death." (10.618b7-e4). 
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and a regular god-like condition insofar as they have not developed the love of 
wisdom of their soul and striven for the attainment of knowledge of what is good. In 
consequence, they wil l probably remain at a distance for a indefinite time from the 
fulfilment of their desire for the real good as well as for a god-like existence. 
However, provided they choose a human life, they wil l still have the chance of, at 
times, having a just life during their incarnate existence and at least temporarily leave 
an existence of misery. 
b) People who by chance -not by knowledge- have had a sort of virtuous kind of 
incarnate life receive in their disembodied state the reward of a god-like existence of 
celestial blessings for one thousand years. However, insofar as they have not tried to 
attain knowledge of the Good in their previous incarnate lives and here attained 
virtue only by habit (10.619c7-dl), they also might not only not choose a right kind 
of life -as in the case of the people of category a) above- but might even prefer a 
tyrannical life (10.619b7-d3) because of their ignorance. Through the possibility of 
this choice being made by people who have had a just life just accidentally -not 
knowingly- Plato surely wants to underline that only virtue acquired through wisdom 
can assure regular ownership of the real good as far as is possible for a human being. 
c) People who have been irredeemably evil are tormented forever and are thus always 
separated from the real good universally desired. They have no escape from their 
misery as they can never be reincarnated again and achieve a better existence, 
remaining for ever in Tartarus (see for example the case of Ardiaeus and other tyrants 
at 10.615c5-616a7). 
d) Finally, those who have had a philosophical life and striven for the attainment of 
knowledge of the Good not only achieve the reward of a thousand-years of the 
enjoyment of heavenly happiness in their discarnate existence (like those of category 
b) above, who have attained virtue by habit) but also get the highest prize of being 
able to correctly choose a virtuous kind of new incarnate existence, as they possess 
wisdom and knowledge of the Good (10.618b6ff.). As a consequence, a continuous 
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ownership of the real good as far as is possible for a human being is available only to 
them.4 3 6 
In this way, i f in our present condition, our other sources of motivation having being 
rightly orientated in the early childhood, we develop reason's desire for truth and 
attain an internally just state in our soul and with it happiness, this also allows us the 
enjoyment of happiness and sharing of what is good and beautiful after life. This god-
like immortality would also bring us as far as is possible to possession of the real 
good which is universally desired during the time of our disembodied existence. By 
contrast, if we happened to choose to live unjustly during our incarnate existence, we 
do not only encounter misery in this life: we also attain after death only a second-rate 
immortality and experience greater penalties according to the order of the universe. 
2.2.2. Desire and determinism 
It has often been pointed out that4 3 7 determinism seems to predominate in Plato's 
proposal given that after this primeval decision of what type of life we choose to live 
we are tied to it as a destiny.438 However, this element of the myth might indicate 
rather that, although all of us are bora with a certain tyiioic, and T\Qoq and in certain 
circumstances, we do not choose either,439 it is again up to us how we choose to live 
4 3 6 This discrimination of different kinds of post-mortem lives is slightly different from that which 
appears in the geographical myth of the Phaedo at 113a-3. Nevertheless, the differences can be 
explained, I think, in relation to the diverse focuses of the two dialogues, the ultimate meaning of 
the different kinds of post-mortem existences remaining the same. 
4 3 7 Halliwell (1993), pp. 21-23 consistently points out many problematic elements of this sort in the 
myth in this respect. See also Annas (1981), p. 350, who in general dismisses the myth as "a 
painful shock" (p. 349). 
4 3 8 See above Chapter 2, Section IV, 2.1. Understanding of the deeds of human beings in their 
embodied existences within a cosmic justice, pp. 242 ff.. 
4 3 9 The assumption that human beings have different nature and characters is presupposed in the 
educative and political project of the Republic and clearly symbolized in the myth of the races. 
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this l i fe . 4 4 0 As the prophet who throws the lots to establish in what order the souls 
wil l choose their new life says, all of us have the opportunity to have a valuable life 
and of living it thoroughly: 
Koci xeA-evxcdco em6vxt, £\)v vop eXop.evcp, ovvxbvcaq £covxi Keixoci |3io<; 
dyaTtTTCOQ, oij K C X K O Q . 4 4 1 
The exception might be those who irresponsibly choose a tyrannical life, i.e. who 
have this kind of disposition or nature. At 10.617d6-e5 it is also emphasised that 
there is no established destiny but rather each individual is the maker/craftsman of 
the virtue of his own l i fe : 4 4 2 
dv&YKT|Q Qvyaxpbc, Kopr|<; Aax,saeco<; X6yo<;. ^Vvxal e^fpepca, apxri 
aXXr\q nepibdov 9vr|xo'u ykvovq 9avaxr|<|)6pou ov% x>\i.aq 8ai(icov 
Xrfeexai, OLXX' v\i.elq 8aip:ova oupfiaeaGe. icpcwxoQ 5' b Xa%d>v 7tpo3xo<; 
dipeia9co (3iov cp auveaxai e£ avayicru;. dpexrj 8e dtSeanoxov, f\v xipcov 
jcai axipdfav nXeov KCLI eXaxxou abxfjg ^Kaaxoq e^ei. aixia 
eXopevov Bedg dvaixiog.w 
4 4 0 The frequency of aipeaiQ and its derivatives in the whole narration of the eschatological myth 
are remarkable. 
4 4 1 "Even the last to come forward, provided he chooses sensibly and lives with integrity, has a 
worthwhile life before him, not a bad life". (10.619b3-5). 
4 4 2 For a similar interpretation of the myth see Crombie (1962), p. 374. 
4 4 3 "The word of the maiden Lachesis, daughter of Necessity. Souls, creatures of a day, here begins 
another cycle of mortal life and the death it brings. Your guardian spirit will not be given to you by lot. 
You will choose your guardian spirit for yourselves. Let the one who draws the first lot be the first to 
choose life. He will be then joined to it by Necessity. Virtue knows no master. Your respect or 
contempt for it will give each of you a greater or smaller share.The choice makes you responsible. 
God is not responsible." (10.617d6-e5) 
251 
It has also been suggested that Plato's scheme does not leave any room even for 
improvement444 insofar as all the souls walk through the meadow of Forgetfulness 
(10.621a2-3), drink from the river of Carelessness (10.621a5) and cross the river 
Lethe before reassuming an embodied existence (10.621cl-2).4 4 5 However, perhaps 
amusingly, perhaps also significantly, it is suggested that, although all souls lose their 
memory of all the things that they have seen, given that they are obliged to drink 
from the waters of Carelessness, certain of them who are not guided by 4>p6vr|CTi<; 
drink too much: 
(xexpov \\kv ovv xi xox> vbaxoc, ndow avayKociov e i v a i juieiv, rovg Si 
(ppovfjaei jur/ aco^ofieuovq nXeov mvew rov juerpov xdv 5£ aei movxa 
rcdvxcov ETtiA-avGdveaGai.446 
This might suggest that it is possible, when we are advised by reason, not to drink too 
much and, thus, though temporarily forgetting, to be able at least partially to 
remember by virtue of an appropriate education the understanding of what a good life 
and a bad one are like, the rewards and punishments that we might receive in the 
framework of a mathematically ordered cosmos and the beautiful visions of the 
heavenly regions that the just souls contemplate. Thus, as in other dialogues such as 
Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus, &vct[J.VT)CTi<; of what we once knew would be possible 
in this life or, in other words, the attainment of dialectical knowledge through the 
development of reason's desire for the truth is an open possibility for all of us.447 In 
fact, as we have seen, the only guarantee of the enjoyment of a happy and just 
condition in our embodied life as well as in our disembodied existence lies in the 
4 4 4 Halliwell (1993), p.22 says that the whole scheme seems to suggest rather a retrogression than a 
progression through the reincarnated existences. 
4 4 5 See above n. 426. 
4 4 6 "Drinking a limited amount of the water was compulsory for all of them, but those who were not 
saved by reason drank more than a limited amount. And as each drank, he forgot everything he had 
seen." (10.621a6-bl) 
4 4 7 See Halliwell (1993), p. 21. 
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achievement of this wisdom and in nothing else. Once again, the consideration of 
what a post-mortem existence would be like is fundamentally focused on the 
development now and here of a philosophical way of life that wi l l enable us to attain, 
in as far as is possible for a human being, knowledge of truth and so the eternal 
possession of the good universally desired. 
2.3. The two levels of interpretation of the myth 
2.3.1. Diachronic understanding of the myth: regular post-mortem attainment 
of the eternal possession of the good 
Thus, as shown above, a more literal, diachronic interpretation of the myth is 
available for anyone who is able to believe in the immortality of the soul and to open 
his mind to a wider comprehension (whether or not it is possible to render this wider 
comprehension through a ful l conceptual explanation or not). In this case, he wi l l be 
able to understand that the myth of the end of Republic both asserts that human life is 
part of the order of the universe and in this sense subject to a destiny but, at the same 
time, without contradiction, that we are co-constructors of this destiny by virtue of 
choices made in our present existence as whether we live or fail to live a life led by 
reason's desire for the truth. 4 4 8 If we always choose to be philosophers, we wil l be 
able regularly to enjoy for a millennium an existence in the company of the gods and 
not only now but also forever be able to get as close as possible to the eternal 
possession of the good which is universally desired (provided we continue choosing a 
philosophical way of life). 
enei ei Tig del, bnoxe eig TOP evGdSe fiiov dfyiKvoixo, vyicog <piAocro<p6i 
iced b icXfjpoQ avxco xfj<; cc'ipeaecoq [ir\ fev TEA.£a)Taioi<; J I I I C T O I , K I V S D V E V E I 
...ob novov kvddde evSaijuoueiv dp, dXXd /cai TTJV eudeuSe e/ceicre Kcci 
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Sevpo ndXiv nopeiav OVK av xQoviav Kai xpaxsiocv nopevecdai, alXd 
Xeiav xe Kai oi)pauiav.m 
Thus someone who believes in the indestructibility of the soul together with its 
justice or injustice and in its participation in a wider cosmic justice wi l l feel -so 
perhaps Plato hopes- even more committed to practise a life of philosophy and virtue, 
insofar as he wil l think himself as constructing his destiny of happiness and getting 
closer to the possession of the good not only for the present time but for ever, such 
that he might gain a god-like existence in so far as is possible for a human being: 
bXk' dv e|ioi TteiGcbiaeGa, vopA^ovxei; dGdvaxov y\)%r\v Kai 8waxfiv 
irdvxa |iev Kaicd dvexecjGai, icdvxa 5e dyaGd, xfj<; dvco bdov del 
e^ojieGa KOCI 8iKaioawr|v \iexd ^povfiaecoq rcavxi xpo7ccp 
ejiixTiSe-uaoiiev, iva Kai T||J,IV ai)xdi(; (J)i?ioi &\iev Kai X O I Q G E O I Q , abxov 
xe |ievovxe<; evGdSe, Kai ejcei8dv xd dGXa a-uxfjq KO|ii^cb|j.eGa, o^anep 
oi viKt|(t)6poi 7uepiaY£ip6|i.£voi, Kai evGdSe Kai ev xr\ %ikieTEi juopeia, 
fjv SieX'nX'uGaixev, EV Tipdxxcofiev.450 
4 4 8 Similarly in Heraclitus we find the assertion that everything happens according to the Xbyoq in 
22B1 and at the same time that all men, including the 'sleeping ones', collaborate with what 
happens in the world (22B75). 
4 4 9 "However, if there is anyone who every time he enters this life here, consistently pursues 
philosophy in the right way, then provided the way the lot falls out does not put him among the last to 
choose, the chances are...«or only that he will be happy here, but also that his journey from here [i.e. 
incarnate existence] to there [i.e. disembodied existence] and back again will be along the smooth, 
heavenly road, not the rough, terrestrial one". (10.619d7-e5) 
4 5 0 "And if we take my advice, we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of coping with all 
evils and all goods, and we shall keep always to the upper way, doing whatever we can to practise 
justice with wisdom. That way we shall be friends to ourselves and to the gods, both while remaining 
here and when we carry off our prizes afterwards, like winning athletes on their victory tour. And so, 
here and on the thousand-year journey we have described, let us fare well." (10.621c3-d3). 
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2.3.2. Synchronic understanding of the myth: temporary achievement now 
and here of a god-like condition 
However, the complexity of the myth simultaneously also allows the reader to choose 
other interpretations of it. 
An a priori consideration of the soul only in the light of its desire for wisdom -the 
sort of examination proposed in the preliminaries-451 is also possible in our present 
existence so that only the degree to which we develop in this life the essential 
rational essence of our soul is taken into account, while its aspects related to the 
bodily are left aside. In the light of this interpretation, the rewards and punishments 
of men after death452 could also be translated into terms of our present existence. 
Thus, the person who has a tyrannical way of life and is dominated by his lawless 
desires remains always separated from the good. The man who does not develop the 
rational nature of his soul properly and is neither completely just nor completely 
unjust has an existence in which pains and enjoyments are mixed; in some cases he 
might come to resemble an animal because of the lack of development of his reason. 
The just man achieves for the moment a god-like condition and, alongside it, the 
possession of the good universally desired. Nevertheless only the philosopher who is 
able knowingly to choose this kind of life can expect a regular enjoyment of this 
condition or at least not to end up by choosing, because of ignorance or lack of 
knowledge, the most unjust kind of life. 
The possibility of this kind of reading has made authors like Annas think that the 
myth is in fact only an allegory of our choices in our present life and not a serious 
suggestion of what our existence would be like after death. Thus: 
4 1 See above 1. Preliminary points to the eschatological myth: everlasting justice and injustice of 
the soul in the light of its desire for the truth and from the perspective of eternity, pp. 234 ff.. 
4 5 2 See above 2.2.1. Kinds of disembodied existence and necessary reincarnation according to 
the leading desire in our present life, pp. 245 ff.. 
255 
"Plato is not seriously suggesting that we have lived other lives and been through 
their consequences in heaven and hell, but only that our decisions, though they are 
bound to reflect the character we already have (602a) reflect also our awareness of 
the kind of life we are choosing to live and its results [ . . . ] . If we take the myth this 
way, then Plato is saying that we punish or reward ourselves now in choosing bad or 
good lives." 4 5 3 
It is true that the myth could be taken as a useful and edifying allegory which gives 
symbolic reinforcement to arguments already developed in favour of a just and 
philosophical way of life. In this case, the story narrated by Er at least illustrates for 
the benefit of the sceptic, who might not accept the immortality of the soul,4 5 4 what 
all the previous books of the Republic have tried to teach him: i f we choose to live 
under the guidance of reason's desire for the truth, this brings us justice and, together 
with it, happiness and a god-like condition, for we are able to understand and know 
which forms of life are good and which ones are bad; i f we prefer to have our lives 
guided by other desires (the love of honour of the 'spirited' part or the appetites), we 
only choose by habit and experience and so might prefer unjust lives or animal-like 
lives. The eternity of this kind of existence that each of us choose could also be 
reinterpreted in the following way: insofar as the choices that constitute each 
person's life are irreversible, through them we seal forever what our brief time of 
existence wi l l be definitely, even if everything finishes with death. Rewards and 
punishments are also involved in this case too: the prize of the just man -even if 
suffering human injustice- is to contribute through his actions to the justice of 
universe (while also in fact having the best kind of life available); the punishment of 
the evil person is to remain at a distance from it. 
4 5 3 Annas (1981), pp. 351-352. See also Halliwell (1993) p. 22 
4 5 4 Thus Glaucon at 10.608d3-6:- oi)K f)a8T|Cca, fjv 8' eyco, on (JtSdvaxoc, r|jj.63v r| XJ/'UX'H 
iced obdenoxe ait6X,A/urai; - Kcd be, euPXevyac, uoi KCXI Gauudaac, e'tue- ud Ai', 
oi)K feycoye- (" 'Don't you know for a fact', I said, 'that our soul is immortal, that it never dies' 
He looked at me in astonishment. 'Good heavens, no', he said, 'I don't know that for a fact.'"). 
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Nevertheless, this allegorical understanding of the myth which might make sense 
even to the sceptic does not need to rule out a wider comprehension of it. Those who 
accept the immortality of the soul can follow Plato further first of all in a diachronic 
-more literal- understanding of the myth. They wil l be able to envisage what a post-
mortem existence would be like in the light of eternity as well as in the framework of 
a just and mathematically ordered universe and so to understand that only a regular 
choice of the philosophical way of life is rewarded after death with a regular 
attainment of the good universally desired. But in addition to this, and at the same 
time and without contradiction, an interpretation of a synchronic type is also open to 
us: i f we develop our love for truth, we might have access in this life at times -when 
knowing the Good- to a god-like condition and take part briefly in eternity according 
to the justice of the cosmos. This immortality in life and experience of eternity could 
be taken as an anticipation of what things might be like when after death we lose our 
bodily limitations. 
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C H A P T E R I I I : Conclusion. Understanding the Symposium in the light of the 
Republic 
In this last chapter it wi l l be shown how questions which remain unsolved in the 
Symposium find a proper answer i f we take the Republic into consideration. 
1. Different ways of looking for and understanding the good universally 
desired in the light of the theory of the tripartite soul of the Republic 
The first question put at the end of the chapter on the Symposium was why, 
although all human beings desire the good, the erotic current can be directed to 
diverse goals (physical training, business, philosophy (Symp. 205dl-8)), to 
different forms of procreation (biological procreation; cultural procreation (Symp. 
206b78) of "images of virtue" (Symp. 212a4); procreation, in contact with Beauty 
itself, of "true virtue" (Symp. 212a4-7), and even away from the real good (as in 
the case of Alcibiades). The tripartite theory of the soul of the Republic offers an 
articulated explanation of these facts. 
Insofar as, as seen above, all human beings possess a rational aspect -the 
Axyyicmicov- which desires the real good and, alongside it, the truth, the desire 
for the attainment of the good is universal. In fact, reason's desire for wisdom is 
what constitutes our essence as human beings.455 Nevertheless, not everybody is 
able to attain the good universally desired given that the achievement of it requires 
wisdom in order to recognize it (Rep. 6.505d5-506a7) and reason's passion is not 
the only 'stream' of desire within our souls. There are two other 'currents' within 
each human being: the current of the appetites, which attempts their satisfaction, 
independently of their goodness or badness; and the 'current' of the 'spirited' part 
4 5 5 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 3. The A.OYIOTIK6V, esp. 3.1. The leading desire of the 
rational part: desire for the truth.; 3.2. Desire for the truth and desire for the real good. The 
XoyiOTiKOV's understanding or misunderstanding of the real good, pp. 173 ff.. 
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which looks for victory and honour.456 This last aspect of us is bivalent: it 
sometimes works as an ally of the rational part and thus helps to drive the soul in 
the direction of what is good and true; it sometimes operates on its own and goes 
irrationally for its goals so that it is finally weakened, subdued and dragged along 
by the appetites. These 'streams' of desire are often in conflict with each other -
especially the irrational appetites of the e7ii8\)(j.T|XiK6v and the rational part; the 
'spirited' takes part on one or the other side of the conflict. 4 5 7 In the end, with the 
help of the kind of education received, one of the three currents dominates each 
person's life and drags the other two in that direction (although the dominion of 
the 6D |iOEi8eQ wi l l be in principle precarious given that, i f not helping reason, it 
is finally enfeebled by the appetitive part). Thus three types of human being are 
depicted according to what kind of epcoQ leads their lives: the lover of wealth, the 
lover of honour and the lover of truth (Rep. 9.581c). This tripartite classification 
overlaps with a distinction made but not explained in the Symposium according to 
which people love, look for immortality and strive for the eternal possession of the 
good in three fundamental ways: some focus their lives on biological procreation; 
others crave for fame through cultural productions; finally, a few of them are 
passionate for the truth. 4 5 8 
According to Socrates/Diotima in the Symposium the truest and highest expression 
of Eros/epax;, at least in human beings, is to be a fylkoootyoc, and, at the same 
time, a procreator of true virtue. 4 5 9 From developments found in the Republic a 
coherent explanation of this can be established: only a lover of truth, i.e. a 
4 5 6 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 1. The ETUGUHTTUKOV , pp. 127 ff. and 2. The 0uuo£i5e<;, 
pp. 148 ff.. 
4 5 7 See above Chapter 2, Section I: The deduction of the parts of the soul from a conflict of 
desires, pp. 107 ff. 
4 5 8 The arguments developed through the present thesis have tried to give foundation to this 
correspondence between the Republic and the Symposium, already suggested by Cornford (1950). 
4 5 9 See above Chapter 1,3. Diotima/Socrates' speech. The truest and best eYKCDUiov to Eros: 
Eros as <|>iA.6ao<|)OS, pp. 44 ff. 
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philosopher, who develops and strengthens reason's desire for truth wil l be able to 
attain, as far as possible for a human being, the real good universally desired and 
to procreate "authentic virtue", insofar as the attainment of justice and a ful l 
acquisition of the other virtues -moderation and bravery- requires knowledge of 
what the good is for an individual as well as for society, founded on the Good.4 6 0 
In other words the attainment of the good universally desired requires wisdom and 
the philosopher is the only one that looks for it. 
By contrast, in individuals like the lover of wealth or the lover of honour who are 
dominated by their appetites or their desire for victory, reason cannot work on its 
own, achieve knowledge and establish what the real good is. Under these 
circumstances the XOYICJXIKOV is obliged to examine things in the light of goals 
alien to it (the satisfaction of the appetites or of the 'spirited' part) and in contact 
with what is changeable so that knowledge of what is really good cannot be 
attained.461 Thus, although these human beings also desire the real good, they are 
not able to attain it because of their lack of knowledge. They, being at different 
degrees of distance from it, have their lives directed to goals other than the real 
good, like business or physical training. 
In the case of the tyrant, his rational aspect has completely deteriorated and his 
soul is governed by a 'drone' epcoi; which protects unnecessary appetites {Rep. 
9.572e5-573a2), weakens the 0u|iO£i8e<;, corrupts reason and takes him in the 
opposite direction to the real good. This would be the case of someone like 
Alcibiades who, in spite of his natural talent, has unfortunately developed a life 
dominated by unrestrained appetites and a desire for worldly renown in such a 
4 6 0 See above Chapter 2, Section III, 2.4.Coincidence of the just man and the lover of the truth 
foundations of individual and social good on the Good, pp. 227 ff.. 
4 6 1 See above Chapter 2, Section II, 3..3. Reason as the organon of judgement, pp. 180 ff.. 
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way that he is not able to follow Socrates and change his life according to his 
better instincts -desires.462 
However, the currents of desire other than reason can be appropriately trained in 
such a way that the rational part is at least not totally corrupted and the person 
attains as a second best a sort of virtuous life but without knowledge (since reason 
does not operate at a sufficiently high level and cannot establish what the real 
good is). 4 6 3 Thus, in some cases, a lover of wealth -dominated by his appetites-
might be able, nevertheless, to have only useful, productive appetites and keep 
them within appropriate limits. In the ideal city of the Republic this would be the 
case of the class of the traders who, though not being capable of being guardians 
and, even less, philosopher rulers, can, nevertheless, positively contribute to the 
existence of justice in the nbXiC, and be themselves just, so far as this is possible 
for this kind of human being.4 6 4 Similarly individuals who, like those described in 
the Symposium, devote themselves to their sexual appetites but keep them at the 
4 6 2 See above Chapter 1, 4.3. Ruinous love: Alcibiades, pp. 98 ff. Alcibiades' final betrayal of the 
Athenians that led him to his tragic end is a good example of how even one of the bravest Athenian 
generals was finally able to have his 'spirited' part weakened by virtue of the growth of the 
unnecessary appetites. This event is not mentioned in the Symposium as the dramatic date of 
Agathon's party must be placed before these events. However, Plato might count on Alcibiades' 
final, tragic fall being vividly present in the mind of his audience. 
4 6 3 As shown above in Chapter 2, Section II, 1.3.2. Inappropriate education of the appetites, 
pp. 143 ff., the evolutionary description of the types of unjust lives made in Books 8 and 9 of the 
Republic shows that even timocratic and oligarchic individuals have an unstable psychological 
structure which might easily develop into a tyrannical condition. Nevertheless, in the case of the 
merchants and soldiers of the ideal state the organization of the whole state in the direction of the 
real good should help to keep their leading currents of desire within the appropriate limits. (On the 
influence of society on the classes of the traders and guardians see Lear (1992)). Otherwise, Plato's 
ideal just state would not be really just. 
4 6 4 The Republic focuses on the education of the future philosopher-rulers so that they may become 
just and wise in order to govern the city and make it just. However, the psychological and 
sociological characteristics of the other two classes, which are also part of the just state -the traders 
and the soldiers-, can be inferred. 
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service of biological procreation and the perpetuation of the species have their 
epco£ roughly orientated towards the real good, although they wil l be never 
capable, as the philosopher is, of a maximum and permanent attainment of i t . 4 6 5 
Likewise a lover of honour might have the ambition for victory and fame of his 
'spirited' part appropriately trained and rightly orientated so that reason, though 
not developed, is at least not enfeebled and annihilated (in fact maybe even 
supported by right beliefs) and his appetites are kept under control. Both the 
soldiers of the ideal state in the Republic who bravely and justly defend the city 
and those who productively focus their lives on the attainment of honour so that 
they perform brave deeds and leave behind valuable cultural productions, in virtue 
of their desire for fame, would be a good example of this possibility. However, 
even when these people have their leading currents of desire -their love of 
appetites or their love of honour- orientated in the best way possible, they lack the 
infallibility about what is good that only wisdom can provide and, thus, they just 
attain a sort of virtue -"an image of it"- given that their moderate lives, brave 
actions or cultural productions are not founded on and 'tied' to knowledge. 
4 6 5 The philosopher is the only person who is permanently able to produce good deeds. The rest of 
the people only produce the good occasionally -for example, when they are biologically 
procreating, if dominated by their appetites, or performing a virtuous action, writing not a 
knowledgeable but at least, occasionally, a useful law, if ruled by their desire for honour. This fully 
agrees with the idea expressed at Rep. 6.505a-d: the good is universally desired but, unless the 
person possesses knowledge of what the good is, he/she only attains the good at times and 
randomly. 
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2. The erotic ascent of the Symposium as a sketch of the programme of earlier 
and higher education in the Republic 
The second question that remains unanswered in the Symposium is what the stages 
of the erotic ascent would more specifically refer to. A certain correspondence 
between the erotic ascent of the Symposium and the dialectical journey of the 
philosopher exemplified through the image of the line and the allegory of the cave 
in Books 6 and 7 of the Republic has often been pointed out.4 6 6 However, it has 
been less noticed that the scala amoris is actually a sketch of the whole 
programme of earlier and higher education in the Republic,**'1 which consists in an 
appropriate training of the desires of the three parts of the soul so that reason's 
desire for the truth and the real good -i.e. Eros (j)iX,6ao(()0(;- rules and attains 
maximum development. 
2.1. Earlier education: training of the sources of motivation in order to 
develop acquaintance with and understanding of physical and ethical beauty 
in general 
According to Symp. 210dl-212a7 the erotic ascent starts when the person "initiated 
in the mysteries of love", being young, feels attracted to the beauty of bodies. At this 
first stage he/she should learn to appreciate physical beauty in general468 -developing, 
in this way, a sort of aesthetic understanding- and to dismiss sexual intercourse, with 
the result that he is only interested only in the procreation of "beautiful discourses". 
4 6 6 See for example Kahn (1987). 
4 6 7 It has already pointed out the coincidence between the acquisition of familiarity with aesthetical 
and moral beauty at the end of Book 3 and the first two stages of the erotic ascent in the 
Symposium (See ch. 9 of Raven (1965), pp. 119-130). I hope to have given some new support to 
this idea insofar as I have tried to show how through earlier education the sources of motivation of 
the young guardians are trained in such a way that this acquaintance with what is good and 
beautiful can be achieved at the end of it. 
4 6 8 See Symp. 211c3-4 : dno evoq em 8\)o KCU &KO 8ix3iv em Jtdvtoc tot KaXa 
a<h\i<xvx.... 
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The next stage is 6t7r,o KOCA-OOV <7co(j.dxcov em xa tcaXa £ 7 U T T | 8 £ ' U | j . a ' c a (Symp. 
211c4-5). At this level the person learns to value the beauty of souls more than 
beauty of bodies and acquires a general understanding of the beauty of laws and 
pursuits which make human beings better. In Books 2 and 3 of the Republic the 
appropriate method -i.e. 6p06<; way of being initiated (Symp. 210a2)- for the 
development of attraction to and comprehension of aesthetic and moral beauty in 
general is substantially explained.469 
In the period of primary instruction470 the young guardians have their sources of 
motivation rightly orientated and limited with the result that the way is paved for 
reason's leadership. The desires of the irrational parts -the EniBv[Lr\xiKOV and the 
GuiioeiSeq- are trained mainly through habituation. The stream of the appetites such 
as hunger, thirst or greediness, which is by nature a powerful stream with a tendency 
to overdevelop, is kept within the limits of what is necessary through an appropriate 
training (for example, an appropriate diet Rep. 3.403e8ff.; Rep. 8.559allff.; 
provision of no more than a minimum material equipment Rep. 3.415e6ff.), so that it 
does not drag reason's stream into its channel and so interfere with its search for the 
truth and the real good. The aggressiveness of the 'spirited' part is developed through 
activities like physical training or/and hunting (Rep. 3.410b5-8; 8.549a3-7) but 
orientated in a specific way with the result that it makes that person resist against the 
pull of the appetites (Rep. 3.413clff.; 4.442b-c), fight only against the enemies of the 
city (Rep. 2.375b9-c4) and never give up his right convictions (Rep. 3.412d-e3). In 
this way it becomes an 'ally' of reason's pursuits and adds its current of desire to the 
stream which runs towards wisdom and the good. As regards the rational part itself, 
|i,oucriKTl educates its love of wisdom (and simultaneously has an indirect positive 
effect on the habituation of the other two parts by providing appropriate examples 
4 6 9 See Chapter 1, 3.4.2. The erotic ascent: stages previous to the contemplation of beauty 
itself, pp. 71 ff.. 
4 7 0 On early education in the Republic see Chapter 2, Section III, 1. Primary education, pp. 204 
ff.. 
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and patterns of moderation and courage). In this way right beliefs are acquired, 
though in an unreflective way, as well as a certain affinity with the unchangeable, 
which is related to what is real and true. The final result of this earlier education of 
the young guardians' sources of motivation clearly overlaps with the first two levels 
of the erotic ascent of the Symposium. Their love of wisdom has been developed in 
such a way that the young guardians are now acquainted with and have unconsciously 
learnt to identify what is really good and beautiful and graceful (Rep. 3.401b8-d3). 
More specifically, the young guardians have become able to recognize the beauty of 
bodies and to esteem it only when it is attached to the beauty of souls (Rep. 3.402d), 
dismissing sexual intercourse with beautiful partners (Rep. 3.403a-b). In addition, 
they have become familiar with beautiful habits and pursuits and able to recognize 
universal characteristics of virtues in individual instances. Thus, earlier education in 
general and ( lODaiKf] in particular trains the currents of desire of an individual in 
such a way that it increases within the young guardians their love of beauty (cf. xoc 
xov KaXov epcoxiKd, Rep. 3.403c6-7) in close parallelism with what is shown at 
the first two stages of the scala amoris. 
2.2. First stage of higher education: comprehending the beauty of beautiful 
sciences 
The next stage in the erotic ascent of the Symposium consists in developing 
knowledge of the beauty of sciences -drco xcov E7tiXT|5e'i)|j.dxcov em xd K O C A X X 
|0 .a9f] | iaxa, (Symp. 211c5-6)- and procreating beautiful discourses and 
outstanding thoughts out of inspiration from this beauty (Symp. 210d3-6).471 This 
understanding implies the lover's ability to leave behind more radically than in the 
previous stages a comprehension of beauty based on beautiful particular instances 
such as a handsome adolescent, a fine-looking man or even a beautiful pursuit 
(210dl-3). As the expression ev (|)iXoao(|>ia (Symp. 210d6) suggests, this phase 
4 7 1 See Chapter 1, 3.4.2. The erotic ascent: stages previous to the contemplation of beauty 
itself, pp. 71 ff. 
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seems to be more philosophical than the previous stages. Which sciences these are 
and how this understanding is developed subsequently to the previous stages 
remains unexplained in the Symposium. On this point the Republic also provides a 
solid explanation. 
Only those among the young guardians who have successfully passed the final 
tests of their earlier education are selected to begin the programme of higher 
education, given that only in their case is there a guarantee that the appetites wi l l 
not interfere and the 'spirited' part wil l in fact collaborate with reason's search for 
the truth and the real good. Moreover those who have successfully passed have 
developed acquaintance with aesthetic and moral beauty in general as well as with 
unchangeableness and their reason possesses right beliefs, albeit without rational 
foundations. They are now ready to develop a more properly philosophical 
comprehension so that they become able to distinguish what is unchangeable in 
and common to multiple cases from what is changeable and multiple, to reason 
about unchangeable entities such as mathematical objects (7.527d) and, thus, to 
leave further and further behind an understanding based on particular, concrete 
entities.472 
In other words - i n the terms of the famous passage at the end of Book 5- their earlier 
education has prepared them to become philosophers or lovers of the truth, i.e. 
people ready to believe in (vo|ai£eiv) Forms.473 For example, in very similar terms to 
the erotic ascent of the Symposium, they are keen to accept the existence of Beauty 
itself, and able to follow someone who tries to guide them to the knowledge of it 
(differently from the man who just believes in beautiful things, 5.476c3) and, then, to 
distinguish beauty itself from the things that participate in it and vice versa (5.478c9-
On higher education in the Republic see Chapter 2, Section III, 2. Higher education: The 
development of the of the lover of the truth and of the just man through the higher 
education, pp. 214 ff.. 
4 7 3 See Chapter 2, Section III, 2.2. The upward "conversion" of the soul according to the end 
of Book 5: being a philosopher or lover of the truth and the real good, pp. 219 ff.. 
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d4). In this way they leave behind the intermediate (|4.exa|i)) state (between ayvoia 
and knioxi]\L7\) of mere 86£ct (5.478d5-12) in which the majority of the 
(j)iA,o864oi474 remain because they are attached to beautiful sensible particulars 
(5.476b4-8). They are in a new state of mind -<f>iXocJO(|>ia. This epistemological state 
wil l presumably be, like §6£a , a [LExa^v state of mind. However, there is a crucial 
difference: the philosopher believes in the existence of the Forms and, thus, craves 
for and is enamoured of wisdom and knowledge (5.475bll-c8) in such a way that, 
motivated by this passion, he may approach beauty itself and contemplate it 
(5.476c2-d4). Correspondingly in the Symposium Eros is a ^.exa^i) in the sense of 
being a 8cti|icov and tyikoGotyoc,, i.e. not just an intermediate state between 
ct j iaBia and cotyux but actually an intermediary, i.e. a force which is able to take 
and link us to the god-like state of device (see 202blff. and 204blff.). This 
philosophical state of mind may also be described from the point of view of its 
cognitive contents as 6p9f| 86£cc.475 
This ability to distinguish what unites and is common to multiple things is 
fundamentally gained by the future philosopher-rulers through the study of the 
mathematical sciences -arithmetic (7.522c5-526c7), geometry (7.526c8-527cll), 
stereometry (7.528a6-e2), astronomy (7.527dl-a5; 7.528e3-530c4) and harmonics 
(7.530c4-531c8)- according to a specific method -i.e. correctly (bpGcoQ, 
Symp.210a2).475 Thus this kind of learning helps the soul to move away from 
visible, concrete instances, working with reason in its search for what is beautiful 
and good (see 7.531c6-7). Simultaneously these "beautiful" sciences provide 
foundations for the rest of the arts (XE%vai) (7.522c5-9) that deal with the world 
4 7 4 6.480a6. 
4 7 5 See Symp. 202al-10; also Rowe (2001), Sier and here Chapter 1,3.2.1.4. 
like the bpQr\ 66£oc (202a), pp. 52 ff. 
a) Eros is ixexa^i) 
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of generation, i.e. the kind of artistic production with which the guardians were in 
contact during their earlier education. The final result of this phase of education 
wil l evidently be the attainment of an understanding of the unity and connection of 
all these sciences (7.531c9-d4) and the comprehension of a beauty different from 
and higher than the visible one (as is clear in the case of astronomy, see 7.529c7-
d l ) . 
2.3. Final step of higher education: contemplation of Beauty and the Good 
There is more or less unanimous agreement about the coincidence between the 
final step of the erotic ascent of the Symposium -the contemplation of Beauty 
itself- and the contemplation of the Good by the dialectician, represented in the 
Republic in the image of the line as the released prisoner gazing at the sun in the 
allegory of the cave, and understanding reality on the basis of a principle which 
does not require further foundations. However, it is necessary to emphasize that 
neither text is a simple repetition of the other and that we in fact need the Republic 
once again in order to clarify what in the Symposium remains unexplained. 
As shown above, Socrates deliberately puts his reflections about Eros into the 
mouth of the enigmatic figure of a wise priestess Diotima in such a way that the 
understanding of what Eros/kpcOQ truly is (i.e. a fyikbcofyoc,) and especially of his 
maximum development through the erotic ascent is presented as a mystery to 
which only few people are able to gain access.477 Moreover, although Beauty itself 
is extensively characterized as independent, in its beauty, of the limitations which 
its instantiations presuppose, the access to the Beautiful itself, if, in fact, someone 
ever happened to attain this kind of knowledge, is described as a revelation of 
something outstanding, glorious (210e4-5) and divine (211e3), which surpasses 
4 7 6 See Chapter 2, Section III, 2.3. Maximum development of reason's stream through the 
programme of higher education in mathematics and dialectic: being a fully-developed 
philosopher or lover of the truth, pp. 223 ff.. 
4 7 7 See Chapter 1, 3.1. Diotima as Socrates' mask, pp. 44 ff.. 
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anything achieved at the previous stages but whose exact nature is not determined. 
What exactly Beauty itself is supposed to be, what its relation to the previous 
levels of beauty is and why what is really good for us and is universally desired 
-i.e. true virtue- is achieved through procreation in it stays as a veiled secret for 
the reader as well as for the fictional audience.478 
Although only the personal experience of making the whole dialectical journey 
could provide definite knowledge about what kind of thing might happen if we 
ever contemplated the Beautiful itself, the Republic gives us some keys for 
understanding this mystery. Here Socrates, being in different fictional 
circumstances from the convivial situation of the Symposium, has more to say and 
makes more detailed developments.479 After being trained through the programme 
of earlier education and studies in mathematical sciences, the dialectician strives 
after the discovery of an avxmoQexoc; dpxTl, an dp^T] of a kind that does not 
need further foundations and simultaneously provides appropriate grounds for the 
previous levels of understanding. This kind of principle is the Good which, like 
the sun, is cause of existence (Rep. 6.509b6-10) and understanding (Rep. 6.508d4-
e6) as well as ethical principle, insofar as it is the metaphysical foundation of the 
individual and social good (Rep. 6.504c9-505a4, see especially Rep. 505a2-4). If, 
as shown above, the first three stages of the scala amor is of the Symposium clearly 
sketched the primary and the mathematical education of the philosopher-rulers, 
the moment of access to Beauty itself has naturally to refer to finding something 
like an dvmoGetOQ dp%f). As seen above, the beautiful in the Symposium must 
be an aspect of the good and, in fact, the Republic suggests that to contemplate the 
reality of the Good is also to contemplate what Beauty and Justice more 
authentically are (Sid TO xdA,T|0fi eoopccKevai KaX,cov xe K a i Siicaicov KOCI 
dya9o3v Ttepi, 7.520c5-6), the Good surpassing in knowledge and the truth in 
4 7 8 See Chapter 1, 3.43.1. The Idea of Beauty itself, pp. 75 ff.. 
4 7 9 See Chapter 2, Section HI, 2.3. Maximum development of reason's stream through the 
programme of higher education in mathematics and dialectic: being a fully-developed 
philosopher or lover of the truth, pp. 223 ff.. 
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beauty (&|j.Ti%avov K&XXoq... ei eniaxi\\ir\v |iev KOCI oiA/r]0£iav raxpexei-, 
aired 8' imep xavia K&XA,ei eaxiv, 6.509a6-7). So the contemplation of 
Beauty itself in the Symposium -contemplation achieved through the steps of the 
erotic ascent which are a sketch of the programme of earlier and higher education-
wil l imply the discovery of something like the Good and also be both ontological 
principle, making all things beautiful beautiful, and also gnoseological principle, 
explaining why beautiful things are beautiful. In this way the description of 
Beauty itself can be reinterpreted so that it becomes independent of its instances, 
not simply by being what is common to them -like an Aristotelian universal- but 
more precisely as being their cause of existence and so ontologically superior to 
them. This also explains the need of the previous erotic stages as toils necessary 
for arriving at this final phase: an experience of being in actual contact with this 
kind of principle is not easily available but requires a sustained effort through a 
whole life, i f we are to understand the beauty and perfection firstly of cultural 
activities and then of the mathematical sciences, so that we may finally attain a 
comprehension of what makes everything beautiful and perfect. The Republic also 
brings some light to the connection between procreation in beauty and attainment 
of the real good universally desired, as well to the specific relationship between 
contemplation of Beauty itself and procreation of true virtue suggested in the 
Symposium. Wherever we feel attracted to beauty and desire to procreate in it, we 
in some way approach, through this attraction, what we all desire -the real good-, 
as beauty is an aspect of the good. If, motivated by this erotic desire for beauty, we 
are appropriately directed to erotic matters and ever contemplate Beauty itself and 
procreate out of inspiration from it, our deeds would be authentically virtuous and 
good as they wi l l be founded on knowledge of the Good, this wisdom being the 
only means to fu l l and sustained achievement of the other virtues such as courage, 
moderation and justice at an individual and at a political level. 4 8 0 Thus, a human 
being, when procreating true virtue in Beauty itself, would attain, as far as 
possible, the real good universally desired. 
4 8 0 See Chapter 2, Section III, 2.3.Coincidence of the just man and the lover of the truth 
foundations of individual and social good on the Good, pp. 227 ff.. 
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3. Consummation of the desire for the truth: a god-like immortality for the 
philosopher in life and after death 
Lastly, we can use Book 10 of the Republic to solve another puzzle in the 
Symposium: that passage at at Symp. 212a5-7 about the god-like immortality 
attainable by the philosopher.481 
As already shown,482 Socrates/Diotima fundamentally refers to a sort of 
immortality in life which comes from leaving behind some kind of production 
through which a person can go on existing vicariously. This immortality has 
basically two forms: biological procreation, i.e. generating a living creature similar 
to oneself so that continuation of the species is achieved; and cultural procreation, 
i.e. producing works of art or virtuous deeds through which immortal fame and 
survival in the memory of others is achieved. Immortality by procreation of a 
higher range of importance -procreation of true virtue and not just of "images" of 
it- is open to the philosopher who has completed the whole dialectical journey 
insofar as, being in contact with Beauty itself and so having knowledge of the 
Good, he becomes the only person able, continuously and knowingly, to produce 
acts of authentic virtue. 4 8 3 In this way he becomes as close as is possible for a 
human being to the permanent possession of the real good which is universally 
desired. Nevertheless, all these forms of immortality through procreation -
including the procreation of true virtue that is available to the philosopher- fall 
short insofar as what everybody desires is to possess the good for ever and, 
alongside it, a god-like immortality after death (i.e. being like the gods always 
4 8 1 On this same line of interpretation see O'Brien (1984), pp.198-202. He compares Symp. 212a2-
7 with Republic 10 (especially 612e8-614a8; 621c) and heroic mythology. 
4 8 2 See above Chapter 1,3.3.3.2. Different ways of attaining vicarious immortality and, 
alongside it, a certain possession of the good: procreation KCtTa t o a c o j i a and procreation 
KOCTOI xr\v \yx>%i\v, pp. 66 ff.. 
4 8 3 For a similar interpretation see ch. 18 of Irwin (1995), pp. 298-317. 
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absolutely the same, which is, of course, impossible for human beings), which wi l l 
guarantee this eternal possession of the good. This possibility, hinted at for the 
philosopher at Symp. 212a5-7, is more extensively explained in Book 10 of the 
Republic.™ 
As seen above, the eschatological myth of Republic 10 deals with the immortal 
destiny of the soul according to its justice or injustice and the development or lack 
of development of its desire for the truth during its last incarnate l i fe . 4 8 5 In 
accordance with the theory of periodical reincarnation used in the myth the 
immortality of the soul is presented not simply as some kind of existence after 
death but as a continuous existence through successive states of disembodiment 
and reincarnation inscribed in the cosmic justice of a mathematically organized 
universe. The thousand-year punishments or rewards of the soul in its discarnate 
condition depend on the justice or injustice of its previous life. The choice by the 
soul of its new incarnate life is determined by the development of its desire for 
truth and knowledge of the Good. Thus, people who have been philosophers and 
attained as much knowledge as they could of the Good and so possession of the 
good, are not only rewarded with a thousand years of delights of celestial 
happiness in their discarnate existence (like those human beings who have 
accidentally had a virtuous sort of life): afterwards, they wil l also rightly choose a 
just kind of life, given that they have knowledge of the Good. In consequence, 
they are the only ones who can achieve the maximum continuous possession of 
the real good available to a human being. 
In addition to this, as I have tried to show above,486 the myth of Book 10 also 
admits of a synchronic interpretation according to which the story of Er would 
4 8 4 See Chapter 1, 3.4.33. The Idea of Beauty as ethical principle: wisdom and virtue, pp. 79 
ff. and 3.4.3.5. Immortality through procreation in Beauty and eschatological godlike 
immortality for the philosopher, pp. 83 ff.. 
4 8 5 See Chapter 2, Section IV: The eschatological myth of Republic 10, pp. 233 ff.. 
4 8 6 See Chapter 2, Section TV, 2.3.2. Synchronic understanding of the myth: temporary 
achievement now and here of a god-like condition, pp. 254 ff.. 
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also be hinting at the possibility of temporarily attaining some kind of divine 
immortality in life i f the lover of truth accesses the knowledge of the Good. The 
Symposium would encourage this interpretation insofar as it suggests that the 
philosopher, by developing his desire for the truth and the real good, achieves in 
this life a sort of god-like immortality which consists in constant procreation, in 
Beauty, of true virtue and thus, in a way, possesses the good universally desired. 
But in addition to this, according to the eschatological myth of the Republic, his 
god-like incarnate life as a philosopher allows him to hope that not only through 
his embodied but also in his disembodied existence, he might be able to partake 
like the gods in a permanent ownership of the good for the whole of eternity. A l l 
this, provided that he continues choosing a philosophical way of life, albeit with 
the unavoidable limitations of his human condition.4 8 7 
7 According to some interpreters the Phaedo would also refer to the 'death' of the philosopher in 
two different ways -the actual/real death, with which he attains a permanent contact with the 
Forms, and also -and mainly- to an 'initiatory' death in life (see Eggers Lan (1989), p. 28). 
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EPILOGUE 
Here I have limited my argument about Plato's theory of desire to the Symposium 
and the Republic. Nevertheless, I think that a similar approach could also be 
applicable to other dialogues. The Phaedo, for example, has more to say in 
relation to different kinds of immortality available to us according to what we 
have devoted ourselves to, particularly focusing on the god-like immortality open 
to the philosopher as a result of the development of his desire for truth. As for the 
Phaedrus, the myth of the winged-soul, though clearly referring to a post-mortem, 
discarnate existence of the soul in the framework of an ordered universe, is 
simultaneously an ethical allegory of our present condition and of what kind of 
Eros can lead our lives here and now. Thus, even more obviously than in the case 
of the eschatological myth of Republic 10, a diachronic and synchronic 
understanding of this myth of the Phaedrus seems to be appropriate. 
I hope that I will be able to give further development to these lines of 
interpretation in my future research. 
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